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A hunting scene from Chiseme cave in Mutoko 
communal land , Zimbabwe. The rock.art at this 
single site is rich in hunting scenes and unusually 
portrayed human and animal figures. 
(Map reference: 1732 A4: 394.835) 
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"In scientific analysis there is much data and 
little action, whereas in everyday thinking there 
is much action but little data. Action is the main 
purpose of everyday thinking. It is not a matter 
of accumulating as much knowledge as possible 
but of coming up with just enough knowledge to 
tell you what to do next." 
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Preface 
This dissertation complements the coursework for the degree of Master of Science in 
Environmental Science. The research project involved a five month period of individual field 
work in Zimbabwe and subsequent analysis and preparation. The project's aim was to 
demonstrate practical application of theoretical concepts to a real life issue in the context of 
a developing country, for use by the Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management (DNPWLM). The present document presents a synthesis of the approach, the 
methods used, the results, and recommendations for the DNPWLM to take these results 
forward. Included in the appendices are additional data, for the purposes of documentation 
and future research. 
The idea to study the licensing system used for citizen hunting in the Charara/Makuti area, 
and to consider alternative licensing systems, originated from discussions with Rowan Martin 
in the DNPWLM. For this opportunity and challenge, I am extremely grateful to him. In 
addition, I am indebted to the Department's Director, Willi Nduku, and Deputy Director, 
George Pangetti, for their permission to undertake this research in the Parks and Wild Life 
Estate in Zimbabwe. It is hoped that this research combines an appropriate mixture cif 
scientific and practical thinking to stimulate decision-making and action. 
Many people inside and outside the Department were consulted during the study. They are 
listed separately in the acknowledgements (page 250). Information, when available, was 
always willingly supplied. The cooperation of all persons is greatly appreciated, for no 
research of this kind may be concluded successfully without it. 
I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the following persons for their generous, and often 
personal, contributions during the course of this research: 
Lindsay McNiell for the statistical consultancy and programming. 
Tony Leiman, Trudy Hartzenberg, Tim Dunn and Heather Cambell for their respective 
expertise and valuable advice. Andy Vinnicombe for his cartographic skills. 
Peter Seymour-Smith and Norman Travers for sharing some of their long-standing 
experiences as hunters. 
John and Sheina Butler, Charles and Margi Grobbelaar and their families for the hospitality 
of C-camp in the Rifa hunting area. 
Michael Chimbangu who acted as a spontaneous and invaluable guide in the Charara Safari 
Area, and whose knowledge of roads and terrain made two-wheel progress by road at 
all possible. 
My mother for her patience and time in transcribing hunter's preferences. 
Gill Mitchell, Linda Vanherk, Simon Goudie who acted as sounding boards for many ideas. 
Niklaus Maurhofer, Jane Froggart, and Rob Austin for their patience, and their solutions to 
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Use of Gender 
When referring to hunters, hunting, and hunting activities the generic "he" is used throughout 
this report. This use of gender reflects historical evidence that there have been few women 
subsistence hunters (Ardrey, 1976; Coon, 1971; Lee and De Vore, 1968), and more recent 
results of a survey by Reilly (1987), where fewer than 1 % of sport hunters who responded 
were women. 
Format 
The Harvard method of citation used in this report was based mainly on the guide by 
Thurabian (1982). Where deviations from this convention were necessary, the author opted 
for consistency and accuracy. For example, page numbers are sometimes included for exact 
referencing after the date, as in Rae, et al., 1981: 64-67. Printing was done in postscript 
12.5 point Times Roman typeface. To improve readability, all figures, maps, tables and 
appendices are cross-referenced by their page number, in addition to their consecutive 












The research was undertaken to determine first, how well the hunting resources were 
allocated by a lottery to Zimbabwe citizen hunters in the Charara/Makuti study area. 
A second investigation determined whether the opportunity costs of this allocation method 
could be justified in the context of Zimbabwe's current socio-economic development 
priorities. The Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) is the 
government agency responsible for the management of Zimbabwe's protected areas and 
wildlife. 
In a first assessment, the lottery allocation was investigated at the microeconomic level 
(individual persons). The efficiency with which all hunts were allocated to hunting applicants 
was assessed assuming that resource managers aimed to allocate all hunts available in the 
Charara/Makuti study area in an equitable manner. The findings were, that: in 1991 the lottery 
was very inefficient; only 55 percent of available hunts were allocated successfully; after a 
second re-allocation using a first-come-first-served method, the DNPWLM succeeded in 
allocating a further 12 percent of available hunts successfully; and by the end of the hunting 
season, 67 percent of all available hunts had benefitted some citizen hunters. The DNPWLM 
and applicants incurred considerable costs due to this inefficient allocation method. It was 
concluded that lack of personal choice for appiicants due to the design of the lottery system 
was the single major cause for these results. 
The equality, or fairness, of the lottery allocation was then investigated. It was assumed that 
the lottery allocation was intended to be random for all applicants. Each applicant's 
probability of winning a hunting opportunity in the Charara/Makuti study area was simulated. 
The findings were, that: in 1991 the lottery allocation was very inequitable; it allocated hunts 
to those applicants with the greatest willingness to pay, rather than randomly with the same 
probability of winning for all applicants; an arbitrary allocation rule was applied by the 
DNPWLM to determine which specific hunt each lottery winner won. This (impersonal) 
allocation rule was a major cause for dissatisfaction and for lack of commitment on the part 
of hunters to take their hunts up. It was concluded that lottery systems did exist that were 
more equitable and could accommodate applicant's personal hunting preferences. Such 
lotteries are complex and costly to administer. In view of these opportunity costs alone, the 
question was posed whether a lottery allocation method was justified for the Charara/Makuti 
study area in the name of equality for very few Zimbabwe citizen hunters. 
The second assessment investigated opportunity costs of the lottery system at the 
macroeconomic level of Zimbabwe's economy. The lottery allocation was compared to other 
systems that allocate sport hunting in Zimbabwe. Findings for the lottery system in the 
Charara/Makuti study area were, that: the lott~ry system had the lowest P.rices; the lottery 
system had the least numbers of people who benefitted directly from the hunting activities; 
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Zimbabwe dollars and foregone foreign exchange revenue; by forgoing foreign exchange 
revenue significant multiplier effects for the Zimbabwe economy of this valuable economic 
resource were foregone, amounting to 4 Zimbabwe dollars activity for every Zimbabwe dollar 
of foreign exchange foregone. Further, it was concluded that: by not returning any revenue 
from sport hunting in protected areas to the DNPWLM, the present institutional arrangements 
exacerbate the opportunity costs; this revenue is thus not invested in conservation in the 
Charara/Makuti area, or in the DNPWLM to promote conservation. Jobs are not created, and 
bio-diversity and park management goals are severely restricted. Instead, all revenue at 
present is delivered to central treasury in the Zimbabwe Government. 
By determining the value of foreign exchange, it was concluded that even if Zimbabwe 
citizen hunters were allocated hunting using an auction at market prices (in Zimbabwe 
dollars) in competition with foreign hunters and safari operators, Zimbabwe citizens are 
directly subsidized by about 65 percent at the macroeconomic level by the state at 1991 prices 
and exchange rates. The Zimbabwe dollar's weakness versus foreign currencies is a major 
factor for these economic costs. Significant economic activity and job-creation opportunities 
(multiplier effects) would, in this case, be forgone indirectly as well. 
The advantages of using a competitive auction system to allocate sport hunting at market-
determined prices to all participants ( citizen hunters, foreign hunters, safari operators) are 
many, including: that the market price determines the proportion of hunting resources 
allocated to foreign and citizen hunters; that the opportunities for participants in the safari 
hunting industry to obtain big game - a factor limiting profitability, growth and new entrants 
into the industry - are increased; that the safari hunting industry will become more 
competitive. 
The main recommendations for action indicated by the research include: 
• The DNPWLM should clarify basic allocation principles for land-use in protected 
areas. Conflicts between principles of resource allocation that apply inside (non-
economic) and those that apply outside protected areas ( economic) should be removed. 
• 
• 
Unqualified intentions to subsidize Zimbabweans should be avoided, and the cost of 
such actions quantified and put in relation to foregone benefits from alternatives. 
Policy on citizen hunting should be reviewed. The policy for the Charara/Makuti 
hunting area should be reviewed, objectives should drawn up in terms of a park plan, 
and particular emphasis should be placed on financial sustainability of actions. 
Pending removal of the tsetse-control fence could alter land-use patterns and 
conservation management for the area after 1994. 
• Non-consumptive uses of the Charara/Makuti study area should be especially 
emphasized, and sport hunting of quality trophy animals integrated. Consumptive and 
non-consumptive land-uses should be integrated to benefit the region surrounding 
Charara/Makuti study area. Multiple land-use options would more fully utilize the 
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Contractual partnerships together with the private sector could enhance facilities and 
services for the hunting and non-hunting public, without posing any additional 
financial burden on the state. 
Collaborative and creative ways need to be found to free the DNPWLM from 
institutional arrangements that restrict the agency from fulfilling its responsibilities to 
adequately protect, research, and secure the country's best conservation and 
development benefits with the bio-diversity resources the agency is entrusted with. 
As a matter of priority, present institutional arrangements between central government 
and the DNPWLM are inimical to wise resource use, to the promotion of conservation 
and development in the Charara/Makuti study area; the arrangements should be 
altered. As a basic principle, all revenue from protected areas should be returned to 
the DNPWLM as the management agency . The agency can then account for the full 
cost of activities in each protected area with a view to achieving ecological and 
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Term indicating that hunting applicants could not choose any 
characteristics of the hunts they were applying for, due to the way 
the allocation system was designed (DNPWLM lottery system). 
Applicants applied for an option to hunt an undefined hunting 
opportunity. Compare First Hunt Preference and Next Hunt 
Preference. 
The process of collecting, organizing and analysing, interpreting 
and communicating data that are relevant to some decision. 
Compare evaluation. 
The mature male species hunted by sport hunters as the classic "big 
five" safari for their trophy value: elephant, rhinoceros1, lion, 
leopard and buffalo. Can also include hippopotamus, and 
crocodile2 • Also termed "hard-skinned animals". Compare plains 
game. 
A type of sport hunting. The licensed hunting by Zimbabwean 
citizens of plain and big game species for a combination of their 
trophy, meat, and recreational values associated with the hunting 
trip. Shooting an animal is only one part of the whole recreational 
experience. Compare citizen/safari hunting and safari hunting. 
A type of sport hunting which includes aspects of citizen hunting 
and safari hunting. Includes Zimbabwean and foreign hunters who 
hunt big game and plains game mainly for their trophy value. 
Compare citizen hunting and safari hunting. 
Any hunting activities which are run on a commercial basis, 
usually on a large scale, which serve mainly formal markets for 
venison meat. Takes place mainly in centrally planned economies 
of Europe. 
Forms of wildlife use that depend on harvesting by some means to 
generate value. Hunting, population reduction for ecological reasons 
( culling), and game farming are the main forms. Compare non-
consumptive utilization. 
Refers specifically to three species of big game hunted for their 
trophy value: elephant, lion and buffalo3• 
Any service or material item that gives people satisfaction and 
whose present or ultimate supply is limited. 
Types and amounts of certain economic goods ( eg. food, clothing, 
water, oxygen, shelter) that each of us must have to survive and 
stay healthy. Compare economic wants. 
1 Black and White Rhinoceros are a specially protected species at present, and are not on quota for sport hunting 
in Zimbabwe. 
2 The common and scientific names for species are listed in Appendix 1, page A3. 
3 As defined by the Zimbabwe Professional Hunter's and Guides Association of Zimbabwe. Safari Operators' 











Economic resource: A natural, human, or financial resource used in an economy to 
produce material goods and services. See natural resource. 
Economic wants: Economic goods that go beyond the basic economic needs. These 
wants are influenced by the customs and conventions of the society 
we live in and by our level of affluence. Compare economic needs. 
Efficiency: In economic terms, as first defined by Pareto, an allocation of 
resources is efficient if there is no other feasible allocation that will 
make someone better off, whilst making no one else worse off, 
under conditions of perfect competition (Arrow, 1983; Samuelson, 
1973). 
Equality: (or Equity) A theoretical, political, and practical problem of 
distributing resources and their benefits amongst people in society 
according to some rule. Each rule involves giving benefits to some 
individuals deemed to be deserving, at the expense of other 
individuals. Willingness to pay (wealth) is challenged as the rule 
for benefit distribution (Rae, et al., 1981). 
Evaluation: The process of weighing information. The act of including 
individual's subjective value judgements in order to weigh choices 
make a decision. Compare assessment. 
First Hunt Preference: Term indicating that hunting applicants could choose the hunt 
characteristics they were applying for by ranking their preferred 
hunts according to their personal preferences. The allocation system 
(Wyoming lottery system) was designed to consider each 
applicant's first hunt preference, then each applicant's second hunt 
preference, etc. Compare Any Hunt and Next Hunt Preference. 
Foreign exchange: Includes all currencies other than the Zimbabwe dollar (Z$). 
Hunting bag: A quota of animals, identified on a licence issued to a sport hunter 
by species, sex and number, which may be shot during a number 
of hunting days between set dates in the hunting season. The 
species in the hunting bag, eg. big game or plains game, and the 
total bag size influence the duration of the hunt, which in turn both 
affect the bag's value for the hunter. 
Institutional arrangements: Financial and administrative relationship between central 
government and its agencies. Closely linked to how much 
autonomy the agency (eg. DNPWLM) has in budget and 




Defined as an integrated administrative system to regulate hunting 
by allocating scarce resources (the supply of hunting bags) amongst 
hunters competing for an opportunity to hunt. It performs three 
main functions: pricing the hunting bags on offer, limiting the 
number of hunters demanding a hunting bag to the number 
available in each hunting area, and determining the distribution of 
revenue and benefits from hunting amongst people. 
Economic activity which is added to the size of the local, regional, 
or national economies from a project or institution. Arises from the 










Glossary xx iii 
or from services purchased from local suppliers (eg. transport) due 
to the project or institution (see Vorhies, 1992). 
Natural resource: The earth's solid surface, nutrients and minerals in the soil and 
deeper layers of the earth's crust, water, wild and domesticated 
plants and animals, air, and other resources produced by natural 
processes. 
Next Hunt Preference: Term indicating that hunting applicants could choose the hunt 
characteristics they were applying for, and rank (value) their 
choices according to their personal preferences. The allocation 
system (ZHA lottery system) was designed to consider all 
preferences of each winner, ignoring the hunt's preference ranking 
during the allocation. Compare Any Hunt and Next Hunt 
Preference. 
Non-consumptive utilization: Forms of wildlife use that do not rely on harvesting to 
generate value. Such forms include photographic safaris, walking 
safaris, game viewing and other recreational and tourist activities 
closely associated with, and dependent on, wildlife populations and 
their habitats. 
Plains game: Various antelope species hunted by sport hunters. The more 
valuable trophy animals are the rarer species, eg. sable, wildebeest, 
kudu, eland. The less valuable, more common species are impala, 
springbok, duiker and grysbok. Also termed "soft-skinned animals". 







A hunter who has attended and passed a practical and written test, 
is registered with the Department of National Parks and Wild Life 
Management in Zimbabwe, and is qualified to accompany foreign 
hunters when hunting game for remuneration. 
A professional hunter who has attended and passed additional tests 
to become an operator, is registered with the Department of 
National Parks and Wild Life Management in Zimbabwe. Qualified 
to offer hunting expeditions to foreigners commercially and to 
employ other professional hunters. 
A type of sport hunting. The licensed hunting mainly by foreigners 
who visit Zimbabwe to hunt mainly big game and valuable plains 
game species for their trophy. Often undertaken as the fee-paying 
client of a safari operator, or with the services of a professional 
hunter. Compare citizen hunting and citizen/safari hunting. 
A category of licensed hunting activities which includes citizen 
hunting, citizen/safari hunting, and safari hunting. Sport hunting 
serves the economic wants of persons hunting for trophies, venison, 
and recreational benefits. Sport hunters follow a sound ethical code 
of conduct in the pursuit of their sport. Often termed "recreational 
hunting"; a practice not followed here. Compare subsistence 
hunting. 
A category of unlicensed hunting activ1t1es which serves the 
economic needs of local communities in rural areas. 
Any part of an animal that is retained by the hunter as a sign or 































An acronym for a community based rural development programme 
in Zimbabwe, called the Communal Areas Management Programme 
For Indigenous REsources. The indigenous resource base includes 
wildlife, grazing, water and wood, but at present emphasizes 
wildlife, the economically most valuable resource. 
Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management. Also 
referred to as the "agency". Responsible for Zimbabwe's protected 
areas and wild life. 
An acronym for a policy programme adopted by the Zimbabwe 
Government, called the Economic Structural Adjustment Pro-
gramme. It aims to revitalize Zimbabwe's economic and social 
development by promoting a market economy with the support of 
the World Bank and other institutions (Zimbabwe Government, 
1990c; Zimbabwe Government, 1991b). 
Natal Parks Board. Responsible for protected areas and wildlife in 
Natal, South Africa. 
South African rand currency unit. 
United States dollar currency unit. 
World Wide Fund for Nature (formerly World Wild Life Fund) 
Zimbabwe dollar currency unit. 
Zimbabwe Hunters' Association. 
Major exchange rates for the Zimbabwe dollar 
Exchange rate in Zimbabwe 










United States dollar (USS) 
German mark (DM) 
British pound sterling (£) 
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Regulated sport hunting in Zimbabwe started as early as 1924, when the conservation agency 
made hunting of valuable African big game species available to Zimbabwe citizens and 
foreigners (see Beira, Mashonaland and Rhodesia Railways, 1924). Then, as now, Zimbabwe 
citizens paid less than foreigners to go sport hunting. One apparent reason for maintaining 
preferential access to sport hunting for Zimbabwe citizens was the controlled foreign 
exchange market, which Jed to big game hunting being marketed and sold to safari hunters 
in foreign exchange currencies by safari operators, effectively excluding local hunters. 
Another reason may be due to the legacy that conservation agencies have treated wildlife and 
protected areas as open access resources and attempted to make them accessible to a broad 
mass of people. The Zimbabwean's right to enjoy cheaper, exclusive, access to their country's 
natural resources for sport hunting has therefore been accepted. The resource allocation 
problem was seen in terms of how sport hunters - as opposed to subsistence hunters1 - could 
be supplied with suitable land and wildlife quotas for hunting. 
This approach to resource allocation is not an economic one, but a politically sanctioned and 
bureaucratically managed choice based on the assumption that resource allocations for this 
activity are "the right thing to do". The government conservation agency was automatically 
responsible for making sport hunting opportunities available on state land, and incurred the 
costs. The economics of such government decisions, that is the costs and benefits of this 
resource allocation, were not raised in the past. This dual system of preferential hunting areas 
for Zimbabweans and areas for foreign hunters has persisted right up to the present day. 
Since the advent of hunting trips organised for foreign hunters in Zimbabwe's first protected 
areas declared for this purpose early in the 1960s (Cumming, 1988), demand for big game 
hunting resources has increased, as has the supply of land devoted to wildlife utilization and 
sport hunting (Cumming, 1988; Bowler, 1992). 
A significant break with past state policy and approaches to wildlife and the conservation of 
natural areas was made during the 1960's, which was formalized in the Parks and Wild Life 
Act in 1975. The previously sole state responsibility and control for wildlife was devolved 
1 Sport hunting. the category of licensed hunting activities on which the dissertation focuses, serves the economic 
wants of persons hunting for trophies, venison, and recreational benefits. Subsistence hunting, also known as 
traditional hunting. is defined as a category of unlicensed hunting activities which serves the economic needs of local 
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to individual landowners on whose property wildlife resources existed.1 State policy officially 
endorsed economic incentives and market principles to promote conservation, utilization and 
development of wildlife by all landowners in Zimbabwe. With this policy, all categories of 
land in Zimbabwe (including protected areas that allow sport hunting) were potentially 
available for wildlife utilization and sport hunting. Landowners on all categories of land -
except protected areas - were now able to derive the full range of economic and conservation 
benefits from wildlife management on their land. 
The considerable growth of safari hunting as a commercially viable form of land-use is well 
documented (see Child, B., 1988; Bigalke, 1986). Safari hunting is recognized as an 
ecologically sustainable form of land-use. Moreover, this particular activity is also financially 
sustainable - indeed highly profitable. Sport hunting gave landowners on private and 
communal land the initial impetus to conserve and use their wildlife resources wisely, and 
is now increasingly being complemented with a broad spectrum of tourist related land-uses 
that add further ecologically and financially sustainable tiers of value (Child, B., 1988) to 
land and wildlife. 
More recently, the state also offered sport hunting to Zimbabweans at fixed prices using a 
form of lottery in the hunting areas of Charara/Makuti, the study area . Decision-makers 
intended that citizen hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area should be accessible to "all 
Zimbabweans in the middle-income bracket". The prices used to value big game hunts in this 
area are fixed, are the lowest in Zimbabwe, and are significantly lower than market prices for 
big game species. 
Against this background, and in contra-distinction to the safari hunting industry, the allocation 
of valuable big game hunting resources to Zimbabweans - defined as citizen hunting in this 
dissertation - is not based on economic principles. Whilst wildlife conservation and sport 
hunting in Zimbabwe is officially based on market principles (eg. Child and Heath, 1990), 
high resource values, and market prices to allocate resources in the most efficient manner, 
citizen hunting is valued at fixed prices far below market prices, giving resources low values, 
and allocated using different forms of lottery systems. Lottery systems were rationalized 
politically and administratively using non-economic principles such as "fairness", "equal 
access", "equal opportunity" and "a fair chance". However, available policies have failed to 
define these principles sufficiently for them to be tested objectively. The lottery methods 
employed are neither officially documented, nor are their aims and objectives clear. The 
allocation process and results of non-market lottery methods have not previously been 
analyzed according to their economic costs and benefits. 
Another policy conflict became apparent in the preliminary stages of this research concerning 
the lottery system used to allocate citizen hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area. Although 
1 Landowners were not given ownership in the legal sense, but the full usury rights for wildlife on their land, 
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the lottery system should, in · principle, allocate hunts based on some probability of being 
drawn, the particular design of the lottery system in the Charara/Makuti study area allowed 
applicants to influence their own probability of winning by purchasing unlimited numbers of 
lottery tickets (similar to many state-run lottery systems held for charity or welfare in many 
countries). The allocation by lottery appeared to be based on applicants' willingness to pay, 
not on luck. Once again this form of allocating resources differed with policy makers' stated 
intentions. 
At this point of the research, it became clear that certain basic questions were not being 
addressed in policy and management concerning the allocation of resources for Zimbabwe 
citizen hunters, probably for historical reasons, but also due to their wide-ranging implications 
and political nature. For example: 
a) What are the arguments for giving Zimbabwean sport hunters preferential (exclusive) 
access over foreigners? 
b) What does sport hunting by Zimbabwe citizens involve? Which citizens go to hunt, 
and which persons could potentially afford to hunt in this manner? 
c) Since big game sport hunting resources in Zimbabwe are very scarce, and a limiting 
factor for the safari hunting industry, their allocation for citizen hunting on any 
category of land involves opportunity costs for that landowner. Why should the 
DNPWLM allocate land and big game resources in protected areas for citizen hunting 
using the DNPWLM budget and so bear the opportunity costs, when big game 
resources and all other land categories are being managed by their respective land 
authorities for maximum economic return? 
d) Why should Zimbabwe citizens be allocated big game hunting opportunities - reco-
gnized as the most valuable sport hunting resource - at fixed government prices using 
a lottery system, rather than at market determined prices using an auction system? 
e) Since land in protected areas used for citizen hunting can principally be used for a 
wide range of alternatives instead (such as safari hunting and non-consumptive 
activities), and the size of hunting area determines the quota of animals available and 
therefore the number of hunters, what proportion of the big game hunting resources 
(quota) and the protected areas (land) should be allocated exclusively for Zimbabwe 
citizen hunting? In other words, how large must the supply of hunting opportunities 
for Zimbabwe citizens be compared to the demand for such opportunities? 
f) What quality and variety of hunting experiences and facilities should be supplied, and 
at what price? 
g) What financial, human, technical, and other resources of the DNPWLM budget for 
protected area management are to be allocated to supply citizen hunting? 
h) What additional benefits should be provided in the hunting area outside the hunting 











4 Chapter 1: I nlroduction to study 
-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:,:,:,:.;,:,:,:,:,;.:,;.-.,x,:,. . :,:.-,:,:,:,:,:,;,;,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:-:-:,:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:-:,:,:,;.:,:,:,:,;,:,:,:·:·:·:·:-:-:,;.:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:,;,:,:,:,:,:,:,:.:,:,:,:,:,:,:,;.;.:,:,:,:,:,:,;.:,:,:,:,:,;,x,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:-:·z-: .... :,:,;.;,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,;,:,:,;,.,.:,:,;,:,. ... w .. :,:,: .. ,.-,.;,:,:«,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,: 
No previous work has attempted to apply economic principles of resource allocation to citizen 
hunting on protected areas in Zimbabwe. This research addresses this lack of data and 
documentation. Existing policy and allocation methods in Zimbabwe are documented. The 
scope of this dissertation is limited to sport hunting resources that are available on state land 
designated as Zimbabwe's protected areas (Parks and Wild Life Estate). 
The lottery system in the Charara/Makuti hunting areas was suggested as the study area by 
R. Martin of the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM). The 
purpose of this allocation system is to give Zimbabwe citizens an "equal opportunity" to 
participate in big game sport hunting. The first question asked at this operational level of 
analysis was: 
• How well did the DNPWLM lottery system allocate resources for citizen hunting in 
Charara/Makuti according 'to the DNPWLM policy objectives? 
The opportunity costs of achieving objectives of so-called equal access using a fix-priced 
lottery system for citizen hunting in Zimbabwe are hitherto undocumented. A second 
comparative assessment investigates these opportunity costs for hunting resources in the study 
area. The principle question asked at the level of Zimbabwe's national economy, and in 
relation to objectives for sustainable development was: 
• What are the opportunity costs of using the present non-market and fix-priced lottery 
system in the Charara/Makuti study area to allocate resources in terms of Zimbabwe's 
national policy objectives and sustainable conservation and development? 
An aspect of particular importance concerns the possibility of earning foreign exchange from 
the hunting resources. With recent moves instituted by the Reserve Bank and the Government 
of Zimbabwe to liberalize the foreign exchange market, the opportunity costs of earning 
Zimbabwe dollar revenue from sport hunting rather than foreign exchange revenue can be 
estimated. 
This comparative analysis is of particular note for protected area resource managers and 
policy makers seeking to take decisions that are to be in tune with Zimbabwe's economic and 
social development priorities. Documents announcing Zimbabwe's economic structural 
adjustment programme (ESAP) (Zimbabwe Government, 1991b; Zimbabwe Government, 
1990c) clearly outline key areas for action, which are: earning foreign exchange by promoting 
export activity and economic investment; creating employment; reducing the Zimbabwe 
Government 's budget deficit and the national debt; reducing Zimbabwe's balance of payments 
deficit and the national foreign debt; promoting a dynamic market-oriented economy, with 
less government involvement. The documents emphasise that economic development priorities 
must take place within the limits of natural resource sustainability. 
The positive implications of a well -managed wildlife and natural resource base are important 
from an ecological, social and economic viewpoint in any country, but especially so in 
Zimbabwe. As a developing country with a fast growing population, Zimbabwe relies heavily 
on its natural, rather than its capital or human resource base, to sustain economic and social 
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1.2. Aims and objectives of the study 
The main purpose of licensing systems is to allocate resources for quality sport hunting to 
sport hunters. To achieve this for the Charara/Makuti hunting area, the following questions 
served as general aims to guide the study: 
1. What type of hunting needs to be provided to hunters? 
2. For whom should the type of hunting be provided? 
3. What are the alternatives to provide the type of hunting required? Specifically: 
• Where are the alternative land areas situated? 
• By whom are the alternatives to be administered and managed? 
4. How can the type of hunting be provided using the alternatives available? Specifically: 
• 
• 
What licensing system should be used? (price or non-price system) 
What additional services should be provided? 
5. What are the opportunity costs of these allocation decisions? 
The research centred around questions four and five. 
The study's objectives were formulated as follows: 
1.2.1. To assess the efficiency of hunt allocation to hunters by the lottery system in the 
hunting areas of Charara/Makuti for 1991. (Chapter 4, section 4.2.) 
1.2.2. To assess the equality of hunt allocation to hunters by the lottery system in the 
hunting areas of Charara/Makuti for 1991. (Chapter 4, section 4.3.) 
1.2.3. To assess comparatively the efficiency of generating revenue with price and non-price 
licensing system alternatives in Zimbabwe with wildlife and time (the hunting season) 
as the limiting factors of production. (See Chapter 5, section 5.2.) 
1.2.4. To assess comparatively the equality of benefit distribution of hunting revenue from 
price and non-price licensing system alternatives in Zimbabwe. (See Chapter 5, 
section 5.3.) 
1.2.5. To place the present allocation system used by the DNPWLM in the Charara/Makuti 
hunting areas in the context of Zimbabwe's economic and social development, in 
order to draw conclusions and recommend suitable actions on the suitability of this 
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1.3. Approach used 
An economic approach was chosen, based on market principles. The following approach was 








To document of the policies, resource allocation methods and conflicting practices 
that may exist concerning citizen hunting in Zimbabwe. (This may serve as a basis 
for decision-making, and further research.) 
To consider alternative licensing systems used for allocating hunting in Zimbabwe . 
To assess each systems' principal features (advantages and disadvantages). A 
central question is how each system addresses the trade-off of equality against 
efficiency. 
To motivate criteria to make the theoretical concepts of efficiency and equality 
operational for the assessment of licensing systems. 
To first assess the resource allocation achieved by the lottery system in the study 
area. This assessment viewed the lottery system as though it involved no 
opportunity costs. The assessment forms the case study of the of the DNPWLM 
lottery system for the Charara/Makuti study area. The resource allocation problem 
is analyzed from the perspective of the individual hunter (a microeconomic 
analysis). 
To then compare the lottery system in the study area with alternative licensing 
systems that allocate sport hunting resources in Zimbabwe in a comparative study. 
The perspective of analysis for the resource allocation problem is altered to a 
national level of Zimbabwe (a macroeconomic analysis). 
To draw conclusions for decision-makers based on the research, and recommend 
actions to be taken based on the data presented. 
To adopt a holistic approach to the resource allocation problem, and not limit 
analysis, conclusions, or recommendations to the present system used in the study 
area. Once the assessments at the microeconomic level and at the macroeconomic 
level have been concluded, overall conclusions and recommendations focus on the 
resource allocation problem in the Charara/Makuti study area, although some 
conclusions are broader and apply to the management of Zimbabwe's protected 
area resources in general. 
1.4. Sources of reference 
The investigation required the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data on the 
demand for hunting, the supply and allocation of hunting, socio-economic data, policy 
documents, personal experiences of hunters and non-hunters. Often personal interviews with 
past and present members of the DNPWLM proved to be the only source of data on many 
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The variety of methods and sources used reflects this lack of documentation: 
• Personal interviews, with: 
• Hunting administrators, park wardens, and staff of the DNPWLM in Harare and 
Chinhoyi, and at the DNPWLM offices Marongora and Kariba; 
• Hunting administrators of the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association; 
• Selected hunters and selected urban employees in Harare. 
• Archive research and primary data collection, from: 
• Licensing offices of the DNPWLM in Harare, Marongora and Kariba for hunting 
licences; 
• Research centres, Centre for Applied Social Studies, at the University of Zimbabwe 
and the WWF-Multispecies Project, Harare; 
• Auctioneers of the Zambezi valley hunts, ABC Auctions. 
• Archive research and secondary data collection, from: 
• Government departments (Ministry of Finance, Department of Veterinary Services, 
Central Statistics Office, Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe); 
• Other institutions (World Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Zimbabwe Trust, local 
government in Kariba, Zimbabwe Republic Army); 
• Department of Forestry at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. 
• Correspondence with managers of wildlife resources in various countries for 
comparative information on licensing systems and the management of wildlife for 
hunting purposes. Major sources included: 
• U.S. Fish and Game Department 
• NPB, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa; 
• Ciskei Safaris, Queenstown, Ciskei, Southern Africa. 
• Pilanesberg National Park, Mogwase, Boputhatswana, Southern Africa. 
• Personal observations of hunting activities made: 
• On a field trip of 4 days in the company of hunters to C-Camp in Rifa hunting area 
during August 1991; 
• On a field trip of 1 week to Marongora, Kariba and the Charara Safari Area during 
August 1991; 
• Literature review. 
Individual research methods are described and referenced in the relevant sections of the 
report. Persons consulted for personal communications, data, or critical comments are listed 
in the acknowledgements, page 250. Data were corroborated from different sources, where 
possible. Permit data were processed using spreadsheet analysis, part of which was used in 
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1.5. Assumptions underlying this research 
This study is based on the following assumptions: 
1.5.1. Individual persons are in a better position to make efficient and equitable choices for 
themselves than government can ever hope to 'be, through lack of information. 
1.5.2. Efficient use of economic and natural resources is a principle that can, and should, 
be applied to government activities (Crowe, 1987; Kernaghan and Dwivedi, 1983). 
1.5.3. Efficiency of government is necessary and important for sustaining activities with 
scarce public finances. 1 This implies that the DNPWLM should be responsible for 
a balanced budget, ie. for revenue as well as expenditure, from all activities in 
Zimbabwe's protected areas. At present, this is not the case. 
1.5.4. Equality ( or equity) is understood as a theoretical concept that requires political 
definition to translate it from theory to practice. Equality is seen as a particular way 
of distributing resources amongst people (a distribution pattern). In reality, there are 
many equalities possible, not merely one absolute equality of resource distribution 
(Rae, et al., 1981). 
1.5.5. There is currently little incentive for the DNPWLM to use revenue from profitable 
activities to subsidize other activities on the land for which it is responsible, but from 
which it does not receive the revenue (see assumption 1.5.3). 
1.5.6. All hunts that have been planned for a specific hunting area must be sold, once the 
area's quota has been decided on. Unsold hunts have ecological, economic and social 
opportunity costs, especially in the longer term ( eg. habitat degradation, culling 
requirements, poor trophy quality, foregone revenue for conservation and 
development, restricted access and benefits for people). 
1.5.7. A quantitative increase in the number of hunter-days offered in an area (more hunting 
campsites, more hunters per hunt, shorter hunting periods) ultimately affects the hunt 
quality; economic, ecological, and environmental factors further limit such increases. 
The exact nature and influence of these factors for resource management are still 
poorly understood and researched in African environments (Bothma, 1989: 325). 
1.5.8. "For the most part, detailed information on population size, structure and dynamics 
[for Zimbabwe's protected areas] is lacking" (Cumming, 1988: 163). For 
Charara/Makuti study area in particular, the ecology and animal populations and 
dynamics are not documented, and are inadequately researched (Robertson-Magnus, 
personal communication). 
1 This is the main thrust of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), adopted by the Zimbabwe 
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1.5.9. Variety, understood as the potential for individual persons to make free choices 
amongst alternatives according to their personal preferences, has a positive value.1 
If an individual hunter is given a wider range of choice (eg. of hunt types), he will 
be better off; if his available choice is limited, his satisfaction and welfare are 
diminished. 2 
1.6. Report structure 
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides a conceptual, theoretical, and socio-
economic background to the study. First, hunting terminology used in this dissertation is 
defined and put into context with existing literature and usage. A framework is introduced 
to structure licensing systems for administering (allocating) sport hunting. The theoretical 
concepts of efficiency and equality are explained, and the theoretical and practical trade-off 
problems associated with these terms are highlighted. Resource allocation is conceptualized 
for hunting and licensing systems using a market approach. A one-hunt model of the hunting 
market is sketched to clarify the economic problem of allocating sport hunting resources. 
Market and non-market approaches to solve these allocation functions are interpreted for · 
licensing systems. Both approaches seek to balance the supply of hunts with the number of 
applicants demanding a right buy a hunt at some price. 
Next, sport hunting practice in Zimbabwe is described. The organisation of land for wildlife 
in Zimbabwe is outlined. The wildlife policy and organisation of sport hunting on land 
categories in Zimbabwe are described. Protected areas used for sport hunting activities are 
mapped. Land-use areas are quantified. An overview of the market for citizen hunting in 
Zimbabwe's protected areas is given. Demand for and the supply of hunting opportunities for 
Zimbabwe citizens is documented to put the resource allocation problem into an overall 
context within the country. An estimate of potential demand for sport hunting by Zimbabwe 
citizens is made, based on income distribution data. Finally, key socio-economic indicators 
are tabulated, showing Zimbabwe's current development status. 
Chapter 3 serves as a background for analysis in chapters 4 and 5, where descriptive detail 
has been kept to a minimum. The chapter provides a detailed technical review of alternative 
licensing systems in two parts. The first part describes licensing systems that allocate sport 
hunting in Zimbabwe. Four different systems are used (lottery systems, tender systems, 
auction systems and safari operator marketing systems) in seven different hunting areas. The 
systems are administered directly by the DNPWLM, by the ZHA, or by the safari operator. 
The second part describes three foreign systems (lottery systems and a first-come-first-served 
I On variety. see Lancaster (1979). especially pages 5-6. On free choice. as in the sense of personal. rather than 
a chance, event. see Boyle. Grisez and Tollefsen (1976): 11. 
2 This is a central postulate of welfare economics and of consumer theory, where it is known as consumer 
sovereignty. In separate contexts. both Lancaster. and Krutilla and Fisher. see variety as enhancing the opportunity 
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system). Emphasis is placed on relevant differences between these system and the 
Zimbabwean systems. The chapter concludes with a summary of Zimbabwean licensing 
system's main points. 
Chapter 4 sets the scope of analysis at the level of the individual applicant and hunter for 
the Charara/Makuti study area (microeconomic). The concepts of efficiency and equality are 
applied to the hunt allocation procedure for the DNPWLM lottery system as a case study 
assessment. Were all hunts allocated to applicants? Did the lottery allocation procedure match 
standards of fairness (in terms of equal probability) expected of a lottery? 
Chapter 5 sets the scope of analysis at the national level of Zimbabwe's economy 
(macroeconomic). A comparative study of the DNPWLM lottery system is made to determine 
the opportunity costs of this system in relation to other Zimbabwean licensing systems. The 
concepts of efficiency and equality are defined to make all Zimbabwean licensing systems 
comparable. The opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system for the Charara/Makuti 
study area are quantified; efficiency of generating hunting revenue and other conservation 
benefits generated from revenue are measured; revenue foregone in foreign exchange is 
valued at market exchange rates; the results are interpreted in terms of Zimbabwe's socio-
economic development priorities. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the major results of the study from all previous chapters for the fix-
priced lottery system in the study area. Conclusions are drawn for the DNPWLM and 
decision-makers that integrate these results. Recommendations are made for action based on 
this research. Strategies and actions are recommended to supply citizen hunting in the 
Charara/Makuti study area in the short term (by the year 1994). Strategies and actions for 
allocating resources in the Charara/Makuti study area more efficiently in the medium term 
(between the years 1994-2000) follow which require a longer lead-time to action, due to their 
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CHAPTER2 
A CONCEPTUAL AND 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
2.1. Terminology 
2.1.1. What is a Zimbabwe citizen hunt? 
In Zimbabwe, a citizen hunt involves: licensing1 a hunting party to access and hunt a hunting 
bag in a protected area. Each hunt has a specific hunt duration and takes place at a certain 
time of the year between set hunting dates. The hunter pays a price to hunt, normally termed 
the trophy fee, for each species in the hunting bag. All hunting is done accompanied by a 
staff member (game scout or tracker) of the protected areas management agency, known as 
the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM). Hunters are based 
at a hunting campsite, surrounded by a no-hunting zone of up to two kilometres, within the 
protected area. Key hunting terms are now explained further, in the above order. Readers are 
also referred to the glossary, on page xxi. 
The licensing system procedure, that is the procedures for allocating and administering the 
licence issue to a particular hunter and his hunting party, is .undertaken by hunting 
administrators. They may be the DNPWLM, the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association (ZHA) who 
are allowed to use certain protected areas for hunting activities, or the safari operator who 
leases a protected area for exclusive hunting rights (see section 2.2.2, page 22, for a 
framework of licensing systems). 
A hunting party may be between 1 and 30 members, and include: 
• The hunter, in whose name the hunting licence has been issued; 
• Co-hunters, between one and three in number, who are permitted to actively assist 
the hunter by shooting; 
• Non-hunting visitors, of varying numbers, who are usually family or friends, 
including children; 
• Members of staff, employed by hunters to help with duties at the hunting 
campsite, such as the preparation of hunting trophies and venison. 
• A member of the DNPWLM (game scout or tracker) armed with a rifle, whose 
function is to control the hunting activities, help tracking game, and support 
hunters in incidents involving wounded animals or dangerous game. 
1 A note on grammar (The Oxford English Dictionary) . The document authorizing a hunter to hunt is a licence 
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A hunting bag includes a limited quota of African big game and plains game, specified by 
species, sex, and number of animals, and sometimes by tusk size (eg. for elephant). 
The protected area is spatially delimited for hunting the hunting bag (quota of animals) and 
hunting activities. Hunting parties are not, however, limited to exclusive hunting areas, except 
in the case of foreign clients who hunt in areas of a park leased by the DNPWLM to a safari 
operator for his exclusive use. This means that a number of hunting parties enter the same 
hunting area at any point in time, and each party of hunters has access to the whole area for 
the entire hunt duration. 
The hunt duration specified for hunts by hunting administrators is currently between 6 and 
14 days in Zimbabwe's protected areas, but may be longer for foreign client safari hunts, 
where standard hunting periods of 5, 10, 15 or 21 days are used to market certain types of 
hunts with buffalo, lion or leopard and the big four, which includes elephant but excludes 
rhinoceros in the case of Zimbabwe. 
The hunting dates are dates specified during the hunting season by hunting administrators, 
before and after which no hunting by the licence holder or members of his hunting party may 
take place. 
The trophy fee for each species in the hunting bag is set according to the type of system used 
to price hunting resources (eg. market-priced or fix-priced systems). The trophy fee only 
values the hunt's consumptive resources, that means the quota of animals. Table 2.1 shows 
trophy fees for selected species set by the government schedule for citizen hunting. 
Table 2.1 Government scheduled trophy fees of selected species for citizen hunting: 1991 
·.•· Big and.dangerous<game: ••······· 
Elephant/ 6u11 
Buffalo, bull 
)•••r•••••·····•••· .. •;tion: ~~11 •· .. ··.·< > · .. · < Leop~rd / > < 
Plains game and other: . > 
. Kudu/ male 
Warthog .·· 
.. Guinea Fowl 
For ~orilparison:> .··• < / .···. · ·· ... / ··•• 
Government legislated minimum : . 
) :~i~i~~~igri9~1tura1 .. work~(i:;Jq :> 
.·.·.··•· : ) > 1 . ··.··· ..•. > SeeA~~~,0~11~1~1~itrtffic;J~4d~<i 
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Often, a hunt includes a daily hunting fee (the daily rate) that is determined according to the 
type of hunt being sold to the hunter (big game hunt, plains game hunt), so that the total hunt 
price varies depending on both the composition and species in the hunting bag and the 
duration of the hunt. 
The hunting campsite is usually located at or near water in scenically attractive settings. In 
some areas, hunt and campsite allocations are linked. Facilities provided at these hunting 
campsites vary greatly in quality. Safari operators usually establish temporary luxury tented 
campsites, the ZHA uses built campsites with certain permanent facilities, whilst facilities at 
others are fairly basic. 
The costs of a hunting trip are substantial, involving the purchase of a hunting bag, transport 
to and within the hunting area which is located in remote parts of Zimbabwe, food for the 
hunting party (hunters, visitors and staff), wages for staff, camping equipment that may 
include refrigeration facilities, lighting equipment, four-wheel drive vehicles, as well as 
appropriate hunting rifles and ammunition depending on the type of species on quota in the 
hunting bag. Excluding the purchase of the hunting bag, the costs of undertaking a 10-day 
hunting trip have been estimated at Z$10'000 (Appendix 18, page AllO), or about US$3'000 
calculated at 1991 foreign exchange rates. Hunting bags offered to Zimbabwe citizens in 1991 
ranged from about Z$18'000 to Z$1 '000, depending on the species in the bag and the pricing 
system. Total costs for a Zimbabwe citizen hunting trip thus ranged between Z$11 '000 and 
Z$28'000. These costs compare with government controlled minimum wages of about 
Z$2'200 per annum for agricultural workers in the same year. By these standards alone, it 
may be concluded that citizen hunting is an expensive sport, which only rich people in 
Zimbabwe can afford; citizen hunting has nothing to do with subsistence hunting activities 
carried out for survival (see Glossary, page xxi, for definition of subsistence hunting). 
In addition to going hunting, members of a citizen hunting party (hunters and non-hunters) 
make good use of the recreational opportunities offered by the hunter's right of access to 
some of Zimbabwe's prime wildlife resource areas (used as hunting areas) within the 
protected area system. Activities undertaken include fishing, which is popular, but mainly the 
diversity of non-consumptive recreations possible within each area, such as bird watching, 
tree identification, walking, boating, photography. 
2.1.2. A hunt - A bundle of hunt characteristics 
Lancaster (1966) developed a novel way to view goods as _comprising a bundle of physical 
characteristics or properties whose specific combinations consumers valued (eg. sit-down meal 
with a hamburger), but which consumers would quite easily substitute for a good possessing 
the same characteristics, but combined slightly differently (eg. steak and chips in an expensive 
restaurant). Conventional economic theory on consumer behaviour and choice had hitherto 
assumed all goods to be completely homogenous, and being valued equally by all persons. 
Lancaster's marketing and psychological approach categorizes goods with similar 
characteristics, and helps to explain for instance why personal service or the atmosphere in 
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Applying Lancaster's characteristics approach to "a hunt" as an economic good, it becomes 
clear that a "hunt" has firstly a complex set of characteristics, and secondly that allocating 
or selling a "hunt" consists of significantly more than killing a number of animals on quota. 
Resource administrators who sell a "hunt" are packaging a whole range of resources and 
characteristics into a hunting opportunity, many of which are available in other hunts offered 
in the same or similar hunting areas. Lancaster's approach also explains why "going hunting" 
can mean very different things to individual persons, and why a hunter is motivated by more 
than the desire to shoot an animal - especially in the case of citizen hunting in Zimbabwe -
since not all members of a hunting party are hunters and actually hunt. 
The complex motives for going hunting and the many benefits enjoyed from the activity are 
noted by Giles (1978) and Bigalke (1986), and were confirmed in the southern African 
context for Transvaal game hunters by Reilly (1987). For Zimbabwe, the author's personal 
observations in the company of citizen hunters (C-camp in Rifa hunting area, 1991) 
confirmed that a hunting trip gives many persons the possibility of a bush-related experience 
in the company of friends and family members. The harvest motive, which includes the actual 
kill and products of the wildlife species, eg. venison, biltong, skin, and trophy, is de-
emphasized by both Giles (1978) and Bigalke (1986) in their identification of motives for 
sport hunting in the American context. The Transvaal hunters also indicated that the harvest 
motive was the least important motive for sport hunting (Reilly, 1987: 25). 
Thus, a hunter does not desire a hunting opportunity for the sake of owning the right to hunt 
and access to a hunting area, but for the hunt characteristics which make it useful, give him 
and other members of the party benefits (the trophy, venison or African bush experience) and 
enjoyment. Consequently, for a hunter to perceive that a particular hunt is preferred the most, 
and will give him the greatest use and value, the hunter must know its characteristics and 
those of available alternative hunting options. 
A specific mixture of the following hunt characteristics are part of a typical hunt: 




These determine whether, for example, the hunt on offer is a classic big game 
hunt, a cat hunt (lion or leopard), a buffalo hunt, or an impala hunt; 
The quality of animal in the hunting bag (trophy bearing (male), non-trophy 
bearing (male or female), and possibly trophy limits on tusk size); 
The number of animals in the hunting bag; 
The hunting period (eg. 1-day, 7-day, or 21-day hunt); 
• The hunting dates ( eg. during the school holidays, leave or working holidays, or 
the cool-dry as opposed to the hot-dry season); 
• The price of the hunting package ( only if fixed prices are used for valuation). 
The hunting bag quality and quantity of animals together determine the hunt type offered, that 
is whether a trophy or non-trophy hunt is offered, and whether a big game hunt or plains 
game hunt is offered. It should be noted, that if a hunter pays a higher price for certain hunts 
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necessarily worse off, but quite possibly better off - quality and choice would not be available 
if all prices were I ow .1 
2.1.3. Motives for hunting 
Three basic hunting motives were identified in the course of this research: the trophy motive; 
the venison motive; and the recreational motive which includes all non-consumptive 
experiences that may be enjoyed. 
2.1.4. The hunt's resources 
The scarce resources involved in a hunt are the quota, or consumptive resource, and 
the access time (hunt duration) to the particular hunting area. The access time principally 
allows all members of the hunting party to enjoy recreational activities based on non-
consumptive resources that are largely unlimited, eg. a beautiful view. In addition, 
administrative and human resources are invested in supplying hunting, in particular the 
official DNPWLM employee who accompanies the hunting party for the duration of the 
hunting trip. 
2.1.5. The importance of hunter's personal preferences and choice 
2.1.6. The need for informed personal choice by the hunter 
To apply for a hunting opportunity and make an informed choice about which hunt he prefers, 
a prospective hunter must be fully informed of the hunt's basic characteristics (see listed 
items, page 14). A hunter's personal preferences (eg. traditional customs and beliefs 
associated with specific animals), or a particular hunter's dislike at hunting certain species, 
(eg. elephant or other dangerous game) can greatly influence the value he places on any 
particular hunt. For Zimbabwe citizen hunters, it is also apparent that the primary hunting 
motive is important for the type of hunt a hunter chooses. A trophy hunter may emphasize 
the hunt characteristics of trophy quality, the number of sp.ecies in the hunting bag and the 
price of the hunt. A venison hunter, by contrast, might emphasize the meat, available 
recreational facilities and opportunities, and perhaps the wilderness experience. 
The hunter may also wish to know: 
• The statistics of exceptional trophy animals recorded by hunters in the past for a 
particular hunting area; 
• The hunting area's features ( eg. topography, vegetation, location, diversity of 
experiences) and wilderness value; 
• The location of the hunter's campsite (eg. with water frontage), and facilities 
included in the hunt price ( eg. accommodation, slaughter block, meat drying 
racks). 
1 The author is grateful to A. Lciman for this point, and the examples to illustrate it. See: Gallini, 1988: 57-66 and 
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2.1. 7. Hunting terminology 
Citizen hunting is now defined and related to other key hunting terms for this dissertation. 
Important differences are to be found between citizen hunting and safari hunting in the 
composition of the hunting party, the activities of hunters and non-hunting members of the 
hunting party, and their hunting motives. Due to the present organisation of citizen hunting 
in Zimbabwe, a systematic definition of the two terms was further complicated. Although 
citizen hunting, in principle, is allocated exclusively to Zimbabwe citizens, and safari hunting 
is only available to foreign hunters because it is sold in foreign exchange currencies, the 
DNPWLM uses one particular system that makes hunting available to both foreign and 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters because it is sold in the local Zimbabwe dollar currency. This 
mixture is defined as citizen/safari hunting. 
2.1.7.1. A variety of hunting terms in literature and practice 
A confusing variety of hunting terms is in use in policy, literature and practice on hunting. 
Table 2.2, page 16, lists some terms used in DNPWLM policy documents (see also 
section 2.3, page 37). 
Table 2.2 Sport hunting terms used in DNPWLM policy documents 
-:· .·::- .. ·. .. 
it4 tj.H.tih~ lf~t~ ······· 
Apart from the last term, quality trophy hunting of male animals, the documents do not 
further define or relate the hunting terms. For Botswana, Cumming and Taylor use citizen 
hunting to mean "hunting undertaken by affluent citizens (those who own vehicles and guns)" 
(in Botswana Government, 1989: 15) sold at subsidized (ie. non-market) prices by 
government, as does Barnes (in Botswana Government, 1988). Cumming and Taylor refer to 
safari hunting as synonymous with recreational hunting (page 14), and to safari hunting as 
synonymous with trophy hunting one page later. The authors also refer to sport hunting by 
citizens (Botswana Government, 1989: 22). 
Hudson (1988a) attempts to systematize hunting terminology in the context of diverse wildlife 
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unmanaged wild populations to intensive farming of tamed wild animals. The authors define 
the category of sport hunting, and propose in addition commercial hunting and subsistence 
hunting as two further categories. In later chapters, however, the authors are inconsistent by 
referring to sport hunting and comtnercial hunting synonymously as recreational hunting. 
According to Hudson (1988a), the category of sport hunting includes: licensed hunting, safari 
hunting, fee hunting and revier hunting (traditional European hunting systems). Unfortunately 
the authors do not base their definitions on a set of explicit and common criteria. In the 
context of Zimbabwe's sport hunting practice, the terms licensed hunting, fee hunting, safari 
hunting and commercial hunting used by Hudson were found to be ambiguous and overlap. 
For example, all sport hunting in Zimbabwe's protected areas is licensed as well as priced. 
All safari hunting is priced as well as commercial. The sub-category "fee hunting" 
erroneously implies that an alternative such as "free hunting" exists. 
Describing wildlife production systems with plains game for South Africa, Berry (1986) 
introduces the terms trophy hunting and non-trophy recreational hunting. With trophy hunting 
he refers to mature male animals hunted for their trophies (eg. horns or tusks) whilst with 
non-trophy hunting he refers to the hunting of larger quotas of less mature animals of both 
sexes. In Zimbabwe, only certain hunting areas and quotas are devoted exclusively to trophy 
hunting. These so called hunting safaris 1 are organised by safari operators and sold to foreign 
cli ents at high prices as complete hunting packages to include professional hunting services. 
Quotas in other hunting areas of Zimbabwe do not only comprise strictly only male trophy 
animals, but also include considerable numbers of non-trophy female animals (eg. female 
buffalo and female impala in Charara/Makuti hunting quotas, see Appendix 2.1, page A5, and 
female impala in Dandawa hunting quotas, see Appendix 2.6, page Al 9). The hunting 
motives and activities of Zimbabwe citizen hunters reflect this mixture of hunting for quality 
trophies, for venison, and ·for recreation. 
Table 2.2, page 18 presents the results of a review of terminology used by various authors 
in the context of sport hunting. 
I Safari is from the Swahi li language. and means to undertake an extensive journey. or to travel to a far off place 
for some days. A hunting safa ri is thus :i hunting trip involving considerable preparation and travel. The Zimbabwean 
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trophies (size and weight of tusks or horns)'. Anderson (n.d.); 'Sport hunting'. erry 
com~are venison hunting, 
non- rophy hunting 
(1986) ; 'Non-trophy recreational hunting'. 
Non-Trophy Zimbabwe Government (1992) : 'Culling quotas are larger than trophy quotas'. Berry COITJfare trop1 hunting, 
Hunting (1986) ; vent on huntin 
Venison Ciskei Safaris and Natal Parks Board (personal communication.); 'plains game non-trophy non-~rop~ huntin~, biltong 
Hunting bearing animals'. hunting, eat hu mg 
Meat colloquial usage in southern Africa (personal observation). venison hunting, bilton~ Hunting hunting, non-tr phy hu ting 
BiltonRi 
Hunti g colloquial usage in southern Africa (personal observation). 
veni$On hunting, non-trophy 
hunting 
Big Game 
Hunting Cumming (1988) ; 'Zimbabwe: types of trophy hunts sold by safari operators'. 
compare ~lains Riame 
hunting, ' o big ve' 
Plains game 
Hunting Cumming (1988) ; 'Zimbabwe: types of trophy hunts sold by safari operators'. compare big game hunting 
Ranch Cumming (1988): 'Zimbabwe: types of trophy hunts sold by safari operators on private implies Rlains game hunting 
Hunting ranch land'. on ranc with attle 
Licensed Hudson (1988a): 'Simplest way of organised sport hunting'. as o~~ed to 'unlicensed Hunting hunti g'. 
Fee Hudson (1988a) : 'Private landowners charge fees to organise sport hunting'. as o~o~ed to 'gratis Hunting hunt, g' . 
Revier Hudson (1988a) ; Bubenik (1988) ; 'Continental European organisation of sport hunting 
Hunting with landowner and hunter involvement'. 
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2.1.7.2. Defining sport hunting systematically for Zimbabwe 
A systematic definition of sport hunting for Zimbabwe is proposed in Figure 2.2, page 20. 
This dissertation focuses on sport hunting (the hunting for sport and enjoyment) as opposed 
to subsistence hunting (the hunting for food as a basic human need). 
Sport hunting is defined as category of licensed hunting activities practised for sport, that 
includes three types of hunting: citizen hunting, safari hunting and citizen/safari hunting. 
Differentiating sport hunting primarily according to the citizenship of the hunter (Zimbabwe 
citizen or foreigner) and then accommodating the mixed participation of both citizens and 
foreigners in one system (the DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting areas), 
the following definitions for the three types of sport hunting activities are proposed. 
Citizen hunting is a type of sport hunting. It includes the licensed hunting by Zimbabwe 
citizens of plains and big game species for a combination of their trophy values, their meat 
values, and the recreational value associated with the hunting trip. Shooting an animal is only 
one part of the whole recreational experience. By intent, the hunter may be a trophy hunter, 
a venison hunter, or a combination of both. Citizen hunting presently takes place in hunting 
areas reserved exclusively for Zimbabwe citizens1 within Zimbabwe's parks system, and on 
private land. Hunting is priced using fixed prices and allocated to citizens in the Zimbabwe 
dollar currency using lottery or tender allocation systems. 
Safari hunting is a type of sport hunting. It is undertaken exclusively by foreign hunters 
visiting Zimbabwe. Together with a safari operator and the services of a professional hunter, 
foreign hunters hunt big game and valuable plains game species mainly for their trophy. 
Usually a safari operator with exclusive rights to hunt in big game hunting areas markets 
hunting packages at internationally competitive market prices to foreign clients who pay in 
foreign exchange currencies (mainly the US$). Safari operators frequently combine big game 
quotas on state land with plains game quotas on private ranch land. 
Safari hunters pay high prices for their hunting package, which are calculated and sold using 
a daily rate for each day's hunting. In the limited time available, safari hunters thus pursue 
their prime objective of securing quality trophies. This means that foreign hunters spend little 
time in the pursuit of non-hunting recreational activities, in comparison to most citizen 
hunters. 
1 To qualify as a citizen of Zimbabwe under the Citizenship Act (Act No. 23 of 1984), a person must be a citizen 
by birth, by registration, or a permanent resident of Zimbabwe. Foreigners and temporary residents are thus excluded 
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Citizen/Safari Hunting is a type of sport hunting that includes aspects of citizen hunting and 
safari hunting. Zimbabwe citizens, foreign hunters or their Zimbabwe agents representing 
them and safari operators all have .access to this type of hunting, because it is sold in 
Zimbabwe dollars. The hunting of big game and plains game offered in two hunting areas in 
the parks system is mainly for the trophy value. Hunting is allocated using a public auction 
system and priced at the highest auction price in Zimbabwe dollars. 
Figure 2.2 on page 20 emphasizes that because the personal motivation of individual hunters 
may differ, an important and necessary distinction should be drawn between hunters 
according to their primary motive for hunting. Major differences in emphasis of hunting 
motive between citizen hunters and safari hunters are shown using three sizes of dot for the 
trophy, venison and recreational motives respectively. 
A safari hunter's main motive is to secure a quality big game or plains game trophy. A 
citizen hunter's main motive may either be to secure a quality trophy, or the venison, whilst 
emphasizing the recreational experience. A citizen/safari hunter's main motive is to secure 
a quality big game or plains game trophy. 
It is evident from the above and Figure 2.2 that although similar motives underlie both citizen 
hunting and safari hunting activities, the importance of each motive for individual hunters 
may be quite different, and depend on the hunter's personal preferences and income. 
Data confirming the difference in primary hunting motivation between foreign hunting clients 
and some Zimbabwe citizen hunters was obtained from personal observations in hunting areas 
and discussions with professional safari hunters. In South Africa, the Natal Parks Board 
(NPB) and Ciskei Safaris offer hunting bags that differentiate between the hunting quota and 
price at which trophy hunting, and non-trophy hunting for venison or recreation, are sold. For 
an example of the hunts offered, see Appendix 15.1, page A105 for NPB; and Appendix 15.2, 
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2.2. Concepts and theory of resource 
allocation systems for sport hunting 
2.2.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to relate licensing systems used to allocate sport hunting to 
economic theory, since the problem of allocating hunting is a problem of scarcity, with too 
many people wanting to hunt the available big game resources. First, a conceptual framework 
to structure licensing systems is introduced, then a theoretical model of allocation based on 
price mechanisms, markets and people's behaviour is sketched. The economic issues of 
allocation are stated, and the systems available to solve them are outlined for the theoretical 
model (at zero-prices) and are then adapted to Zimbabwe's real life situation, where resources 
are all, to some extent, priced in monetary terms. These models serve to analyze and review 
licensing systems for sport hunting in Chapter 3. 
Finally in this conceptual section, the theoretical concepts of efficiency and equality are 
reviewed and brief working definitions as used in this dissertation are given. These concepts 
are at the centre of the controversy between the efficient economic production and distribution 
of resources (or benefits), and their politically desired and enforced (or non-economic) 
distribution. 1 The controversy underlies much of the literature on the productive and 
distributive allocation of resources, where the frequency with which authors use the terms 
"equity", "fairness" and "equitable distribution" is often matched by the authors' omission to 
define this difficult, but nevertheless practical, highly political and important idea. 
2.2.2. Licensing systems: A framework to allocate sport hunting 
A licensing system is defined as an integrated administrative system to allocate resources, 
particularly hunting resources consisting of sustainable quotas of wild animals, access time, 
and space, to hunters in hunting areas. Its purpose is limit and control the hunting activity to 
within ecologically sustainable limits inside an ecological resource area (hunting area). 
The overall objective of licensing systems is to supply a certain combination of the hunting 
characteristics to satisfy the demands of a particular sport hunting community. 
Other possible objectives of hunting licensing systems are suggested, such as: 
• Maximizing revenue ( defined in foreign exchange, or in Z$); 
• Allowing hunters access to hunting benefits, by licensing them; 
• Providing maximum benefits from access and revenue to the public from protected 
areas and their natural resources; 
• Enhancing the conservation of bio-diversity. 
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Figure 2.3, page 23 shows a framework for the allocation of sport hunting in Zimbabwe. The 
framework shows the sequence of steps involved to license sport hunters. The framework is 
general, in that it shows the steps used to allocate a fixed number of licences amongst a 
number of applicants to allow the controlled use of a resource. The framework is based on 
descriptions of hunting administration given by Crowe (1987), Cumming (1988), Giles (1978), 
and also on the review of licensing systems used in Zimbabwe, South Africa andd Wyoming 
as detailed in Chapter 3. 
The allocation functions of major importance in the framework (see Figure 2.3, page 23) are 
now briefly described, taking a fix-priced lottery system, such as that used in the 
Charara/Makuti study area, as an example. 
A licensing system involving a lottery allocation procedure begins with the policy, resource 
assessment, and planning of the quota allocation to hunts. These hunts are then allocated by 
a particular system, which involves advertising, receiving applications for hunts, conducting 
the lottery draw procedure and determining who wins (is allocated) a particular hunt, issuing 
the licence and receiving payment. For the appointed hunting dates, the hunter and his 
hunting party then book-in at the DNPWLM control office in the hunting area, collect 
DNPWLM trackers who are to accompany the hunters throughout their hunting trip, set up 
the hunting camp at the designated site. After completing their hunt with the tracker, hunters 
then officially book out at the DNPWLM control office, return their hunting licence 
indicating their hunting success (animals killed and wounded) and undertake the return 
journey carrying any hunting trophies or prepared venison. 
• Policy: 
Policy and land-use for each protected area must be specified in a park plan. For the 
Charara/Makuti study area no park plan exists, and available policy documents are either not 
specific enough, or contain conflicting statements concerning the implementation of a 
licensing system. For details on sport hunting policy in Zimbabwe, see section 2.3, page 37. 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
In each hunting area, the species ' quotas are packaged into a number of individual hunting 
bags and assigned to a number of hunts. The function of allocating the quota to individual 
hunting bags determines the hunt's specific characteristics. This quota allocation to hunts is 
done by hunting administrators of each system for every hunting area, according to the type 
of hunting that is to take place. The type of hunt, its potential value to hunters, and the 
revenue potential of this hunt type are determined at this stage of planning the actual 
licensing system. 
Hunt types include: trophy hunts, containing male trophy-bearing animals; Non-trophy hunts, 
containing other animals with value for venison and the hunting experience; Big game hunts, 
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hippopotamus; Plains game hunts containing a wide variety of antelope species, some of 
which are common on much land in Zimbabwe, such as impala, kudu, grysbok, and others 
which are rarer and valued for their trophy or hide by sport hunters, such as eland, sable 
antelope, nyala and zebra. 
All the above hunt types provide recreational value to the hunter whilst, at the same time, 
providing trophy and venison value from the activity of hunting as a sport. The term 
"recreational hunting", though frequently used by many writers, ignores the primary 
consumptive motives that are the reason for the limiting the harvest to sustainable levels in 
the first place, these being the trophy and venison motives. 
This differentiation of consumptive motives is necessary, if the resources associated with a 
hunt are to be priced correctly. A hunter is under no obligation to actually kill the animals 
on quota. During the time he is in the hunting area, the hunter still benefits from the 
experience, in which case he has enjoyed privileged access to the whole hunting area 
accompanied by a DNPWLM member of staff - which makes the hunter an exclusive visitor. 
If the hunter is not prepared to pay more than an exclusive tourist for the non-consumptive 
resource of access and space in the hunting area, then there are opportunity costs associated 
with allocating space and access to hunters instead of visitors. The fact that a hunter benefits 
additionally by hunting the consumptive resource of a hunting bag means that by purchasing 
a hunt, he enjoys two completely different types of resources and benefits with one and the 
same licence. 
A further point is important for resource managers. The recreational quality of hunting and 
non-hunting activities that derive from access to the protected area, since access is not limited 
or consumed by any one person, can only be enhanced if facilities or personalized services 
are offered to the visitor. 
• Hunt allocation to applicants: 
Once a certain number and type of hunts have been determined, hunting administrators must 
solve the following economic problems of resource allocation: 
• Who gets how many hunts? 
• Who gets which particular hunt or hunts? 
• What price is to be paid by each hunter for the hunt and its associated resources? 
A critical question m terms of resource allocation is: How are personal valuations and 
preferences to be measured and compared by individuals for the hunts on offer, and between 
individuals when choosing which persons to allocate resources to? 
This question is taken up further in two sections . . First, in the market model of resource 
allocation (section 2.2.3), then in the section introducing efficiency and equality as 
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• Pricing the hunt: 
Hunt prices are determined by the type of allocation system used. Fix-priced systems 
(lotteries) use controlled trophy fee prices per species, set by the government trophy fee 
schedule (Appendix 8, page A 77) for Zimbabwe citizen hunters. Hunting administrators then 
value each species in a hunting bag with the trophy fee; the value of the hunting bag is then 
the hunt price. The Zimbabwe hunter's Association bases its calculation on the scheduled 
trophy fees, but adds an association levy to increase each species' fixed price. Market-priced 
systems (auction and tender) value each hunt according to the hunter's maximum willingness 
to pay in competition with other applicants. Safari operators use market prices determined by 
international competition for safari hunting clients, and by business principles to cover costs. 
• Licence issue and payment: 
Once the allocation system has determined which hunt has been allocated to whom and at 
what price, the hunter is issued with a hunting licence against payment of the hunt price. The 
hunting licence specifies the hunter's "hunting rights", additional rules and regulations, and 
any duties that the hunter must perform during or on completion of the hunt. Minimum items 
recorded on each licence are: the hunter's identity, the hunting bag (sex, species and number 
of animals), the price paid for hunt, the hunt identification number, the hunting area, the 
hunting dates. 
• Post-hunt statistics from hunting licences: 
Licences completed by the hunter after his hunting trip are returned to the issuing agency 
with data on hunting success. Trophies are measured and teeth are aged by DNPWLM staff 
and data is recorded. These statistics of harvested species are intended to serve resource 
managers for planning sustainable quotas in future years. 
2.2.3. Allocation functions of licensing systems: A market model 
at zero price and fixed supply 
Figure 2.4, page 27 applies a market model to a fictive hunting market to illustrate the 
principles underlying the allocation of scarce, ie. economic resources. The functions are 
illustrated more easily by considering the allocation as though hunts were free of charge, ie. 
valued at zero price. The model assumes that the hunts to be allocated are all homogenous, 
rather than the extremely diverse hunting packages characteristic of reality .1 Alternatively, 
the hunting market may be viewed as the supply of one single hunt to anyone demanding this 
particular hunt. This view of a "one hunt market" is closer to reality.2 The interpretation is 
based on the instructive example used by Lindsay (1984) to illustrate market theory 
fundamentals. 
1 See definition of hunting bag in Glossary, page xxi. 
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Pri~ of ! 
hunts · s 
a• +- Quantity of 
hunts 
Figure 2.4 Economic model of the hunting market : Allocating hunts at zero price 
Source: After Lindsay (1984). 
The economic model in Figure 2.4 shows the original demand D I for hunts, assuming a fixed 
supply of hunts S based on the hunting area's sustainable species quotas. The demand curves 
for hunts (D 1, D:? and D:J obey the laws of demand. More hunts are demanded (on the 
horizontal axis) by hunters the lower the hunt price ( on the vertical axis). The supply curve 
for hunts (S) is vertical, reflecting the short-term assumption that the maximum hunting quota 
in a hunting area is not a function of price, but depends on the ecologically sustainable quota 
set by hunting administrators. Therefore, the quantity of hunts supplied is Q* regardless of 
the hunt price. 
At the equilibrium price of hunts p·, the quantity of hunts demanded is o· - equal to the 
quantity supplied. At zero price, the quantity of hunts demanded by applicants increases to 
0 1, which is larger than the fixed number o· available. If, to restrict demand, applicants have 
to queue for hunting licences, the value of each hunt to the hunting applicants at the back of 
the queue decreases ; as queuing time increases, some applicants will be discouraged from 
demanding hunts. The demand curve shifts to the left at D:?, and a smaller number of hunts 
(Q:?) is demanded (see Figure 2.4, page 27). In time, the number of applicants demanding 
hunting will shift further to Q ' - and exactly equal the quantity supplied. At zero price, 
therefore, when the queuing time is sufficiently Jong, the hunting market will clear and 
quantity demanded will equal quantity supplied. Had the hunts been sold at the equilibrium 
price p·, instead of at zero price, the market would also have cleared without causing 
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2.2.3.1. Scarcity and the economics of allocation 
The model illustrates the everyday problem of resource scarcity. A number of basic problems 
are indicated that any allocation system needs to address (after Lindsay, 1984: 42). At a hunt 
price of zero ( or any other controlled price below P*), it follows that: 
• More hunts are demanded than are available for allocation (ie. hunts are scarce); 
• Some hunters demanding hunts will not get what they want at any price. 
An allocation system must address the following economic issues: 
• The value of the good that is being allocated (hunts) will vary amongst hunting 
applicants; 
• A hunt's value is a personal measure in terms of what individuals are willing to 
give up to obtain it, for example money, time, or the certainty (probability) of 
going hunting; 
• Someone will have to decide which demanders get some, or more of the hunts, 
and which get no hunt at all. This decision may be taken indirectly, if a decision-





Different decision-makers (choosers) and different systems will result in different 
allocations to different people; thus different hunt distribution patterns imply 
different equalities1; 
Under some allocation systems, some hunters will be better off than others; 
hunters will prefer a system that benefits them personally. 
Under some allocation systems, the decision-maker (resource owner) will be better 
off than under others; the decision-maker will prefer a system that depends on the 
institutional arrangements (eg. private enterprise, government policy, or member's 
association) and power to influence the system. 
Under different systems, hunters will adapt their behaviour to qualify themselves 
for a share of the scarce hunting resource. 
Critical questions in terms of resource allocation are: How are personal valuations and 
preferences of individual persons to be measured? How are valuations for the alternative 
hunts to be compared by the individuals themselves? How are valuations made by different 
individuals to be compared amongst each other? 
2.2.3.2. How can licensing systems allocate hunts? 
Different systems for allocating scarce resources are discussed and contrasted by Lindsay 
(1984): 43 according to economic theory and efficiency principles. The alternative systems 
for hunt allocation listed are: 
• Market mechanisms, and market prices for valuing resources; 
• Lottery mechanisms, and zero prices for valuing resources; 
• First-come-first-served systems and zero prices for valuing resources. 
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By using market mechanisms to allocate (based on the principles of efficiency), money is the 
measure of relative . resource valuations, and individuals take account of their personal 
preferences by determining their own willingness to pay. By using lottery mechanisms to 
allocate (based on notions of equality), individual's relative resource valuations and personal 
differences are ignored, and other criteria such as fairness, probability or need determined by 
an authority are used instead. 
A critical function in any licensing system is whether and how it is designed to accommodate 
individual preferences and choice of hunts by hunting applicants. As shown, choice is 
necessary for hunters due to the diversity of hunt characteristics and individual preferences, 
tastes and valuations of hunters, and their different budgets for hunting. Choice enables 
personal differences to be accommodated and enhances equality. Choice of hunting 
opportunities also enhances the efficiency of the allocation system! If, due to choice, any 
hunter obtains a hunt that exactly matches his tastes, then he values the hunt more highly than 
any alternative, and will consequently be prepared to pay a higher price to obtain this 
particular hunt. (Here, price is understood as the hunter's willingness to give up more time, 
effort, m~ney and other options of spending his recreation in order to obtain his first 
preference.) 
According to economic theory, Lindsay (1984) concludes that the market mechanism and 
competitive market prices allocate resources most efficiently, at least cost to society, and with 
the greatest number of people benefitting from the quantity of goods and services produced. 
2.2.3.3. How do Zimbabwe's licensing systems allocate hunts? 
Since all big game hunts in Zimbabwe are priced, not free, the systems used to allocate hunts 
in reality are adaptions of the zero-priced model of a one-hunt market (Figure 2.4, page 27). 






Whether the licensing system is based on market or fixed prices, ie. whether a 
market (eg. an auction) or a non-market mechanism (eg. a lottery) is to be used 
to allocate and price hunts. 
How the quota is packaged into hunts by th~ hunting administrators; 
For the non-market fix-priced systems, hunt price depends on: the species in a 
hunting bag, and what fixed price is used to value each species. 
For the market-priced systems, hunt price depends on: Who can compete in the 
competitively priced hunting market (eg. Zimbabwe citizens only, Zimbabwe and 
foreign hunters, all of these including Zimbabwe and foreign safari operators). 
Whether the right to hunt, once acquired, can be freely traded or sold . 
For priced allocation systems in Zimbabwe, two categories of systems are used to allocate 
resources and value: · 
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Market-priced systems include auctions, tenders and commercial marketing systems. These 
systems maximize revenue by valuing each hunt at market prices using applicant's maximum 
willingness to pay and personal valuations measured in money determined in competition with 
other applicants. With a tender system, applicants tender a fixed price for a hunt, whereas an 
auction system systematically raises 1 the auction price until the final bidder's price clears the 
market. 
Fix-priced systems include lotteries and first-come-first-served systems. These systems limit 
revenue by valuing each hunt at fixed prices controlled by government. With the price of 
each hunt fixed, there is invariably more than one person wanting this single hunting 
opportunity, so applicants are further limited according to some criterion other than price and 
willingness to pay the fixed price. Lottery systems are adopted where applicants are limited 
using luck (probability) and random allocations procedures. Lotteries allocate value randomly, 
not personally, and assume applicants are identical, or that personal valuations do not 
influence the allocation results. 
2.2.4. Dynamic resource coordination with market-prices 
In reality, supply is not fixed over the longer term in Zimbabwe, since wildlife can be 
"produced" by many different landowners in different parts of the country. Hunts that could 
substitute big game hunts in protected areas, such as the study area of Charara/Makuti, can 
be supplied on many categories of land. Using economic theory and the market model, it may 
be predicted that if the price is high enough, then landowners will tend to enter the hunting 
market and supply hunts, and as competition increases, the price of this hunting supply will 
tend to decrease. 
The important point m this adjustment process, is that market signals and the pnce 
mechanism were responsible for "coordinating" this increase in supply in the most efficient 
and cost-effective manner.2 The increase in supply was not brought about by a central 
planning authority deciding to "produce hunting alternatives" in Zimbabwe. Markets and the 
competitive price mechanism have the property of coordinating an economy to produce and 
distribute resources in a distributed allocation system, rather than controlling such allocations 
centrally using, for example, a lottery allocation system. 
By introducing competition, more quality for lower hunt prices can be achieved as more 
people offer hunting packages on their land. By increasing supply in response to people's 
willingness to pay the current market price, wildlife, land and economic activities are 
"developed" and welfare is created for the country as a whole. Market allocation systems can 
1 The system that systematically lowers the auction price, until the first person bids, known as the Dutch auction 
system . Used to auction flowers in Holland, it aims to achieve even higher prices than the bottom-up auction. It was 
not considered in this dissertation. 
2 Toe link between free markets and individual decision-making is emphasized particularly by the Austrian 
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bring about this economic development and welfare, with the consumer paying for the full 
costs of supplying and distributing resources during the development process - no subsidy 
is necessary, and no debts are incurred. Markets incorporate the principle that the user pays 
the full costs, if someone feels it is worthwhile producing, distributing and consuming that 
resource. 
2.2.5. Theoretical concepts of efficiency and equality 
The theoretical concepts of economically producing and distributing benefits from scarce 
resources at least cost to society, and enforcing a different political or non-economic 
distribution of benefits and resources, are at the core of efficient and equitable resource 
allocation principles. 
In this section, an attempt is made to transform the concepts from theory into practice for the 
problem of allocating sport hunting and understanding the purpose of using lotteries to 
allocate hunts to people, instead of market determined prices that are so widely used in 
everyday life. 
2.2.5.1. Introducing efficiency, equality and the trade-off problem 
The two concepts of efficiency and equality, and the trade-off problem that exists between 
them are introduced with an analogy. 
Imagine that hunting licences are distributed over-the-counter at every post office throughout 
Zimbabwe. For the purposes of this analogy1, the number of licences issued is unlimited, and 
hunters and post offices are evenly spaced throughout the country. Taking the number of 
hunting applicants in any year, and the total time worked by the post office employees to 
issue hunting licences, a prospective hunter might expect to queue, on average, for half an 
hour until his licence application is processed. 
Now suppose that the agency responsible for licensing decides to make the post office system 
more efficient. Licences are to be issued at a central licensing office, using an up-to-date 
processing system. The modern system allows the same number of hunting applicants to be 
processed as before, so that the average queuing time for any single hunting applicant remains 
unchanged, at half an hour. With a licensing system that costs the government less and has 
the same average queuing time for hunting applicants, clearly the system's efficiency is 
improved. 
How would the new licensing system affect hunters? Once the central licensing office is 
reached, each applicant then queues for the same amount of time under the old and the new 
1 The analogy is based on the examples used to introduce, and illustrate the same problem by Lancaster (1979): 
1-5. Hunting licences were distributed through the post office system in Zimbabwe from 1964 until 1975. Any further 
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system. The total time spent by each applicant in obtaining a hunting licence, however, has 
altered, and depends on where the hunter's home is located geographically relative to the 
licensing office. With the more efficient centralized allocation system, the agency has passed 
the costs of distributing licences on to the hunting applicants. For applicants who are now 
further from the licensing office than before, these access costs are tangible, and include extra 
travelling time, extra fuel or bus fares, and added inconvenience. The costs will be unevenly 
distributed amongst applicants. Hunters living farthest from the central licensing office might 
now be worst off under the new system.1 
In this analogy, the trade-off is obvious and explicit for hunters as extra distance. Most 
hunters must travel further than before to apply for a hunting licence, and might object 
vociferously to the more efficient licensing system. Improving the system's efficiency 
(reducing costs of allocation to the government agency for the same average waiting time) 
has created problems of equality by making some applicants worse off than others. 
Carrying the analogy one step further, imagine that a standardized hunt and hunting bag could 
be offered to all hunters, instead of the present variety of species and hunting dates. For the 
agency, this would simplify administration, require less time, and be more efficient. If the 
agency passed these cost savings on to hunters by offering the .standard hunts at a lower 
price, hunters who prefer a standard hunt would now be more satisfied. Hunters who 
preferred a non-standard hunt - and were willing to pay more for this choice - would be 
unsatisfied with the standard hunts. 
In this extended analogy the trade-off between the efficient allocation of hunts and the issue 
of equality is less obvious. The di tribution of satisfaction or dissatisfaction amongst the 
individual hunters, due to the standardized hunts, is less tangible, and defies meaningful 
quantification. Yet the choice of hunts available to hunters has been reduced, and somehow 
influences the equality and efficiency of hunt allocation. 
Both versions of the analogy capture the issues of equality, efficiency, and variety of choice 
for the individual hunter. The manner in which the efficiency of producing benefits from 
wildlife is traded off against the equality of benefit distribution is determined by the 
allocation system. Due to the variety of ways in which wildlife and natural areas can produce 
benefits, questions concerning which benefits to produce, and how to distribute these benefits 
amongst individuals are important. 
In addition, the analogy indicates that spacial aspects are important to consider when choosing 
a system to allocate hunting, since they directly influence efficiency of production and 
equality of access to hunting areas and their benefits. 
1 The analogy simplifies many examples of worst cases under the new system. Someone with limited or no 
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2.2.5.2. Efficiency: Producing benefits - How big is the cake? 
In everyday terms, the concept of efficiency means that the maximum benefit is obtained 
from a given number of resources, or conversely, that to produce a given benefit a minimum 
in resources is to be used.1 Efficiency thus relates the value of benefits from something that 
is produced as an output (a hunting experience) to the resource costs used to produce it as 
inputs (animal quota, time and space, financial and human resources). Ultimately, the concept 
of efficiency relates net-benefits to costs of inputs; it is a profit-related concept. Efficiency 
may also be viewed as not wasting scarce resources - when it does not necessarily require 
resources or benefits to be valued, but where quantities are sufficient. 
For American licensing systems in Wyoming, Crowe (1987) defines the outputs produced for 
hunting as: 
• the number of hunts (for uniform hunting bags); 
• the number of quality hunter-days, as valued by hunters . 
The costs of resources are the actual administration costs incurred by the agency to achieve 
the programmes necessary for this particular objective. 
The efficiency of a licensing system would then be defined as the number of hunts ( or value 
of the hunter-days) produced in relation to the administration costs incurred by the agency. 
In Zimbabwe, data on both the valuation of the hunting experience by citizen hunters, and 
on the agency's costs of producing the hunts (or hunter-days) are not available. There is a 
compounding problem, because for African wildlife hunting bags are not homogenous with 
single species bags, but consist of mixed bag of big game and plains game species. 
Instead of relating the value of citizen hunting to its costs of production, a licensing system's 
efficiency was measured firstly as the number of hunts actually benefitting hunters of those 
planned for the hunting area (Chapter 4), and secondly as revenue from hunting resources 
(quotas and access time) in Chapter 5. 
2.2.5.3. Equality: Distributing benefits - How is the cake sliced? 
The concept of equality in this dissertation means a particular pattern of resource distribution. 
Thus, there are many possible equalities - distribution patterns - and not only a single best 
equality. This notion of equalities as resource distribution patterns therefore includes all 
similar terms referring essentially to this notion, such as: equity, equal opportunity, equal 
access, fairness of allocation, pricing, or lottery. As used here, the concept of equality extends 
beyond the welfare notion of equal income and/or wealth for all persons (Samuelson, 1973: 
801-810), and include~ other resources and distribution patterns. Although equality is 
1 Literature on efficiency is extensive, and the terminology varies: See Taylor (1911 ); Martindell (1950); Shepherd, 
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generally accepted as a principle of resource allocation (Stauth, 1980; Lancaster, 1979), many 
authors fail to define the concept and make it operational. 1 
The political nature of equality as a distribution pattern is summarized by Coleman: 
"The very use of the tenn "equality" is often clouded by imprecise and inconsistent meanings. 
For example, "equality" is used to mean (1) equality before the law - equal treatment by the 
authorities, (2) equality of opportunity - equality of chances in the economic system, (3) 
equality of result - equal distribution of goods, amongst others. These different meanings often 
conflict, and are almost never wholly consistent." Coleman (1987): 169. 
He then relates equality to economic theory: 
"The concept of equality has no place in positive economic theory. There is in the concept of 
free choice, however, something closer to the idea of equality before the law, than to equality 
of opportunity. Equality of result implies a distribution process that is the antithesis of the 
market" . Coleman (1987): 170. 
Thus, it is clear that the concept of equality is normative (how resources and benefits ought 
to be distributed), and deals with the distribution pattern of benefits and costs. In a succinct 
and authoritative treatise on the subject in "Equalities" by Rae, et al. (1981), the authors 
define the concept and order the popular meanings given to equality. By so-doing, the authors 
show that there are almost unlimited dimensions to the concept of equality, and many "rules" 
by which resources can be distributed among people: in other words, Rae, et al. prove that 
many different equalities can be achieved, which depend on the precise definition of the 
dimensions of "equalness" by the decision-makers who are in a position of power to choose 
the allocation system. 
Taking the example of allocating hunts using a lottery, the following vexatious yet practical 
questions arise. The idea of using a lottery, rather than an auction price to allocate hunts, is 
that the criterion of randomness, rather than a hunter's maximum willingness to pay, should 
determine whether he hunts. Rae, et al. define this allocation as prospect-regarding equality 
of opportunity, that is: 
"Two persons, j and k, have equal opportunities for some end-good X if each has the same 
probability of attaining X." Rae, et al., (1981): 65-67. 
With a lottery, nothing about people should affect the allocation result, and the authors 
recognize that the prospect-regarding equality of opportunity is rare in practice. If this 
theoretical definition is applied to citizen hunting, several questions arise before the equality 
concept can be made operational and applied to allocate hunts by lottery. 
1 See for instance: Sinden and Worrel (1979): 64, who use "social utility"; Zimbabwe Government (1986): 26, who 
use "equity"; Zimbabwe Government (1992): 8, who use "equitable and efficient allocation of opportunities"; Preston, 
et al., (1991): 545-547, who use the synonyms "equity in a user-pays system", "unfair advantage", "appropriately 
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• What is the end-good X?: 
Is X an option to hunt, meaning the right to access and to hunt an unspecified hunt (Any 
Hunt), or does X mean the right to hunt a specific hunt of known characteristics that the 
hunter has chosen personally (First Hunt Preference)? Clearly, these are different cases. In 
the first instance, the rights to access and to hunt are randomized and the probability of 
winning them can be the same for all persons; hunters are not given a choice of which hunt 
they are allocated. In the second instance, hunters are given a choice of hunts; access and the 
right to hunt a specific hunt preference is then randomized for all persons who chose that 
same hunt and preference. Hunters choosing different hunts then need not necessarily have 
the same probability of winning that particular hunt preference. 
• What is meant by attaining X?: 
Is it enough to have an equal probability of winning a hunt in the lottery, yet allowing some 
persons to access the actual hunting benefits in ways other than by applying in the lottery (the 
free-rider problem)? In Zimbabwe this possibility exists and does occur, since co-hunters in 
the hunting party are not necessarily part of the lqttery draw procedure, and by cooperating 
with other applicants can adopt a strategy to enter the hunting area and benefit inspite of the 
lottery system. 
• What persons are meant?: 
Following on from above, is each applicant who applies to hunt to have an equal probability, 
or is each hunter who enters the hunting area (the hunter and co-hunters in any size of 
hunting party) to have an equal chance? 
The answer to this apparently trivial question is complicated, because the logical answer 
contradicts practice in Zimbabwe today. Logically, since the aim of applying is to participate 
as a hunter in a hunt, one expects prospects of winning a hunt to be the same for all hunters. 
In practice, however, no lottery system in Zimbabwe currently gives hunters, rather than 
applicants, equal prospects of success. No Zimbabwean lottery system's rules require 
applicants to specify their co-hunters. Co-hunters are thus not amongst the persons 
participating in the draw. In this dissertation it is assumed that for lottery allocation systems 
the prospects are to be equal for all hunters, not for all applicants (Chapter 4). 
A second interpretation of equality was adopted in Chapter 5. This definition of equality 
seeks to establish how widely the benefits of hunting (measured as numbers of persons) are 
distributed amongst hunters and other members of society in Zimbabwe, of those who benefit 
directly and personally from access to the hunting area. In this definition, an allocation system 
that earns large amounts of revenue in such a way that many people have access to the 
natural resource areas (eg. tourism, educational group outings) is considered to be more 
equitable than one which may earn the same revenue from a few persons only, but fails to 
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is similar to asking at which level of economic activity (large or small cake) a particular 
equality of resources or benefits (distribution pattern) should be achieved (see Rae, et al., 
1981: 128). (It should be noted that to be able to invest revenue from any activity (eg. sport 
hunting) and develop other benefits (eg. educational facilities and access), the first activity 
must produce a profit; revenue must exceed costs of production and distribution. Only then 
can an additional activity be funded and undertaken in terms of an equality objective.) 
2.2.5.4. Finding the balance 
There is an inherent conflict between allocating resources according to economic principles 
based on prices that reflect costs of production, and their allocation according to politically 
pre-determined criteria. In this dissertation an essentially economic view of all resource 
allocation decisions is adopted based on decision-making by individual persons as far as 
possible, rather than central authorities. 
The question for policy- and decision-makers is therefore not: Whether or not citizen hunters 
should be allocated hunting. In economic terms, the question becomes: What does it cost to 
allocate hunting resources to citizen hunters, as opposed to allocating the same resources for 
a different purpose, such as safari hunting or tourism? This essentially economic approach 
can be justified with the argument, that without a larger economic cake (consisting of wealth, 
income and jobs) which is growing at the same rate as Zimbabwe's population (3.13% in 
1992)1, each person's slice of the economic cake will diminish, increasing poverty and 
decreasing the prospects for sustainable development of all persons. The "World development 
report 1991" focused on the links between poverty and lack of development on the one hand, 
and reducing poverty with sustainable market oriented economic growth on the other (World 
Bank, 1991). 
The political question for rational decision-makers is then, whether the differences in costs 
and benefits of one resource allocation over another ( opportunity costs) are warranted, or can 
be justified for Zimbabwe as a developing country. 
This dissertation quantifies some opportunity costs of allocating citizen hunting using a 
particular lottery system in the Charara/Makuti hunting areas. Zimbabwe's current economic 
and social development priorities are outlined in section 2.6 of this chapter. 
1 Zimbabwe's population of 10.4 million persons was growing faster according to the 1992 census (3.13% p.a.), 
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2.3. Zimbabwe's legislation, policy and practice for 
allocating wildlife, land categories and land-use 
2.3.1. Introduction 
This section summarizes in point form policy and policy related statements relevant to citizen 
hunting in Zimbabwe. It documents the conflicting policy context for the allocation of 
wildlife, land-use and sport hunting activities in protected areas and other land categories in 
Zimbabwe. 
Six key documents contain policy and policy related statements relevant to wildlife in 
Zimbabwe, to sport hunting1 on state land in the Parks and Wild Life Estate, and to citizen 
hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area. The key documents are: 
(1) Parks and Wild Life Act of Zimbabwe 
(Act No. 14 of 1975. as amended on 1.8.1990); 
(2) Zimbabwe's National Conservation Strategy 
(Zimbabwe Government, l 987b ); 
(3) Policy for Wild Life 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1989d); 
( 4) Draft Wild Life Policy on Sport Hunting 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1990b); 
(5) Updated policy for Wild Life 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1992); 
(6) Workshop proceedings: "Recreational Hunting on State Land in Zimbabwe: 
Options for the Future" 
(Zimbabwe Government. 1984a). 
Two further draft policy documents for land-use management of the Charara/Makuti areas 
were consulted, but their contents remained as inofficial draft documents. The drafts do not 
clarify citizen hunting policy, but specify land-use intentions by the then decision-makers for 
the Charara/Makuti hunting areas. Non-consumptive land-use options were consistently 
underlined for these areas, due to their wilderness qualities and proximity to the Lake Kariba 
shoreline. The documents are mentioned here for completeness, in the absence of other formal 
documents (policy or park plan) that should guide management and research of present-day 
citizen hunting activities in the Charara/Makuti study area. The documents are: 
(7) Draft Policy Document for Charara Safari Area, 24.2.1991 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1981); 
(8) Draft Policy Document for Charara Safari Area, 19.7.1974 
(Zimbabwe Government. 1974). 
I Formulations in policy documents such as " ... sport hunting for Zimbabweans ... " and " ... hunting for citizens ... " 
(Zimbabwe Government. 1989d: p. 4) or " ... recreational hunting opportunities ... (for) indigenous Zimbabweans ... " 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 11) have been defined as "Citizen hunting" in this report. Policy which is cited in 
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2.3.2. Parks and wild life act: Act No. 14 of 1975 . 
The act states general policy for wildlife, land categories and landowner responsibility for 
hunting and wildlife on their land. The Act describes the system of protected areas, their 
purpose and permitted land-uses. 
2.3.3. National conservation strategy: 1987 
In the section on wildlife and protected areas, the use of economic principles for conservation 
and wildlife utilization is endorsed: 
"In the more remote farming areas, by giving wildlife economic values, and treating it like any 
other renewable resource, albeit one that requires special management and marketing skills, 
many benefits are realized." (Zimbabwe Government, 1987: 11) 
2.3.4. Policy for sport hunting 
2.3.4.1. Introduction 
The policy relating to allocation principles for land-use in protected areas, the use of wildlife 
for sport hunting activities, the provision of citizen hunting by the DNPWLM in protected 
areas is now summarized, with verbatim quotes from the five documents mentioned above. 
2.3.4.2. Policy for wild life: 1989 
The document "Policy for Wild Life" was valid in 1991 during the research period, but has 
since been updated to include the document "Draft Wildlife Policy on Sport Hunting" (see 
section 2.3.4.3), and now forms the current "Policy for Wild Life" as of 1992 (see section 
2.3.4.4). The 1989 version is in some respects more explicit, but contains statements that are 
ambivalent and remain so in the updated 1992 version. 
In section 3 of the policy, reference is made to the role of wildlife as an accepted ecologically 
and financially sustainable productive form of land-use, and linked to the passage quoted 
above from Zimbabwe's National Conservation Strategy. For land outside protected areas, 
wildlife production systems are to compete with conventional land-use (agriculture and 
domestic livestock) as a land-use according to "the outcome of competition ... [and] ... 
economic processes" (Zimbabwe Government, 1989d: 7). 
For land set aside as protected areas, section 11 of the policy, entitled "Recreation and 
Tourism", states: 
"In setting aside national parks I for the conservation of biological diversity, government is 
aware that this is a direct cost to the taxpayers of Zimbabwe and uses land which could 
otherwise be put to alternative uses. For this reason, government intends that citizens of 
Zimbabwe shall have a primary claim on the Parks and Wild Life Estate." (Government 
of Zimbabwe, 1989d: 19. Emphasis my own) 
1 Zimbabwe's system of protected areas (Parks and Wild Life Estate) comprises a category called "National Parks". 
In the context of the policy quoted from section 11, however, the entire system of protected areas is implied, since 
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This statement is reinforced one page later: 
"Government recognizes the primary right of Zimbabweans to benefit from the Parks and Wild 
Life Estate. It will ensure that the cost of recreation for Zimbabweans remains compatible 
with local incomes, and that there is a strong inducement for Zimbabweans to make use of 
their own natural and cultural heritage" (Zimbabwe Government, 1989d: 20. Emphasis my 
own) 
In section 12 on "Commitment to Funding", a financial strategy is outlined. The conservation 
(as preservation) of bio-diversity in key minimum areas within the protected areas is to be 
a priority, whilst the conservation (as utilization) of all remaining non-key park areas is 
accepted. Key areas should be adequately funded with the "entire annual budget [of the 
DNPWLM) ... allocated to them." (Zimbabwe Government, 1989d: 22). For non-key bio-
diversity areas, the document specifies that: 
"The remaining extent of the Parks and Wild Life Estate should be planned so that it 
generates, at a minimum, sufficient income for its own maintenance." (Zimbabwe 
Government, ]989d: 22. Emphasis my own). 
Key bio-diversity areas have yet to be mapped and defined in a park plan for the 
Charara/Makuti study area. The dilemma between using economic incentives to generate 
revenue and subsidizing access for Zimbabwe citizens by treating parks as open access 
resources is apparent in the following draft policy. 
2.3.4.3. Draft wild life policy on sport hunting: 1990 
This document was available when the research for this dissertation was conducted in 1991, 
but has since been partially included in the revised "Policy for Wild Life", dated 1992 (see 
section 2.3.4.4). A feature of this document is the dichotomy between promoting wildlife 
conservation as an industry by harnessing economic incentives and market principles on all 
categories of land in Zimbabwe, with the exception of those activities supplied to Zimbabwe 
citizens on the Parks and Wild Life Estate. For the sport hunting industry, section 8 of policy 
states: 
"Because of the potentially high returns from sport hunting, the Department (DNPWLM) will 
administer the industry for the maximum Jong term benefit to the nation rather than for 
short term profits to individuals. Allocation of state hunting areas will be done without favour, 
with the object of realizing the greatest overall gain to the national economy through 
efficient operators." (Zimbabwe Government, 1990b: 3. Emphasis my own). 
Further, section 12 of the draft policy states that the economic return from land should be the 
criterion for determining the land-use: 
"Sport hunting will not be entrenched as a form of land-use in any area, but will be 
managed on a flexible approach based primarily on economic returns from land. Non-
consumptive uses of wildlife will be preferred wherever they offer a better financial returns 
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In section 16 of the draft, an unqualified commitment is made to provide Zimbabwe citizens 
with sport hunting: 
"Government recognizes the right of Zimbabweans to enjoy sport hunting as a form of 
recreation. It [Government] will ensure that opportunities exist on State Land for hunting 
by citizens at affordable rates ... " (Zimbabwe Government, 1990b: 4. Emphasis my own). 
The interpretation of affordable in the context of a developing country wit~ large differences 
in income is not attempted. 
Section 17 specifies the lowest price at which sport hunting on state land is to be made 
available: 
"No wild animal will be hunted on state land for less than the prevailing market value of its 
meat and hide." (Zimbabwe Government, 1990b: 4). 
Market prices for wildlife and its products are extremely variable, and it is difficult to 
establish "average market prices" for the country as a whole. The problem is due to the lack 
of competitive, widely distributed formal markets for most wild animal products, and the 
influence of where the market is established for meat and hide. In rural markets, meat and 
hide prices are very low, but by transporting the products to larger urban markets with greater 
consumer purchasing power, prices for the same products can be increased many times over. 
2.3.4.4. Updated policy for wild life: 1992 
This document updates the two previous documents that were available at the time this 
research commenced (Policy for Wildlife: 1989 and Draft Wildlife Policy: 1990). Apart from 
incorporating some policy statements from both documents and introducing new terms, this 
updated version does not clarify policy on allocating wildlife in protected areas for citizen 
hunting. Wildlife, land and their land-uses are treated as economic resources when allocated 
for safari hunting on all land in Zimbabwe, but the same resources are treated as open access 
resources when allocated for citizen hunting in protected areas. Economic trade-offs are not 
clarified. 
In the preamble to section 2 of the current policy entitled on the "Public use of the Parks and 
Wild Life Estate", reference is made to the question of access for foreign versus Zimbabwean 
visitors: 
"Government places considerable importance on the primary right of Zimbabweans to have 
access to recreation in the Estate and will seek an equitable balance between domestic and 
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Section 2.3.2 then explicitly mentions citizen hunting: 
"Recreational hunting will be encouraged in appropriate areas of the Estate and opportunities 
provided to ensure that indigenous (sic) Zimbabweans1 have access to hunting. 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 11) Emphasis my own. 
The dichotomy between using market principles and non-market principles for resource 
allocation is clearly evident in section 4.4.4 on the pricing policy of wildlife resources: 
The Department will: "Ensure that wild life-based tourism in the Estate is priced so as not 
to undervalue the resource or to be subsidized, except in the case of facilities used by 
Zimbabwe residents, especially of low income, or where the tourism opportunities have a 
strong educational component for local people." (Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 16) Emphasis 
my own. 
Section 4.4.8 makes unqualified reference to the economic market model and the exception 
afforded to Zimbabweans for access: 
The Department will : "Market all tourist opportunities within the estate so as to rationalize 
supply and demand and ensure that Zimbabwean residents have a reasonable opportunity 
to enjoy the Estate." (Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 16) Emphasis my own. 
The terms "rationalize" and "reasonable" are meaningless in economic terms, and avoid the 
issue of costs of supplying any sport hunting activity to the public with scarce resources. 
The preamble to section 5 of the updated policy concerns sport hunting. The terms 
"recreational hunting" and "sport hunting" are used synonymously, but it is not always clear 
if reference is made to sport hunting as an "industry", or as a land-use that applies to citizen 
and to safari hunting activities. Initiall , a clear commitment to allocate sport hunting using 
economic principles is made: 
"Recreational hunting is an economically and ecologically efficient use of wild life consistent 
with policy for high quality and low density tourism. Recognizing the substantial foreign 
exchange earnings which huniing generates, Government will administer the industry for 
the maximum long term benefit to the nation rather than for short term profits to individuals." 
(Government of Zimbabwe, 1992: 17) Emphasis my own. 
In section 5.4, economic principles for resource allocation within protected areas are further 
endorsed, but unspecified reservations are made for the allocation of citizen hunting: 
"The Department [DNPWLM] will not entrench sport hunting in all Safari Areas in the Estate 
but will maintain a flexible approach based primarily on economic returns from land, 
provided that opportunities exist in the Estate for hunting by Zimbabwe citizens." (Zimbabwe 
Government, 1992: 17) Emphasis my own. 
1 In current political interpretation and daily usage. the term "indigenous" in Zimbabwe has a racial connotation. 
To adopt this usage for the allocation of sport hunting would mean. in the first instance, that a licensing system must 
discriminate according racial criteria. not according to every person's willingness to pay or every person's probability 
of being drawn in a lottery. A racial interpretation is rejected by the author. Firstly, the approach taken here to the 
allocation problem is an economic one, not a political one: thus, the opportunity costs of any hunt allocation are 
relevant. Secondly. a racial interpretation is not compatible with democratic government and market principles (World 
Bank, 1991): competitive market prices have the ability to supply all citizens (not only an elite) with hunts at least 
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In section 5.5 of the policy, a minimum price for the sale of sport hunting is formulated less 
precisely than that of the draft version on wildlife policy for sport hunting in 1989: 
"No animal will be hunted in the Estate for less than the market value of its raw products." 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 17). 
In a policy statement on the conservation of the African elephant species in section 9.3.2 of 
the policy for wild life, economic incentives are clearly highlighted as the general economic 
principle endorsed by the DNPWLM for resource allocation: 
"Consistent with its [Government] policy for placing a high economic value on all wild life, 
Government will defend Zimbabwe's right to trade in elephant products internationally." 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 34) Emphasis my own. 
2.3.4.5. Workshop on land-use policy for the study area 
The proceedings of the DNPWLM workshop, entitled "Recreational Hunting on State Land 
in Zimbabwe: Options for the Future", refer to citizen hunting for the Charara/Makuti study 
area, but fail to resolve key economic policy issues. Points of policy can be summarized as 
follows: 





The conflict between the economic benefits of earning foreign exchange (from 
safari hunting) for the Zimbabwe economy on the one hand, and the policy 
statement of offering Zimbabweans citizens affordable hunting was recognised, but 
not resolved. The key policy issue of which pricing system to adopt for citizen 
hunting remained open (Zimbabwe Government, 1984a: 47). 
The workshop recommended revenue maximization (in Zimbabwe dollar and 
foreign exchange currencies) for the predominantly big game quota in the Charara 
Safari Area . 
Revenue maximization in foreign exchange currencies for the predominantly big 
game quota in the Makuti Section of Hurungwe Safari Area was recommended by 
the workshop by selling specialist big game hunts1 to safari hunters. (Zimbabwe 
Government, 1984a: 2-3; 46) 
The remaining big game on quota in Charara/Makuti was to be sold to safari 
operators who had no access to big game (game ranchers) to balance and raise the 
marketable value of their plains game hunts (Zimbabwe Government, 1984a: 44-
45). 
Despite these recommendations for land-use and allocation of Charara/Makuti hunting areas 
as safari hunting in 1984, land-use practice in both areas has reverted from safari to citizen 
hunting as of 1987 (details in Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.2, page 62). By so-doing, all foreign 
exchange revenue has been foregone for these protected areas. 
1 Specialist big game hunts include elephant hunts, buffalo hunts and leopard and lion hunts (Seymour-Smith, 
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2.3.5. Critical summary and conclusions: 
Conflicting allocation principles, policies and practices 
Farsighted legislation and sport hunting as an experimental land-use in Zimbabwe viewed 
wildlife and land in agriculturally marginal areas as economic resources. Successful 
conservation was achieved by giving land authorities rights as custodians to use, benefit from 
and thereby protect the resource and its ecological land base. Utilization and the right to 
benefit allowed these scarce and valuable resources to be priced using money at their highest 
marketable value. Wildlife in Zimbabwe was thus effectively turned from a public access and 
common property resource (ownerless) into an economically controlled access and private 
property ( owned) resource, because economic values of wildlife to landowners greatly 
exceeded its costs of protection in this type of system. This economic principle of allocation 
has been endorsed by the DNPWLM and successfully applied on private land by landowners, 
on communal land by appropriate land authorities 1, on state owned forest land by the state 
Forestry Commission agency, on state owned private land by state agencies2 - all based on 
safari hunting as the economically most valuable form of utilization. 
In contrast to the above, section 2.3 on legislation, policy and practice has shown that 
economic principles of allocation have yet to be fully endorsed by the Zimbabwe Government 
and DNPWLM and consequently applied on land designated as Parks and Wild Life Estate -
Zimbabwe's protected area system. The economic and social benefits of this land may be 
va luable in terms of conservation value, but the costs of protecting these valuable assets for 
Zimbabwe presently exceed the financial resources of the DNPWLM under this non-economic 
system. 
Costs of enforcing protection, management and research for all protected areas are largely 
incurred by the DNPWLM, although donor-funding of endangered species protection is taking 
place>' Some costs are borne by persons leasing protected areas (safari operators and the 
ZHA). Increasingly, there are disturbing signs that many costs are being borne by society but 
remain unquantified. For example, the loss of endangered black rhinoceros and elephant 
species in protected areas4, deforestation of protected areas\ insufficient resources for 
I See the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe Trust, 
et al., (1990) and Child and Peterson (1991) for some recent results. 
2 Two state agencies own significant tracts of private land in Zimbabwe with developed wildlife resources. The 
Agricultural Development Authority (ADA) owns l '096km 2, whilst the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) owns 
2'095km\ both with wildlife potential (Price Waterhouse: Volume 5, 1992b: 38-42). Safari hunting occurs at present 
on ADA ranches (Zimbabwe Herald. 16.2.93). 
3 Zimbabwe Herald (6.2.93) reported that the DNPWLM had received a helicopter and materials worth 2.$3 million. 
4 Press reports in Zimbabwe Herald issues: 15.12.92; 21.1.93 (editorial); 28.1.93; 22.2.93. 
5
• Coates-Palgrave (in press) reported at a conference "Our endangered environment" on the 6.2.1992 that the Haroni 
and Rusitu Botanical Reserves (two areas protected for their bio-diversity) on the border to Mozambique had never 
been mapped on the ground by the DNPWLM. and had both been almost deforested of their former lowland tropical 
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protection and management by the DNPWLM1). Due also to the lack of financial resources 
allocated to the DNPWLM budget by central government for conservation and development2 
in protected areas (Child and Heath, 1990), present and future generations in Zimbabwe 
arguably also bear the indirect costs of species Joss, understaffed protection and management, 
and the Jack of significant development and conservation benefits. These benefits may be 
significant, but are being foregone, that is not realized, despite the inherent economic and 
ecologically sustainable high value of wildlife and natural resource areas. 
From an economic perspective, it would appear that conservation and development activities -
such as sport hunting - in protected areas must adhere to ecological sustainability, as 
proposed by numerous environmentalists (eg. IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1991; World Commission 
on Environment and Development, 1987). The activities in protected areas also needs to 
incorporate a further principle, that of financial sustainability, in order to become truly 
sustainable for present and future generations alike. Leaving ecological debts ( deforestation) 
and financial debts ( eg. Zimbabwe's national and foreign debt) is shifting the burden of 
present resource allocation to future generations to deal with. 
·1 
In the press, Martin reported that the DNPWLM had insufficient funding to carry out an elephant culling exercise, 
and that the department had run out of funds (Zimbabwe Herald, 2.2.93). See also Zimbabwe Herald (20.1.93; 
6.2.93). Child and Heath (1990): 223 report a declining real budget against growing commitments by the DNPWLM, 
and lack of funds. Earlier reports by Pittman focused on the lack of funds even earlier (Financial Gazette 
(Zimbabwe). 21.12.84). 
2 Of the total DNPWLM budget in 1991 (ZS33 million), 63% was planned for salaries and only 3.5% for capital 
expenditure (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 1991 ). Capital development expenditure by the department has not exceeded 
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2.4. Zimbabwe's sport hunting: Land resources, 
licensing systems and their administration 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Zimbabwe's total land area of 390'310 km2 is classified into four main categories, with the 
following areas and proportions: 
Table 2.4 Zimbabwe's land classification, by landowner category 
:::l ::i: ::!li!!:J: r.$Mtic·i1:g6i; = : : 
1
J!li
11fb~m!gfiq!~ ,kA& < : 
:<:§t~t~b~~ed ····· <· · r· 
· Communal farm land 
:.State -owned . 
park,s and Wild Life · Estate 
.)lj;~i .i:i1:!\~~d 
Source: Sayee (1987); DNPWLM list of promulgated Parks Estate, dated 1983; Adjustment made for a reduction 
in communal land area due to the increase in the Parks and Wild Lif  Estate since 1987. 
As a result of the legal reforms for wild life management which were initiated in 1960 and 
culminated in the proclamation of the Parks and Wild Life Act in 1975, landowners on all 
categories of land in Zimbabwe were made responsible for the management of wildlife on 
their land.1 On commercial land, the private landowner is authorized; on communal land, the 
state or the appropriate rural district council is authorized; on Parks and Wild Life Estate, the 
government Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM) 1s 
responsible; on forest land, the government Forestry Commission is authorized. 
In 1975, state controlled hunting licenses and license fees for wildlife were abolished for 
hunting activities. Appropriate land authorities were given the power to decide on hunting and 
issue licences . For areas hunted within the protected areas (Parks and Wild Life Estate) the 
DNPWLM remained responsible for licensing hunting. Thus the respective land authorities 
have had real economic incentives to conserve and manage wildlife on their land for their 
own benefit. Extensive restocking of suitable private and communal wild land with wildlife 
over the last 10 to 20 years has increased the potential supply of plains game quotas for 
utilization. Hunting is only one of these forms of consumptive utilization, but plains game 
quotas could become increasingly available for hunting on private land in the future. 
As the government agency responsible for implementing the Act, the DNPWLM has 
attempted "to follow free market principles to the maximum extent possible" (Child and 
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Heath, 1990: 216). Certain sections of the policy documents also reflect these economic 
principles (see section 2.3.4, page 38), whilst policy and practice have excluded economic 
principles from allocating citizen hunting. 
Sport hunting takes place on land in each of Zimbabwe's four land categories distinguished 
above. At present, all hunting alternatives supplied on land categories outside protected areas 
consist of safari hunting. Big game populations in these areas, together with those on forest 
land and areas hunted in the protected areas of the Parks and Wild Life Estate, form the core 
of the safari hunting industry. The supply of wildlife for safari hunting available on any land 
type in Zimbabwe is allocated using competitively determined market prices. Being 
commercial, the safari hunting allocation systems are termed safari operator marketing 
systems in this dissertation. 
The potential and type of hunting offered on private land, forest land, and communal land 
will be briefly reviewed here, before sport hunting activities in Zimbabwe's protected areas 
are then considered in detail. 
On private land, plains game species are used for safari hunting, together with big game 
quotas on state land which increases the hunt value to the private landowner. No data on the 
supply of citizen hunting on commercial farm land is available (White, personal 
communication), although the ZHA regularly advertises short, individual plains game hunts 
to association members. 
On communal land, quotas comprise predominantly big game, but include plains game. Rural 
communities have opted for safari hunting to maximize the revenue from their wildlife 
resource base in the communal areas management programme for indigenous resources 
(CAMPFIRE). Safari operators tender for a lease on their land. To date, rural communities 
have not decided to use their wildlife resources for citizen hunting, either for their own 
benefit, or as a form of land-use and source of income. 
On all other state owned land (forest areas, state owned private land) safari hunting, as the 
economically most valuable use of wildlife, is being developed. 
2.4.2. Protected areas used for sport hunting: Location, area, 
licensing systems and administration 
The Parks and Wild Life Estate covers almost 50'000 km2, or 12.7% of Zimbabwe (see 
Table 2.4, page 45) . It is divided into six classes of protected areas. Legislation currently 
permits sport hunting in only one category, known as Safari Areas. A total of 38% 
(18'963km2) of the Parks and Wild Life Estate has been set aside as Safari Areas. 
The purpose of designating Safari Areas is to provide for a wide range of outdoor recreational 
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consumptive uses of wildlife, such as hunting and fishing, to any form of non-consumptive 
use, such as camping, photography, game viewing, bird watching . Although sport hunting 
as a land-use predominated in these areas historically, Safari Areas are not intended by 
legislation to be used solely for hunting, but are meant to be multi-purpose areas. 
The research concentrates on populations of big game and dangerous game restricted to the 
category of protected areas known as Safari Areas, referred to as hunting areas in this 
dissertation. These species are arguably some of the largest, most spectacular and valuable 
of Africa's wildlife resources. 
The location of Safari Areas within Zimbabwe and their current land-use is shown in 
Map 2.1, page 47. The extent of each Safari Area used for the three types of sport hunting 
(citizen hunting, citizen/safari hunting and safari hunting, as defined in section 2.1.7.2, 
page 19) and for other non-consumptive activities in each Safari Area is shown in Table 2.5, 
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At present, 13% of all land in the Safari Area category is devoted to non-hunting activities. 
Sport hunting activities predominate in the remaining areas. Safari hunting takes place in 
over half (57%) of the land area set aside as Safari Areas. These areas are leased to 
commercial safari operators as exclusive hunting concessions. 
Table 2.5 Extent of Safari Areas in Zimbabwe, by land-use: 1991 
\,:p<M;{ 
f¢1Ats t· ·.· 3'41.6 .•. · 1s% .. · .1()'.ts.a\ si% ••• ~·316 fa~\ /2~1~!\13%/ :1s}963 :: Jppj::: 
Sources: Boundaries as legislated for Safari Areas according to Parks and Wild Life Act 14 of 1975, and 
amended at the 1st August 1990; Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management; Cumming (1988); 
Digitized topographical maps (Appendix 17, page Al 10), calculated to the nearest 1 km 2• 
Citizen/safari hunting, open to both foreign and Zimbabwe citizen hunters, is offered on a 
further 18% of the land area in two areas: in part of the Hurungwe Safari Area called the 
Nyakasanga section, and in the Sapi Safari Area. The allocation of hunts takes place using 
an auction system administered by the DNPWLM. The licensing system in both hunting areas 
is termed the DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi (see Table 2.6, page 49). 
The remaining 18% of the Safari Areas is allocated to citizen hunting. Citizen hunting is 
administered using three licensing systems, and each system applies to different hunting areas. 
The DNPWLM allocates citizen hunting using a lottery in the Charara/Makuti study area, 
which comprises · portions of two separate Safari Areas: one portion of 570km2 is situated 
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the Hurungwe Safari Area. Together, they comprise the Charara/Makuti hunting area and 
cover 1 '452km2• This allocation system is termed the DNPWLM lottery system for the 
Charara/Makuti hunting areas (see Table 2.6, page 49) . 
Citizen hunting is administered secondly by the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association (ZHA). The 
organisation allocates citizen hunting to members using a lottery system for three hunting 
areas: part of the Hurungwe Safari Area called the Rifa section, Doma Safari Area and Tuli 
Safari Area. These licensing systems are termed the ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa 
hunting areas (see Table 2.6, page 49). 
In the third system, the DNPWLM allocates citizen hunting of impala using a tender system 
at a hunting camp called Dandawa, located in the Nyakasanga section of Hurungwe Safari 
Area. This licensing system is termed the DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa. 
Table 2.6 summarizes the licensing systems that allocate citizen hunting in Zimbabwe's 
protected areas. 
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2.5. Citizen hunting in Zimbabwe: Supply and demand dynamics 
2.5.1. Supply of citizen hunting in protected areas 
The number of citizen hunters that could be accommodated by the hunts supplied in protected 
areas is shown in Table 2.7. The table summarizes data from Chapter 3, where each system 
is reviewed separately. The calculation is based on the number of hunts and maximum 
number of hunters allowed per hunting party. 
Table 2.7 Supply of citizen hunting in protected areas (Safari Areas): 1991 
A total of 277 predominantly big game trophy hunts of various types, are available to 
·accommodate a maximum of 704 Zimbabwe citizen hunters. 
2.5.2. Demand for citizen hunting protected areas 
Data on the number of hunters participating in hunting in Zimbabwe are limited. Describing 
the early development of sport hunting, Cumming (1988) reports between 86 and 213 
participating sport hunters on state land in 1969 to 1973. An increase in the number of 
participating non-resident (foreign) hunters from 36% to 47% is noted for the same period. 
Further data after 1973 is not available. These figures do not indicate demand, ie. the number 
of people willing to pay a certain price to hunt in Zimbabwe (Samuelson, 1973). Demand 
would include those hunters who applied to hunt, and could not participate, and should be 
related to the price of hunting. 
No estimate has been made to date of the type and size of the demand for hunting and its 
benefits (trophy, venison, recreation) in Zimbabwe. The author considered using a 
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exceeded the scope of the dissertation and the available financial resources to conduct it in 
rural areas1• 
Three methods were used to gather information on the demand for citizen hunting by 
Zimbabweans. First, a few Zimbabwe hunters were questioned informally. Qualitative 
information was sought, in preference to quantitative data. Second, the actual number of 
citizen hunters who demanded hunts in 1991 was quantified using licence data. The third 
method estimated the number of Zimbabweans who potentially qualify as citizen hunters, 
based on available income distribution data. 
2.5.2.1. Demand perceptions by citizen hunters 
A limited number of Zimbabwean hunters were interviewed to gather qualitative information 
on Zimbabwe citizen hunter's expectations. Their experiences and suggestions for improving 
the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti used in 1991 were sought. 
The interviewed hunters (Appendix 3, page A27) were selected according to their sport 
hunting experience and their membership in the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association. Interviews 
lasting on average half an hour were conducted by appointment at the hunter's place of work 
during working hours, on an informal basis. The initial questions asked were general 
(Appendix 4, page A27), in order to give the interviewee scope to elaborate on his personal 
experiences, after which more specific follow-up questions attempted to find out particular 
motives for hunting, expectations of the hunting bag and infrastructure in particular areas, and 
any suggestions for improving any aspect of hunt allocation. 
The summarized results of the hunter interviews are as follows: 
• The motives for hunting ranged from being dedicated to the sport of trophy 
hunting, enjoying the venison, and to seeking the hardships, relaxation, and bush-
life experience. 
• Sport hunting activities are undertaken in tightly knit groups of people. The 
combined application by several hunters for a hunt, and subsequent sharing of 
costs and participation in the camp activities is common practice. 
• Hunters were well aware of the economic value of venison from game; hunters 
plan their hunting trip to make full use of the value of the animals on quota, 
frequently selling venison to recover some costs of the hunting trip on their return. 
• No hunter was fully aware, or informed, about the licensing systems available to 
citizen hunters in Zimbabwe. Hunters not well informed about how to apply for 
the hunting opportunities, or how individual licensing systems worked. 
• Hunters were very dissatisfied with the DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti from experiences in 1991 and previous years. They felt the system 
1 The cost of a household survey of I '000 people (660 rural. 250 high density urban, 90 low density urban 
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was particularly unsatisfactory since the latest changes made to the system in 
1991. 
• One interviewed hunter who had hunted for over 20 years, further specified his 
displeasure with the lottery system for Charara/Makuti in 1991. He stated that the 
hunting bag he had been allocated by the lottery draw had not included a major 
trophy animal, and he admitted that it was not worth his while to pay for the hunt, 
or to go hunting, and he forfeited his right to hunt. 
• Hunters who had experience of the hunting camps in the ZHA lottery system for 
the Rifa hunting areas stated that the lack of facilities and infrastructure in the 
Charara/Makuti area made it more expensive and less attractive for a hunting party 
to go there. Items mentioned that were lacking included: slaughter facilities, meat 
drying facilities and water availability for the camp. 
• 
• 
All hunters either volunteered the information, or agreed when prompted, that the 
DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti (1991 version) did not allow 
applicants to choose any of the important hunt characteristics. Those mentioned 
included: the hunting bag, the hunt price, the hunting dates. 
Hunters emphasized that hunting for sport was an expensive recreation in terms 
of money, and time. A hunter has to take leave from his workplace for the hunting 
period (s ix days for Charara/Makuti hunts). This means that only persons in higher 
salaried positions could afford to hunt, or could take a week's unplanned leave 
during the year for the hunt they had been allocated in the DNPWLM lottery 
system in 1991. 
2.5.2.2. Estimating present demand for citizen hunting in protected areas 
In the following, the present number of citizen hunters in protected areas is estimated based 
on known hunting applicants . For the DNPWLM auction system, the number of participants 
was not available; instead, the number of hunts actually bought by citizen hunters is used. For 
the DNPWLM tender system application data was not available from the Harare licensing 
office, and an assumption is made (Tavona, personal communication). 
For 1991, the number of Zimbabwe citizens demanding various types of big game hunts in 
Zimbabwe is estimated in Table 2.8, page 53. At minimum, about 1 '000 Zimbabwe citizens 
demanded hunts in protected areas in 1991. Prices for the hunts varied considerably, 
depending on the licensing system used (market-priced or fix-priced), the species composition 
of the hunting bag (big game or plains game, trophy or non-trophy species) and the presence 
of foreign hunters (eg. in Nyakasanga and Sapi hunting areas). Hunt prices ranged between 
2$18'000 and Z$1 '000 per hunt. The table summarizes data from Chapter 3, where each 
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Table 2.8 Estimated present demand for citizen hunting in protected areas (Safari Areas): 1991 
2
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2.5.2.3. Estimating potential demand for citizen hunting in Zimbabwe 
Potential demand for hunting by Zimbabwe citizens was estimated using data on income 
distribution by wage category, as reported by the Central Statistics Office (Zimbabwe 
Government, 1988b ). Although the author is aware of the shortcomings and tentative nature 
of these data on income distribution, comprehensive data is not available. It is frequently 
reported that Zimbabwe has a very unequal income distribution (see World Bank, 1992: 592; 
Zimbabwe Government, 1986: 19-27). For the purpose of estimating a maximum number of 
persons who would qualify by their reported gross income alone to spend between Z$11 '000 
and Z$28'000 for a big game hunting trip (see section 2.1.1, page 13), the data quality was 
judged to be adequate. 
In 1985, the highest wage category distinguished by the survey was for "urban high income 
households" with an average income of Z$10'100 per annum, or greater. This wage category 
represents the min imum gross income that might allow a person a disposable income high 
enough, to afford the expensive sport of hunting big game. This income level in 1985 prices 
was adjusted to 1991 prices by multiplying it with the rise in the consumer price index for 
higher income urban families (taken from Zimbabwe Government, 1991a). Between 1985 
(index 198%) and 1991 (index 409%) the index rose by 211 %. The urban high income thus 
represented households earning on average about Z$21 '000 per annum in 1991, or greater. 
In rural areas in Zimbabwe, average income is lower by several orders of magnitude 
compared to urban centres. 1 
1 For the Omay communal land in the Zambezi valley during the period 1984-1985, Reynolds (1991: 31) calculated 
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The urban high income household category represents 14% of all households surveyed 
(Zimbabwe Government, 1988b ). Taking this proportion to be representative for Zimbabwe's 
whole population of 10.4 million (1992 census), a total of 1.4 million citizens (14%) would 
be in this highest income category and earning over Z$21 '000 per annum. 
Of these persons, what proportion are sport hunters? Dagg (n.d.) reports that hunters 
constitute between 0.18% and 8.5% of the total population for various European countries, 
and America respectively. In the absence of similar baseline data from the southern African 
countries, it is assumed here for Zimbabwe that sport hunters represent a maximum of 5% 
(about 72'000 persons), or a minimum of 0.2% (or 1'400 persons) of this country's so-
calculated highest income category. 
Therefore, it is estimated that in Zimbabwe there are potentially a maximum of 72'000 citizen 
hunters ( or less than l001h of the total population), and potentially a minimum of 1 '400 citizen 
hunters ( or more than 10'0001h of the total population). The minimum estimate of potential 
citizen hunters compares closely with the 1 '000 estimated actual number of citizen hunters 
in Zimbabwe for 1991. Evidently citizen hunting is a sport that only very few Zimbabweans 
actually engage in at present, and potentially could engage in, due to the high cost of a 
hunting trip . 
2.6. Resource allocation, protected areas and development in 
Zimbabwe: A national perspective 
2.6.1. The status: Selected development indicators for Zimbabwe 
Table 2.9 summarizes selected indicators of Zimbabwe's current development status. The 
table reflects that Zimbabwe is a "typical" developing country, with a rapidly growing 
population, a stagnating economy, and large foreign and public sector debts. 
2.6.2. The priorities: Conservation, development and markets 
The economic and social development priorities for Zimbabwe are outlined clearly in 
documents announcing ESAP, Zimbabwe's Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 







Earning foreign exchange by promoting economic export activity and investment; 
Creating employment, income and wealth; 
Reducing the Zimbabwe government's budget deficit and the national debt; 
Reducing Zimbabwe's balance of payments deficit and the national foreign debt; 
Promoting a dynamic market-oriented economy, with Jess government 
involvement. 
The documents also emphasise that Zimbabwe's economic development priorities must take 
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Table 2.9 Indicators of Zimbabwe's socio-economic development 
Sources: World Bank (1991) (for a). d); e), f), g), h), j), k). 1). m)]; 1992 Census of Zimbabwe (for b), c)]; 
Zimbabwe Government (1988b) (for u). v), y)]; First Merchant Bank (1992) (for i)]; Stenflo (1992) [for p), q), r), 
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2. 7. Conclusions and progression of study 
Sport hunting activities, of which citizen hunting by Zimbabweans is one type, are not a basic 
human need. Citizen hunting is an expensive luxury practised by an estimated 1 '000 persons 
in Zimbabwe in 1991. A citizen hunt costs between Z$11 '000 and Z$28'000 to undertake, 
although these expenses may be shared out amongst members of the hunting party. An 
important component of citizen hunting is the number of non-hunters in a hunting party who 
benefit from the hunter ' s right of access to the protected area, and undertake a wide range 
of non-consumptive (recreational) activities as a result. 
Citizen hunting encompasses hunters who may be interested in two very different types of 
hunts: trophy hunters, who are willing to pay high prices for quality big game and plains 
game trophy hunts, and venison hunters, who are mainly interested in hunting for the venison 
meat but are prepared to pay less than trophy hunters . 
By national income standards for Zimbabwe's population, however, citizen hunters must be 
amongst the wealthiest segment of the population to afford to hunt big and plains game in 
protected areas. This is because the available hunts consist of a hunting bag with several 
animals and species to be hunted over a 7 to 10-day period, which requires hunters to be take 
leave from work for this time period. The bags include at least one major big game species -
the most expensive and valuable species of African wildlife. 
This chapter showed that citizen hunting in Zimbabwe is allocated using a variety of licensing 
systems under different institutional arrangements. The majority of citizen hunters benefit , 
from hunts offered by the DNPWLM or the ZHA using different versions of a lottery system 
at fixed prices. Policy relating to citizen hunting and resource allocation principles stands in 
direct conflict with the economic approach that has otherwise been encouraged by the 
DNPWLM for the economic allocation and valuation of wildlife, and land-use, for safari 
hunting at market prices on all other land inside and outside protected areas. 
The concept of using a lottery to give Zimbabwe citizens an "equal opportunity" to benefit 
from citizen hunting - termed equality in this dissertation - can be expected to be difficult, 
and costly to achieve in practice. Foreign exchange, a resource of top priority for Zimbabwe's 
declared national economic and social development goals, is being foregone outright by 
allocating certain hunting areas exclusively to Zimbabwe citizens. 
Chapter 3 following gives a technical review of licensing system alternatives in Zimbabwe 
and other countries. The procedures used by lottery systems . to allocate hunts are considered 
in detail, and compared . Additional licensing systems used in other countries are reviewed 
briefly. 
Because of indications given by hunters interviewed in Zimbabwe and data from Chapter 3, 
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Chapter 4 assesses the lottery system's efficiency and equality. Chapter 5 then assesses the 
DNPWLM lottery system for the Charara/Makuti study area comparatively against other 
Zimbabwe licensing systems to establish some of the principle opportunity costs of using a 
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CHAPTER3 
REVIEW OF LICENSING SYSTEM ALTERNATIVES 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter describes five licensing systems that allocated sport hunting during 1991 in 
Zimbabwe. Three of these systems supplied hunting exclusively to Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
(citizen hunting); one system supplied hunting to both Zimbabwe citizens and foreign hunters 
(citizen/safari hunting); one further system markets internationally competitive hunting only 
to foreign hunters (safari hunting). A brief description of three further systems supplying sport 
hunting in other countries follows, highlighting aspects that differ to the Zimbabwean 
allocation systems. 
Table 3.1 below shows the alternatives reviewed in this chapter. 
Table 3.1 Zimbabwean and foreign licensing systems reviewed 
•··········••·•••: ·•••••··~i9~~r~··~t~j~m•••••••• . 
. /.·.·:::·: . . · .. :-·-: .. : 
····~r~,\~tf!/p~ise) 
.· .·. 
marketing syst~rn, ·· 
As indicated in Table 3.1, each system regulates sport hunting activities in one or more 
hunting areas. Each Zimbabwean licensing system is first introduced with a location map of 
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according to the framework for licensing systems introduced in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.3, 
page 23). The description follows the sequence of functions proposed by this framework. The 
lottery systems are a complex allocation method, and are reviewed in some detail (the 
DNPWLM, ZHA and Wyoming lottery systems). Their hunt allocation procedures are 
compared and contrasted to reveal the type of "fairness" attained by each lottery. 
According to the framework, each licensing system's major components are: 
• the quota (species, sex and composition); 
• the quota allocation to hunts (hunting bag, hunting period, hunting dates); 
• the pricing of hunts (at fixed prices or market prices); 
• the demand for hunts by applicants; 
• the procedure that allocates hunts to applicants (is personal choice possible?); 
• the procedure that re-allocates any surplus hunts after the first allocation 
procedure; 
• facilities available to hunters at campsites and hunting rules. 
Detailed data for each licensing system are included in appendices, to which the reader is 
referred throughout the chapter. This data has been organised according to the order in which 
licensing systems are reviewed here, with the following categories: 
• Quota allocations to hunts (Appendices 2.1 to 2.7.2); 
• 
• 
Fixed prices for each species sold by ' lottery systems, set according to the 
government trophy fee schedule (Appendix 8); 
_Prices of each hunt sold to hunters (Appendices 7.1 to 7.7.2); 
For the hunts sold by a safari operator marketing system details on the quota allocations, 
prices charged and hunt prices are shown separately (Appendix 16, page A109). 
Two foreign licensing systems emphasize venison hunting of plains game rather than trophy 
hunting of big game and plains game. Examples of their hunts and hunt prices are also 
included in appendices: 
• for the NPB lottery system, see Appendix 15.1; 
• for the Ciskei first-come-first-served system, see Appendix 15.2 . 
For a summary of the Zimbabwean systems and the Wyoming lottery system, readers are 
referred to the final section of this chapter. The market model presented in Chapter 2 
(Figure 2.4, page 27) is applied in turn to summarize each licensing system. The specific 
economic model shows the different ways that licensing systems: 
• Limit the number of applicants demanding hunts to the fixed supply; 
• 
• 
Distribute the available hunt variety amongst hunting applicants 
according to some rule (eg. personal willingness to pay, or probability); 
Price hunts using fixed, or market prices . 
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3.2. Review of Zimbabwe's licensing systems 
3.2.1. The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti 
3.2.1.1. The Charara/Makuti study area 
The Charara/Makuti study area is part of two protected areas of the Parks and Wild Life 
Estate in northern Zimbabwe: the Charara Safari Area and the Makuti Section of Hurungwe 
Safari Area. The general terrain is very rugged as the escarpment descends from the plateau 
to the Zambezi valley and the eastern shores of Lake Kariba. The Charara/Makuti study area 
is mapped as a foldout in Appendix 20, page Al 13. 
The boundaries of the Charara/Makuti study area are complicated by the fact that three areas 
exist that are utilized differently for hunting and non-hunting activities within the two 
protected areas, namely: 




The Kuburi Wilderness Area is zoned as a non-hunting area, leased by the 
DNPWLM to the Zimbabwe Wildlife Society for recreational development; 
The area situated south of the game fence within the remaining portion of Charara 
Safari Area is leased by the DNPWLM to a safari operator for safari hunting. 
The portion known as the Charara/Makuti citizen hunting area is indicated on the map 
(Appendix 20, page Al 13) by wide diagonal hatching. The Zambezi escarpment forms a 
natural boundary to the north, running in a north-easterly direction. The game-proof veterinary 
control fence forms a physical boundary to the south. It runs in a north-easterly direction, 
bisecting the entire Charara Safari Area from southwest to northeast. The main road along 
the watershed from Makuti to Kariba defines the boundary between Charara Safari Area and 
the Makuti Section of Hurungwe Safari Area. 
The Kuburi Wilderness Area is indicated on the same map by narrow vertical hatching. The 
unshaded area between the game-proof veterinary control fence and the cattle-proof veterinary 
control fence, which forms the southernmost boundary of the Charara Safari Area, is leased 
to a safari operator for safari hunting.1 The two metre high game-proof fence is well 
maintained by the Tsetse and Trypanosomiasis Control, and prevents any movement of any 
wildlife between the southern part used for safari hunting and the northern parts used for 
citizen hunting and tourist development. 
The government Department of Veterinary Services is currently substituting the existing 
cattle-proof veterinary control fence on the southern border of Charara Safari Area for a 
buffalo-proof fence with the aim of controlling the spreading of foot-and-mouth disease to 
1 The author is grateful to Cunliff (personal communication) for this point. later confirmed as Vadoma Safaris by 
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cattle south of the fenceline (Hargrieves, personal communication). Once this work reaches 
the eastern boundary of the Charara Safari Area, near the section marked "Provisional fence 
alignment" on the foldout map (see Appendix 20, page A113), the present game-proof fence 
bisecting the Charara Safari Area will be removed in its entirety. This can be expected by the 
end of 1993 at the earliest (Flanagan, personal communication). The removal of the game-
proof fence will have important consequences for the future planning, vegetation and wildlife 
management in the area, as well as for Charara's consumptive and non-consumptive 
utilization potential. Management actions of particular importance will be those concerning 
Brachystegia woodland management in the escarpment, early burning programmes1 and 
elephant population management. Deforestation of the woodland is documented clearly by 
aerial photographs2 for the fence section that crosses the main road between Vuti and 
Makuti. 
3.2.1.2. Introduction to licensing systems used in Charara/Makuti 
Charara was designated as a Safari Area in 1975.3 Until the end of 1986, all of Charara 
Safari Area was leased to professional safari operators for big game trophy hunting (with 
interruptions during the war in the early 1980's). Since 1987, the area's land-use has been 
split into the three categories mentioned above. Until 1986, all of the Makuti Section of 
Hurungwe Safari Area was allocated for citizen/safari hunting. Since then, this area has been 
given over to hunting exclusively for Zimbabwe citizens. 
For the remainder of the report, "Charara/Makuti study area" refers only to those parts of 
Charara and Makuti that are presently used for citizen hunting. 
The licensing systems used to regulate citizen hunting in Charara/Makuti are administered by 
the DNPWLM. Since citizen hunting was introduced in 1987, the lottery system has been 
altered three times. 
The first version (1987-1989) of the lottery system allowed each applicant to purchase 
unlimited numbers of lottery tickets, at Z$20 per ticket. Applicants submitted a preference 
list of animals (species, and numbers of animals) and were able to compose their own hunting 
bag, based on personal choice and a fixed trophy price for each species in the bag. 
1 For the problem and management of Brachystegia woodland in the escarpment, see: Zimbabwe Government 
(1989b) and Robertson (in press). For practical early-burning recommendations, see Robertson (n.d.). 
2 See 1:25'000 aerial photographs for the years 1973 (Kariba North: Nos. 607, 658, 660, 714, 716); 1981 (Bumi 
Hills/Kariba: Nos. 530, 592, 593, 654, 655); and 1989 (Bumi Hills/Kariba: Nos. 522. 582, 584, 648, 649), obtainable 
from Surveyor General Department, PO Box 8099, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
3 Parks and Wild Life Act (Act No. 14 of 1975), fourth schedule to section 27, item 5. The area first designated 
was 170'000 ha, which has subsequently been altered to 169'000 ha in 1979, to 169'214 ha in 1981, and most 
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For this version, an arbitrary number of tickets were drawn randomly by hand, the applicants 
identified, and their preference lists consulted. Animals on a winner's preference list was 
allocated on a first-drawn, first-served basis. As each animal was allocated, it was struck off, 
animal by animal, from the species quotas set by the DNPWLM for the Charara/Makuti area, 
until the whole quota was allocated. Ticket winners who were drawn at the beginning of the 
lottery received their full preference list of animals, while those drawn later had to make do 
with those animals that remained. Some winners, however, could not be allocated any game 
at all, causing dissatisfaction amongst applicants (Drury, personal communication). Although 
applicants had won the right to hunt in the lottery, no hunting bags were defined prior to the 
draw. Consequently, the fixed supply of animals on quota ran out before the last hunter was 
drawn. This problem was addressed in the second 1990 version of the lottery system. 
The first version allowed hunters to access the hunting area at any time during the hunting 
season, without prior arrangement. Because all hunters on state land in Zimbabwe must hunt 
accompanied by a DNPWLM staff-member, for control and personal safety of the hunter, 
difficulties arose when the number of unannounced hunting parties exceeded the available 
personnel. Some hunters benefitted from this system of multiple entry, in that they were able 
to complete the quotas remaining unshot from their first hunting trip at their leisure during 
the hunting season. 
In 1990, this lottery system was modified slightly for the second version (1990). Using the 
total species quota set for Charara/Makuti, fifty hunting bags were defined prior to the lottery, 
each valued at fixed prices for each species, as set by the government schedule. Once more, 
applicants bought an unlimited number of tickets for the right to hunt. The fifty winners who 
were drawn in the lottery were thus guaranteed a hunting bag. Winners of this 1990 lottery 
system were allotted hunting bags by the DNPWLM, and could not choose according to their 
personal preferences. The hunting bag's species, animal numbers, and total value were not 
known to hunters until they were notified of their successful draw. This lack of choice again 
caused dissatisfaction amongst hunters (Drury, personal communication) . Some hunters chose 
to forfeit their right to hunt by not paying for their bag to obtain a hunting licence (personal 
observation, Harare licensing office). As before, hunters who did take up the hunt had 
unrestricted access to the hunting area during the entire hunting season. 
The lottery system was modified a third time for the 1991 hunting season. The dissertation 
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3.2.1.3. The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti (1991) 
Hunts were allocated in two distinct stages to applicants. The components involved in the first 
stage allocation by lottery are depicted in Figure 3.1, page 65, marked as "First stage hunt 
allocation by DNPWLM lottery system". Components involved in the second stage first-
come-first-served allocation are depicted on the overlay to the same diagram, marked as 
"Second stage hunt allocation by DNPWLM first-come-first-served system (Overlay)". The 
first stage DNPWLM lottery system is now described in chronological order of the 
components in Figure 3.1. (For the second stage, see page 69.) 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The 1991 sport hunting quota for the Charara/Makuti study area was almost identical to that 
of previous years. It comprised a high proportion of big and dangerous game\ and included 
good numbers of trophy and non-trophy buffalo, a particularly valuable and sought after 
trophy species in the safari hunting industry.2 Instead of fifty hunts, as in the 1990 version, 
100 hunts were defined prior to the lottery: 40 hunts in Charara hunting area (Appendix 2.1), 
and 60 hunts in Makuti hunting area (Appendix 2.2). The size of the hunting bag for each 
hunt was consequently much reduced. The hunts were mainly buffalo hunts, with either a 
trophy or a non-trophy buffalo as the main animal. Each hunt in Charara/Makuti had a hunt 
number that was linked to the hunting area (Cl to C40 for Charar'a, Ml to M40 for Makuti), 
lasted 6 days between specified dates for the pre-defined hunting bag. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
Hunts were priced by valuing each animal in the hunting bag at the fixed price set for each 
species and sex in the government trophy fee schedule for local hunters (see Appendix 8, 
page A 77). Table 3.2 shows the maximum and minimum range of total hunt prices for the 
100 citizen hunts available in the Charara/Makuti hunting areas. 
Table 3.2 Maximum and minimum hunt price~ in Charara/Makuti hunting areas: 1991 
T9tal Hunt priqr . 
Ay~iij~$ hd6t ~ride ~~ hJ;ter . ·. 
:l i~~Ji~~iHa!i~@~ ~~ hunterp~r 11uoiin9 ~a{ 
•••··~!• •••·••r··•••••••••••••••••:•~~i~!~~a
1~:···· ·········· ··· ··.··· · ·. 
Source: Charara/Makuti hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.1 (page A49), and Appendix 7.2 (page A53). 
1 For definition of hunting terms, see Glossary, page xxi. 
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Figure 3.1 Components of the two-stage hunt allocation for Charar~/Makuti study area 
First stage hunt allocation by the DNPWLM lottery system. 
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By allowing for a maximum of two hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 1 co-hunter), 
each hunter's average contribution towards the hunt price, and towards the hunt price per 
hunting day, is shown. Since most hunting bags contained a buffalo as their principal quota, 
most hunts sold for between Z$700 and Z$ l 'OOO (see Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3), except for 
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This uniform distribution has implications for the variety of hunts supplied in the study area. 
A majority of 85% of Charara/Makuti hunts (35 in Charara, 50 in Makuti) had a total hunt 
price of less than Z$1 '500, or cost less than Z$125 per hunter per day. As will become 
evident during the review of all Zimbabwean licensing system alternatives, these prices are 
the lowest prices for big game sport hunts in the whole of Zimbabwe.1 
• Hunt characteristics known to applicants: 
Essential hunt characteristics for applicants such as hunting bag, hunt price, hunting dates, 
hunt duration and hunting area (Charara or Makuti) were not available to hunters before they 
applied to hunt in Charara/Makuti, which meant that applicants were buying in the dark. 
• Application procedure for the lottery system: 
The lottery for Charara/Makuti was advertised in the national press and applicants were 
invited to enter the draw by purchasing tickets. The text is reproduced in Figure 3.4. 
Department of National Parks 
and Wild Life Managementa> 
MAKUTI/CHARARA 
HUNTING DRAW 
The Department invites bona fide citizens or permanent residents of 
Zimbabwe to participate in a draw for hunting in MakutiiCharara area. 
A non-refundable deposit of 2$20.00 for the right to participate shall be 
payable. 
Further details of the Draw can be obtained from : The Director of 
National Perks and Wild Life Management, PO Box 8365, Causeway, 
Harare. 
Entries for the Draw close at the end of business on Friday, 15th 
February, 1991 . Draw will be held on 19th March, 1991. 
a) This advertisement appeared in the Zimbabwe Herald on T.-day, 
151h January 1991. Emphasi5 in origirel. 
Figure 3.4 Text of press advertisement for 
Charara/Makuti hunts: 1991 
It is significant that the advert made no mention of hunting opportunities, hunting bags, or 
hunts, since applicants were in effect purchasing an option to win an undefined hunting 
opportunity, not a specific hunt. Many applicants returned at later dates and bought more 
tickets (to improve their draw chances), as successive entries under the same name in the 
ticket register indicated (personal observation, Harare licensing office). 
1 Compare the hunt prices in Table 3.2 with: those for the ZHA lottery systems in Table 3.3 (page 72), Table 3.4 
(page 74), and Table 3.6 (page 79); with those for the DNPWLM auction system in Table 3.10 (page 93); and with 
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• Demand by hunting applicants: 
, Application data was sourced from the DNPWLM ticket register at the Harare licensing 
office. Full details of application data and ticket distributions are given in Chapter 4 (see 
section 4.3.4, page 145). Records showed that 196 applicants bought 2'153 tickets between 
them, with a total ticket revenue of Z$43'060. Most people bought between 1 and 20 tickets 
each, worth Z$20 and Z$400 respectively. The opportunity to hunt in Charara/Makuti was 
highly valued by hunting applicants. 
Of the total 196 applicants for Charara/Makuti, it was also estimated that 133 applicants ( or 
52%) were also members of the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association, and had access to this 
association's equivalent big game hunting areas. This means that the DNPWLM lottery 
system only catered for 63 additional Zimbabwe citizen hunters in 1991 - a very small 
number of persons. 
• Hunt allocation procedure with no preferences or equal probability: 
To prepare the lottery draw, the total number of tickets bought (2'153) were individually 
numbered and placed in a barrel (Tavona, personal communication). The draw was conducted 
in public by hand. At each draw, the ticket number was cross-referenced with the ticket 
record book to determine the winner's identity. The winner was then allotted a hunt 
depending on his draw order and an arbitrary 3:2 allocation rule for hunt numbers in 
Makuti, or hunt numbers in Charara. 
The outcome of this allocation rule 1s now illustrated with an example. The following 
notation is adopted: 
W 1, W 2, through to W 5 for the first five winners drawn in the lottery. 
Applying the 3:2 allocation rule to hunts in the hunting areas of Makuti, and Charara, 
respectively, winners W 1, W2, and W3 were then allotted the hunt numbers Ml, M2, and M3 
in Makuti hunting area, whilst winners W4 and W 5 were allotted hunt numbers Cl and C2 
in Charara hunting area. The same rule was applied for each consecutive group of five 
winners until all 100 winners were drawn. This rule thus determined not only which hunt, but 
which hunt characteristics a hunter was allotted by the DNPWLM lottery system's allocation 
procedure. It is impersonal, and arbitrary in the sense that any other rule with hunt 
proportions of 3:2 for Makuti, and Charara, respectively, could have been applied (eg. a 6:4 
or 9:6 rule), each having very different consequences for individual winners. 
No applicant was permitted to win more than one hunt, which meant that further draws of 
tickets belonging to the same winner were invalid (tickets remained inside the barrel), and 
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Due to these redundant draws1, the allocation by hand was time consuming to complete for 
the 100 hunts (Booth, personal communication). 
The resulting 100 individual winners were then notified by the DNPWLM of their successful 
draw, their allotted hunt number and its pre-determined characteristics (eg. hunting bag, 
hunting dates, hunt price) and requested to pay the total hunt price by a due date (30.4.91). 
After paying, hunters were issued with a hunting licence (non-transferable) from the Harare 
licensing office and could take up their hunts on the specified hunting dates. 
• Costs of sport hunting trips: 
In addition to paying the DNPWLM for the hunting bag, the hunter incurs transport costs to 
and within the hunting area, and costs for food, ammunition, servants, and camping 
equipment. These additional costs are estimated to be about 2$10'000 calculated for a typical 
hunting trip with distances measured from the city of Harare.2 
For the following description of the second allocation stage using the DNPWLM first-come-
first-served system, refer to the overlay in Figure 3.1, page 65. 
• Reallocation of hunts: 
In 1991, a number of early hunts were not taken up by hunters; some hunters did not pay and 
collect their hunting licences by the due date (hunt not sold); other hunters paid, but did not 
register at Marongora or Kariba hunting offices of the DNPWLM to pursue their hunting 
activity (hunt not hunted). These hunters all forfeited their right to hunt, and any price paid 
for the hunt. A number of these hunting opportunities were subsequently re-advertised in the 
press3 by the DNPWLM. The reallocation to hunters took place on a cash, first-come-first-
served basis at the central licensing office in Harare from the 17. 7 .91 onwards. All these 
hunts were sold within one day. 
The reallocation procedure is depicted as an overlay to the first lottery allocation in the 
framework (Figure 3.1), indicating that the re-allocation procedure caused additional 
administrative costs and reduced the efficiency of hunt allocation. By using a second rule 
(first-come-first-served) rather than probability to allocate hunts, the equality of hunt 
distribution was affected, the first-come-first-served system favouring applicants living near 
the DNPWLM licensing office in Harare. 
1 The computer simulation of the DNPWLM lottery system (see section 4.3.4, page 145, and footnote 2, page 147) 
subsequently proved this fact, when the number of simulations had to be dramatically increased. 
2 Estimates of hunting costs by C. Grobbelaar included only recurrent expenditures. Not included were investments 
in equipment, such as weapons or vehicles. The cost of a weapon was taken as the rate to hire it from the ZHA. 
Details comprising the 2$10'000 estimate are in Appendix 18, page Al 10. 
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At the outset of this research, it was not foreseen that the DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti would fail to allocate all hunts, nor that a second allocation system would be 
used. Consequently a detailed analysis of the DNPWLM lottery system was undertaken to 
determine the extent and reasons for the unsuccessful hunt allocation in 1991. The research 
is presented in Chapter 4. 
• Hunting facilities and rules: 
Once hunting parties arrived at Marongora or Kariba hunting offices to registered and take 
up their hunt, they were able to choose which camping site they wanted. Information in map 
form defining the boundaries of the Charara/Makuti hunting areas was not made available to 
hunters, who relied instead on the information and guidance of the DNPWLM trackers who 
accompanied each hunting party for the hunt's duration. 
Hunting facilities offered in the camp sites were basic, and included a pit latrine, a cleared 
area to camp, a water point, although this was not reliable (Chenaux-Repond, personal 
communication), in spite of numerous boreholes available in the area with permanent water 
(see map, Appendix 20, page Al 13). Hunting camps in Charara/Makuti lacked water storage 
facilities, slaughter blocks, and meat drying racks - a severe limitation for hunters to process 
larger big game species such as elephant and buffalo. 
3.2.1.4. Summary of DNPWLM lottery system: Purpose in this research 
In Chapter 4, the extent of the allocation problems mentioned in this section for the 
DNPWLM lottery system will be assessed objectively using this allocation system as a case 
study. Criteria are defined for an efficient and equitable hunt allocation. These criteria are 
then quantified using application data for 1991. 
In Chapter 5, the opportunity costs of using the DNPWLM lottery system are assessed using 
this allocation system in a comparative study. The DNPWLM lottery system is compared with 
other Zimbabwean allocation systems for sport hunting that rely on lotteries, tenders, auctions 
and a commercial marketing system. 
Descriptions of further Zimbabwean licensing systems follow. The next licensing system is 
a fix-priced lottery system that differs from the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti 
in two important aspects: Each applicant is allowed a single ticket rather than multiple tickets 
in the draw procedure, and the hunt allocation procedure does accommodate hunters' personal 
preferences for specific hunts. In addition, the system allows considerable numbers of non-
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3.2.2. The ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa 
This section reviews citizen hunting allocated by the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association (ZHA) 
in three hunting areas: Tuli Safari Area, Dama Safari Area, and Rifa section of the Hurungwe 
Safari Area. In each area, the DNPWLM sets the total species quotas for sport hunting. All 
other components of the licensing system are planned and administered by a provincial branch 
of the ZHA for the benefit of members. Educational activities funded by two branches of the 
ZHA provides Zimbabwe school children with important non-hunting benefits. 
First, a map shows each hunting area's location in Zimbabwe. Any details specific to that 
area or its administration are highlighted. The hunt allocations by each branch of the ZHA 
are identical, so that the ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa is described once for all 
areas (section 3.2.2.4, page 81). 
3.2.2.1. The Tuli hunting area 
The Tuli Safari Area is located on Zimbabwe's southwestern border with Botswana (see 
Map 3.1, page 71). 
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Map 3.1 Location map of Tuli hunting area in Zimbabwe 
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The Matabeleland branch of the ZHA makes citizen hunting available to all members. The 
lottery system i administered from the Mashonaland branch office, in Harare, from where 
all hunting records for the area were obtained. The area's varied landscape and a diverse flora 
and fauna attract both hunting and non-hunting visitors alike, making this the second most 
favoured of the three hunting areas available to ZHA members (see hunting applications for 
Rifa in Table 3.7, page 80). 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The total species quota available for hunting in Tuli is well balanced with big game and 
plains game spe ies, and has a more species on quota than either Doma or Rifa hunting areas. 
In 1991, the branch packaged the total species quota in Tuli into 26 individual hunts, each 
lasting 11 hunti g days. (For details of hunt allocations, see Appendix 2.3, page A13). 
• Pricing of hunts: 
The Matabeleland branch does not pay the DNPWLM a lease fee for the rights to use the 
area.1 The total species quota for the hunting area is valued at fixed prices set for each 
species and sex in the government schedule for local hunters (Appendix 8, page A 77), and 
is then sold by the DNPWLM at a discount of 25% to the Matabeleland branch. In return, 
the branch mai tains certain services in the hunting area. The Matabeleland branch then 
charges members a levy, in addition to the full prices in the government schedule, for each 
animal in the hunting bag. The levy set by ZHA members in 1991 was 70% of the scheduled 
prices. The price difference finances the branch and the ZHA. 2 
Table 3.3 Maximum and minimum hunt prices in Tuli hunting area : 1991 
3A~~f.~~~ ti6ctf ~~¢~ per: hunter 
••••• Avijt~J; ••nJhi•• J~8e per.·h~n.1er·.per:·nu.n1irig .•day .·.··•· :~l > ~~~~i~m~t:t~~ ··· ·· · 
Source: Tuli hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.3, page A57. 
Table 3.3 shows the maximum and minimum range of trophy prices for the 26 hunts available 
to members of the ZHA in 1991 as their total hunt price. By allowing for a maximum of four 
1 The Rifa, Tuli ::ind Doma hunting areas are not "leased" to the ZHA in the strict, contractual and economic sense 
of the word. This fact was confirmed by the author in the DNPWLM lease register, and by Grobbelaar (personal 
communication), contrary statements by Cumming (1988): 152 and Price Waterhouse (1992b): Volume 4: 36. 
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hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 3 co-hunters), each hunter ' s average contribution 
towards the hunt price, and towards the hunt price per hunting day, is shown. 
The trophy price is only one part of the total cost of a hunting trip. In addition, hunters incur 
transport costs to and within the hunting area, and costs for food, ammunition and camping 
equipment for the 11-day hunting period . These additional costs are estimated at 2$10'000 
as a minimum (see Appendix 18, page AllO). 
3.2.2.2. The Doma hunting area 
The Doma Safari area is located m very rugged terrain to the north-east of Karoi (see 
Map 3.2, page 73). It borders on the Zambezi valley escarpment to the north. The area is 
allocated by the DNPWLM to the Lomagundi branch of the ZHA, and is administered from 
Mhangura where hunting records were sourced. 
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Map 3.2 Location map of Doma hunting area in Zimbabwe 
Source: Digitized m,1p:... Appendix 17. page Al 10. 
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The Doma hunting area is the hunting area least frequented by members of the ZHA (see 
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but also due to the limited recreational activities available to non-hunting members of the 
hunting party (the area lacks a major waterbody). 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The total species quota available for hunting in Doma is limited (small numbers of animals), 
and the composi tion lacks balance between the numbers of dangerous game and plains game 
as the quota comprises large numbers of trophy and non-trophy elephant (see Appendix 2.4, 
page A15). As result, only ten hunts, each lasting 12 hunting days, are made available to 
members for allocation by lottery. In contrast to the application rules which apply to the next 
hunting area in ifa, applicants for Doma hunts are not limited to only one trophy elephant 
hunt every fifth year. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
No lease fee is paid by the Lomagundi branch to the DNPWLM for the rights to use the 
hunting area. 1 The total species quota is valued at fixed prices set for each species and sex 
in the governme t schedule for local hunters (Appendix 8, page A 77), and is then sold by the 
DNPWLM at a discount of 25% to the Lomagundi branch. In return, the branch maintains 
certain services in the hunting area. In 1991, prices charged to members hunting in the Doma 
area were: the · ull government schedule price plus a 20% levy payable to the ZHA for 
administration. 2 
Table 3.4 Maximum and minimum hunt prices in Doma hunting area: 1991 
f6$1 hu8tptise > . 
)Av~r~ge hlJnt Jnce per hunter 
::•i.,~~f~~~··hµqf •paci~··per•.hunter. per.· h~ntipg .• d~y 
Source: Doma hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.4, page A59. 
afo;~ i:: 
./ :it~ 
Table 3.4 shows the maximum and minimum range of trophy prices for the 10 hunts available 
to members in Doma hunting area during 1991 as their total hunt price. By allowing for a 
maximum of four hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 3 co-hunters), each hunter's 
average contribution towards the hunt price and towards the hunt price per hunting day is 
shown. These hunt prices reflect the larger proportion of elephant on quota in the Doma area. 
1 The Rifa, Tuli a d Doma hunting areas are not "leased" to the ZHA in the strict, contractual and economic sense 
of the word. This fact was confirmed by the author in the DNPWLM lease register, and by Grobbelaar (personal 
communication), contrary statements by Cumming (1988): 152 and Price Waterhouse (1992b): Volume 4: 36. 
2 In 1991, due to poor trophy quality. male elephant were excluded from the additional levy. It should be noted 
that in 1992 members were charged the full government schedule price plus 70%. Of the 70%, 20% was a levy 
payable to the ZHA for administration and 50% remained with the Lomagundi branch for education. Thus, in 1992, 
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• Education facilities: 
In addition to providing hunting opportunities to its members, the Lomagundi branch has 
financed and built an educational facility, located in the Charara non-hunting area of the 
Kuburi Wilderness (see map in Appendix 20, page Al 13). The facility is sited near the Lake 
Kariba shoreline in an area that provides maximum diversity of habitats and experiences for 
education. 
Members and volunteers have designed and conducted an environmental education 
programme during the school holidays, aimed primarily at groups of primary school children 
and their teachers. Table 3.5, page 75, shows schools and clubs that benefited from the 
education programme in 1991. There were ten education camps organised during the year, 
each with a group of thirty pupils taking part for an average of 7 days. 
Table 3.5 Schools on ZHA (Lomagundi branch) school education camps: 1991 
····································•························ / .... /.·.···.·········••> §fhd81···/// ..... +.· >>•············· >·······.·.·.·. 
Source: Thomas, Lornagundi branch of ZHA, Mhangura. 
The facility can also be booked by schools outside this time. Conservation topics, set in their 
natural environment, are the main theme during the educational camps. Up to 1991, all 
transport and accommodation costs for participating schools were met by the Lomagundi 
branch. Between 1988 and 1991, the Lomagundi branch has invested revenue from hunting 
and membership fees in facilities worth a total of Z$162'603, including: an A-frame house, 
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3.2.2.3. The Rifa hunting area 
The Rifa section, part of the Hurungwe Safari Area, is located in the floodplain of the 
Zambezi valley with the Zambezi river as its western boundary (see Map 3.3, page 76). The 
river frontage of all three hunting camps presents ideal recreational opportunities, and 
accounts for the greater popularity of this hunting area amongst hunting and non-hunting 





Map 3.3 Location map of Rifa hunting area in Zimbabwe 
Source: Digitizecl mnps. Appendix 17, page J\ 110. 
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The Rifa section is allocated by the DNPWLM to the Mashonaland branch of the ZHA for 
citizen hunting. The lottery system is administered by the branch from their Harare office, 










Chapter 3: Re,•iew of licensing systems 77 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
In 1991, the total species quota for the Rifa hunting area was packaged into 39 quality trophy 
hunts, each lasting 11 hunting days (see Appendix 2.5, page Al 7). Each hunts was allocated 
at least one significant trophy animal (eg. elephant, leopard, hippopotamus, kudu, waterbuck). 
To package hunting area's species quota into hunts, administrators of the ZHA observe 
certain principles to enhance hunt quality and revenue for the ZHA, namely: 
• Species allocated for bait: All cat hunts with lion or leopard allocated are hunted 
using certain animals for bait.1 For lion hunts hippopotamus or non-trophy kudu 
are allocated to the hunting bag as bait animals; for leopard hunts warthog, non-





Species requiring longer hunting periods or smaller bags: A hunter needs more 
time to secure a quality trophy (hunts which have trophy elephant, lion and 
leopard allocated to them) than to hunt other species (eg. hunts with impala or 
kudu). Hunts which have trophy elephant allocated to them consequently are not 
allocated trophy buffalo in addition. 
Species with lower hunter success: The most valuable, high quality species of 
dangerous game (eg. trophy elephant, trophy buffalo, trophy lion, and leopard) are 
allocated to hunts with low hunt numbers that are hunted early in the hunting 
season. Should these trophy animals remain unshot after a hunt, they can be re-
allocated by the Mashonaland branch administration to any hunter who has bought 
a hunt in Rifa later in the season, on a first-come-first-served basis. This allows 
the hunter to benefit from having additional hunting opportunities (hunters derive 
hunting and recreational value from hunting trips even if animals remain unshot). 
The ZHA benefits by maximizing its revenue from unshot animals that are 
resold.2 
Species for easier, cheaper hunts: Added variety is achieved with three of the 
hunts in the allocation (lA, 2B and 3C, see Appendix 2.5, page Al 7). Because 
they take place during the school holiday periods, they are assigned plains game 
animals, rather than dangerous game. These hunts are easier to hunt, and hunt 
prices are lower, making them ideally suited as "beginners hunts" and "father and 
son hunts". 
Allocations for full quota utilization: The last four hunts of the season in Rifa 
(hunt numbers 36C, 37A, 38B, and 39C) serve as "unshot game hunts". The hunts 
have few animals allocated to the hunting bag initially, but are allotted any 
animals that remain unshot by the end of the hunting season. The ZHA benefits 
1 The practice of baiting to hunt trophy lion and leopard is common, and legal in Zimbabwe. Questions of how 
acceptable this practice is morally, and in relation to the sport hunter's code of conduct which require him to hunt 
whilst giving animals "fair chase", will not be discussed here. The quality of the hunting experience could, however, 
arguably be increased by not resorting to baiting, but relying on personal bushcraft skills. 
2 The ZHA member pays for the animals in the hunting bag regardless of whether the animal is shot, or remains 
unshot. He is only refunded 50% of the trophy price for unshot leopard or lion. By contrast. safari operators charge 
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by u ilizing the species quota fully and maximizing revenue. Members benefit 
from additional hunting opportunities. 
• Application rules for hunters: 
To limit the number of applicants who qualify for this, the association's most popular hunting 
area, the Mash naland branch applies the following additional rules to the lottery for Rifa 
applicants: 
• To r educe applicants for trophy elephant hunts: irrespective of hunting success, 
any unter who wins a trophy elephant hunt in the lottery system for Rifa is 
excl ded from applying for a further trophy elephant hunt for five years. 
• To r educe applicants for hunts in the Zambezi valley: hunters of the ZHA (the 
winner of a hunt in the lottery system for Rifa) may only hunt once in the 
Zambezi valley in any year (Grobbelaar, personal communication). The citizen 
hunting areas in the Zambezi valley include: Charara/Makuti, Nyakasanga/Sapi, 
and Rifa. Winners of the lottery for Rifa are excluded from the application 
procedures of these hunting areas.1 To enforce this rule, the application 
procedures for these hunting areas needs to be coordinated for different licensing 
systems between the DNPWLM and the ZHA. 
• To r educe applicants for hunts with "big four": To ration hunting out further 
amongst applicants in Rifa, successful hunters, their nominated co-hunters and any 
other hunters shooting one of the "big four" ( elephant, buffalo, lion, Jeopard) are 
excl uded from participating in the draw for Rifa hunts the following year. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
The Mashonala d branch does not pay the DNPWLM a lease fee for the rights to use the 
Rifa hunting area.2 The total species quota available for hunting in Rifa is valued at fixed 
prices set by the government trophy fee schedule for local hunters (see Appendix 8, page 
A 77), and is then sold by the DNPWLM at a discount of 25% to the Mashonaland branch. 
In return, the Mashonaland branch renders certain services in the hunting area. The branch 
then charges members the following price for a hunt in the Rifa area: The full government 
schedule price plus 70% for each animal. Of the 70%, 20% is a levy payable to the ZHA for 
administration and 50% remains with the Mashonaland branch to finance the educational 
programme in the Rifa hunting area. 
1 The names and addresses of hunt winners in the Rifa lottery go to the DNPWLM licensing office, Harare for 
control purposes. 
1 The Rifa, Tuli a d Doma hunting areas are not "leased" to the ZHA in the strict. contractual and economic sense 
of the word. This fact was confirmed by the author in the DNPWLM lease register. and by Grobbelaar (personal 
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Table 3.6 Maximum and minimum hunt prices in Rifa hunting area: 1991 
Source: Rifa hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.5, page 7.5. 
Table 3.6 shows the maximum and minimum range of total hunt prices for the 39 hunts 
available to ZHA members in Rifa hunting area during 1991. By allowing for a maximum 
of four hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 3 co-hunters), each hunter's average 
contribution towards the hunt price, and towards the hunt price per hunting day, is shown. 
These hunt prices reflect the higher levy charged by the Mashonaland branch for all hunts in 
this prime hunting area. The large difference between the maximum and minimum hunt prices 
reflects the varied hunting bags that were on offer to members in this hunting area. 
• Demand by hunting applicants: 
DNPWLM records of visitor entry to five hunting areas in the Zambezi Valley1 have shown 
that over the last three years, the hunting camps in Rifa have had a higher proportion of non-
hunting visitors (including camp staff) to hunters, than the other hunting areas. For many 
hunters and non-hunters the opportunity of taking a holiday in the Zambezi valley during a 
hunting trip serves as a strong motive to become members of the ZHA. 
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Table 3.7 show. branch membership, numbers of hunting and non-hunting members, and 
numbers of applicants in each hunting area used by the ZHA. 
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Source: Grobbelaar. ZHA Harare. 
The table shows that the Mashonaland branch has the largest numbers of hunting and non-
hunting member . In 1991, over half (55%) the association's hunting members applied to hunt 
in the Rifa hunting area, indicating the area's popularity. In the same year, it was also 
estimated that s me 133 member of the ZHA applied to hunt in the DNPWLM lottery system 
for Charara/Mak.uti (see section 4.3.5, page 148). 
• Educati n facilities: 
In addition to providing hunting benefits to members, the Mashonaland branch has financed 
and built an educational facility in a non-hunting area of Rifa. The facility caters for 30 
school pupils at a time. During school holidays in 1991 nine education camps of senior 
school pupils took place, each lasting six days. Since the facility was built, a total of 1 '500 
pupils have benefitted from the educational programme and instruction (Grobbelaar, personal 
communication). Pupils are not charged a fee to attend, but provide their own food and 
transport. The activity of hunting is integrated into the learning programme. Between 1987 
and 1990, about Z$230'000 has been invested in the project, including: accommodation 
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3.2.2.4. The ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa 
This section reviews the lottery procedure used to allocate hunts in the three hunting areas 
used by the ZHA. Of particular interest is the way this lottery system accommodates 
individual hunter's preferences, and the type of "fairness", or equality of hunt allocation, it 
achieves. 
• Hunt characteristics made known to applicants: 
All members of the ZHA receive a copy of the hunts that are planned for the three hunting 
areas by branch administrators. 1 Full details of every hunt's characteristics are available to 






the hunt number; 
the hunting dates; 
the species, and number of animals in the hunting bag; 
the trophy price of the hunt; 
any additional animals that may bought. 
• Application procedure: 
Each applicant then applies for those hunts he prefers in each hunting area, ranking the 
preferred hunt numbers according to his personal value judgements, his hunting experience, 
and his willingness to pay the hunt price. For each hunting area, the number of preferences 
available is equal to the total number of packaged hunts. In Tuli, for example, each applicant 
has a maximum of 26 preferences available, although few people made use of the full number 
when applying. Data on hunter's preferences for 1991 are included as appendices for each 
hunting area.2 On receipt of the hunt preferences, each application is checked and given an 
application number. Applicants are aware that if they win a hunt in the draw, they are obliged 
to take the hunt up and pay the hunt price. 
To promote a professional attitude towards sport hunting, the ZHA has introduced a system 
of grading all hunters in the association according their experience in hunting big game and 
dangerous game species. The hunts are likewise graded according to difficulty, and hunters 
who win a hunt with a species for which they are not yet qualified, are required to hunt 
accompanied by a suitably graded hunter as their co-hunter. The grading ensures that hunters 
who are inexperienced in hunting any of the big game or dangerous game species - these are 
not unduly so-named - are taught by hunters more experienced than themselves, and can be 
assisted during the shooting to prevent incidents of wounded animals from endangering 
anyone's life. However, neither the DNPWLM nor the ZHA require hunters to sight their 
weapons or to undertake a mandatory shooting test prior to the hunt (compare requirements 
for South African citizen hunters: by NPB, see page 106, by Ciskei Safaris, see page 109). 
1 For Tuli. see Appendix 7.3. page A57; for Doma, see Appendix 7.4, page A59; for Rifa see Appendix 7.5, 
page A61. 
2 For hunter's preference lists in Tuli. see Appendix 6.1, page A39; for Doma. see Appendix 6.2, page A43; and 
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• Hunt allocation procedure: 
Draw procedures for the individual lotteries of Tuli, Doma and Rifa are identical. Lotteries 
are drawn in the order Rifa, then Tuli, and finally Doma. The draws take place prior to the 
DNPWLM hunt allocations for Charara/Makuti and Dandawa, to allow unsuccessful members 
time to apply f r other hunting opportunities. 
The preference allocation procedure can be followed in Figure 3.5, page 83. Each lottery is 
drawn by hand, and in public. When an applicant's number is drawn, he wins the first 
available hunt on his individual preference list (Next Hunt Preference). The drawing 
procedure conti ues with the next applicant number, until all hunts in a particular hunting 
area are allocated. If every preference on a winner's list has already been allocated, this 
winner is not awarded a hunt, and the drawing procedure continues as before.1 Winners must 
pay the full hunt price before being issued with the hunting licence to enter the state hunting 
area. If hunters forfeit a hunt, they are only refunded if another hunter is found to take up the 
hunt. 
• Hunt preference allocation procedure and equality: 
The ZHA lottery system takes account of hunter's individual preferences that have been 
expressed as a ranked list of most, to least preferred hunt numbers per hunting area. The draw 
determines which particular hunt a drawee wins - irrespective of how high or low this hunt 
was ranked by 1he applicant on his preference list. In terms of equality, those persons with 
longer preference lists will be more likely to be assigned a hunt at all, than those with shorter 
lists. 
There is a further implication for equality by allocating every applicant's highest available 
preference at each step during the draw. 
The earlier an applicant is drawn in the lottery, the more likely he will be allocated a hunt 
he prefers more, whereas the later the applicant is drawn, the more likely he will be allocated 
a hunt he prefers less. Although the ZHA lottery procedure appears to be fair for all 
applicants beca se it applies one rule to everyone, it benefits applicants who are drawn earlier 
over those who are drawn later because their preferences are given more weight. The reason 
for the unequal preference weighting this lies in the manual draw procedure, which ranks 
winners according to their .draw order as they are drawn. As winners are drawn, the draw 
order - seen in retrospect - also ranks the preference lists of the winners of a hunt. Undrawn 
applicants and their preference lists remain unranked. 
1 In practice, if th,; applicant is present in person at the draw. he is asked if a hitherto unallocated hunt is preferred 
(which was not indicated on the preference list). and this hunt is then allocated. If the hunter is absent from the draw, 
the applicant does 1101 draw a hunt. Since this practice represents an exception to the rule. and is arbitrary. it was 
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For Applicants = 1 ... n 
For Preferences = 1 ... m 
START ALLOCATION OF HUNTS WITH UN-EQUALLY WEIGHTED PREFERENCES 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, goto END 
Do 1st Applicant 
Is First Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 1st Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Second Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 1st Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Third Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 1st Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Mth Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 1st Applicant 
No: Else Applicant unsuccessful 
END Do 1st Applicant, new Applicant draw follows 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, goto END 
Do 2nd Applicant 
Is First Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 2nd Applicant 
No: try next Hunt Preference 
Is Second Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 2nd Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Third Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 2nd Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Mth Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do 2nd Applicant 
No: Else Applicant unsuccessful 
END Do 2nd Applicant, new Applicant draw follows 
... 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, goto END 
Do nth Applicant 
Is First Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do nth Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Second Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do nth Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Third Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do nth Applicant 
No: try next Preference 
Is Mth Hunt Preference available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, and remove from HUNTS to allocate: goto END Do nth Applicant 
No: Else Applicant unsuccessful 
END Do nth Applicant, new Applicant draw follows 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, or Applicants = 0, goto END 
END Allocation of Hunts is finished 
83 
Figure 3.5 ZHA lottery system: Preference allocation with unequally weighted hunt preferences for 
applicants 










84 Chapter 3: Re1·iew of licensing systems 
... ,.....-: .1;,:.x;.:-:,:,:-:,:,w .. :.,,:.- //hz-::. .._.,.._.. .-,.z ;. :.;.,;,:;. r:-:-:-:,;.;.:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:..:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:.:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·z1u .. ,.;,:,:,:,;,:,;.;,:,:,:,:,:,:,;.:-:,:,:.:,:,:·:·:·:·:·: ,..,,..,,.. .... ; ... :.;,;.:,:.-.. :.;,••.,:.; .,., .. ,.,.,.,. .• ,.,.,.. .,,. .. ,.,. .,.. .. ,. ..• 
This result may 2.ppear trivial, but the preference allocation procedure used by the Wyoming 
lottery system accords each applicant's preferences an equal weighting whether they are 
winners or not. All applicants are ranked before they are drawn. The draw order is determined 
once only, prior to the assignment of preferences, for all applicants simultaneously (see 
section 3.3.1, page 98) using a computer programme. 
In conclusion, since the drawing procedure used by the ZHA is done by hand, a simultaneous 
ranking of all applicants is hardly feasible. 1 It appears that no manual method can be 
suggested to make all applicant's preference rankings equivalent, in order that no winner is 
allocated his Second Hunt Preference before all other applicants have had the opportunity of 
winning their First Hunt Preference (see Figure 3.5, page 83). 
The licensing system described next allocates citizen hunting of plains game using price, 
rather than chance, as the deciding criterion. Applicants determine the maximum hunt prices 
they are willing to pay for each hunt themselves. The tender system does accommodate 
hunter's personal preferences, but raises two problems due to the fixed tender prices. 
3.2.3. The DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa 
The Dandawa hunts take place within the Nyakasanga section of Hurungwe Safari Area. The 
single hunting c,1mp is situated on the bank of the Zambezi river, in attractive surroundings, 
which lend themselves to recreational activities . The tender system is administered by the 
DNPWLM from their Harare licensing office. During interviews of hunting administrators in 
Harare, Chinhoy1, Marongora and Kariba, the objective of this licensing system was variously 





to appeal to the occasional Zimbabwean hunter; 
to suit "father and son hunts"; 
to prc,vide hunts for less wealthy citizen hunters; 
to help reduce the impala population on the Zambezi river frontage . 
In contrast to all other opportunities for citizen hunting in protected areas, the Dandawa hunts 
involve only impala - one of Zimbabwe's most abundant plains game species. Impala are not 
a scarce hunting resource; consequently, impala are less valued by trophy hunters than big 
game hunts. Because the government controlled trophy fee for impala is low, the species is 
ideally suited to promote the first three objectives mentioned above, that is non-trophy citizen 
hunting for hunters who emphasize the venison motive, at government subsidized prices.2 
1 A manual ranking is possible by drawing each applicant (for a total of 362 individual applicants). but hardly 
feasible in tenns of time used to establish the rank order. Also. this procedure destroys the essence of a lottery 
conducted in public, before an audience of expectant winners. 
2 The minimum value of a species for sport hunting on state land must exceed the market value of its raw products 
(meat and hide) according to DNPWLM policy (Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 17). The market value of wildlife 
is difficult to establish. as it depends on many factors, including the location of the "market place", eg. urban or 
rural. It is unlikely that there is a market where the animal is shot. A private landowner in a rural farming area sells 
impala venison (dressed weight 20kg) at 2$160 each from the farm butchery ([ravers, personal communication). The 
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The fourth stated objective conflicts with DNPWLM policy (Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 
17) to separate quotas set for ecological population reductions (comprising large numbers of 
immature and female animals) and quotas for trophy hunting (small numbers of mature, male 
animals). But using tender prices to allocate potentially "cheap" impala hunts to citizen 
hunters conflicts with the third objective above, should policy-maker's intention be to make 
impala hunts available to Zimbabwe citizens below their market clearing price. 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
As the total species quota comprises only impala, all 30 Dandawa hunting bags are identical, 
with 4 male, and 2 female impala to be hunted in 7 hunting days between specified dates. 
Details of the quota allocation to hunts are included in Appendix 2.6, page A19. 
The objective and nature of these sport hunting quotas is unclear. Trophy hunts by definition, 
refers only to the hunting of male trophy-bearing animals, yet these quotas specifically 
include non-trophy female animals. As indicated above, these non-trophy hunting quotas 
conflict with DNPWLM policy on sport hunting (Zimbabwe Government, 1992: 17). The 
conflict between policy and practice merely is documented here for decision-makers, but will 
not be resolved in this dissertation. 
• Minimum pricing of hunts: 
The DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa prices each of the thirty hunts at the highest 
tender price offered by each applicant. Had fixed prices set by government for this species 
been used, then Dandawa hunts would have been priced at 2$320 each. Instead, the 
DNPWLM required a minimum hunt price of 2$400 to be tendered for all hunts. The 
maximum tender prices actually exceeded the minimum price considerably for all thirty 
Dandawa hunts (see item on hunt prices resulting from the tender system, page 87). 
• Hunt characteristics made known to applicants: 
Applicants knew each hunt's hunting bag and hunting dates before tendering. The hunting 
area boundaries, the location of the hunting camp and the hunting regulations were not made 
known to applicants. 
• Application procedure/Tender rules for applicants: 
The Dandawa hunts were advertised in the press, and hunters could choose which hunts they 
tendered for. Each applicant could tender for several hunts at once on the application form, 
but could not win more than one hunt in his name. The hunt numbers were not ranked in 
personal communication). Thus the minimum market value of an impala's venison and hide is 2$172. The same 
private landowner sells impala for sport hunting by Zimbabwe citizen hunters at 2.$500 per impala. The 1991 trophy 











86 Chapter 3: Re,•iew of licensing systems 
,:,.,.-: •• . •,,,,,,,, ................. -: • • • -: • • , •• ,:;,:, •. ,: ......................... ·.·,·,•.·.·.· .•.•••.. ;,;.:,;,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,;,;,;,;,,.;,;,;,;.;,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·;·:·.':·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:•:•:·:,:,;,,: .,;,;,;,:;;.;,:,::-,,:-:-;,;,;.;,,:,;,;,:,;,;,;,;,:,:,:,::,u··············:,·.z;,·;,-.-:+:,::,:uu:,:-:,:u:,.:,:x;.:· 
order of preference by the applicants on the application form, causing problems during the 
allocation of hunt preferences (see item on hunt preference allocation, page 86). 
• Demand by hunting applicants: 
The number of hunters in the hunting party was limited to two (1 hunter, and his co-hunter). 
No data or records of the Dandawa applications for 1991 or any previous years were kept 
(Tavona, personal communication), so that the number of applicants in total (demand), the 
number of hunt preferences per applicant, and the distribution of price offers amongst all 
applicants could not be established for this system. Consequently, the popularity of the 
Dandawa impala hunts amongst citizen hunters remains to be assessed quantitatively. The 
present Jack of data limits objective and efficient resource management decisions being taken 
by the DNPWLM for this allocation system. 
• Hunt allocation procedure: 
The applicants who tendered the highest price for each of the Dandawa impala hunts, or time 
slots, was awarded that hunt. Two difficulties arose concerning the hunt preference allocation 
procedure, due to the fixed tender prices. How did the allocation problems occur? 
• Hunt preference allocation procedure: 
The first problem encountered was due to the fact that several applicants tendered the same 
(fixed) tender price for a specific hunt, as confirmed by Tavona (personal communication). 
This problem had also occurred prior to 1991 according to the hunting records consulted at 
the Harare licensing office (personal observation). In such cases, administrators of the 
DNPWLM used a separate lottery to decide which of the hunters whose tenders tied for the 
same hunt was declared the winner. 
The second problem encountered was due to the tender price of any applicant exceeding all 
other applicant's tenders for several hunts at once. Since the DNPWLM restricts each hunter 
to one hunt, the agency solved the new allocation problem by deciding administratively which 
hunt such hunters were allocated - without consulting personally with the tenderer. The hunter 
was thus not given a choice of hunting dates; the winning tenderers were probably not aware . 
of this fact at any stage, since the hunt allocation procedure was not conducted in publ ic or 
documented by the DNPWLM. Had tenderers instead been required to rank the multiple hunts 
on the application forms, this would not solve the first allocation problem of tied tender 
prices for a single hunt. 
Once each winner and his hunt number are determined in the above tender allocation 
procedure, the DNPWLM notifies hunters that their offers have been accepted, and requests 
payment for the hunt. 
Each hunter must pay the tender price before being issued with his hunting licence. Data from 
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hunt price.1 These hunters lacked commitment to take up their hunt because no pre-payment 
was made and hunters could forfeit the hunting opportunity at no financial cost to themselves . . 
Due to legal formalities and cost, it is unlikely that the DNPWLM would sue these hunters 
to effect payment of the hunt; the available hunts went unused and the tender system thus did 
not benefit the maximum possible number citizen hunters. The design of this DNPWLM 
tender system resulted in a partially unsuccessful allocation due to hunter's lack of 
commitment during the application stage and the fixed tender prices. 
• Hunt prices resulting from the tender system: 
Data gathered for 1991 showed that the maximum tender prices for the 30 Dandawa hunts 
ranged from Z$2'000 to 2$600, considerably exceeding the required minimum hunt price of 
2$400 in all instances (see Table 3.8). This indicates that there is a strong demand for plains 
game sport hunting by Zimbabwe citizen hunters with a hunting camp located on the Zambezi 
river. 
Table 3.8 Maximum and minimum Dandawa hunt prices in Nyakasanga hunting area: 1991 
······. ·.· .. ;·.\/ -:, •.::-:_::::.,:: ··:/·. 
ToiJJ.hGn1·· pnce 
Aver~.9e hunt price per hunter 
·•····~ver.~Q~ttunt.·pri.ce:-:per hunt~r perJ,untin9_·~~t C•>·•···•··· 
····-~·•:: ::} ~#ij:~·g~.J.f!~~~ >x•.•· ·_. 
. · :: : \2'.000~ ) . .• ·.· .· 
•.• :< ·········1·000·• ::·········· 
· : TJ,dls,• .:}•:·./· '· 
Source: Dandawa hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.6. page A65. 
Table 3.8 shows the maximum and minimum range of total hunt pnces for the thirty 
Dandawa impala hunts. By allowing for a maximum of two hunters who can share a hunt (1 
hunter and 1 co-hunter), Table 3.8 also shows each hunter's average contribution towards the 
hunt price, and towards the hunt price per hunting day. 
As impala are a common species throughout Zimbabwe, the high prices tendered for the 
Dandawa impala hunts indicate that some citizen hunters could value the hunts for other hunt 
characteristics than merely their trophy value, or their venison meat value. 
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A Dandawa impala hunt gives hunters and any accompanying visitors access to the following 
benefits and scarce resources: 
• Non-consumptive benefit and resource due to access: A prime wildlife resource 
area in the Parks and Wild Life Estate (Nyakasanga section of the Hurungwe 





Non-consumptive benefit and resource due to access: A diversity of wildlife, 
natural resources, and possibilities for their non-consumptive enjoyment. These 
might include walking, viewing, photography, and canoeing; 
Non-consumptive benefit and resource due to access: The exclusive use of a 
campsite in the protected area for a 7-day period for two hunters, and the option 
of inviting a maximum of up to 28 further persons as non-hunting visitors to their 
campsite for this period; 
Consumptive benefit and resource due to quota: The right to hunt and shoot a 
hunting bag of six impala during seven days. It should be oted that hunters are 
not obliged to shoot, or undertake any hunting activities as such, when purchasing 
a hunt. 
The topography, resources, and recreational opportunities available to hunters of a Dandawa 
impala hunt are equivalent to the benefits available to non-hunting visitors in other prime 
areas of the Parks and Wild Life Estate ( eg. Mana Pools National Park). 
It is not surprising, therefore, that some persons who tendered and won a Dandawa impala 
hunt appear to have done so in order to gain access to the wildlife resource area exclusively 
for non-hunting recreational motive . In support, the following evidence was found on the 
field trip to the Charara/Makuti hunting areas. For one Dandawa impala hunt (Hunt D14) in 
1991, both hunters arrived to book in at the Marongora control office without hunting rifles, 
stating that they did not like to kill animals. A staff member of the DNPWLM confirmed that 
these so-called "citizen hunters" intended to make use of their right of access to the hunting 
area solely for non-hunting recreational purposes during the seven day access period 
(Mashori, personal communication). The entire quota for this particular hunt remained unshot 
according to the hunting licence returned by both "citizen hunters" (personal observation). 
The incident suggests that some Zimbabweans value the right of access to a prime protected 
area offered by a Dandawa hunt more highly than hunters. Zimbabwe non-hunters are also 
prepared to pay 2$710 - more than citizen hunters - for seven days of exclusive access and 
recreation at a prime Zambezi river campsite. The incident suggests further, that managers 
of wildlife resource areas should treat access and time spent by hunters and visitors in a 
1 See item on demand by ZHA members in 1991. page 79, for the popularity of the three campsites on the Zambezi 
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protected area as a scarce resource1, and that it should be price accordingly2• For hunters, 
the price charged for the hunting bag as the consumptive resource should be in addition to 
the price of access. Table 3.9 calculates the price for access time per person, and per person 
per day, based on the single Dandawa hunt bought by non-hunters. 
Table 3.9 Prices for access time and recreational value of a Dandawa camping site on the Zambezi 
river-frontage: 1991 
Source: Mashori, Marongora (personal communication). Dandawa hunt prices in Appendix 7.6, page A65. 
The system described next is a competitively priced allocation system. Prices for the wildlife 
resource are determined by Zimbabwean and foreign hunters who bid at a public auction for 
the hunting opportunities supplied. The allocation mechanism accommodates hunters' 
preferences, according to their willingness to pay market prices. 
I For safari operators, financial success depends on the efficient planning and use made of time spent in the 
resource area, and each wildlife species available on quota. Safari operators charge their foreign clients a daily 
hunting fee that is related to the trophy animal species, and a trophy fee for each species shot. See Child, B., (1988) 
for an account of the Zimbabwe hunting industry. For an example of an allocation for safari hunting, see 
Appendix 16, page Al09. In Ciskei. plains game hunts are also packaged and sold with a daily hunting fee by a 
commercial enterprise. Ciskei Safaris (Wilmot, personal communication). For an example of an allocation system 
that prices time and the quota for citizen hunting. see Appendix 15.2, page A107. 
2 McNeely (1988): 114 lists points to consider when determining entry fees for protected areas. The basic question 
is whether resources should be priced using market mechanisms to cover full costs of setting aside a protected area, 
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3.2.4. The DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi 
3.2.4.1. The Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting areas 
The sport hunting activities allocated by the auction system take place in the mid-Zambezi 
valley in two protected areas: The Nyakasanga section of Hurungwe Safari Area, and the Sapi 
Safari Area (see Map 3.4, page 90). Both areas offer trophy hunting of prime African big 
game and dangerous game to Zimbabwean and foreign hunters. The sport hunting activities 
are termed citizen/safari hunting in this dissertation. The hunts are sold by private auctioneers 
for the DNPWLM on a commission basis. The DNPWLM administers the system from their 
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Map 3.4 Location map of Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting areas in Zimbabwe 
Source: Digitized maps. Appendix 17. page Al JO. 
3.2.4.2. The DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi 
The auction system 's objective is to offer quality big game trophy hunting to foreign and 
Zimbabwean hunters at the highest market price. The auction system is now well established, 










Clmpter 3: Re,•iew of licensing systems 91 
The auction achieves the three allocation functions simultaneously at the fall of the 
auctioneer's baton: 
• Hunters are allocated a specific hunt of their preference; 
• Applicants demanding any hunt are limited to a single bidder, by raising the price; 
• Hunts and individual trophy animals are valued at market prices using hunter's 
final bids. 
The final auction price expresses how highly the hunter values the hunt, based on his personal 
preferences and his willingness to pay (measured in money). By using the highest auction 
price to decide who hunts, the auction system ensures that each hunt is bought by the bidder 
who values that particular hunt most out of all applicants. By allocating hunts purposefully 
(efficiently) to applicants who value the benefits most distinguishes the auction systems from 
the random distribution of hunts amongst applicants as achieved by lottery systems. (The 
randomly allocated hunts in lottery systems according to chance disregard the real value of 
hunting opportunities to applicants.) 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The total species quotas available for citizen/safari hunting in Nyakasanga/Sapi areas are well 
balanced with big game and plains game species. The DNPWLM packaged the species quotas 
in both areas into a total of 72 hunts for both areas, each with a basic hunting bag of 10 or 
14 hunting days. In 1991, the DNPWLM auction system supplied 42 basic bags in 
Nyakasanga, and 30 basic bags in Sapi . 
The most valued trophy animals of species such as elephant, buffalo, lion, nyala, 
hippopotamus were auctioned off singly to any hunter who had purchased a basic hunt. Full 
details of the 1991 hunt allocation - known only once the auction was over - are included in 
Appendices.1 
• Minimum pricing of auction hunts: 
The DNPWLM required each auction lot to be priced at the previous year's final auction 
. . . 
pnce, as a mm1mum. 
• Hunt characteristics made known to applicants: 
The opportunities available in each hunting area are published in a catalogue (ABC Auctions, 





Hunt numbers, identifying each hunt; 
Hunting dates, and periods (10-day and 14-day hunts are offered); 
Species, sex and number of animals in each basic hunting bag; 
Additional, individually auctioned trophy animals; 
1 For the hunt allocation tables in Nyakasanga. see Appendix 2.7.1. page A21. for those in Sapi, see 
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• The previous year's auction prices (in Z$), as DNPWLM reserve prices; 
• A map of the hunting areas, which indicates the location of hunting camps and 
delimits hunting and no-hunting areas; 
• Auction procedure, payment requirements, and hunting regulations . 
.... . 
• Application procedure: 
Applicants can be foreign hunters, their Zimbabwean agents, Zimbabwe citizen hunters, or 
Zimbabwe safari operators. The DNP\VLM uses a rigorous and bureaucratic application and 
screening procedure to qualify participants as bidders at the auction (ABC Auctions, 1991). 
Hunts are not transferable between hunters once they have been auctioned, and safari 
operators are limited to two hunts each. These measures limit competition and free market 
forces, and increase administrative costs of the auction system. 
Based on full details of each hunt's characteristics in the prospectus, prospective bidders then 
choose the basic hunts or individual trophy species they prefer, and decide the highest price 
they are were willing to pay at the auction. 
• Auction rules for applicants: 
On winning an auction lot, all hunters must effect immediate payment of the final auction 
price to secure their hunt and any additional trophy animals they bid for. Foreign hunters or 
their agents must pay in foreign exchange currencies. 
• Demand by hunters/Hunt allocation procedure/Pricing of hunts: 
Bidding for Zimbabwean citizens and foreign hunters is in the Zimbabwe dollar currency. The 
price is systematically raised, until there is only one final bidder, who is allocated that auction 
lot. Final prices paid by the hunters varied markedly depending on the hunting area, the 
campsite assigned to the hunt (those near water were higher), the composition of the basic 
bag, any additional single species bought, and the hunter ' s status as foreigner or Zimbabwean. 
• Hunt prices resulting from the auction system: 
Strong demand by market participants (foreign hunters, citizen hunters and safari operators) 
is reflected by the high prices paid for basic hunts and single trophy animals. For example, 
prices for basic hunts in 1991, ranged from Z$4'500 to Z$24'000 depending on the species 
composition of the hunting bag. A single trophy elephant bull fetched Z$34'000, and a single 
female impala (non-trophy) sold for just Z$40, equal to the government controlled trophy fee 
(see Appendix 8, page A 77). 
Of a total of 72 hunts offered for Nyakasanga/Sapi 10 1991, 51 basic hunts (70%) were 
bought by foreign hunters, and the remaining 21 basic hunts (30%) went to Zimbabwe 
citizens. Of the 104 single trophy animals on offer, two thirds of the animals (70 lots) were 










Chapter 3: Rei·iew of licensing systems 93 
·:·:·:·:.:·:·:·:·:,;.:-:,;.:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·;.:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:<·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:-:-:,:,:-: .·:·:,:,:,:,;,:,:,:,:,:-:-:.:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:,:,;,:,:-:·:·:·:·:.:·:·:·:-:·:·:,:,:-:,:,x,:-:·:·:·:,:,:,:,;,:,:,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·: .... :,;,;,;,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-x ,;.:,;.:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:,:,:.;,;,:,:-:,:,:,,.-:,;.:,:,;.;.:,:,:,:-:-x-:, 
All final bid prices for Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting areas are included in appendices.1 For 
comparative purposes, each bidder's individual trophy animals were added to his basic hunt 
and then totalled, using a tabular format similar to that of previous systems.2 
Table 3.10 presents a summary of the maximum and minimum price range of the final 
Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting packages, ie. the basic hunt and any other single trophy species 
bought by the hunter. 
Table 3.10 Maximum and minimum hunt prices in Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting areas: 1991 
AJtt~~~ hGAtI,;16J p&~· hunt~; ···· 
Average hunt price per hunter per hunting d~~ 
· :Hirt N2, 14 hunlilg days 
·HIJfll N33, 10 hunting days 
:: ; ~!Bod~: I J 
i!ioo :r> 
Source: Nyakasanga/Sapi hunt prices calculated in Appendix 7.7.3 (page A71). and Appendix 7.7.4 (page A75). 
By allowing for a maximum of two hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 1 co-hunter), 
each hunter's average contribution towards the hunt price, and towards the hunt price per 
hunting day, is shown. The wide range of hunt prices reflects the variety of hunts bought by 
participants and the auction system's flexibility for the hunter. The auction system allows 
hunters to package their own hunts by buying as many individual species as they prefer and 
are willing to pay for. The high auction prices also reflect the market-priced valuation 
achieved by auctioning hunting resources incrementally as single auction lots, allowing the 
seller (the DNPWLM in this instance) to capture the consumer surplus3 in the final auction 
price. 
The next licensing system described is a competitively packaged and priced system used by 
safari operators to market safari hunting to foreign hunters. The prices are determined by 
international supply of, and demand for, big game trophy hunting and by business principles 
(financial sustainability). 
I For auction values of basic hunts for Nyakasanga/Sapi. see Appendix 7.7.1, page A67, and for auction values of 
single trophy animals for these hunts. see Appendix 7.7.2. page A69. 
2 For total auction values for Nyakasanga, see Appendix 7.7.3, page A71; for Sapi see Appendix 7.7.4, page A75. 
3 The consumer surplus is the difference between the actual price a person is willing to pay and the competitive 
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3.2.5. The safari operator marketing system for Charara/Makuti 
3.2.5.1. Introduction 
The wildlife resources available in Charara/Makuti are ideally suited to offer quality big game 
and dangerous game trophy hunting to foreign clients. This type of sport hunting has been 
termed safari hunting for purposes of this dissertation. It forms the basis of Zimbabwe's 
viable commercial safari hunting industry. 
This section estimates the 1991 hunting quota for Charara/Makuti as though it were marketed 
for safari hunting by a safari operator. This safari hunting value of the Charara/Makuti sport 
hunting quota represents the opportunity cost of using the area for citizen hunting - its present 
land-use. In the following, the method of marketing and pricing the resources of wildlife and 
access time for safari hunting are described. A minimum value for the Charara/Makuti sport 
hunting quota as safari hunting is estimated. The estimation was done by an experienced 
professional hunter and safari operator1• Full details of the quota allocation to hunts and their 
price calculations are given in Appendix 16, page A109. 
3.2.5.2. The safari operator system of marketing Charara/Makuti 
State hunting areas where sustainable hunting quotas2 of African big game and dangerous 
game species occur are normally leased by the DNPWLM to commercial safari operators. The 
DNPWLM sets the total species quotas for sport hunting. Safari operators bid competitively 
to acquire the hunting concession. Successful operators pay a concession fee for exclusive 
access to the resource area and the right to hunt the quota. The safari operator then packages 
this quota into a number of different types of hunts, depending on the demand by his 
international safari hunting clients and their specific hunting preferences. This packaging is 
market-related and involves almost exclusively the hunting of male trophy animals. 
• Hunts in demand by safari hunting clients: 
The following hunts are internationally in high demand by foreign safari hunters, and typify 
how commercial safari operators allocate the scarce resources of wildlife species and access 
time in the hunting area (in hunting days) to specific hunts, in order to achieve a market-
related quota allocation. 
• 21-day trophy bull elephant hunt 
• 5-day trophy buffalo hunt 
• 15-day cat hunt (trophy lion or leopard) 
1 The infonnation is based on Seymour-Smith (personal communications) from 1991, whose invaluable assistance 
is gratefully acknowledged. Valuable insights were also gained in personal communications with: Travers, Booth, 
Grobbelaar (see Acknowledgements, page 250). 
2 Sustainable quotas for sport hunting are different to sustainable quotas for other management objectives, and have 
different implications for population management. Sustainable sport hunting quotas imply that populations are 
managed for the maximum yield of trophy animal numbers of a particular trophy quality (eg. ivory tusk size for 
quality trophy hunting of elephant). See Martin (1990). Populations can also be managed for maximum yield of 
animal numbers of average or random trophy quality (eg. for meat production or maximum population growth for 
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The trophy species elephant, · buffalo, and lion or leopard form the basis for the hunting 
package, acting as so-called "draw cards" for clients to buy the hunt. The number and species 
of other animals (big game or plains game, trophy or non-trophy) included in the bag depends 
on a variety of factors. Ultimately, an operator includes the minimum hunting bag that, 
together with his personal services, is necessary to market the hunting package to a safari 
hunting client. Often, the relationship between a safari operator and his hunting clients is a 
personal one. A client's wishes are accommodated by the safari operator (within the quota 
limitations) and influence the final hunting bag. Alternatively, the hunting bag may also vary 
due to the composition of the sport hunting quota in each hunting area, and the safari 
operator's professional experience and skill at utilizing the hunting quotas (Booth, personal 
communication). In the end, the packaged hunt must be commercially viable, and saleable. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
The hunt's total price comprises two parts: the daily-rate for each hunting day, and the trophy 
price for each species sold in the hunting bag. In the following, prices given are in US$ - the 
currency in which most safari hunting is quoted and marketed internationally. Market prices 
for safari hunting are estimated for 1991. 
The US$ was converted to Z$ at a fixed exchange rate of 3.07 Z$ per unit US$ (as per 
31.5.91). Readers should note, however, that the Z$ values calculated here for safari hunting 
are conservative estimates, due to extensive devaluation of Zimbabwe's currency in 1991 by 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe - and its continuing devaluation whilst this research was 
being conducted. 1 The fixed exchange rate used here is not to be mistaken as a measure of 
the market value of foreign exchange in Zimbabwe dollars. The market value of foreign 
exchange is estimated separately in Chapter 5 (see section 5.5, page 213). 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The following information is based on estimations by an experienced professional hunter and 
safari operator (Seymour-Smith, personal communication). The method packages the total 
quota available in Charara/Makuti into marketable hunts, and then values these hunts at actual 
market prices per species and hunting day.2 
1 The ZS currency is weak when compared to the USS and German D-Mark, the two main hard currencies that 
Zimbabwe earns from safari hunters. The ZS has been devalued continuously since this research was undertaken. 
The exchange rate was ZS2.67 per unit USS (per 31.1.91), having been devalued by 13% to ZS3.07 per unit USS 
per unit ZS as used in this report (per 31.5.91), and being devalued still further to ZS5.05 per unit USS (per 
31.12.91); Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 1991. 
2 For Zimbabwe, Jansen (1989) and Child, B. (personal communication): 15-20, and for Botswana Cumming and 
Taylor (Botswana Government, 1989) have used another method that is based average trophy prices per species 
actually sold, calculated by analyzing data from many safari operator returns. Each safari operator's total revenue 
is based on different quotas, in different areas. The average trophy prices per species are then multiplied with species 
on an unpackaged quota to yield the total trophy revenue according to "market values". This method takes no account 
of the species composition or the relative species abundance of that quota. Daily rates are then added to this revenue 
as an average % of the total. The method appears questionable, as it does not guarantee the marketability of such 
a hunting quota. Actual (gross) hunting revenues may easily be over-estimated by this method. It is therefore not 
surprising that profitability and hunter-days are not correlated, nor that (gross) revenue per hunter-day varies greatly 
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The most efficient (revenue maximizing) way to package the Charara/Makuti quota into 
hunts, is to start with the most valuable trophy species and hunt types (in terms of daily rates 
and hunt length) and to allocate these so-called "draw cards" to hunts first. Taylor (1984) 
documents the safari operator packaging method. For the Charara/Makuti study area, the 1991 
total species quota was estimated to support the following quality big game trophy hunts: 
• Five 21-day trophy bull elephant hunts, each valued at a daily-rate of US$900 per 
day, with trophy prices totalling US$13'460 for each hunting bag. 
• Ten 5-day trophy buffalo hunts, in high demand by safari hunters due to the 
scarcity of the buffalo species, each valued at a daily-rate of US$500, with trophy 
prices totalling US$1 '960 for each hunting bag. 
• Five 15-day "cat" hunts (draw cards are trophy lion or Jeopard), each valued at a 
daily-rate of US$700 per day, with trophy prices totalling US$4'550 for animals 
in each hunting bag. 
Full details of the quota allocation to hunts are in Appendix 16, page A109. 
• Hunt prices resulting from the marketing system: 
The total price for these hunting packages is then calculated by multiplying daily-rates with 
hunt length, and adding in the total trophy prices for this hunt type. 
Table 3.11 Maximum and minimum hunt prices of safari operator marketing Charara/Makuti hunting 
areas: 1991 
T:¢t~kpofo<paJJ < . ····· ··.· .. · .. · ....... . 
IY~f~~ij RYID ~r~ pe(hµnt~( .. · . 
•:·!~1~,i·••·!: ::: ••• , •• 
•\ot345>, 
Av~t~S$ h9trtii5rit& pefib&ht~r:pechunting <lc1v?•L• 
•••••~•·•••••• ••••••••••:••••••••••·iit~~~;i~crs•~~g·F.(:
0r•~f ·•~f•1•3;•:i e,,•••••1r•:••• 
Source: Safari operator marketing hunt prices calculated in Appendix 16, page Al09. 
Table 3.11 shows a summary of the maximum and minimum range of prices for the hunting 
packages marketed by a safari operator. Allowing for a maximum of two foreign hunters who 
can share a hunt (1 hunter and 1 co-hunter), each hunter's average contribution towards the 
hunt price and towards the hunt price per hunting day is shown. Calculations of hunt prices 
are shown in Appendix 16, page A109. 
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• Estimated market value of Charara/Makuti as safari hunting: 
The total value of the hunting resources in Charara/Makuti hunting area if sold as safari 
hunting by a safari operator comes to US$281 '650, or the equivalent of 2$859'039 using the 
exchange rate of 3.07 2$/ 1 US$ (per 31.5.91). Allocated as citizen hunting using the 
DNPWLM lottery system, The same quota earned a revenue of 2$171 '6271 from citizen 
hunting using the DNPWLM lottery system. The safari operator's gross revenue from 
safari hunting is five times less than that earned by the DNPWLM from citizen hunting. 




Only those animals on quota in the Charara/Makuti hunting area were available 
to the safari operator. 
The value of animals on quota that remained un-utilized, consisting mainly of 
trophy and non-trophy buffalo, impala, and sable (see Appendix 16) were not 
included. The marketability of the hunts and the quota utilization could be 
improved, if additional plains game animals were available to the safari operator 
on other land.2 
Foreign exchange is valued at the official controlled (non-market) exchange rate, 
which does not reflect its true opportunity costs to the economy. This point will 
be considered further in the comparative study in Chapter 5. 
These initial estimates strongly suggest that by allocating valuable big game and land in 
protected areas exclusively to citizen hunting in Charara/Makuti, these resources are being 
grossly undervalued by the present allocation system. 
Chapter 5 assesses some opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system with other 
Zimbabwean licensing systems. 
1 Revenue from the quota at fixed prices was ZS128'567 (see calculations in Appendix 7.1, page A49), but also 
included ZS43'060 in ticket revenue from the lottery system (see item on demand by hunting applicants, page 68). 
2 Two options are made use of by safari operators in Zimbabwe. Additional plains game species may be available 
on other state land to which the operator has access for clients, or the operator may combine predominantly big game 
and dangerous game animal species in Charara/Makuti with additional plains game animal species situated elsewhere 
in Zimbabwe on private ranch land. increasing the latter's market value for sport hunting many times over. For 
details, see Child, B. (1988): especially pages 99, 280-282, 327-333; for a case study account involving Charara 
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3.3. Review of other licensing systems 
The three foreign licensing systems sketched in this section contrast in some important points 
with the previous systems reviewed for Zimbabwe. These points are: the quality of services 
provided to sport hunters; the requirements for proof of a hunter's marksmanship prior to his 
entry into a hunting area; the use of a sophisticated computerized lottery and preference 
allocation procedure by the Wyoming lottery system to achieve a particular equality1 -
understood as a type of "fairness" in the distribution of hunts amongst applicants. This point 
is of particular interest for comparison with the equality of hunt allocation achieved by the 
ZHA lottery system in Zimbabwe (section 3.2.2.4, page 81). 
The foreign allocation systems are excluded from the comparative assessment of Zimbabwean 
alternatives conducted in Chapter 5, for two reasons: Data requirements exceeded the time 
available for their collection, and the hunting revenues in several foreign currencies would 
have to be converted into Zimbabwe dollars, placing limits on their interpretation for 
comparative purposes. 
3.3.1. The Wyoming lottery system 
The description is based on the account of the American "Single license (sic) draw system" 
in a report issued by the Wyoming Game & Fish Department (1988). Additional licensing 
documents (Wyoming Game & Fish Commission, 1990; Wyoming Game & Fish Department, 
1991) that were received in personal communications with Crowe were also consulted. The 
licensing system is called the "Wyoming lottery system" here for purposes of comparison 
with lottery systems in Zimbabwe. General descriptions of wildlife management for sport 
hunting in Wyoming and other American states were found in Crowe (1987) and Payne 
(1988). 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
The Wyoming lottery system was designed for use in the state of Wyoming, U.S.A. by the 
Wyoming Game and Fish Department. In response to public demand for hunting licences, the 
system was fully computerized in 1988. The system allocates one single licence for each 
animal and species hunted on all land (state and private land) throughout Wyoming. In 
Wyoming, hunters undertake their hunt unaccompanied by staff of the Wyoming Game & 
Fish Department. 
In both these points, sport hunting activity in Wyoming differs significantly to that practised 
by sport hunters in an African context. In Zimbabwe, a hunt involves a hunting bag with 
multiple animals and mixed species. Furthermore, all hunting parties are individually 
accompanied for control purposes by DNPWLM staff. Hunting trips in Wyoming are 
generally not restricted to a specific number of hunting days, such as they are in Zimbabwe 
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or South Africa. For these reasons, the functions of planning, administering, and controlling 
hunting in Wyoming are fundamentally different to those of Zimbabwe's licensing systems, 
and demand significantly more detailed ecological and financial data than is available for 
African wildlife in Zimbabwe (see also Cumming, 1988). Further aspects of resource planning 
and management for the Wyoming system are not included here; they have been well 
documented by Crowe (1987). 
Instead, the focus here is on the lottery, and specifically on the preference allocation 
procedure used by the Wyoming lottery system to allocate specific individual hunting 
preferences tq applicants. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
The Wyoming lottery system caters for resident and non-resident hunting applicants. It is a 
fix-priced allocation system, which means that at fixed hunt prices a lottery is used to limit 
demand, rather than higher prices and applicant's willingness to pay. The prices paid for 
licence fees and application fees for most species are nominal compared to trophy fees for 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters. Licence fees in Wyoming range from US$15 (about Z$45) for a 
general deer licence, to US$200 (about Z$600) for a wild bison licence. Non-residents pay 
slightly higher fees than residents. (The administrative costs of allocating hunts by this system 
are planned in such a way that they are covered by licence fee revenue.) 
• Hunt characteristics and information made known to applicants: 
All applicants are only allowed one application for each species offered. Each species is made 
available to hunters using distinct licence types, according to the characteristics of hunting 
area, restrictions on hunting periods during the year, and other criteria. Non-resident hunters 
who applied the previous year for a licence, and applicants in the current year, are posted 
detailed application brochures. This information provides applicants with complete details of 
hunt characteristics, including: 







the hunting seasons; 
the numerous licence types for each species; 
the licence fees; 
the complete hunting regulations for every species; 
the detailed application procedure, with examples on sample application forms . 
• Application procedure: 
After studying the information brochures, applicants have a choice of five preferences for 
each species. For each preference, applicants indicate the hunting area and the licence type 
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• Application rules for hunters: 
For certain of the rarer species ( eg. moose, big horn sheep and mountain goat), each applicant 
is limited to one application every fifth year. This rule limits the demand for these species 
prior to the lottery, effectively increasing each applicant's probability of being drawn in the 
lottery for these hunt types. 
Another important feature of the Wyoming lottery system is that at all stages, a clear 
distinction is made between applications submitted by single individuals for hunting licences, 
and applications submitted by groups of individuals (hunting parties) who intend hunting 
together. Both individual hunters and hunting parties are issued a single licence to hunt, so 
that group applications count as single applications. Hunters in a group are individually 
identified as belonging to a group application, and no group applicant can gain an advantage 
over a single applicant in the lottery draw because applicants are not permftted to apply as 
individual hunters and as members of a group - a rule enforced by rigorous controls of 
application data using a computer database. Consequently, hunting parties and individual 
hunters are equally weighted for the lottery draw. This rule has implications for the equality 
achieved during the hunt allocation procedure (see item on hunt preference allocation 
procedure, page 101). 
• Demand by hunting applicants: 
In 1988, the agency received about 300'000 applications1 for 19 licence types and 11 species 
in Wyoming. 
• Hunt allocation procedure: 
Application data, licence types, area hunting quotas and licence fees are computerized. As 
licence applications are processed for the computer, they are cross-checked using manual and 
mechanical controls. Faulty applications are identified and returned to their applicants together 
with their application fees and a letter of explanation. If the deadlines permit, these hunters 
can then re-apply. 
Due to the large number of hunts supplied to hunters in Wyoming, the number of applications 
(hunting parties and individuals) does not always exceed the number of licences supplied for 
each licence type. In 1988 for example, 131 '000 applications by hunters were allocated 
licences directly without recourse to a lottery (Wyoming Game & Fish Department, 1988: p. 
4 and p. 21). 
In the majority of cases, however, the number of applications exceeds the available number 
of licences. A computerized random lottery draw is then used to allocate the remaining 
101 '109 available licences amongst the 169'000 applications (Wyoming Game & Fish 
1 Applications are not the same as applicants; a group application can include more than one hunter in this system. 
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Department, 1988: p. 4 and p. 21). A procedure then determines which hunter's preferences 
can be accommodated. The lottery seeks to " ••• assure absolute fairness for all applicants ... " 
(Wyoming Game & Fish Department, 1991: 3. Emphasis in the original.). 
The meaning of equality, or "fairness", in the Wyoming hunt preference allocation procedure 
is now explored. It may be contrasted to the procedure used in the ZHA lottery system for 
Tuli/Doma/Rifa (section 3.2.2.4, page 81). 
• Hunt preference allocation procedure and equality: 
To commence the procedure, a computer programme assigns each individual or party 
application a random number using a tested algorithm. The applications are now sorted from 
smallest to highest random number, in descending order. The list of applications, ordered by 
random number, represents a single simultaneous ranking of all applicants prior to considering 
their actual hunt preferences. The actual lottery, or draw, in this computerized system thus 
takes place only once. (Lotteries drawn by hand achieve a step-by-step ranking of all winners 
at each draw, but not of all applicants.) The number of licences available in any hunting area 
determines how many random numbers will now be allocated a hunt. 
The preference allocation procedure then assigns hunts to applications in a specific order, 
according hunt preferences. It is this order that determines the equality, or fairness 1 achieved 
by the system, and can be followed in Figure 3.6, page 103. 
The first preferences of all applicants are considered according to their priority in the ranked, 
random number list. If an applicant's first preference is not available, the applicant is assigned 
to a temporary waiting list by the computer, until the first choices of the lower order 
applicants (those with larger random numbers) have been processed, or until there are no 
more hunts available. 
Only once all applicants have had a chance to be assigned their first preference, are the 
second preferences of all applicants by the allocation procedure (see Figure 3.6, page 103). 
The computer retrieves the applications from the temporary waiting list (applicants with 
unfulfilled first preferences), and goes through the same procedure for the second preferences 
in order of their ranked, assigned random numbers. Thereafter, should there be any remaining 
applicants or hunts, the procedure attempts to assign their third, fourth and mth preferences. 
If, at any stage the quota limit for a species and licence type is reached, or no applicants 
remain in the waiting list, the procedure is ended (see Figure 3.6, page 103). In this 
procedure, each applicant's first choice is accorded an identical weighting, disregarding the 
draw order he was assigned in the ranked random number list. 
I Equality, or fairness, is used here as a concept that describes the distribution pattern of some benefit (or cost) 
amongst a number of individuals. Equality, in this sense·, does not imply a value judgement of the distribution 
pattern(s) as being right, or wrong; the distribution(s) is (are) merely different. Since many distribution patterns may 
be achieved, there is no equality or fairness per se, but there are always a number of equalities. Rae, et al., (1981) 
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• Example illustrating Wyoming's preference allocation procedure: 
The outcome of this procedure is best illustrated with an example, by adopting the notation: 
A1, A2, ••• As for applicant A's preferences 1, 2, through to 5, who is 
ranked first on the random number list; 
Z1, Z2, ••• Zs for applicant Z's preferences 1, 2, through to 5, who is 
ranked last on the list. 
Then, according to the Wyoming preference allocation procedure, applicant A's second 
preference A2 would not be allocated before applicant Z's first preference Z1, if this was 
available; similarly applicant A's third, fourth and fifth preferences A3, A4 and A 5 would 
similarly not be allocated before applicant Z's second preference Z2, if this option was still 
available. The same logic holds true for every applicant in the Wyoming lottery system. 
By assigning all applicants a ranking prior to the preference allocation using the random 
number, the Wyoming lottery system achieves an equal weighting of all applicants' and 
winners' preferences. The ZHA lottery system, by contrast, assigns each winning applicant 
at a time a rank whilst continuously allocating preferences using a manual draw. The ZHA 
lottery allocation thus achieves an unequal weighting of the winner's preferences (see section 
3.2.2.4, page 81). 
Once the Wyoming preference allocation is finished, the system uses the stored application 
data to print and address the hunting licences which are then mailed to all successful 
applicants. A report of unsuccessful applicants is produced, and the amount submitted in 
application fees is returned to the unsuccessful applicants within 48 hours of the draw. In the 
Wyoming lottery system, unsuccessful applicants are thus financially no worse-off after the 
draw than they were before it. (In the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti, by 
contrast (see section 3.2'.l.3, page 64), tickets are a significant form of revenue but 
unsuccessful applicants gain no benefit.) 
The reviews of the next two allocation systems for hunting is on the facilities and services 
offered to South African citizen hunters, on the diversity of hunting packages offered, and on 
the clear distinction drawn between quotas sold strictly as trophy hunts, and those sold as 
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For Applicants = 1 ... n 
For Preferences = 1...m 
START ALLOCATION OF HUNTS WITH EQUALLY WEIGHTED PREFERENCES 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, goto END 
Do First Hunt Preferences 
1st Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
2nd Applicant 
.. . 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
nth Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
End Do First Hunt Preferences 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, or APPLICANTS in waiting list = 0, goto END 
Do Second Hunt Preferences 
... 
1st Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
2nd Applicant 
... 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
nth Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
End Do Second Hunt Preferences 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, or APPLICANTS in waiting list = 0, goto END 
Do Mth Hunt Preferences 
1st Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
2nd Applicant 
... 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
nth Applicant 
Is Preference Hunt available? 
Yes: allocate to Applicant, remove from HUNTS to allocate 
No: put Applicant into waiting list 
End Do Mth Hunt Preferences 
If HUNTS to allocate = none, or APPLICANTS in waiting list = 0, goto END 
END Allocation of Hunts is finished 
Figure 3.6 Wyoming lottery system: Preference allocation with equally weighted hunt preferences 
for applicants 
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3.3.2. The NPB lottery system for Mkuzi/Spioenkop 
The Natal Parks Board (NPB) in South Africa offers hunting packages to foreign safari 
hunters and to South African citizen hunters in the controlled hunting areas of the Mkuzi 
Game Reserve and the Spioenkop Reserve. Data for the 1991 hunting season is based on 
correspondence with the NPB hunting administrator for the area (Davies, personal 
communication) in 1991. The NPB lottery system allocates hunts at fixed prices to applicants 
using a lottery system in two separate hunting areas. 
In the Mkuzi Game Reserve, citizen hunters were offered 14 hunts in 1991, all exclusively 
with plains game species: 
• 3 trophy hunts; 
• 7 venison hunts; 
• 4 mixed trophy/venison hunts . 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
For trophy h1,mts, the NPB allocates only male trophy-bearing animals to the hunting bags 
whereas for venison hunts, the bags comprise only female non-trophy-bearing animals, and 
for trophy/venison hunts, the bags comprise both male (trophy) and female (non-trophy or 
venison) animals (see Appendix 15.1, page A105). Quality and price diversity of the hunts 
on offer to prospective hunters is thereby increased, allowing hunters a variety of choice. 
The size of the hunting bags, ie. the number of animals included in the hunting bag, for each 
of the 14 hunts, was small. Six animals from amongst four to six species of plains game were 
allocated to each bag. All hunts were for a 5-day hunting period, with one additional non-
hunting day. A maximum of 4 hunters may comprise each hunting party; they must be 
accompanied by two game guards for control and guiding purposes inside the hunting area. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
For the NPB lottery system, hunt prices include a trophy fee for animal species and a small 
licence fee that varies according to the species. The access time for hunting in the resource 
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Table 3.12 Hunt prices of NPB lottery system for Mkuzi hunting area: 1991 
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Source: NPB lottery system hunt prices calculated in Appendix 15.1, page Al05. Exchange rate taken from: Reserve 
Bank of Zimbabwe (1991). 
Table 3.12 shows a summary of the range of prices for the trophy, venison and mixed 
trophy/venison hunting options sold by the NPB in 1991 in Mkuzi Game Reserve. Allowing 
for a maximum of four hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 3 co-hunter), and an 
average of five hunting days per hunt, each hunter's average c ntribution towards the hunt 
price and towards the hunt price per hunting day are shown for each option. These prices 
excluded the accommodation of the hunting party in a comfortable bush camp (see item on 
hunting facilities and rules, page 106). 
In the Spioenkop Reserve a pilot hunting programme for the controlled hunting area was 
planned in conjunction with the Natal Hunters' Association, and approved by the Natal Parks 
Board in mid 1991. For that year, two 3-day hunts took place, generating a total revenue of 
Z$11 '050 (Rand6'000; Davies, personal communication). The prices at which Zi,mbabwean 
hunters can purchase qualitatively superior big game hunting are, by comparison, much lower 
to these plains game hunting prices. 1 
• Application procedure/Demand by applicants: 
In 1991, there were 600 applications for the 14 hunts in Mkuzi. To apply, a hunter submits 
a maximum of three applications for any three hunts of his choice, at a cost of RandlO per 
application. Hunters who were drawn were required to pay half the hunt's value in trophy 
fees as a deposit in order to secure the hunting rights, with the balance being paid prior to 
entering the hunting area. This rule ensures that applicants have a financial commitment to 
take their hunt up once they have been allocated one in the draw procedure. 
1 For hunt prices in the DNPWLM lottery system, see Table 3.2 (page 64); for those in the ZHA lottery system, 
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• Hunt allocation procedure: 
Hunts are allocated to applicants by a lottery draw using a computer. The procedure is not 
described further here. 
• Hunting facilities and rules: 
On arrival at the hunting area, hunters are given the opportunity to test and sight their rifles, 
after which each hunter is required to undertake and pass a shooting test. 1 Those who fail 
the test are not allowed to hunt, and forfeit their hunting rights and deposit. This requirement 
ensures that high standards of marksmanship and hunting apply to all participants without 
favour, and increases hunter commitment to go and hunt once they have secured a hunt in 
the draw, quite apart from issues of safety and humane killing for human, and animal life 
respectively. 
To provide accommodation, the Umkumbi bush camp was built in the hunting area of Mkuzi 
Game Reserve after its fourth successive hunting season. The facilities are well appointed, 
being designed to be available to hunters during the hunting season and to tourists during the 
non-hunting season. The facilities and services cost 2$940 a night (Rand480) for eight 








Tented accommodation sleeping eight persons, with toilet, shower and washbasin 
in each of the 4 tents. Bedding, towels and soap are provided; 
A fully furnished thatched rustic lounge/dining- room/bar, overlooking a natural 
water pan; 
A fully equipped kitchen. A deep-freeze and a fridge are included; 
An abattoir, a hoist under cover, working tables, and hanging beams, drying racks, 
a salting area and a brine bath; 
A cold room for meat is available at the Warden's camp, situated 30 kilometres 
from the hunting camp; 
The camp accommodation and kitchen facilities are fully serviced by staff; 
Laundry services are provided, and the camp is powered by electricity, and water 
is provided from a dam. 
Strict precautions are taken to ensure that visible signs of hunting activity (eg. blood, or 
firearms) are minimized during transport of hunter's game carcases to the cold room facilities, 
located at the Warden's camp in the main tourist area. 
In reports received by the NPB, hunters have commented favourably on the accommodation 
facilities offered at the hunting camps of both reserves (Davies, personal communication). 
This should not be interpreted as being the only standard of accommodation and facilities 
sought after by South African citizen hunters, as shown by the survey conducted by Reilly 
1 Hunters test and zero their rifles at 25. 50 or 100 metres. The shooting test required 3 out of 4 shots to be placed 
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(1987) amongst Transvaal hunters. Their answers to a question on the standard of facilities 
required for hunting on private game farms ranged from rustic, to full board facilities. 
3.3.3. The Ciskei first-come-first-served system 
Ciskei Safaris, a private safari operator, leases four areas1 of state land in the Ciskei, South 
Africa. The operator offers safari hunting to foreign clients, and citizen hunting to South 
African residents on a commercial basis using a first-come-first-served system based on 
market prices. 
• Quota allocation to hunts: 
For citizen hunters, venison hunts (non-trophy animals) are offered with short hunting periods 
that include a hunting bag of African and non-African plains game. One type of hunt is 
designed as a trophy hunt, its bag including trophy animals of various species. Depending on 
the number of animals in each bag, the hunting periods of venison hunts varied as follows: 




2-days ( 4 animals, two species); 
3-days (7 animals, two species); 
5-days (13 animals, seven species) . 
Details of the hunt's individual animal and species allocations are m Appendix 15.2, 
page A107. 
• Pricing of hunts: 
In 1991, an estimated 100 such hunts were offered to South African venison hunters 
(Donaldson, personal .communication). Hunting parties for these hunts comprised a maximum 
of 4 hunters, and could include a number of non-hunting observers. The hunts were priced 
using a daily rate of Rand125 per hunter, and Rand50 per observer for each day's hunting, 
in addition to the trophy fee for any animals in the hunting bag that the hunter shot (killed 
or wounded). 
Apart from the safari operator marketing system (see section 3.2.5, page 94), this is the only 
other allocation system which was reviewed which _treats access time in the resource 
area as a scarce resource, and places an economic price on it, both for the hunter and the 
recreational observer who benefit in different ways from the access time. No Zimbabwe 
citizen hunting allocation system explicitly values and prices access time by hunters, co-
hunters or visitors in the hunting party (at cost or what the market will pay) in the manner 
that the Ciskei first-come-first-served system does. 
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What implications would a daily rate charged per person have for hunter's behaviour? To 
minimize his hunting costs per person, a hunter will have an economic incentive to form a 
hunting party with a maximum number of hunters (and contributing visitors) who will share 
the costs of the hunting trip. Consequently more hunters participate from the same 
consumptive ( quota) and non-consumptive resources (access time and space) - improving 
efficiency for the resource owner (Ciskei Safaris in this instance) and the public (sport hunters 
and accompanying visitors). 
Table 3.13 Hunt prices of Ciskei first-come-first-served system: 1991 
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Source: Ciskei lottery system hunt prices calculated in Appendix 15.2, page Al07. Exchange rate taken from: 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (1991). 
Table 3.13 shows a summary of the range of prices for the trophy, venison and mixed 
trophy/venison hunting options sold by Ciskei Safaris in 1991. Allowing for a maximum of 
four hunters who can share a hunt (1 hunter and 3 co-hunter), each hunter's average 
contribution towards the hunt price, and towards the hunt price per hunting day, are shown 
for each option. These prices included the accommodation of the hunting party in well 
appointed facilities (see item on hunting facilities and rules, page 109). 
For South African citizen hunters, the Ciskei first-come-first-served system offers a 
significantly wider range of hunt, prices, and choice of hunting periods than the DNPWLM 
tender system supplies to Zimbabweans (see Table 3.8, page 87). In the Ciskei, plains game 
hunting is sold at three times the price of similar hunting in Zimbabwe, and offers a higher 
standard of services and accommodation. 
• Application procedure/Demand by hunting applicants: 
The hunts are advertised by Ciskei Safaris with full details of the hunt characteristics supplied 
to applicants on request. Applications are accepted by telephone on a first-come- first-served 
basis. In order to confirm an initial application and secure a hunt, hunters must pay a deposit. 










Chapter 3: Re1·iew of licensing systems 109 
• Hunting facilities and rules: 
The prices in Table 3.13 for hunting packages offered to South African venison hunters 
include the following services (Donaldson, personal communication): 
• accommodation in fully furnished and serviced lodges; 




hunting accompanied by trackers; 
slaughtering and meat preparation by experienced staff in an equipped abattoir; 
daily laundering . 
All hunters are required to undertake and pass a shooting test on arrival at the hunting area, 
before they are permitted to hunt. Should hunters fail the test, they forfeit their right to hunt, 
and the deposit. This rule ensures that sport hunters who access the area are accomplished 
marksmen, practice regularly, and cause minimal wounding of the wildlife during the pursuit 
of their sport. It promotes and maintains a professional attitude amongst hunters practising 
their sport. 
3.4. Summary: Zimbabwe and Wyoming licensing systems 
The five Zimbabwean licensing systems and the Wyoming licensing system are summarized 
below. Particular emphasis is placed on how hunts are allocated to applicants at fixed and 
market prices using different mechanisms. 
The economic equilibrium model for the hunting market introduced in Chapter 2 (see 
Figure 2.4, page 27) to illustrate the allocation functions of licensing systems, is applied in 
turn to each alternative. The interpretation of each licensing system alternative with the model 
reveals how each system fulfils its allocative functions. The three main allocation functions 
of licensing systems are: 
• To limit the number of applicants demanding hunts to the fixed supply of hunts, 
ensuring that supply equals demand and that the market clears. 
• To distribute the available supply of hunts according to some rule; 
A further important function that is not obvious from the models, but is vital for a successful 
hunt allocation is: 
• To ensure that hunts are allocated to those hunters who value them most, that means 
to those persons willing to give up most to obtain a hunt (in terms of money, time in 
a queue, or distance. travelled). rather than to hunters who do not value them, or who 
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3.4.1. DNPWLM lottery systeh1 for Charara/Makuti 
The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti is interpreted in Figure 3.7 in terms of the 
equilibrium model for the hunting market (introduced in Chapter 2 with Figure 2.4, page 27). 
The figure shows the demand for hunts in Charara/Makuti as a typical negatively sloping 
demand curve D, indicating that more hunts are demanded at lower hunt prices. The fixed 
supply of hunts is shown by the vertical line S, indicating that supply does not increase at 
higher hunt prices (over the short term). Also shown in Figure 3.7 are the fixed hunt prices 
at P1, set according to the trophy prices in the government price schedule. 
Price of 
hunts s 
~ Fixed trophy prices 






a, Quantity of 
hunts 
Figure 3.7 Economic model of non-price hunt allocation by DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti : 
Allocating a given hunt supply amongst hunting applicanL<; using fixed prices and a lottery 
Source: Adapted from market ·equilibrium model. Lind,;ay (1984). 
Figure 3.7 illustrates the allocation problem for the DNPWLM lottery system. At the fixed 
price P1, the number of applicants was Q 1, almost twice o· - the number of hunts available 
for allocation. Instead of using a higher market clearing price p· to balance the supply of 
hunts (100 hunts) with the demand (196 applicants) the DNPWLM lottery system attempted 
to limit the number of applicants demanding hunts at the lower fixed trophy price (P1) using 
a lottery system. 
The actual allocation of hunting for Charara/Makuti hunting area in 1991 took place in two 
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Access to hunts was determined by a lottery draw. Each applicant was able to buy 
an unlimited number _of priced lottery tickets, according to his willingness to pay. 
Applicants had unequal probabilities of winning a hunt, due to the varying number 
of priced tickets each applicant bought, and his draw order. 
Lottery tickets gave hunting applicants an option to win any of the hunts available 
in Charara or Makuti hunting areas (Any Hunt). Applicants did not know any 
features of hunts available to them. 
Winners of the lottery were allotted Any Hunt according to an arbitrary rule 
determined by the DNPWLM. The rule did not take account of applicant's 
personal hunting preferences, their willingness or ability to pay for the option to 
hunt, the number of tickets purchased, the fixed trophy price of the hunt, or the 
hunt's personal value for the winner. 
Hunts were priced using fixed prices set by the government trophy fee schedule 
for Zimbabwean hunters. The trophy prices are the lowest prices for hunting big 
game species available in Zimbabwe. 
Some winners who were allotted a hunt chose not to pay the hunt's fixed trophy 
price, thereby forfeiting the use and value of the hunting opportunity. 
Many other winners paid for their allotted hunt, but chose then not to take up their 
hunt on the designated hunting dates, thereby forfeiting the use and value of their 
hunting opportunity .1 
The second stage DNPWLM first-come-first-served system 
Hunts that were not sold, or not taken up by hunters during the first stage DNPWLM lottery 
system described above, were re-allocated to applicants in Harare during a second stage 
allocation on a cash first-come-first-served basis. 
This system can be characterized by: 
• Hunters who arrived first at the Harare licensing office had first choice of the 
number of hunts they wanted to purchase, and which left-over hunts they were 
willing to pay for. 
• 
• 
Hunts were priced the same as under the DNPWLM lottery system using fixed 
prices set by the government trophy fee schedule for Zimbabwean hunters. 
All these left-over hunts were quickly bought by applicants, with one applicant 
purchasing four hunts in his own name. 
1 Hunting licences issued by the DNPWLM to hunt on state land may not be transferred between persons according 
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3.4.2. ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Rifa/Doma 
The ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa is interpreted in Figure 3.8 in terms of the 
equilibrium model for the hunting market (introduced in Chapter 2 with Figure 2.4, page 27). 
The figure shows the demand for hunts by members of the ZHA as a demand curve D, with 
the fixed supply of hunts shown by the vertical line S. Also shown in Figure 3.8 are the fixed 
hunt prices set according to the government price schedule at P1, and the fixed hunt prices 





P1 ••••••••••••••••••••• ••••••••••-t•••••• 
• • • • D 
Fixed trophy prices 
In Government schedule 
Quantity of 
hunts 
Figure 3.8 Economic model of non-price hunt allocation by ZHA lonery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa 
Rationing a given hunt supply amongst hunting applicants using fixed prices. a levy, and a lottery 
Source: Adapted from market equilibrium model. Lindsay (1984). 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the all-ocation problem for the ZHA lottery system. Since the ZHA raises 
a levy for all hunts on top of the fixed trophy price in the government schedule indicated by 
P1 in Figure 3.8, hunts were sold at a fixed hunt price P2• The number of hunts demanded by 
members at this higher price was Q'.!, still exceeding the number of hunts (Q•) available for 
allocation. Instead of using an even higher market clearing price such as p• to balance the 
supply of hunts with demand, the ZHA lottery system limited the number of members 
demanding hunts at the combined fixed trophy price and levy of P2 using a lottery system. 
The ZHA lottery system can be characterized by: 
• All hunting and non-hunting members of the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association 
(ZHA) pay a membership fee to benefit from the hunting opportunities and other 
services offered by the ZHA. Hunting members have a choice of three wildlife 
resource areas with big game hunting quotas on Parks and Wild Life Estate, each 
with a variety of predefined hunts. 
• Access to the hunts for each hunting area was determined by a lottery draw . 
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applicant had an unequal probability of winning a hunt: probability was influenced 
by the number of areas an applicant applied for; the number of hunt preferences 
an applicant submitted, and his draw order. 
Applicants were fully documented and informed of the characteristics of all 
hunting options. 
Hunts were priced using fixed prices for each animal on quota in the hunting bag . 
Trophy fee prices were set by the ZHA at between 120% and 170% of the fixed 
prices for these species set in the government trophy fee schedule for Zimbabwean 
hunters, depending on the branch of the ZHA administering the hunting area. 
Applications for the lottery draw included a ranked list of each applicant's hunt 
preferences for a particular hunting area. The lotteries for each of the three hunting 
areas were conducted separate I y. 
As each winner was drawn in the lottery, he was awarded the first hunt available 
on his personal preference list (Next Hunt Preference). 
The ZHA draw procedure results in winners who are drawn early on in the lottery 
always receiving their higher ranked hunt preferences, and in other winners 
generally receiving lower ranked hunt preferences. 
Winners paid the ZHA the appropriate trophy fee for the hunt, and were issued a 
hunting licence. If winners did not want to take up the hunt they had been 
allocated, then they had two options: If the hunt was able to be resold within the 
association before the predefined hunting dates, the hunter incurred no cost for his 
decision to forfeit his hunting option. If, however, the hunt was not able to be 
resold before the designated hunting dates, the hunter was obliged to pay the 
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3.4.3. DNPWLM tender systein for Dandawa 
The DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa is interpreted m Figure 3.9 in terms of the 
equilibrium model for the hunting market (introduced in Chapter 2 with Figure 2.4, page 27). 
The figure shows the demand for hunts by Zimbabwe citizen hunters as a demand curve D, 
with the fixed supply of hunts shown by the vertical line S. Also shown in Figure 3.9 are the 
hunt prices set according to the government price schedule at P 1 (for reference only), the 
minimum reserve price set for all Dandawa hunts by the DNPWLM at P2, and the highest 
fixed price tendered by applicants for a hunt at i\. It should be noted, that because tender 
prices are fixed, the tender prices submitted by hunting applicants need not necessarily be as 
high as the market clearing price of p· if several persons tender the same fixed price for any 
particular hunt. 
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Figure 3.9 Economic model of price and non-priced hunt allocation by DNPWLM tender system for 
Dandawa . h I h . 1· . r· d d . d I d I . Allocating a given unt supp y amongst untmg app 1cants usmg 1xe ten er prices an se ecte ottenes 
Source: Adapted from market equilibrium model. Lindsay (1984). 
Figure 3.9 illustrates the allocation problem for the DNPWLM tender system. Since the 
DNPWLM allocated hunts based on the highest fixed price tendered for any hunt, in those 
instances where no persons submitted the same tender price for any hunt, the highest tender 
price was also the market clearing price P°, as shown in Figure 3.9. At this price only a single 
person still demanded a particular hunt, so that the number of hunts demanded equalled the 
supply of hunts at a·. 
If, however, several persons tendered the same fixed price for any particular hunt, as 
indicated by the fixed tender price i\, then the number of persons demanding hunts at Q 3 still 
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to determine which of the tied applicants was to be allocated the particular hunt randomly. 







Applicants were informed of the characteristics of all predefined hunts, which 
differed only in their hunting dates during the hunting season. 
Applicants then submitted fixed price tenders for each hunt according to their 
willingness to pay. Some hunting applicants tendered the same fixed amount for 
a number of hunts. No pre-payment by applicants was necessary. 
Hunters with the highest tender for each individual hunting opportunity were 
awarded that hunt, and the DNPWLM requested winners to pay the hunt price 
they had tendered. 
Having not committed any money during the tendering application, winners now 
had a choice of either paying for the hunt, or not paying for the hunt. 
Most hunters paid the fixed tender price, and most hunters took up their hunting 
opportunity. 
Some winners of the DNPWLM tender system refused to pay; these hunts 
remained allocated in the formal sense, but were unsold and did not benefit the 
DNPWLM or hunters . 
Two further allocation problems arose due to the fixed nature of the price offers made by 
hunting applicants. 
• The first problem experienced by the DNPWLM was that the price tenders made 
by several applicants tied for the same hunt. In these cases, the DNPWLM drew 
a separate lottery to decide which of the tied applicants was awarded the particular 
hunt. 
• A second problem occurred because if the an applicant's tender price exceeded 
those of other applicants for several hunts at once; in such instances, the applicant 
had won several hunts - which contravened the allocation rules. In these cases, the 
DNPWLM once again used a lottery to decide which hunt was awarded to the 
winning tenderer. The hunter was not given the choice of personally choosing 
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3.4.4. DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi 
The DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga/Sapi is interpreted in Figure 3.10 in terms of 
the equilibrium model for the hunting market (introduced in Chapter 2 with Figure 2.4, 
page 27). The figure shows the demand for hunts (or individual trophy animals) by Zimbabwe 
citizen hunters and foreign hunters as a demand curve D, with the fixed supply of hunts 
shown by the vertical line S. Also shown in Figure 3.10 is the minimum reserve price set for 
auctioned hunts (or individual trophy animals) by the DNPWLM at P1• The hunt price p• 
indicates the highest auction price for any hunt ( or individual trophy animal) bid at the 
auction floor. This auction price was necessarily always the market clearing price. 
Price of 
hunts s 
C.1 Quantity of hunts 
Figure 3.10 Economic model of price hunt allocation by DNPWLM auction system for 
Nyakasanga/Sapi 
Anocating11 given supply of hunts (or individual trophy animals) amongst hunting applicants using market prices 
Source: Adapted from market equilibrium model. Lindsay (1984). 
Figure 3.10 illustrates the allocation problem for the DNPWLM auction system that was 
solved using each applicant 's maximum willingness to pay as the allocation criterion. Since 
the DNPWLM allocated hunts based on the highest auction price bid for any auctioned lot, 
the quantity of hunts demanded at the market clearing price p* was always equal to a· -the 
quantity available. As the auctioneer raised the hunt 's auction price, only those hunters who 
valued the hunting opportunity more than this price continued to bid, reducing the number 
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This licensing system allocated big game hunts to Zimbabwean hunters and foreign hunters 
using a public auction that takes place once a year in Harare. The DNPWLM auction system 
can be characterized as follows: 
• Each auction "lot" (auction lots were either basic hunting bags, or individual 
trophy animals) was auctioned individually to the highest bidder. Bidding was 
conducted in the Zimbabwe dollar, allowing both Zimbabwean and foreign hunters 
to compete according to each person's willingness to pay market prices. 
• The auction was advertised locally and internationally by the auctioneer. 
• 
Prospective bidders were provided with an auction catalogue giving full details of 
the hunt's features, the auction procedure and the payment details. 
The DNPWLM set a minimum (reserve) price for each auction lot that matched 
the lot's final auction price the previous year. 
• A hunt gives successful bidders access to the hunting area for a number of hunting 
days, and licences him to hunt a quota of trophy animals as a basic hunting bag. 
• Once a hunter has secured a basic hunting bag in the auction, he may bid for 
additional trophy animals of selected species. 
• Winners were requested to pay the auctioneers before the auction was concluded, 
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3.4.5. Safari operator system of marketing Charara/Makuti 
This licensing system alternative is based on the author's personal communication with a 
safari operator and an estimation of the option of utilizing the big game quota m 
Charara/Makuti for safari hunting, rather than for its present use of citizen hunting. 
The economic principles for hunt allocation by the Safari Operator marketing system are 
essentially based on a competitive international market for big game trophy hunting. The 
model of the hunting market is similar to that depicted in Figure 3.10, page 116 for the 
DNPWLM auction system. The competitive market price for safari hunts determine both 
quantity and quality of hunting supplied by the safari operator, and the demand for hunts 
exhibited by foreign safari hunting clients. By adjusting the price at which the safari operator 
offers his client a hunting package, he ensures that demand equals supply within the 
constraints of his safari operating business. 






A commercial business that operates in a competitive international market for 
foreign big game and specialist trophy hunts. 
Hunters are usually foreign hunting clients who are offered hunting packages by 
the safari operator priced in foreign exchange (normally US$). 
Safari operators are licensed business enterprises registered and recognized as a 
profession by the DNPWLM and the Zimbabwe Professional Hunter 's and Guides 
Association. 
The exact packaging of the trophy animal species on quota into hunts - complete 
with personalized services, the pricing of the hunts using a species trophy fee and 
a daily hunting rate (related to the hunt's length) all depend on the safari 
operator ' s skil'I , marketing, and hunting experience, competition from other 
operators, and finally the wishes of his foreign hunting clients. 
The hunts are priced competitively using market prices, and are marketed in the 
commercial sense, rather than allocated in the strictly economic sense. Both price 
and reputation of the safari operator influence supply and demand. 
3.4.6. Wyoming lottery system 
In contrast to the Zimbabwean ZHA lottery system alternatives for hunt allocation, the 
Wyoming lottery system can be characterized by: 
• 
• 
Applicants applied and purchased licences to hunt individual animals of one 
species, rather than hunting packages with a hunting bag of mixed species. Hunts 
were priced at fixed prices set by the government which are low, if they are 
compared with prices for African big game hunts. 
Access to hunts was limited by a lottery conducted by the Wyoming Game and 
Fish Department for all hunting opportunities available in the state of Wyoming, 
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Hunters who apply as individuals, and hunters who applied as members of a 
hunting party were treated equally as single applications during the lottery 
allocation procedure. 
Each hunter ( or member of a hunting party) was allowed only one application for 
each hunt type. 
Each application consisted of a ranked list of five possible hunt preferences; 
preferences were for hunts in different hunting areas, and for hunts at different 
times during the hunting season. 
Applicants are successively awarded their first preference, if available (First Hunt 
Preference); no applicant was considered for his second hunt preference until all 
applicants' first hunt preferences had at least been considered by the Wyoming 
preference allocation procedure. 
The order in which the applicants were considered for the hunt allocation 
procedure ( equivalent to the lottery draw order) was determined using a random 
number to rank each applicant. 
The Wyoming lottery allocation procedure ensured that winners of the hunts on 
offer are always randomly chosen from amongst those applicants with the highest 
ranking for every hunting option. 
Each applicant was assured of an equal probability of winning his First Hunt 
Preference for each hunt type. 
Applicants who did not draw a hunt were refunded their application fees in full, 
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CHAPTER4 
CASE STUDY OF THE DNPWLM LOTTERY 
SYSTEM FOR THE C UTI STUDY AREA: 
A MICROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a systematic overview of licensing systems that are used in 
Zimbabwe and other countries to allocate hunting resources to hunters. Particular emphasis 
was placed on how these systems determine who is licensed to hunt, whether and how 
applicants can express their hunt preferences, and how the scarce resources of wildlife and 
access time to hunting areas are priced. 
A major assumption made by all methods of resource allocation (in economic theory and 
practice in Zimbabwe) is that once a hunter has been allocated a hunt at a certain price there 
are no further access costs. The methods all assume that the hunter then automatically pays 
the hunt price and enjoys (consumes) the hunting benefits. For licensing systems in 
Zimbabwe, this means that once an auction, tender or lottery system has determined who is 
licensed to hunt and at what price, all licensed hunters are assumed to actually take up their 
hunts and go hunting, making use of the diverse hunting and non-hunting benefits in the 
hunting areas. 
The assessment in this chapter shows that in 1991 this assumption did not hold for the 
DNPWLM lottery system in th  Charara/Makuti study area, so that on the one hand hunts 
were not allocated efficiently to hunting applicants, that is at the least economic cost to 
hunters and the DNPWLM. In the technical review of this licensing system in Chapter 3, it 
was suggested that the allocation was not efficient for the DNPWLM because hunts were 
allocated twice, first using a lottery system and then using a first-come-first-served system. 
The initial citizen hunter interviews reported in Chapter 2, suggested that the hunt allocation 
was not efficient for citizen hunters, because they were dissatisfied with the lottery system 
and because applicants could not choose hunts personally, which led to one hunter admitting 
he had not paid for the hunting licence and the forfeit of his right to hunt. 
Equality of access on the other hand, (the same probability of winning a hunt in the draw 
for Charara/Makuti) did not appear to match a lottery's expected objective, because the 
DNPWLM lottery system's rules enabled applicants to purchase unlimited numbers of tickets 
according to their willingness to pay, which led automatically to unequal draw chances. 
The purpose of the case study assessment in Chapter 4 is to assess how efficiently and 
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on the hunt allocation component in the licensing system framework (see Figure 3.1, 
page 65), and assesses hunts planned for the Charara/Makuti hunting areas as a case-study. 
The case-study takes a microeconomic perspective of the problem of allocating hunts to 
individual hunters according to their personal choices. 
The assessment in Chapter 4 is in two parts, each based on an hypothesis that is tested with 
licence data gathered for the allocation of hunts to Zimbabwe citizens in 1991. 
The question asked in the first part (section 4.2) concerns how efficiently the lottery system 
allocated "hunts", viewed as a complex bundle of scarce resources and valuable benefits: 
Were all 100 hunts planned for Charara/Makuti allocated successfully to Zimbabwe citizen 
hunters by the end of the hunting season? The first hypothesis is that the lottery was not 
efficient. The extent of the problem is examined and quantified, and available evidence 
explaining the causes as far as possible is documented. 
The question asked in the second part (section 4.3) concerns how "fairly" the lottery system 
allocated hunts: Were the 100 hunts planned for Charara/Makuti allocated equitably to 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters? The second hypothesis is that the lottery system was not fair, 
and applicants had different probabilities of winning a hunt. This hypothesis is fairly 
obvious from the lottery rules which allow applicants to enter multiple tickets in the lottery 
draw. Less clear are the extent of ,the problem, the difficulties of achieving fair hunt 
allocations using lottery systems and the limitations of lottery systems. But by simulating the 
lottery, inequality between applicants in the DNPWLM lottery system was quantified to 
enable the subjective concept of fairness to be assessed objectively. The result has important 
consequences in turn for allocating hunts to individual hunters efficiently. 
The relevance of these results for allocating hunts is discussed in each part separately at the 
microeconomic level for efficiency and equality. These discussions assume that decision-
makers choose principally to allocate hunts randomly using a lottery system, and to value 
each hunt's resources and benefits arbitrarily at fixed, government controlled, trophy prices. 
Conclusions from the preceding sections are drawn (section 4.5). Principle limitations of using 
lottery systems to allocate scarce, economically valuable wildlife resources are highlighted 
(section 4.6). Specific recommendations are made (section 4.7.1) to improve efficiency 
problems of the DNPWLM lottery system for the Charara/Makuti study area. To improve 
equality problems of the DNPWLM lottery system, specific recommendations are made 
(section 4.7.2), although this depends entirely on how fairness is defined, the degree of 
equality that is to be obtained, and the unknown administrative costs of putting such measures 
into practice. All recommendations in Chapter 4 are made assuming that the administrative 
costs of lottery systems are, in principle, justified, and are outweighed by the (unknown) 
benefits of lottery systems for the allocation of scarce hunting resources. But since lottery 
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there is no way of determining net benefits of a lottery system using the microeconomic 
viewpoint adopted in Chapter 4. 
Taking a comparative and macroeconomic viewpoint, the following chapter then investigates 
the question of size and significance of the opportunity costs of using fix-priced lottery 
systems, rather market-priced alternatives, for the Charara/Makuti study area. Consequently, 
an integrated overall justification for adopting any of these recommendations to improve the 
lottery system in Charara/Makuti is deferred until Chapter 6. 
4.2. Efficiency of bunt allocation 
The main objective of a lottery system is to allocate a certain number of pre-defined hunts 
to Zimbabwe citizen hunters and give a maximum number of hunters an equal chance to 
benefit by hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area (see Figure 3.1, page 65). To maximize 
hunting experience for hunters involves measuring qualitative and quantitative aspects. The 
quantitative assessment of the hunting experience is undertaken here by measuring the number 
of hunts hunters actually took up during the 1991 hunting season in comparison to those that 
administrators had planned for allocation. The qualitative assessment of the hunting 
experience is not done directly, but indirectly by looking at the consequences of hunter's 
personal decision-making process in retrospect from the time he is allocated a hunt to the 
time he completes his hunt. A hunter's decision-making process begins when he decides to 
hunt and applies in a system. If he is lucky and wins a hunt in the lottery draw, the hunter 
may decide to pay for the allocated hunt. Finally, the hunter can decide whether to go hunting 
and benefit from the right to hunt and access the hunting area, which is determined when he 
actually books into the DNPWLM licensing offices in Kariba or Marongora for the Charara 
and Makuti hunting areas respectively. With selected personal interviews of hunters some 
qualitative data was gathered directly. 
No attempt is made here to systematically assess (quantify) the degree of benefit or 
satisfaction derived by hunters, nor are individuals compared in any way. The quality of the 
hunt can only be experienced by individual hunters according to their own personal 
(subjective) value judgements once they have finished their hunting trip. Elsewhere (Crowe, 
1987), attempts to obtain such information are made by questioning hunters. 
The hypothesis of efficient hunt allocation tested here is that hunters did not benefit fully 
from the 100 hunts supplied by the Charara/Makuti study area in 1991, due to the design of 
the DNPWLM lottery system. 
The efficiency of hunt allocation in section 4.2 is structured as follows: 
• Efficiency criterion for hunt allocation by lottery; 
• Data and method used; 
• Decision tree results; 
• Discussion of results; 
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4.2.1. Efficiency criterion for hunt allocation by lottery 
Efficiency is quantified as: the actual number of hunts that applicants made use of during the 
1991 hunting season, in relation to the total number planned (100) by the DNPWLM. Were 
all the hunts available for allocation in Charara/Makuti in 1991 actually taken up by hunters 
after that year's lottery allocation? If this question can be answered in the affirmative, then 
the DNPWLM lottery system would have been 100% efficient. 
The review of the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti (Chapter 3) showed that hunt 
allocation in the study area took place in two distinct stages, as the framework and overlay 
indicated (see Figure 3.1, page 65). The first stage allocated hunts using a lottery system 
(until the 30.4.91), whilst the second stage used a first-come-first-served system (after the 
16.7.91) to re-allocate hunts that were still available. A generous period of two weeks was 
allowed for administration and planning of the re-allocation by the DNPWLM, so that the 
1.7.91 was taken as the cut-off date for hunts (according to their planned hunting dates) that 
were available for re-allocation. This date is based on information supplied by the DNPWLM 
offices in Kariba and Marongora to the central licensing office in Harare.1 
The two stage hunt allocation for the Charara/Makuti during 1991 meant that three 




The efficiency of the first stage allocation by the lottery system, for hunts with 
planned hunting dates and actual licence receipt dates prior to 30.4.91. 
The efficiency of the second stage allocation by the first-come-first-served system, 
for hunts with planned hunting dates before the 1.7.91. 
The efficiency of the overall allocation in terms of the objective of allocating all 
planned hunts to benefit the maximum number of hunters in the Charara/Makuti 
areas. 
Any hunts with hunting dates after the 1.7.91 which the allocated hunters did not take up 
after the first lottery allocation could not, therefore, have been re-allocated by the DNPWLM 
using the second first-come-first-served allocation system. Hunts with hunting dates after the 
1.7.91 that became available constituted "wasted" hunting opportunities and an inefficient 
resource allocation. 
The two stage allocation required data to be collected, analyzed, and presented so that each 
efficiency could be assessed separately. 
4.2.2. Data and method 
The efficiency of the hunt allocation was examined using data from hunting licences issued 
by the DNPWLM central licensing office in Harare for each hunt planned. In total, the 
DNPWLM planned 100 hunts using the hunting resources available for the Charara/Makuti 
1 The DNPWLM Kariba licensing office informed the central licensing office in Harare by letter of the hunts that 
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study area in 1991: 40 hunts for the Charara hunting area (for quota allocation to hunts, see 
Appendix 2.1, page AS), and 60 hunts for the Makuti hunting area (for quota allocation to 
hunts, see Appendix 2.2, page A9). 
To trace the history of each hunt, the method required that the hunting licences for all 
100 hunts be located and accounted for. The licence originals and carbon copies were 
consulted at the DNPWLM licensing offices in Harare, Marongora and Kariba. Data was 
corroborated between these sources a number of times during the hunting season; and on the 
26.9.91 for the last time. 
For each hunt, identified by a hunting licence and hunt number, data on the licence holder's 
identity (surname, initials, address), the number and species of animals on quota (hunting 
bag), the total fixed price of the quota of animals (hunt price), the receipt date on the licence 
(payment), were noted and entered in a spreadsheet programme. For reasons of confidentiality 
and volume, the author decided to exclude raw application data, and that the condensed 
analysis results sufficed (Figure 4.1, page 126). The planned hunting dates were also entered 
for each hunt. 
The data was then analyzed using a decision tree technique to trace each hunting licence from 
its first allocation by the lottery system (receipt date before 30.4.91), through its possible 
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4.2.3. Decision-tree results 
The results of the analysis are presented as a decision-tree (Figure 4.1, page 126) to show the 
number of hunts that benefitted hunters at each allocation stage during the 1991 hunting 
season. Starting with the first allocation by the lottery system, the total number of applicants 
that applied ( on the left) are followed through to the lottery draw and first allocation stage 
(in the centre), then on to the second stage re-allocation by the first-come-first-served system 
( on the right). The number of hunts used by hunters at each stage is marked on every branch 
of the decision-tree using triangular symbols for hunts in Charara, square symbols for hunts 
in Makuti. Hunt totals in Charara/Makuti by the end of the hunting season (26.9.91) are 
marked using circles on the far right of Figure 4.1. 
The stem of the decision-tree is highlighted. It represents the most efficient overall hunt 
allocation possible. The licensing system would have been 100% efficient if all 100 hunts 
planned for Charara/Makuti had been sold by the 30.4.91, and subsequently all 100 hunts had 
been taken up and hunted by these hunters during the hunting season on their specified 
hunting dates. 
The actual results of the hunt allocations (Figure 4.1) differ markedly from the 100% efficient 
results. The results in Figure 4.1 for the 40 hunts in Charara and 60 hunts in Makuti are 
summarized as follows. The notation ( ... 40/•60) is adopted, where ... 40 indicates forty hunts 
(or licences) in the Charara, and •60 indicates sixty hunts (or licences) in the Makuti hunting 
areas, respectively: 





A total of 55 hunts ( ... 24/•31) were allocated to hunters who paid, and used the 
hunting opportunity to their benefit, as shown by the shaded stem in the diagram. 
Of the remaining 45 hunts that were not used during the first stage, a total of 12 
hunts ( ... 71•5) were allocated, their applicants notified, but the hunts were not paid 
for by the deadline, as shown by the branches above the efficient shaded stem. 
These hunters thus forfeited the hunt they had won in the lottery and derived no 
benefits from hunting. 
A further 25 hunts ( ... 17/•8) were allocated, paid for by the hunter, but were not 
taken up, as shown by the branches below the efficient shaded stem. These hunters 
thus forfeited the hunt after the hunting dates, incurred the cost of the hunt's 
trophy price, but did not use their option to access the hunting benefits in the 
resource areas. 
Finally, a total of 8 hunting licences ( ... 5/•3) could not be traced, despite numerous 
efforts made by the author to locate licence originals and copies at the Kariba, 
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For the analysis, the author assumed that none of these licences had been 
allocated, paid for, or used by applicants for hunting at any stage1• 
After the second hunt allocation stage by the DNPWLM first-come-first-served system: 
• All 12 ( •5/•7) of the previously allocated, but unsold hunts, were re-allocated at 
the Harare licensing office. Hunters, who may or may not have been applicants 
in the lottery, derived benefits from hunting. 
• 
• 
Of the 25 hunts ( ... 8/• 17) that were sold after the first stage lottery, but not taken 
up by hunters, only two hunts in Makuti were able to be re-allocated in the 
second stage because hunting dates were prior to the re-allocation date. Both the 
hunts were not re-allocated. 
The balance of 23 hunts ( •8/• 15) with hunting dates after the re-allocation date 
were not re-allocated, or hunted by the end of the year. 
Consequently, the efficiency of the hunt allocation for the Charara/Makuti hunting areas in 
1991, differentiated according to each allocation stage, was as follows: 
• The first stage using the lottery system for hunt allocation was 55% efficient. (The 
first stage DNPWLM lottery efficiency is calculated as the total of 55 hunts 
( ... 31/•24) out of the 100 hunts ( •40/•60).) These 55 hunts benefited hunters who 
first applied using the DNPWLM lottery system. 
• 
• 
The second stage using the first-come-first-served system to allocate hunts was, 
in itself, 85% efficient. (The second stage DNPWLM first-come-first-served 
efficiency is calculated as the further 12 hunts ( ... 5/•7) divided by the possible 14 
hunts ( ... 5/•7) that had hunting dates prior to the cut-off date (1.7.91).) These 12 
hunts benefitted additional hunters who obtained a hunt using the DNPWLM first-
come-first-served re-allocation system. 
Overall, the allocation of hunts in the Charara/Makuti study area was only 
67% efficient by the end of the season. (The overall efficiency is calculated as 55 
first stage hunts, plus 12 second stage hunts, that benefitted citizen hunters, in total 
67 hunts divided by 100 planned hunts for the study area in 1991.) The remaining 
33 hunts ( ... 13/•20) were not allocated or hunted by applicants who had not 
already obtained a hunt. 
4.2.4. Discussion of results 
The results presented in the previous section show that the actual number of hunts which 
benefitted citizen hunters in Charara/Makuti in 1991 (overall 67 hunts) fell markedly short 
of the planned number (100 hunts), inspite of the re-allocation of unused hunts attempted by 
the DNPWLM using the first-come-first-served system. 
I It is, however, possible and likely that the quotas of unsold hunting bags were sold and hunted by the end of the 
hunting season (species' quota utilization), since unshot animals are regularly re-allocated to hunters who already 
have hunts, at the Marongora and Kariba licensing offices. The resale of entire hunting bags as unshot animals does 
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To find the reasons that Jed to these results, and to understand why overall the licensing 
system in the Charara/Makuti study area was not 100% efficient, further investigation was 
done and is reported below. Applicant's, winner's, and hunter's motivations are examined. 
Additional evidence, consisting of hunter interviews, hunter correspondence, DNPWLM 
administrator interviews and personal observations during field research, is put forward to try 
to establish why participants behaved the way they did. Inferences from available data are 
made assuming rational economic behaviour ( cost minimization or benefit maximization) on 
the part of citizen hunters. Concentrating on the first stage allocation by lottery, three 
questions are pertinent to understanding the efficiency results: 
1. Why did some hunters (13 out of 100 planned hunts) buy lottery tickets, but then 
choose not to pay for hunts allocated by the DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti? 
2. Why did other hunters (25 out of 100 planned hunts) pay for the allocated hunts, but 
later choose not to go hunting between the specified hunting dates? 
3. Were citizen hunters generally, including those who did choose to take up their 
hunting opportunity, satisfied with the hunts they were allotted? 
Some indications answering these questions can be traced back to the problems experienced 
by the DNPWLM and hunters with versions of the lottery system used for Charara/Makuti 
prior to 1991 (see review in Chapter 3). The complete lack of choice for hunters to choose 
any of the hunt characteristics in the 1989-1990 lottery version is still evident in the 1991 
version assessed here. Doubling the number of hunts between 1990 and 1991 based on the 
same sport hunting quota for the area also played a major role by reducing the value of the 
hunts to hunters. 
Further evidence explaining the results presented was found in correspondence between 
hunting applicants and the hunting administrators at the Harare licensing office of the 
DNPWLM. In addition, ~our citizen hunters (listed in Appendix 3, page A27) were 
interviewed informally in Harare to gain first-hand insights to Zimbabwe citizen hunter's 
personal motives and expectations. By asking these hunters a number of general questions 
(see Appendix 4, page A27) on their hunting experience and their previous hunting activity 
in specific hunting areas, the author first established whether the hunter had any experience 
of the DNPWLM lottery system in 1991. If so, these hunters were then specifically asked to 
comment on this system, and to describe how they thought the DNPWLM lottery system 
worked. The hunters were selected for their experience in sport hunting. Two hunters were 
chosen because they were also members of the ZHA, and could draw comparisons with the 
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Key aspects that emerged from hunter correspondence and interviews to explain why the 
DNPWLM lottery system was not efficient, were: 
• The entire absence of personal choice by applicants to choose even the most basic 
of "hunt characteristics" (see section 2.1.2, page 13), for example: hunting bag, 
hunt price, hunting dates; 
• The miss-match between the hunt's trophy quality and fixed price and the hunter's 
willingness to pay for a hunting experience (price of lottery tickets) due to the 
arbitrary procedure (described fully in the review, section 3.2.1.3, page 64) chosen 
by the DNPWLM to allocate hunts to lottery winners; 
• 
• 
Inadequate variety and value of hunting bags in packaged hunts ( quality of 
animals and quantity of animals); 
The total Jack of basic information for applicants on the licensing system and hunt 
characteristics that prevented applicants them from exercising real choice in their 
best interests. 
The indications and evidence that led to these conclusions will be presented under the 
headings of the three questions posed at the outset of this discussion section. 
4.2.4.1. Why did hunters apply to hunt, win a lottery hunt, but not pay? 
• Hunting bags were too small (quantity of animals): 
Some of the interviewed hunters said that the hunting bags they had won contained too few 
animals, or lacked significant trophy animals, to warrant buying the bag and incurring 
considerable additional expenses to undertake their hunting trip (transport, food, time). By 
doubling the number of hunts for Charara/Makuti hunting area from 50 hunts 1990 to 100 
hunts 1991, the hunting bag specified for each hunt accordingly had fewer animals (based on 
the same total species quotas for the areas). 
The behaviour of citizen hunters can be clarified by considering the choices they face with 
respect to the different costs and benefits of the hunting trip as a whole (Table 4.1, page 131). 
Initially, hunters incur the cost of purchasing a number of lottery tickets. The results of the 
lottery simulation (see section 4.3.6, page 148) show that 90% of all winners who won a hunt 
each purchased between 10 and 1 '980 lottery tickets, costing Z$20 per ticket. Total ticket 
costs thus ranged between Z$200 and Z$1 '980 per person. The ticket price was non-
refundable and was not subtracted from the hunt's total price for winners of the lottery, so 
increasing the total hunt price for each winner. 
Then winners of a hunt in the lottery draw paid the fixed price for the right to hunt and 
access the areas, which depended on the composition of the hunting bag allocated to that 
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Figure 3.3, page 66) showed that 85% of all hunts in Charara/Makuti 1 had a hunt price of 
Z$1 '500, or less. 
The remaining cost items for hunters who undertook the hunting trip comprised the greatest 
proportion of the total costs of the hunting trip. Items included transport costs to, within, and 
back from, the hunting areas, food, equipment, staff, weapons and ammunition. Transport 
costs for a return trip from Harare to the Charara/Makuti study area are high. They were 
estimated at Z$1 '180 per vehicle and hunting party for a return trip2, assuming hunters only 
use one vehicle per hunt. For hunters living further from Charara/Makuti than Harare, the cost 
item of transport, and therefore the total costs of the hunting trip were even greater. One 
passenger vehicle (eg. landrover) per hunting party is unlikely. Moreover, a lorry is essential 
for hunters with elephant and buffalo on quota, in order to transport the carcass to the hunting 
camp for processing, and the processed products (meat, hide and equipment) from the hunting 
camp back home, ensuring full utilization of wildlife resources. Other estimates by Grobbelaar 
(personal communication) put the total cost of a citizen hunting trip conservatively at about 
Z$10'000, which includes transport costs to, within, and back from the hunting area, food for 
the hunting party and staff, a figure for hiring weapons and camping equipment, ammunition. 
Details of the estimate are in Appendix 18, page AllO. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the costs mentioned above for purchasing a hunt in Charara/Makuti. 
Table 4.1 Opportunity costs of purchasing a hunt in Charara/Makuti 
llf!lli~ ..............  
HU~ ii !for~% ot •t-iuntsj~ : •. t 
·· o&ti&a&ess tiliHr> 
rdtai~ta.fiioiift····. 
Sources: a) Results of lottery simulation, in Appendix 5.2.2, page A34; b) Hunt prices calculated: for Charara, in 
Appendix 7.1, page A49, for Makuti, in Appendix 7.2, page A53; c) Cost estimation rounded from Appendix 18, 
page A110. 
Rational hunters who had been allocated a hunt that cost Z$1 '500 thus faced the following 
choices, before they decided to actually pay any more money: First, do I value the hunting 
bag that I have been assigned enough to warrant paying Z$1 '500 for the hunt price and 
obtaining the hunting licence? Once the hunter was entitled to hunt, he then had to decide: 
Do I value the hunting trip enough to warrant paying an additional amount of Z$10'000 for 
the costs of the hunting trip? Can I share these costs with someone/a hunting party? 
I Some 35 hunts in Charara and 50 hunts in Makuti, respectively. 
2 Estimate based on: a return distance from Harare to Marongora of 560km; petrol costs of 2$2.85/litre; a petrol 
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Valuation of "a hunt's resources and potential benefits" is a personal process, where the 
hunter assigns worth and - in economic reality - the monetary price he is willing to pay. At 
the time of application, unless a hunter values the potential benefits of undertaking the entire 
citizen hunt - which includes the value of the actual hunting bag he was allocated - more than 
the total costs of undertaking the hunting trip, our rational hunter would not be inclined to 
pay the hunt price, and be even less inclined to incur the far greater costs of the hunting trip 
itself. This means that on average, the value of these hunts to the hunter had to exceed 
Z$12'000 to Z$14'000. 
That hunts were not valued that highly by such winners on average is indicated by their low 
fixed hunt price which means that except for buffalo, none of these hunting bags had been 
assigned significant other big game trophy species (eg. lion, leopard or elephant). (For details 
on hunting bags in the study area, see Appendix 2.1 (page AS) for Charara, and Appendix 
2.2 (page A9) for Makuti hunting areas, respectively.) The total costs of the hunting trip 
would be lower for hunters who live closer than Harare to the hunting areas and had to travel 
less, but otherwise all these average winners would have had no economic incentive to pay 
for the allotted hunt, consequently leading to hunts having been allocated by the lottery 
system, but remaining unpaid or paid-up and forfeited. 
This cost minimizing behaviour appears to have been a strong reason for 12 out of the 100 
winners to have forfeited the hunt they were allocated by the DNPWLM lottery system. 
• Lack of personal choice during the application procedure: 
At no point during the DNPWLM lottery system's procedures for applying or assigning hunts 
could hunters express their personal hunt preferences or choose a specific hunt. Yet the hunt 
price hunters pay is related to the hunting bag, and therefore to the specific hunt that was 
assigned. Consequently, winners of the lottery had no choice about which hunt price they 
would have to pay - certainly one of the most basic hunt characteristics. A rational hunter 
will make a decision based on his information, and include his personal judgement of the 
hunt's trophy value, its venison value, and its recreational value. Because each hunt has a 
unique combination of characteristics,1 hunters will value each of the 100 hunts available in 
the Charara/Makuti study area differently based on this information. This valuation was not 
possible for applicants prior to the lottery draw. 
The hunt value depends on the hunter's expectations, his personal preferences, his willingness 
to pay, the distance he lives from the hunting area. In Zimbabwe, traditional beliefs about 
1 Each hunt differs not only by the hunt price, the hunting bag (species, sex and number), its hunt duration, the 
location of the assigned hunting camp, but also by the specified hunting dates for undertaking the hunting trip during 
the hunting season. The time at which the hunt takes place during the year must firstly suit the hunter personally, 
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totem animals (species that are taboo for family members) amongst certain citizen hunters1 
can also influence the preferred species in the hunting bag. 




One winner declined to pay because the hunting dates were inconvenient (Makuti, 
hunt number M33). 
Several hunters declined to pay for all species in the hunting bags they had won . 
Instead, they selected only valuable trophy species (eg. male lion, male kudu), and 
declined to pay for the plains game or bird species (Makuti hunt numbers M12 
and MSO). 
One hunter declined to pay because he felt his transport costs to access the 
Charara/Makuti from his home alone exceeded the hunt's value to him. 
• Large variation in applicant's and hunter's commitment to hunt: 
With variable hunt characteristics that are unique for every hunt supplied in Charara/Makuti, 
the price each hunter was willing to pay for the hunt also varied markedly. The variation in 
hunter's purchasing power is most clearly indicated by the skew distribution in tickets bought 
per applicant for the option to hunt (see Figure 4.3, page 146). 
The large variety of factors that influence the value of a hunting trip, the personal differences 
between applicants and their hunting motives, and the complexity of the subjective valuation 
process itself (Sinden and Worrell, 1979), are all factors that argue convincingly for an 
allocation system which enables applicants to choose hunts personally, rather than one which 
allocates hunt impersonally according to rule such as the one adopted by the DNPWLM for 
the DNPWLM lottery system (see review, section 3.2.1.3, page 64). Informed choice requires 
applicants to be well 'informed about their options in advance, yet information for applicants 
was lacking in the DNPWLM lottery system (see item on Jack of basic information, 
page 137). 
• The hunt allocation procedure caused a miss-match between hunt prices 
and hunters' willingness to pay: 
As will be shown conclusively by the lottery simulation results (see section 4.3.6, page 148), 
applicants with more tickets entered for the lottery draw had significantly higher probabilities 
of being drawn. There is a relationship (the formula for the mean of a geometric progression) 
between probability and the time waited by any applicant until he wins in a lottery. This 
relationship means that probability of winning and draw sequence (time waited) are linked. 
Put simply, this linkage means that the higher the ticket holding of a person, the more likely 
he will, on average, be drawn earlier on in the procedure than the person holding fewer 
tickets. (For formula details and an example, see Appendix 19, page All 1.) 
1 The custom of totem animals in African cultures is documented for Zimbabwe by Bourdillon, (1976); Bullock, 
[1927]; Bullock, (1950). Despite being a sensitive issue, personal interviews confirmed that the custom is still 
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The draw order determined the hunt, and therefore also the hunt characteristics, that winners 
were allocated by the DNPWLM lottery system. On being drawn, winners were allocated 
specific hunts according to the 3:2 allocation rule for hunts in Makuti, and Charara hunting 
areas, respectively (for details of the rule, see item on hunt allocation procedure with no 
preferences in review of DNPWLM lottery system, page 68). The quota allocation to hunts 
for both areas by the DNPWLM administrators distributed most valuable trophy species to 
the final 15 hunts in each area. 
The consequences of the lottery draw order and hunt allocation procedure for citizen hunters 
were as follows: Hunters drawn at the start who had paid most for the option to hunt were 
allocated hunts with a trophy or non-trophy buffalo, but without the other big game species 
such as elephant, lion, or leopard, and asked to pay average hunt prices (less than Z$1 '500). 
The last 20 or so hunters drawn towards the end of the procedure who had paid least for the 
option to hunt were allocated hunts with the most valuable trophy species which cost the 
most. These hunters were expected to pay the highest hunt prices, although they had 
demonstrated the lowest willingness (and presumably also ability) to pay by purchasing fewer 
lottery tickets for the option to hunt. 
The hunts with elephant allocated to them had hunt prices that were seven times higher than 
the average hunt of about Z$1 '000, because citizen hunters pay Z$7'500 for a single elephant 
(valued at government controlled trophy prices). Those hunters who were allotted a hunt with 
an elephant on quota by the 3:2 allocation rule chosen by the DNPWLM were not necessarily 
able, or willing, to pay for the most expensive hunts in Charara/Makuti. Despite having a 
high trophy value, an elephant hunt that is not chosen by the hunter personally may be 
worthless for the lottery winne.r, because the hunt's price exceeds his budget for hunting. 
Therefore, by ignoring personal preferences of applicants during the hunt allocating the 
DNPWLM lottery system's 3:2 rule resulted in hunts with very different trophy species and 
prices being allocated to those applicants who wanted a hunt with very different 
characteristics. Alternatively, it results in hunts being allocated to those applicants who were 
least willing to pay high prices for hunting, as inferred from their purchase of lottery tickets. 
The miss-match between hunt price and willingness to pay due to the use of an arbitrary rule 
which ignored hunter's personal hunt preferences is judged by the author to be the most 
important cause of the inefficient hunt allocation of the DNPWLM lottery system in 1991. 
Interviewed hunters expressed their surprise at realizing that the system had not given them 
freedom of choice to decide the hunt price, or any other hunt characteristics. 
As further evidence showed, even those hunters who did pay for their allotted hunt were not 
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4.2.4.2. Why did hunters apply to hunt, win a lottery hunt, pay for the hunt, 
yet not take it up? 
• Hunters valued their hunt insufficiently: 
135 
One hunter who won a hunt in Makuti hunting area (M12) did not pay for the pre-defined 
hunting bag, but chose instead only to pay for the most valuable big game species that he 
preferred most. The hunting licence showed, however, that despite this choice, the hunter 
forfeited the hunting trip by not booking in at Marongora or Kariba control offices on the 
planned hunting dates (personal observation). This hunter, apparently, valued the alternatives 
to hunting (other ways to spend his time and money) more than even the money and price 
he had spent on securing the right to hunt and benefit from this big game hunting trip in the 
study area. In other words, the hunter was willing to forego all the money he had paid, rather 
than undertake the hunt, although other citizen hunters were available who would have gone 
hunting at this price. 
The case study licence data presented shows that 25 of the 100 winners of the DNPWLM 
lottery (25%) behaved similarly to the above hunter. They paid for their hunt after the lottery 
allocation but then forfeited the hunt. This behaviour indicates a lack of commitment on the 
part of these hunters. The initial lack of choice for hunters to select their most preferred and 
valued hunts during the application procedure is inferred to have played a major role in 
reducing hunter's commitment to the arbitrarily allotted hunt. 
Nevertheless, this behaviour is very surprising since by forfeiting their hunt after paying for 
the hunting licence, these hunters also forfeited a substantial amount of money (between 
Z$1 '400 and Z$3'000) for the tickets and hunt price. Attempts were made to interview these 
hunters by telephone to find out their reasons for this inconsistent behaviour. Due to severe 
difficulties in the telephone communications system at the time of research (1991) the author 
was unable to contact any hunters for telephone interviews. Other survey methods (postal and 
personal) were ruled due to the time and financial constraints. Nevertheless, in the author's 
opinion, defaulting by 25 of 100 lottery winners is an unsatisfactory and unacceptable 
allocation result, which is due to the lottery allocation procedure not determining which 
hunters were committed to hunting (valued a particular hunt most), and which were not 
committed. 
The other alternative for uncommitted hunters with "unwanted hunts", instead of defaulting, 
is to trade (swop or sell) their hunt to another hunter and recoup the hunt price so that they 
are at least be no worse off by not going hunting themselves. In Zimbabwe, this option has 
not been possible to date. Hunting regulations at present prohibit the legal transfer of hunting 
licences issued by the DNPWLM in protected areas, presumably to prevent private individuals 
from making a personal profit from the transaction. Consequently, the DNPWLM has no 
option but bear the costs of the inefficient hunt allocation that had allocated valuable big 
game hunts to Zimbabwe citizen hunters who did not actually want to go and hunt. In an 
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allocated 12 of the 14 available hunts (with hunting dates prior to 1.7.91) to hunters who did 
want to hunt using the first-come-first-served system (as depicted in Figure 4.1, page 126). 
Additional evidence below suggested there were further shortcomings in the planning of hunts 
by DNPWLM hunting administrators, because not even those hunters who finally did go 
hunting were fully satisfied with the hunt they had been assigned in 1991 by the DNPWLM 
lottery system. 
4.2.4.3. Why did the lottery system not satisfy citizen hunters fully? 
There were several indications that the manner in which the species quotas for 
Charara/Makuti hunting areas were packaged into (allocated to) hunts during the planning of 
the licensing system did not take account of hunter's preferences adequately, ie. that it was 
not consumer orientated. 
• The hunting bags were to small for single hunts, or hunt duration was too 
long for the hunting bags: 
This is indicated by the numerous citizen hunters who asked the Harare licensing office of 
the DNPWLM for permission to alter their hunting dates and combine their hunt venue with 
that of another hunter. The following hunt numbers were combined in the Charara hunting 
area: (C2, CS, C6, C29, and C32), (C18 and C40); the following were combined in the 
Makuti hunting area: (Ml and M54), (M18 and M34). In their correspondence requesting the 
Director's permission to combine hunts, these hunters cited as reasons the low hunt values 
of their individual hunting bags, or high transport costs of undertaking a hunting trip on their 
own. 
During the first-come-first-served re-allocation of hunts on citizen hunter was recorded by the 
DNPWLM licensing office as having bought a hunt with a substantially larger hunting bag 
and high trophy values. He purchased five of the Charara hunts (C2, CS, C6, C29 and C32) 
that were re-allocated by the DNPWLM in Harare, and paid a total of 2$4'112 (personal 
observation, Harare licensing office). This incident indicates that larger bags are sought after 
by citizen hunters to make their hunting trip worthwhile. Although there were only 14 hunts 
in total available to allocate on a first-come-first-served basis, the system appears to have 
been more efficient than the lottery system (85% compared to 55% ), and more flexible for 
applicants than the lottery system because it gave hunters who arrived early in the queue 
choice. At the cost of wasting hunter's time and money travelling to the Harare licensing 
office, the queuing system is better at selecting hunters who are committed to go and hunt 
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• The hunting bag composition (quality of animals) was inadequate for some 
hunters: 
The following indications were recorded from correspondence between hunters and the 
DNPWLM licensing office in Harare. In one instance, two hunts were combined because one 
of the hunters lacked a suitable animal on quota to use as bait for hunting the trophy lion he 
had drawn. The other hunter was willing to combine his hunting bag with that of his 
colleague, and form a new hunting party (Makuti, hunts 18 and 34). 
A further indication was the lack of any significant trophy animal m two hunting bags 
(Charara hunt numbers C36 and C39). Table 4.2 lists the species, sex and number of animals 
in the hunting bags for both these hunts. One citizen hunter who was interviewed stated that 
once he knew what animals had been included in his hunting bag, he had forfeited the hunt 
for this reason alone (Sifeku, personal communication). 
Table 4.2 Hunting bag and hunt price for Charara hunt numbers C36 and C39: 1991 
.·· < ···•··.·• . Ctiarara hunt r,umJer C:!6 \ 
..... Spe.cies {se*) / •<· 
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····· · $rysbt>k ·<•·······•····• 
. · 016888 +· 
emR~gif=oW1 •• 
·. ·· Ff~hcdilri> > 
· Species (sei<)/ ··•• .· .. 
·······•::.:;~f ~li~'::~··••:··············· .......... .......... .. ·<lmp~~··•<r~ru~~k ; ;r• 
Source: Quota allocation to hunts for Charara, Appendix 2.1, page AS; and Value of allocated quota for Charara, 
Appendix 7.1, page A49. 
• Applicants lacked basic information on the licensing system: 
During personal interviews, none of the hunters interviewed (see Appendix 3, page A27) were 
aware that the DNPWLM lottery system had been altered in 1991. Interviewees were 
surprised to learn that the allocation procedure had not been designed to give hunters any 
choice of hunt, or hunt characteristics, since the hunters considered a personal choice vital 
to their hunting satisfaction and decision-making. 
Information available to hunters prior to their application for the DNPWLM lottery appeared 
as an advertisement in the national newspaper (Zimbabwe Herald, 15.1.91). The text did not 
inform applicants on the licensing system (see review, Figure 3.4, page 67) and from the 
author's own research experience, the DNPWLM lottery system was not documented in 
written form and made available to the public. Repeated interviews were required to make 










138 Chapler 4: Case sJucly and microeconomic assessmenl 
,:.x,:..:,;,:,:,:,;.:,:,;.:,:,:,;.;.;,:,;.:,:,:,:,:,;.-.-;,;.:,;.:,:,:,:,;.;.:,;.;.;.;.;.;.;.:,;.:,:,:,;.:,:,:,:,:,:,:,;,;,:,:,:,:,:,;.:,;.:,:,:1.,w..:.:·:·;,:,:.;,:,;.;.;.:.:.:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-;.:,:·:·:·:-:,:.:-:-:,:,:,:,:,:-:.:,:,;,:,:,:,:,;.:,:-:,:-:,:,:,:-:,:,;,;.;.:,;,;,;,;,;,;.;,:,;,;.;,;,;-:,:,:,;,;,:,:,;.;,;,:,:,;,;.;.:,:,;.;.;.:,;.:,:,: .. ,.;.x,,.,;.;-;,:-;,:-:-:-:-:·:,:,;.;,:,:,:,:,:,:,;.:,;.;.:-:,:,:,:,:,:-x,;,:,;.w.-:,:--,:.;,..:,;.-.,-.. :,:-;.;.;.;.:,:,x-:-:,;.:,:,: 
The response time of one month for enquiries and applications to be made may be adequate 
in countries where the postal system requires days to send a letter from one part of the 
country to another and where telephone system works, but is prohibitive for postal application 
by people in Zimbabwe's more remote areas. In addition, application forms were only 
available through the DNPWLM central licensing office in Harare, not at the agency's branch 
offices in major centres. The greater the number of characteristics determining the value of 
a product or service (eg. a hunting package), and the less homogenous this product (eg. a 
trophy elephant hunt compared to a non-trophy buffalo hunt), and the greater the personal 
differences between individuals who are to benefit from the product (eg. beginner hunter 
might prefer plains game, compared to experienced big game trophy hunters), the better it is 
to allow individuals to choose the hunt according to its characteristics and their expectations. 
It has been shown in the literature that personal choice results in the greatest benefit, or 
satisfaction for the hunter1. For the complex product of "a hunt" with its many characteristics 
and combinations personal choice by the hunter is arguably essential. 
4.2.4.4. Principle limitations of lotteries for efficient hunt allocation 
Thus far in the assessment of hunt allocation efficiency for the DNPWLM lottery system, it 
has been argued that personal informed choice of hunt preferences .by applicants is required. 
At this point it is important to note, that even if hunters are able to express their preferences 
for hunts according to a ranked preference list2, and a procedure is used that accommodates 
preferences (eg. the hunt preference allocation procedures of the ZHA, or Wyoming lottery 
systems), lottery systems in general cannot ensure that only those hunters who value a 
particular hunt the most (for whatever reason), are assigned exact this hunt. Why not? 
The lottery system, whether it accommodates applicants' personal hunt preferences or not, 
cannot distinguish between persons who all prefer the same particular hunt to ascertain 
exactly which applicant values this hunt the most. If hunters do not value it highly, they will 
be less committed to take the hunt up and will be more likely to default during the hunting 
season. Lottery allocation systems, by definition, are an impersonal and not a personal method 
of equalizing the opportunity to win a hunt amongst all applicants. This conclusion applies 
to all lottery systems that allocate scarce resources, whether they are valued at fixed prices 
(eg. all lottery systems allocating hunting in reviewed in Chapter 3 for Zimbabwe, South 
Africa and Wyoming), or whether they are not priced in monetary terms and allocated free 
of charge to people (eg. Lindsay's example of queuing for free tickets to a football match, 
see Lindsay (1984): 45-47. For zero-priced hunt allocation, see section 2.2.3, page 26). 
1 See Lancaster, 1979: 5-6, who sees personal choice as being vital in the context of consumer sovereignty for 
efficiency, and Rae, et al., 1981: 92-103, who see personal choice as being vital for person-regarding equality, in 
the sense that such choice takes account of persons and their differences. 
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The reason that preference lists cannot be used to discriminate between different valuations 
placed on a hunt by several hunters, is that applicants' preference rankings represent 
ordinal data, not interval or ratio data (see Stevens, 1946). That is, preference lists express 
an intra-personal ranking of hunt values for a single person alone, but not inter-personal 
rankings of hunt values between people because there are no intervals between preference 
rankings and no zero point is defined for the preference scales ( eg. for the scale first, second, 
third hunt preference). 
The difference can be clarified by asking what type of allocation questions lottery systems 
in principle can, and cannot, answer. 
As ordinal data, preference lists allow the intra-personal questions: 
a) Which hunt does Ms. Y personally prefer the most, hunt Cl or hunt C2? if one person 
is involved; or 
b) Which hunt does Ms. Y personally prefer compared to Mr. X? if Ms. Y prefers hunt 
Cl and Mr. X prefers hunt C2. 
But as ordinal data, preference lists disallow the inter-personal questions: 
c) Does Ms. Y personally prefer hunt C2 more than Mr. X prefers hunt Cl? if Ms. Y 
and Mr. X prefer different hunts; or 
d) Does Ms. Y personally prefer C2 more than Mr. X prefers C2? if both Ms. Y and 
Mr. X prefer the same hunt. 
Lottery systems can distinguish between different hunter's preferences when the allocation 
involves answering questions a) and b ), because no inter-personal comparisons are necessary. 
Questions a), b), and c) do not pose an allocation problem of scarcity for lotteries or resource 
managers, should they occur because not more than one person requested the hunts Cl or C2. 
(Question a) is a choice between two hunts for one person, and questions b) and c) involve 
two persons who prefer separate hunts.) 
Question d) represents the normal scarcity problem of economics (Samuelson, 1973: 3; 17-23) 
and real life, because several people prefer the same hunt. This is the allocation problem that 
lottery systems are faced with but fail to solve efficiently because lottery systems cannot 
distinguish different hunters or their preference intensity. 
If lottery systems cannot allocate by answering question d), how do they allocate? Lottery 
systems assume that all applicants in the draw value a particular hunt identically, or equally. 
They then allocate by choosing randomly amongst all those applicants who prefer the same 
hunt (Ms. Y and Mr. X in the above example), disregarding personal preference differences. 
Impersonal allocation and the ability to apply the same probability to all persons who prefer 
the same hunt, are the very properties of lottery systems which lead people to think that all 
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allocation using the rule of randomness is not identical to arbitrary allocation using the 
3:2 rule, because although this rule is impersonal, it affects hunters differently depending on 
which version is adopted.) 
Allocating according to the non-economic principle of fairness using lotteries to achieve 
equality of hunt allocation is not without costs: Costs of efficiency as wasted opportunities 
for citizen hunters by the end of the hunting season; costs for applicants at not being assigned 
the hunt they prefer, or the frustration at not being assigned a hunt at all by the lottery; and 
costs for the allocating agency who must administer the lottery system and forgoes revenue. 
The costs for efficiency manifest themselves most when the allocation is only done irregularly 
(eg. once a year) and it must be guaranteed that all hunters who are allocated a hunt are 
committed enough to take it up. The later in the hunting season that a person decides to forgo 
his right to hunt, the more difficult it is for resource managers to re-allocate the hunts 
efficiently, and at the same time "fairly" using a lottery system 1• This is the reason for the 
33 out of 100 hunts that the DNPWLM was not able to be re-allocate after the 1.7.91 using 
the first-come-first-served system (see results of hunt allocation in Figure 4.1, page 126, and 
section 4.2.3, page 127). 
The ZHA, being a private membership organisation, can re-allocate hunts that become 
"unwanted" in this way more easily and flexibly amongst its members, since information is 
easily communicated and members are known personally. In addition, a waiting list is drawn 
at the origi_nal lottery draw, preparatory to such occurrences. 
As a government agency, the DNPWLM is Jess flexible to re-allocate unwanted hunts during 
the hunting season to additional hunters, and questions of fairness and efficiency of the 
original allocation procedure arise more easily. 
The Wyoming lottery system accommodates licensed hunters who default during the planning 
stage using known hunter success rates for each species (Crowe, 1987). Hunter success rate 
is defined as: The number of animals actually shot (killed and wounded) by hunters by the 
end of the hunting seasons, of those on quota. (In Zimbabwe, lion, leopard and grysbok are 
known to have lower hunter success rates.) To harvest a specific number of animals by the 
close of the hunting season, the Wyoming lottery system increases actual number of licences 
issued for each species by the factor (1 - average hunter success rate), thus more licences for 
single animals than in total on quota are actually issued by this system. Should administrators 
in any year overestimate hunter success (ie. fewer hunters than expected take up their hunt, 
or fewer hunters than expected harvest an animal), then the Wyoming agency also makes 
1 A conflict exits here between efficient and equitable hunt allocation: For efficient allocation. the agency requires 
a method to tell apart those hunters who will go and hunt and those who will not go and hunt (eg. using each 
hunter's maximum willingness to pay or willingness to wait in a queue) . For equitable hunt allocation, the agency 
requires a method that precisely does not differentiate between hunters, but treats all preferences and hunters alike 
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additional licences available on a first-come-first-served cash basis by press advertisement 
(Wyoming Game & Fish Department, 1991) to try and harvest the total quota by the close 
of the hunting season. 
As shown by the rapid re-allocation of 12 out of a possible 14 hunts for Charara/Makuti at 
the Harare licensing office, the DNPWLM first-come-first-served system was efficient in the 
sense that hunters who were genuinely committed to going hunting did secure a hunt by 
arriving early enough at the DNPWLM central licensing office in Harare; the system also 
caused inequality of hunt allocation by favouring Zimbabwe citizens who live close to Harare 
and who are delivered the Zimbabwe Herald containing the advertisement the same day of 
issue. By placing one advertisement on the 16.1.91 announcing the re-allocation of hunts 
beginning the following day, Zimbabwe citizens outside Harare and in rural areas were 
disadvantaged. (Due to the present poor state of telephone communications and the limited 
number of persons with access to a telephone, bookings by telephone or facsimile-machine 
are not considered by the author to be practical or "fair".) The trade-off between efficiency 
and equality for the DNPWLM first-come-first-served system resembles that described by the 
analogy used to introduce these concepts in Chapter 2 (see section 2.2.5.1, page 31). 
4.3. Equality of hunt allocation 
This section tests the hypothesis that the first stage allocation of hunts by the DNPWLM 
lottery system for Charara/Makuti was not equitable for all applicants. The degree of 
inequality is assessed empirically with 1991 application data. The lottery draw was simulated 
using a computer programme to determine probability values of draw success for each 
applicant. The results are then interpreted in terms of efficiency. 
The purpose of simulating the lottery system used by the DNPWLM in solving the allocative 
functions for hunts in Charara/Makuti, was to quantify and objectively assess the probability 
of winning a hunt for each applicant thus determining the licensing system's "fairness". The 
assessment in section 4.3 assumes that the intention of lotteries is to treat individual 
applicants identically, because personal differences are deemed irrelevant for the allocation. 
There were three objectives of simulating the DNPWLM lottery system: 
1. To quantify the unequal probability of winning Any Hunt for every applicant under the 
application and draw rules used by the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti 
study area in 1991. 
2. To assess the inequality of the DNPWLM lottery system. Distributions of the 
calculated equal probabilities and the simulated unequal probabilities of winning Any 
Hunt were compared for every applicant. 
3. To determine i~ the probability of winning Any Hunt was equal for all applicants who 
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The equality of hunt allocation is structured as follows: 
• The equality criterion for hunt allocation by lottery; 
• Data and methods used; 
• Limitations of the simulation; 
• Simulation results; 
• An inequality interpretation of results as a Lorenz curve; 
• Discussion of results. 
4.3.1. Introducing the notion of "fairness" for lotteries as equality 
Intuitively, lottery systems are perceived to be a method of allocating scarce resources 
"fairly", "randomly", or "equally" amongst a number of people, or giving everyone "an equal 
opportunity to win". These notions imply several things: that no person be favoured during 
the allocation; that an impartial and impersonal choice of winners and losers amongst 
applicants is made using random selections in a lottery; that the wealth of applicants and their 
willingness to pay should not influence the allocation; that each person has the same, equal, 
probability of winning to access the benefits of the good ( eg. hunt) being distributed. 
In accordance with the authors Rae, et al., (1981), this dissertation classifies all these notions 
of "fair distributions" as a class of problem dealing with different patterns of resource and 
benefit distribution - in our case hunts - amongst individual people. Each specific hunt 
distribution pattern is termed an equality; the many different ways in which hunts can be 
distributed gives rise to many equalities ( or distribution patterns). The distribution pattern 
achieved by using each hunter's maximum willingness to pay is an example of one type of 
equality; the pattern achieved by using a lottery system and randomness is another type of 
equality; yet a third distribution pattern and equality could be achieved by using need as the 
criterion and defining a way to measure applicant's hunting needs comparatively. The author 
sees the moral "fairness" or "unfairness" of the different patterns as being a question of 
definition and agreement amongst people according to accepted decision-making procedures, 
rather than a question of absolute advantage or disadvantage. (Such a decision should, 
however, also be based on the relative costs of achieving different equalities in society.) 
The review of lotteries for hunt allocation in Chapter 3 identified essentially three designs of 
lottery system (see Figure 4.2, page 143) that are used to license sport hunting in practice. 
In Zimbabwe the government conservation agency (DNPWLM) administers an unequal 
lottery system with no hunt preferences for applicants in the Charara/Makuti study area, 
whilst the private hunters' associations (ZHA) administer an equal lottery system with 
unequal hunt preferences for applicants in the hunting areas of Tuli/Doma/Rifa. In the state 
of Wyoming, the Wyoming conservation agency administers an equal lottery with equal hunt 
preferences for applicants on all land in Wyoming. (Figure 4.2 shows these lottery systems 
according to their different types of equality, with details of their hunt preferences, their 
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Equal probability (p) to win any specified hunt (Nut Preference 
Hunt), Independent of applicant'• preference ranking 
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system for state 
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Equal probability (p) to win one specific hunt (eg. First Hunt 
Preference), dependent on applicant'• preference ranking 
Figure 4.2 Overview of hunt allocation equalities achieved by reviewed lottery systems 
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In general, with hunts valued at fixed prices, a hunt allocation by lottery must perform two 
allocative functions: 
(1) The number of applicants applying for hunts at a certain price (demand) must be 
limited to the number of hunts available (supply). 
(2) The variety of hunts available (supply) must somehow be distributed amongst the 
selected applicants according to a certain rule whilst accommodating each hunter's 
preferences for specific hunts (personal choice). 
Both functions are solved simultaneously, not sequentially, by any particular lottery system. 
The techniques used to solve the functions determines the type of equality achieved. To 
achieve the first function lotteries use a randomized draw procedure to limit applicants. For 
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or a First Preference Hunt), and applicants must each be able to enter only one ticket in the 
draw-barrel. 
If this equal lottery definition is accepted as a reasonable interpretation of the notion of "a 
fair lottery", and had this equal lottery definition been applied by the DNPWLM lottery 
system for the Charara/Makuti study area to allocate hunts in 1991, then applicant's equal 
probability of winning an unspecified hunt would have been: 
The available number of hunts (100), divided by the number of individual 
ticket holders (196), or p = 0.51 for every hunting applicant. 
(Sources and methods for obtaining the data are described in section 4.3.4, page 145). This 
probability means that all 196 applicants for Charara/Makuti would have an equal chance of 
being drawn and winning an unspecified option to hunt (ie. Any Hunt). 
The second allocation function can be achieved in many ways, two of which are relevant here 
for lottery systems: 
• 
• 
Arbitrarily and impersonally, if some rule is used to allocate each hunt. The rule 
is linked to the random draw order. A good example of such a rule is the 3:2 
allocation rule applied by the unequal DNPWLM lottery system to allot winners 
specific hunts in the study area (see Figure 4.2). 
Personally, if applicants can personally value the options to hunt and then choose 
the hunts he wants most, according to his personal preferences, listing them by 
preference rank. 1 Hunt preferences can be treated equally, or unequally, for all 
applicants (see Figure 4.2). The ZHA lottery system used a procedure that resulted 
in hunts being allocated unequally amongst applicants who applied for the same 
hunt and preference, whilst the Wyoming lottery system used a procedure that 
resulted in hums being allocated equally amongst applicants who applied for the 
same hunt and preference. 
The rules for the DNPWLM lottery system that is the topic of the present assessment did not 
allow hunt preferences at all, so because of its design it belongs to the category of unequal 
lottery systems. According to which standard of equality should the unequal DNPWLM 
lottery system be assessed in this section? It may be compared to the minimum standard of 
an equal lottery system with no hunt preferences which achieves equal probabilities for all 
applicants to draw an undefined hunting option (Any Hunt) - as calculated above. This 
equality standard is used in the following as the criterion for the assessment of the equality 
of hunt allocation. 
1 Free choice, in the strictest sense, does not include a random allocation since this outcome is not chosen 
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4.3.2. The equality achieved by the DNPWLM lottery system 
To limit demand by applicants, the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti used a 
lottery with unequal probabilities of winning for applicants, because applicants had 
different numbers of tickets in the draw.1 With tickets being priced, the DNPWLM lottery 
system in actual fact used the price mechanism and the applicant's willingness to pay for an 
option to hunt in order to limit demand by hunting applicants. (Whether this was the intention 
of the DNPWLM or not remains unclear, due to lack of documented policy, licensing system 
procedure, and vague or conflicting statements made by various hunting administrators.) 
To allot specific hunts in the Charara/Makuti study area amongst applicants who were drawn, 
the DNPWLM lottery system used an arbitrary rule linked to the winner's draw order. The 
rule was determined by the DNPWLM, and did not accommodate applicant's personal hunt 
preferences. (The arbitrary 3:2 rule is described fully in section 3.2.1.3, page 64.) 
4.3.3. Equality Criterion for Hunt Allocation by Lottery 
The criterion of equality is defined as: An equal probability of winning an undefined hunt by 
all applicants for Charara/Makuti.2 Since this probability is related to winning an unspecified, 
arbitrarily assigned hunt number in either Charara or Makuti hunting area, it is termed the 
probability of winning Any Hunt. (If personal preference lists are used, it is termed the 
probability of winning a Next Hunt Preference for the ZHA lottery system hunt allocation 
procedure, and the probability of winning a First Hunt Preference for the Wyoming lottery 
system hunt allocation procedure. See definitions in Glossary, page xxi.) 
Readers should note, that equal probabilities of winning Any Hunt by all applicants does not 
mean that all hunters who hunted in the Charara/Makuti hunting area had an equal 
probability of winning Any Hunt (see limitations of simulation, section 4.3.5, page 148). 
4.3.4. Data and methods 
The computer simulation of the lottery draw procedure used by the DNPWLM for 
Charara/Makuti is based on 1991 data. Data used included: The application rules; the lottery 
draw procedure; the number of hunts that were planned for the Charara/Makuti areas; and the 
frequency distribution of tickets bought by applicants. 
The application rules and the lottery draw procedure for this licensing system, termed the 3:2 
hunt allocation rule, are described fully in the Chapter 3 (section 3.2.1.3, page 64). In total 
100 hunts (Any Hunts) were available for allocation in both hunting areas. 
1 Due to the large number of combinations possible for the order in which winners may be drawn, it was suspected 
that, for a limited number of draws, the probabilities of winning a hunt might also be unequal for applicants who 
had each bought identical numbers of tickets. This hypothesis was tested as the third objective of the simulation. 
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The frequency distribution of tickets bought by each individual applicant was compiled from 
application data in the ticket register at the DNPWLM licensing office in Harare. Applicants 
bought a total of 2'008 tickets.1 To identify individual applicants, each applicant's surname, 
first name initials, and address as entered in the DNPWLM ticket register was.compared with 
other entries. This information was, where possible, correlated with the telephone directory 
entries to establish unique applicants and some consistency of spelling and names. 




For some ticket entries in the register, different addresses were entered for the 
same applicant ( eg. both his physical and postal address); 
For other ticket register entries different applicants with the same surname and 
first name initials could not easily be kept apart (eg. in the case of related family 
members, or unrelated applicants with similar names); 
Some persons in the ticket register could not be matched to the licence holders, 
and some licence holders could not be matched to persons in the ticket register. 
In future, the above difficulties could be avoided by using a unique identification number for 
each applicant during the application procedure, such as the Zimbabwe national identification 
number. 
The frequency distribution of applicants' tickets purchased for an option to hunt in 
Charara/Makuti is depicted as a stem-and-leaf diagram in Figure 4.3, page 146. In total 196 










8 n. 196 applicants 
9 9 Mean. 10 ti:kets 
10 Std elev • 12 ti:kets 
Figure 4.3 Frequency distribution of tickets bought by applicants 
in DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti: 1991 
The column indented to the left gives the ticket numbers in tens. and the main body to the right in units. For 
example. the minimum of one ticket was bought by 29 applicants. and 99 tickets were bought by one applicant. The 
number of applicants. the mean ticket numbers with their standard deviation arc given. One ticket cost 2$20. 
Source: DNPWLM ticket register. DNPWLM licensing office. Harare. 
1 Of the 2' 153 ticket numbers sold. and recorded in the DNPWLM ticket register. 145 were invalid numbers for 
whom no applicant could be identified (ticket numbers 455-499 and l '900-1 '999, inclusive). leaving 2'008 valid 
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Figure 4.3 indicates clearly that in 1991 most Charara/Makuti applicants who applied bought 
more than one ticket. Zimbabwe citizen hunters evidently are willing to spend considerably 
more than the price of a single ticket (Z$20) to increase their probability of being drawn and 
going hunting. Single tickets were bought by 29 persons, 48 applicants each bought the modal 
number of five tickets (worth Z$100), whilst 34 applicants bought the next most frequent 
number, namely 10 tickets (worth Z$200). The mean number of tickets bought per applicant 
was about ten tickets1• Unsuccessful applicants were not refunded the amounts spent on 
ticket purchases, and successful applicants could not deduct the amount from their hunt price. 
The simulation programme (see Appendix 5.1, page A29) was written in Fortran by 
L. McNiell, a statistical consultant, and simulations were run on a VAX computer. The 
programme used data on the number of hunts supplied and on the ticket frequencies bought 
by applicants. Each simulation was considered as one draw year, or hunting season. At each 
simulation 100 winners were drawn, keeping in mind that no applicant could draw a hunt 
twice in any year. A large number of simulations was conducted to reveal any differences, 
or inequalities, that might be part of the lottery system. Initially, the simulation was planned 
to run for 100'000 draws, considered adequate to obtain the probability for each applicant. 
For each draw, the programme recorded the applicant's number, and whether he had won a 
hunt. Finally, however, the lottery programme simulated the draws of 100 winners for the 
ticket distribution of 196 applicants over a period of one million draw years. For fewer than 
this number of simulations, it was found that the frequency of wins (ie. the total number of 
times an applicant won) for applicants with identical numbers of tickets had not yet 
converged, and could not therefore be considered as the probability of winning.2 This 
simulation result confirmed the third hypothesis of the investigation, namely that applicants 
with the same numbers of tickets had unequal probabilities of winning Any Hunt in the 
DNPWLM lottery draw (see objective 3 of this simulation, page 141). 
The probability of winning a hunt was then calculated by dividing the frequency of wins, for 
each applicant, by one million draws. Mean frequencies were calculated for each ticket class. 
1 In total 2'008 tickets divided by 196 applicants. which equals a mean of 10.2 tickets per applicant. 
2 The frequency of wins for applicants with identical numbers of tickets did not even converge after one million 
draw attempts. but the number of draw years was not increased further. This result showed the inequality of winning 
Any Hunt for applicants who had bought identical numbers of.tickets for the DNPWLM lottery system; the third 
objective of the simulation is thus achieved. Due to these differences between individual applicant's probabilities for 
the same number of tickets. the remainder of this the analysis is based on the mean frequency of wins for each class 
of ticket holders (included in Appendix 5.2.2. page A34), not on the simulated individual frequency of wins (included 
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4.3.5. Limitations of simulation 
The following limitations apply to the simulation programme, and the relevance of the lottery 
simulation results: 
• Hunting applicants cooperate in groups: 
The probability of an applicant "going hunting" is greater than his probability of winning a 
hunt in the hunting area1. The probability of going hunting was not calculated, due to its 
complexity. 
• Hunting applicants applied in the ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa: 
Some 133 applicants (52% of the total) for Charara/Makuti in 1991 were estimated to be 
members of the ZHA.2 The personal probability of winning a hunt for these applicants is thus 
greater ·than for applicants who were not members of the ZHA. This fact was not considered 
for the simulation, due to its complexity. 
4.3.6. Simulation results 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the simulation results as the mean probabilities for each ticket class. The 
figure shows how the probability of winning Any Hunt (an undefined hunt) varied according 
to the number of tickets bought per person. As expected, the greater the number of tickets an 
applicant bought, the greater was his expected probability of winning Any Hunt in the 
DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti. 
The results show that the 29 applicants who each bought a single ticket could expect to win 
Any Hunt about 9% of the time (p = 0.0987), whereas the 34 applicants who each bought ten 
tickets could expect to win Any Hunt about 65% of the time (p = 0.6480). Applicants with 
the mean number of five tickets each - the minimum number needed to win a hunt at all -
could expect to win Any Hunt about 41 % of the time (p = 0.4062). Applicants who bought 
23 tickets or more, could expect to win Any Hunt at least 90% of the time. 
1 In Zimbabwe, application rules for citizen hunting allow one hunter and up to three co-hunters to actively hunt. 
Applicants are not at present required to specify their co-hunters when applying. Thus an applicant who applies for, 
but does not win a hunt. or who does not apply to hunt at all, may still hunt as a co-hunter of a successful applicant. 
Both versions occur regularly (personal observation). Applicants who cooperate can maximize their personal 
probability of "going hunting" and need not win a hunt in the lottery. This strategy affects the equality of hunt 
allocation for the DNPWLM case study. It also applies to the ZHA lottery systems for Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas. 
The Wyoming lottery system is explicitly designed to prevent applicants adopting a probability-maximizing strategy. 
Application rules require co-hunters to be specified for each application, and control procedures prevent any duplicate 
applications for the same hunt, so that individual and group applications are equally weighted in the draw (Wyoming 
Game & Fish Department, 1988). 
2 Individual hunting applicants in 1991 were identified from hunting licences for Charara/Makuti, sourced at the 
DNPWLM licensing offices in Harare, Marongora and Kariba, and compared with the ZHA's membership address 
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Figure 4.4 Mean probabilities of winning Any Hum by hunting applicanL<s in DNPWLM lottery 
system in Charara/Makuti : 1991 
Source: Mean simulation results of DNPWLM lottery system, Appendix 5.2.2. page A34. 
4.3. 7. Interpreting the results as inequality 
The unequal distribution of the probability of winning Any Hunt amongst applicants can be 
illustrated using a Lorenz curve in Figure 4.5, page 150. The Lorenz curve plots both equal 
and unequal distributions of some resource amongst a number of persons1• On the vertical 
axis, the diagram plots the cumulative proportions of each winner's probability of winning 
Any Hunt; on the horizontal axis the diagram plots the cumulative proportions of winners, 
ordered according to ~heir probability. 
The line of equality in Figure 4.5 was plotted using the calculated results (equal distribution 
of probability amongst all applicants). The curve of inequality in Figure 4.5 was plotted based 
on the simulation results (unequal distribution of probability amongst applicants). Details of 
the calculation are in Appendix 5.2.3, page A35. The area between the line and the curve 
shows visually the degree of inequality between applicants who bought different numbers of 
tickets in the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti. 
1 The Lorenz curve is more commonly used to indicate inequality in the distribution patterns of income and wealth 
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Figure 4.5 Lorenz curve showing unequal probability or winning Any Hu111 by applicants m 
DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti: 1991 
Source: Simulation resulL<; of DNPWLM lottery system. Appendix 5.2.3. page A35. 
The line of equality and curve of inequality in Figure 4.5 can be interpreted as follows: 
• The diagonal line of equality: 
This line shows the equal probability of winning Any Hunt, and its distribution amongst 
applicants, had the rule of equality (1 ticket per person) been applied during the application 
stage. On this line, the proportion of persons who win to persons who applied is equal for all 
persons. In other words, ori this line, every applicant has an equal probability of winning Any 
Hunt (p = 0.51 for all applicants)1. 
• The curve of inequality: 
This curve shows the unequal probability of winning Any Hunt, and its distribution amongst 
applicants according the simulation results for the DNPWLM lottery system. Probability 
varies greatly (99% > p > 9% ), depending on the number of tickets each applicant bought. 
On the curve towards the centre of Figure 4.5, a large proportion of applicants have much 
Jess than an equal proportion of the probability of winning (51 %> p > 9% ), due to the limited 
number of tickets they bought. On this curve towards the right of Figure 4.5 it can be seen 
that a very small proportion of the applicants have by far the greatest proportion of the 
probability of winning (99% > p > 51 % ), due to the large numbers of tickets they each 
purchased. The more tick~ts each applicant purchased (and the more each was willing to pay), 
the better his chance of winning Any Hunt in the Charara/Makuti study area 










Chapter 4: Case sJudy and microeconomic assessment 151 
For applicants to have been certain of winning Any Hunt at every draw, or to have been 
amongst the first 100 persons drawn for every lottery simulation, the simulation results 
indicate that applicants required a minimum of five tickets (see Appendix 5.2.2, page A34). 
Further, the sum of these applicant's probability of winning (p = 0.4062) was less for the 
unequal DNPWLM lottery system than the probability these applicants could have expected 
(p = 0.5102) had the lottery been equal and allowed each applicant only one ticket. It may 
be concluded that even under the DNPWLM lottery system where applicants had 
unequal chances of winning, there were some winners who were worse off in terms of 
their probability of winning Any Hunt than they might have been had they applied 
under an equal lottery system by purchasing only one ticket each. 
All applicants who bought five tickets and Jess under the 1991 DNPWLM lottery system for 
the Charara/Makuti study area were worse off under this system than they might have been 
under an equal lottery system. 
4.3.8. Discussion of results 
To adapt the present unequal DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti and accommodate 
hunter's preferences for specific hunts using ranked hunt preferences, at least two procedures 
are available: 
• The unequal hunt preference allocation procedure of the ZHA lottery system; or 
• The equal hunt preference allocation procedure of the Wyoming lottery system. 
Both procedures were reviewed in detail in Chapter 3 (see section 3.2.2.4, page 81, for the 
ZHA lottery system; see section 3.3.1, page 98, for the Wyoming lottery system). Here, the 
implications of each pmcedure are merely summarized and illustrated in terms of equality and 
efficiency (hunter's commitment) of hunt allocation. 
The ZHA lottery system procedure ranks hunters only according to their draw order. The 
procedure thereby accords winners unequal rankings of preference order. The Wyoming 
lottery system procedure ranks hunters according to their draw order and their preference 
order. The system thereby accords each winner and each applicant equal rankings of 
preference order. 
Different assumption are made by each system about how "equal" applicants are. The 
Wyoming lottery system assumes that applicants and preferences are weighted equally for 
every preference ranking. The ZHA system assumes that applicants are weighted equally, but 
that preferences are weighted unequally (irrespective of their rank order). In the ZHA lottery 
system, preferences of applicants who are drawn early on in the procedure are weighted more 
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Figure 4.6 compares the outcomes of the ZHA and Wyoming hunt preference allocation 
procedures. The example uses actual application data gathered for the ZHA lottery systems, 
applied to a fictive draw outcome. The applicant order in the hunt preference lists was used 
as the random draw order for both lottery systems based on data collected for the ZHA lottery 
system. Application data for Tuli, Doma and Rifa hunting areas for 1991 are in Appendix 6.1 
(page A39), Appendix 6.2 (page A43), and Appendix 6.3 (page A45), respectively. 
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Figure 4.6 Comparison of fictive hunt allocation results for ZHA lottery system and Wyoming lottery 
system hunt preference allocation procedures 
Source: Data based on applicant's hunt preferences for hunts available in ZHA hunting areas in 1991. Preferences 
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The results in Figure 4.6 show that the Wyoming lottery system consistently allots each hunt 
amongst those applicants who prefer this particular one the most (as their First Hunt 
Preference). Such hunters will be most committed to undertake the hunting trip. The ZHA 
lottery system, by contrast, consistently allots hunts to applicants who do not prefer this 
particular hunt most, and who prefer it much less than other applicants (Next Hunt 
Preference). Such applicants are less committed to this hunt than other applicants would be. 
If hunters could swop or trade hunts, they could benefit mutually and improve the hunt 
allocation achieved by the ZHA lottery system. Trading hunting licences in Zimbabwe is not 
legal, however, so this system is not as efficient as the hunt allocation procedure used by the 
Wyoming lottery system. 
Based on the First Hunt Preference totals in Figure 4.6, the author considers the Wyoming 
hunt preference allocation procedure to be superior to that used by the ZHA lottery system 
at promoting commitment because it assigns hunts to applicants who place the highest value 
(according to their personal preference ranking of hunts) on the specific hunts they are 
allocated. 
4.3.9. Principle limitations of lotteries to allocate hunts equitably 
Equality is a distributive concept, not a productive concept. The more people that demand 
hunting, the smaller the probability of each person who applies actually going hunting. The 
value of the hunt they can expect to win is thus decreased. Lotteries, therefore, do not 
increase the supply for more persons demanding hunts, they merely distribute the available 
supply equally according to some definition of equality ("fairness"). (With market-priced 
allocation systems such as auctions additional revenue could be used to increase the supply 
of hunting opportunities.) Decision-makers choosing a lottery system and applicants thus face 
the following choice: To apply for a popular valuable hunt, but expect not to win or hunt it 
because of the low probability of winning for all applicants, or to apply for an unpopular 
and less valuable hunt and expect to have a higher probability of winning it and actually 
going hunting that year. The choice is difficult, because the exact probabilities are unknown 
for Zimbabwe's lottery systems. Even if this data were known to decision-makers and 
applicants in advance, the basic trade-off question still remains unanswered: What is each 
percentage point loss in probability worth to each individual hunter? For example, what 
would each applicant be prepared to pay in order to win a particular hunt and be able to go 
hunting with certainty, rather than have a 30% or 50% chance of winning that particular hunt 
and a 70% or 50% chance of not going hunting? Being fix-priced licensing systems, lotteries 
do not give applicants such a choice to answer this question for themselves; lottery systems 
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4.4. Summary: Hunt allocation by DNPWLM lottery system 
for the study area in 1991 
The design of the DNPWLM lottery system caused hunts to be wasted, and allocated to 
hunters who did not value them or want to hunt them. By allowing applicants to purchase 
multiple tickets the probability of winning a hunt in Charara/Makuti, and the access to hunts, 
varied according to the hunter's willingness to pay. This phenomenon gave wealthy 
Zimbabwean citizen hunters an advantage to win hunts in the lottery. Applicants had very 
unequal probabilities of winning a hunt in 1991, and were not random, as indicated by the 
name "lottery" in the licensing system's name. The allocation of specific hunts to individual 
draw winners was likewise determined by the number of tickets purchased and the draw 
order. 
The probability of winning an option to hunt was not independent of the applicant himself. 
Yet the specific hunt and hunt characteristics (including the hunt price) a winner of the 
DNPWLM lottery system was allocated was not determined personally by applicants based 
on their personal hunting preferences; specific hunts were allotted using an arbitrary rule 
decided by the DNPWLM. 
4.5. Conclusions: Allocating hunts efficiently and 
equitably by lottery for the study area 
The conclusions to the case study assessment in Chapter 4, and the recommendations that 
follow, are based on the following premises: 
1. Principally, a fix-priced lottery system is to be used to allocate scarce big game 
hunting resources in Charara/Makuti study area to Zimbabwe citizen hunters. The 
fixed prices value the total species quota (the consumptive hunting resource); 
maximum hunting revenue is determined by the quota's species composition and the 
price per species set by government. 
2. Efficiency of hunt allocation aims to minimize administrative costs. 
3. Maximum benefits from hunting and a maximum variety of hunts should be supplied 
to hunters with resources available to the DNPWLM. The resources budgeted by the 
DNPWLM are not known. 
4. Applicants should choose their own hunts rationally based on detailed information. 
5. A lottery system's purpose is to allocate hunts to applicants independent of their 
maximum willingness to pay (ie. not based on a price mechanism) - the exact opposite 
of the DNPWLM lottery system's outcome for Charara/Makuti in 1991. 
6. Equality of hunt allocation aims to give all citizen hunters who apply an equal 
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The case study assessment showed that hunts in Charara/Makuti study area were not allocated 
efficiently or equitably to Zimbabwe citizen hunters by the DNPWLM lottery system in 1991. 
If decision-makers were to decide principally to continue using a lottery system, and agreed 
to adopt the objectives of efficient and equitable hunt allocation as defined in the present 
chapter for lottery systems, then major conclusions from the case study assessment may be 
drawn as follows. 
4.5.1. Conclusions for efficient hunt allocation 
Efficiency of hunt allocation, defined as the number of available hunts that benefitted hunters 
after being allocated by the lottery system, was 55% of that expected in 1991. Conclusions 
relating to this finding are: 
4.5.1.1. Findings: Applicants lacked information and a choice of hunts. Conclusion: 
Applicants need to make rational, informed, and personal choices of the hunts they 
prefer in Charara/Makuti. To do this, applicants need to know: 
• All hunts supplied by the licensing system and their hunt characteristics. The 
essential characteristics are: hunting bag (species, sex and number of animals), 







Probabilities of winning a hunt; 
Rules and procedures used to allocate hunts; 
Timing of the hunt allocation process; 
Payment procedures; 
Conditions and consequences (eg. penalties) of hunt forfeit; 
Infrastructure and facilities offered in hunting areas and at hunting camps . 
4.5.1.2. Findings: Quotas are packaged into uniform hunts in the Charara/Makuti study 
area; Hunts lacked variety of characteristics. Conclusion: The packaging of the 
total species' quotas must cater for variety to increase choice of hunts for 
applicants, because applicants cannot package their own hunts in a lottery system -
as they can do in an auction system (see section 3.2.4, page 90). This is 
particularly important since hunt prices are fixed, and determined by administrators 
when they allocate the quotas to hunts. Variety for hunts includes the aspects: 
trophy quality versus non-trophy quality, expensive versus cheap hunt prices; long 
versus short hunt durations; big game hunting bags versus plains game hunting 
bags. 
4.5.1.3. Finding: Lotteries cannot allocate valuable resources personally and efficiently; 
they can only allocate resources and value impersonally and randomly. 
Conclusion: All lottery systems - even if their allocation procedures take account 
of applicant's personal hunt preferences - have a fundamental limitation of ensuring 
hunts are allocated efficiently. Lottery systems aggravate the problem of allocating 
hunts efficiently and equitably (ie. personally) if citizen hunter's personal 
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society - due to personal and income differences, amongst others (for income 
distribution, see Figure 2.4, page 55). 
4.5.1.4. Findings: The present licensing system for Charara/Makuti has a serious problem 
of lack of commitment by many applicants who were allocated a hunt by the 
DNPWLM lottery system. Conclusion: Major causes are: Applicants could not 
choose hunts personally, but were allocated hunts arbitrarily; applicants did not 
value1 the arbitrarily allocated hunts very much; hunting bags were valued far less 
than the costs of the hunting trip; applicants could not trade their hunts once they 
were assigned; by not going hunting, applicant's behaviour was economically 
rational because they minimized their financial losses; applicant's financial 
commitment to go and hunt was not high, because no advance or down-payment 
on the hunt was requested by the DNPWLM during application, and the cost of 
tickets purchased comprised a mere 2% to 15%2 of an average hunting trip's total 
cost in Charara/Makuti. 
4.5.1.5. Finding: Any lottery's fundamental limitation to allocate hunts to applicants who 
are committed to go and hunt was exacerbated by the arbitrary hunt allocation 
procedure used by the DNPWLM lottery system in 1991 for the Charara/Makuti 
study area. The procedure caused a mismatch between the price of allotted hunts 
and the price applicants were willing to spend for a hunt. Conclusion: The 
commitment of hunters allocated a hunt by the lottery was even more problematic 
than it could have been, had the lottery hunt allocation procedure accommodated 
applicant's hunt preferences. 
4.5.1.6. Finding: Hunting big game in Charara/Makuti and other protected areas in 
Zimbabwe is a very expensive sport and recreation, of which the costs of the actual 
hunting bag - priced at government controlled fixed prices per species - were only 
about 11 % on average in Charara/Makuti study area (Table 4.1, page 131). Costs 
to access the hunt (transport, food, camping equipment, weapons and ammunition) 
comprise at least 74% of the total hunting trip costs to the area. Conclusion: To 
increase the net-value of a hunt for hunters living far from the hunting areas, the 
value of the hunting bag or the value of other hunt characteristics for participants 
(real benefits) must be increased; in this way, the difference between the benefit-
value of the hunting trip and the costs of access (eg. transport) will increase. Hunts 
and hunting bags need to be made more valuable to make it worth the expense of 
undertaking the hunting trip for Zimbabwe citizens living far away from the 
hunting areas. Otherwise those living far from the hunting areas will be 
disadvantaged by the allocation system. 
1 The valuation process is complex and poorly understood (see models in Sinden and Worrell. 1979); however it 
is an individual, and personal. process. 
2 Z$200 for a minimum of 10 tickets and a hunting trip costing in total Z$1 l '700. equals 2%; ZSl '980 for the 
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4.5.1.7. Finding: In general, citizen hunters valued hunts offered in Charara/Makuti study 
area less in 1991 (compared to 1990/89), because that year the quota was packaged 
into 100 hunts (twice the 50 hunts in 1990/89) but based on the same species' 
quotas. Conclusion: With more, less valuable, hunts in 1991, Charara/Makuti hunts 
were made less accessible rather than more accessible for all hunters - particularly 
for those citizen hunters in Zimbabwe living furthest from these hunting areas (eg. 
in urban centres of Mutare and Bulawayo). Citizen hunting cannot be made 
accessible or affordable to Zimbabweans by reducing the size, price and value of 
the hunting bag allocated to hunts, due to the influence of geographical location 
and high access and transport costs associated with a hunting trip. To make hunting 
more accessible, the supply can either be geographically distributed in Zimbabwe\ 
or the hunting trip must be made more valuable for hunters, eg. by increasing the 
size, price and value of the hunting bag. 
4.5.1.8. Findings: Applicants, hunters and the DNPWLM incurred significant costs due to 
the design of the lottery hunt allocation procedure for Charara/Makuti, none of 
which are easily quantified. They include: the cost of lottery tickets for applicants 
who did not benefit from hunting; the cost of hunts for lottery winners who did not 
benefit from hunting; the administrative cost to the DNPWLM of the additional re-
allocation using the first-come-first-served system (preparation, advertisement, and 
administration); unpriced costs of hunter's frustration, inconvenience, and time 
wasted by both applicant's and the DNPWLM. Conclusion: At the microeconomic 
level, lottery systems are costly to administer, and especially so if lotteries are to 
achieve equality of hunt allocation as defined in premise 6, page 154 (eg. using the 
Wyoming hunt allocation procedure). 
4.5.1.9. Finding: The second stage allocation of hunts by the DNPWLM first-come-first-
served system to applicants in Harare was 85% efficient (compared to 55% for the 
first stage DNPWLM lottery system). Conclusion: The inequality of the queuing 
system (applicants travelled different distances to reach the central Harare licensing 
office) did indeed ensure that only hunters who were committed and valued the 
opportunity to hunt were selected, and prevented defaulting. The system was 
efficient for the DNPWLM, but costly for applicants. (The DNPWLM first-come-
first-served system does not fit the definition of an equitable hunt allocation system 
used for lotteries. See conclusion 4.5.2.11.) 
1 Zimbabwe citizens who &re members of the ZHA can benefit by having three big game hunting areas in 
Zimbabwe to choose from (see Map 2.1, page 47). Unless an economic incentive is offered to landowners outside 
protected areas (eg. high hunt prices), no additional big game will be supplied to Zimbabwe citizens in a free market 
economy. Unless opportunity costs are incurred by the DNPWLM and Zimbabwe Government (eg. less revenue), 
no additional big game can be supplied to Zimbabwe citizens inside protected areas presently used for other purposes, 
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4.5.2. Conclusions for equitable hunt allocation 
From the assessment of the equality of hunt allocation for the DNPWLM lottery system in 
Charara/Makuti study area, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
4.5.2.1. Findings: The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti did not give all 
applicants an equal probability to win any hunting opportunity (Any Hunt). 
Probability of winning a hunt ranged from very low (p > 9%) for applicants with 
one ticket, to almost certainty (p < 99%) for the applicant with 99 tickets. Citizen 
hunters had to purchase more than 5 tickets to have any reasonable probability 
of winning an option to hunt, based on 1991 data. Conclusion: Contrary to the 
purpose associated with lottery systems of equalizing probabilities of winning for 
all participants, the DNPWLM lottery system was designed as an unequal 
lottery system: Applicants with the greatest willingness to pay had the highest 
probability of winning a hunt in the Charara/Makuti study area. Due to lack of 
documentation and policy on the DNPWLM lottery system, the author assumed 
that a lottery system should be designed as an equal lottery system. (On 
conclusions how to achieve this, see conclusion 4.5.2.7.) 
4.5.2.2. Finding: Hunters and applicants did not necessarily face the same lottery rules to 
be able to hunt in Charara/Makuti, because co-hunters in a hunting party were not 
specified during application and were not considered by the draw procedure. 
Conclusion: Under present lottery qualification rules (unspecified hunting parties) 
applicants can adopt a cooperative strategy to increase their probability of actually 
going hunting in any area (see footnote 1, page 148, for details). 
4.5.2.3. Finding: Applicants with identical numbers of tickets in the 1991 lottery draw did 
not have the same probability of winning a hunt (Any Hunt). Conclusion: Some 
winners of the unequal DNPWLM lottery system with 5 tickets each were worse 
off than they might have been had they entered an equal lottery system with only 
a single ticket per person. 
4.5.2.4. Applicants had no personal choice about which hunt they were allocated; an 
arbitrary rule based on the draw order determined which hunt was allocated. 
4.5.2.5. Finding: The licensing system offered 100 hunts for a maximum number of 200 
hunters (one hunter, and one co-hunter per hunt). Of an estimated 196 Zimbabwe 
citizens who applied to hunt in Charara/Makuti in 1991 using the DNPWLM 
lottery system, an estimated 52% ( or 133 applicants) were at the same time 
members of the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association (ZHA). Conclusion: In 1991, 133 
applicants for Charara/Makuti had access to other, more expensive, big game hunts 
in other protected areas in Zimbabwe (Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas) as voluntary 
members of the association. All Zimbabwe citizen hunters have the option of 
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4.5.2.6. Finding: In 1991, the DNPWLM lottery system effectively catered for about 63 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters who were not already members of the ZHA. 
Conclusion: By any standards, 63 persons out of Zimbabwe's total population of 
10.4 million persons - or 0.0006% - represent a very small number of beneficiaries 
for whom an area covering 1 '691km2 of prime land in Zimbabwe's protected area 
system was exclusively reserved. 
4.5.2.7. Finding: Two types of equality have been documented that are attainable with 
lottery systems and hunter's ranked preference lists to allocate hunts "fairly". 
Objectively, neither form of equality can be classified as "more" or "less" 
equitable: This classification is a value judgement to be made by decision-makers 
who choose the licensing system. The author has decided that for the allocation of 
different hunts to different people, equality of hunt allocation should be the same 
probability of winning the same thing (a specific hunt and preference rank) for all 
persons who personally choose to apply for this hunt. Conclusion: If personal 
preferences of specific hunts are to be respected for all applicants, equality of hunt 
allocation can be achieved by lottery as: 
• Either, an equal probability of winning (Any Hunt) and an unequal probability 
of winning a specific hunt (First Hunt Preference) by all applicants who apply 
for a specific hunting area. This definition is realized at present by the ZHA 
lottery system in Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas in Zimbabwe. 
• Or, an equal probability of winning (Any Hunt) and an equal probability of 
winning a specific hunt (First Hunt Preference) by all applicants who apply for 
a specific hunting area. This definition is realized by the Wyoming lottery 
system in America. 
The factors affecting the choice of procedure include administrative, technical and 
financial costs. This choice is not clear-cut (see conclusion 4.5.2.14). 
4.5.2.8. Finding: To enforce equality of hunt allocation for hunts in Charara/Makuti 
hunting area does not give all citizen hunters who want to hunt big game in the 
whole of Zimbabwe an equal probability of winning a hunt. Conclusion: Only by 
using one, centralized, lottery system to administer all protected areas where citizen 
hunting in Zimbabwe is supplied1 using the Wyoming lottery system's equal hunt 
preference allocation procedure can equality of hunt allocation be guaranteed. Then 
all citizen hunters in the country applying for similar types of hunts can assured 
of equal chances of winning; no person can then adopt a strategy to maximize his 
personal probability of winning, either by applying in several lottery systems (as 
is presently the case for members of the ZHA), or by collaborating with other 
applicants to form a hunting party. 
1 Big game and plains game hunting for citizens is supplied using 3 different licensing systems in 6 different 
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4.5 .2.9. Finding: Instituting equality of hunt allocation using a centralized lottery system 
for all citizen hunters in Zimbabwe (see conclusion 4.5.2.8) would not prevent 
persons who are willing (and could afford) to pay for big game hunts in the 
DNPWLM auction system from entering the cheaper, fix-priced lottery system.1 
Conclusion: The objective of using fix-priced lottery systems (rather than market-
priced auction systems) to allocate valuable big game hunts and protected area and 
other human and financial resources to Zimbabwe citizens is unclear, and in the 
author's opinion questionable, unless it is to be applied to the same type of 
hunting throughout Zimbabwe.2 
4.5.2.10. The geographical location of the application office and the Charara/Makuti hunting 
areas relative to the hunter's home significantly affects his costs of applying and 
accessing the hunts supplied; transport costs are a major portion of the total costs 
of any hunting trip for citizen hunters (Appendix 18, page AllO). Conclusion: If 
application offices and hunting areas were decentralized, citizen hunting would 
become more efficient (by reducing transport costs) and more equitable (by making 
additional hunts accessible to additional hunters by reducing total costs of the 
hunting trip). To coordinate a decentralized supply of hunting in Zimbabwe is 
costly to administer using the Wyoming lottery system that depends on being 
centralized to achieve equality of hunt allocation (see conclusions 4.4.2.9 and 
4.4.2.10 above) . Such attempts to centrally plan and coordinate economic activities 
are diametrically opposed to price-coordinated market economies. 
4.5.2.11. Finding: The hunts that were re-allocated by the DNPWLM from their Harare 
licensing office using a first-come-first-served system benefitted hunters living in, 
or close to, Harare, and disadvantaged those who were not delivered the Zimbabwe 
Herald (which advertised the re-allocation) on the same day it was issued. 
Conclusion: The first-come-first-served allocation system did not treat citizen 
hunters equally. The queuing system allocated hunts efficiently and inequitably for 
applicants, but efficiently for the DNPWLM because it ensured that hunter's were 
committed and did not default (see conclusion 4.5.1.9). 
4.5.2.12. Finding: Equality is a complex theoretical concept that requires clear definition, 
and is difficult and costly to implement in practice. Conclusion: The benefit or 
net-worth of adopting equality and a lottery system to allocate resources is 
unpriced and extremely difficult to quantify to allow an objective and rational 
decision to be taken. The direct costs of administering a lottery system can be 
quantified, not so the benefits. Only by comparing the allocation results of lottery 
1 Hunters who can afford to pay market prices for hunting in the DNPWLM auction system will always have more 
options open to hunt. if in addition they are willing to be members of the ZHA. Such hunters cannot easily be 
excluded from entering fix-priced lottery systems. 
2 To achieve this objective in practice, a centralized, coordinated licensing system is used in Wyoming. The 
Wyoming lottery system allocates all hunts offered at one point in time to licence all types of hunters on state and 
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systems with other allocation systems can the relative costs be established as 
opportunity costs. Resource managers, policy-makers and resource users are 
challenged to consider the real costs and benefits of this subjective concept and 
whether, and how, it is to be put into practice. 
4.5.2.13. Finding: If applicants are to be given a choice of a specific hunt they are to be 
allocated by a lottery, and equality of hunt allocation is to be the objective of this 
lottery system in Charara/Makuti, then equality of hunt allocation cannot be 
achieved amongst all applicants applying for different hunts (equal probability of 
winning Any Hunt). Conclusion: Equality of hunt allocation can only be achieved 
amongst those applicants applying for the same hunt in those hunting areas ( equal 
probability of winning a First Hunt Preference for a specific hunt). For example, 
all applicants preferring hunt number Cl in Charara can be assured of an equal 
draw probability; applicants preferring hunt number C20 can likewise be assured 
of an equal draw probability; however different applicants will have unequal 
probabilities of winning hunt number Cl and hunt number C20 in Charara. 
4.5.2.14. Finding: Using applicant's ranked hunt preferences, two procedures can be used 
to accommodate choice and achieve different equalities of hunt allocation: the 
ZHA lottery system's unequal hunt preference allocation procedure, or alternatively 
the Wyoming lottery system's equal hunt preference allocation procedure. The 
choice between the procedures involves a difficult (subjective) trade-off for 
decision-makers1. Conclusion: On the one hand the unequal ZHA procedure does 
not promote commitment by winners as much as the equal Wyoming procedure; 
on the other hand, the unequal ZHA procedure can be administered manually and 
is less costly, whereas the equal Wyoming procedure requires a sophisticated 
computerized licensing system and is costly (in terms of human, technical and 
financial resources). To achieve equality of hunt allocation and accommodate 
choice with a lottery system requires a difficult trade-off to be made: High explicit 
financial costs are incurred to achieve greater equality and promote hunter 
commitment and efficiency with the Wyoming procedure; low explicit financial 
costs are incurred to achieve less equality and not achieve hunter commitment and 
efficiency with the ZHA procedure. For decision-makers in Zimbabwe's DNPWLM 
a rational choice at this microeconomic level is difficult, because many costs are 
not quantified and remain unpriced. 
4.5.2.15. Finding: Applicants in the DNPWLM lottery system for hunts in Charara/Makuti 
did not all face the same rules as those citizens who hunted in the study area, 
because hunting members in the party were not specified. Conclusion: If all 
persons are to have an equal probability to apply for and benefit from actually 
hunting a specific hunt (eg. First Preference Hunt) in Charara/Makuti, then lottery 
1 The book "Unpriced values: Decisions without market prices" by Sinden and Worrell (1979) deals with unpriced, 
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systems must adopt the Wyoming hunt preference allocation procedure and meet 
four conditions: 
• All hunters who want to hunt a specific hunt must be uniquely identified on the 




Applicants must not be allowed to enter for the same hunt twice, by applying 
as an individual and as a member of an official or inofficial group application; 
Applicants must not be allowed to enter for two hunts using the same 
preference priority, either as an individual or as a group member; 
Strict control procedures must be set up and enforced during processing of 
applications for the lottery to exclude duplicate applications from the draw 
before assigning hunts. 
4.6. Limitations of lotteries for 
allocating hunts efficiently and equitably 
All lottery systems that attempt to achieve equality of resource and benefit distribution 
inherently limit revenue. The design adopted for the DNPWLM lottery system was an 
anomaly, because it maximized ticket revenue from applicants (and their chances of winning 
a hunt) within the limits of a lottery system. The DNPWLM lottery system, however, still 
limits revenue earned from Charara/Makuti hunting areas by the DNPWLM outright by 
pricing hunting resources at fixed prices. The concept of equality relates to the distribution 
of scarce resources and their benefits amongst different people; the equality concept has 
nothing to do with producing these resource and benefits. 
If decision-makers want to distribute the benefits of citizen hunting in Charara/Makuti in a 
particular way - by giving hunters an equal probability to benefit from a hunt - then the 
quality and quantity of the hunts still has to be produced to be available for distribution. The 
production of wildlife for sport hunting involves economic costs for the DNPWLM. The 
question answered by concepts of equality - being distribution patterns - is: How is the 
resource- and benefit-cake to be sliced? Equality concepts are not concerned with the 
manner in which resources and benefits are produced (efficiently or wastefully), or with the 
quality and quantity in which benefits and resources are to be produced in the first place, 
before they are available for distribution. Instead, equality concepts are concerned with 
establishing distribution patterns for resources and benefits based on non-economic criteria, 
such as need, luck, administrative rules, etc. The questions concerned with production are 
answered by concepts of efficiency, being oriented around material production of goods and 
services, consumer choice, and costs: What size of resource- and benefit-cake is to be 
produced? 
By using government controlled fixed prices to value the hunting resources allocated 
exclusively to Zimbabwe citizens, the DNPWLM is limiting the conservation benefits that can 










Chap(er 4: Case study and microeconomic assessment 163 
and forgone benefits that - in addition to those derived by citizen hunters - this revenue could 
have financed (eg. education, research of protected areas, visitor facilities, DNPWLM staff 
salaries and training programmes) are called opportunity costs in economic terms (Samuelson, 
1973: 472-473; 562). Opportunity costs are the costs associated with not doing something. 
By adopting a lottery system to allocated hunts in Charara/Makuti the DNPWLM is opting 
outright to limit the size of the conservation benefit-cake and the agency's (and the Zimbabwe 
Government's) potential to achieve equality: Additional benefits for citizen hunters and other 
beneficiaries of Zimbabwe's protected areas cannot be funded - conservation benefits are 
wasted. 
How significant are the opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti 
hunting areas in Zimbabwe? This important question is the subject of the next chapter. 
4. 7. Recommendations: Efficient and 
equitable hunt allocation by lottery for the study area 
At the outset of this dissertation, the lack of and often conflicting policy priorities for 
resource allocation of wildlife and land in protected areas for citizen hunting was 
documented. The conflict is between using non-market principles and unqualified notions of 
equality, equal access and subsidization at any economic cost to allocate resources in 
protected areas, and using market principles to promote conservation of the same resources 
throughout Zimbabwe on all other land categories. 
The policy vacuum and conflicts precluded definitive recommendations being made for the 
study area. The following recommendations are preliminary, based on reasonable objectives 
specified by the author for hunt allocation at the microeconomic level (see premises 1 to 6, 
page 154). The recommendations assume that lotteries are - in principle - to be used to 
allocate citizen hunting i  Charara/Makuti. This principle assumption is challenged in 
Chapter 5. 
4.7.1. Recommendations for efficient hunt allocation by lottery 
To successfully allocate every hunt planned for a lottery system to citizen hunters who will 
benefit (achieving efficient hunt allocation), resource managers should: 
4.7.1.1. Consider the macroeconomic opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system 
before any of the recommendations that fol.low are adopted. Chapter 5 considers 
some of these opportunity costs. 
4.7.1.2. Document and inform applicants of the entire lottery licensing system before they 
apply. At minimum, applicants should know: 
• 
• 
All hunts and hunt characteristics allocated by the lottery system for a specific 
hunting area, eg. Charara/Makuti study area (see recommendation 4.7.1.4); 
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• Payment details (how, where, deadlines); 
• Hunt allocation procedure; 
• Licence issuance formalities; 
• Hunt forfeit rules ( deadlines, penalties); 
• Marksmanship test requirements (see recommendation 4.7.2.9); 
• Hunting regulations for conduct and ethics expected of sport hunters; 
• Regulations, procedures and penalties regarding wounded animals should be 
emphasized. 
4.7.1.3. Define all hunts and hunt characteristics for a lottery system; 
4.7.1.4. Define the minimum hunt characteristics as: 









Hunting bag (species, sex, number of animals); 
Hunting dates (to coincide with holidays and weekends); 
Hunt duration (in days); 
Hunt price (total fixed trophy prices, price per hunter per day); 
Number of hunters permitted per hunt (size of hunting party); 
Hunting camp assigned to the hunt; 
Hunting camp's location and facilities available (or lack thereof) in the hunting 
area ( eg. water, slaughtering facilities); 
Number of DNPWLM staff (trackers) to accompany each hunting party; 
4.7.1.5. Document and inform applicants explicitly, clearly, and comprehensively on each 
hunt ' s specific characteristics well in advance of the application deadline for the 
lottery draw; 
4.7.1.6. Allow applicants to choose their preferred pre-defined hunts, and respect these 
ranked hunt preferences in the lottery hunt allocation procedure; 
4.7.1.7. Realize the importance of the quota allocation to hunts (packaging) as being the 
single most critical function for planning a lottery licensing system for achieving 
efficiency and equality (see framework in Figure 2.3, page 23). 
4.7.1.8. Package the species' quotas into hunts during the planning stage of the licensing 
system to maximize the variety of hunting experiences supplied (within ecological 
resource and budget limitations of the DNPWLM). Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
should have a wide variety of hunt qualities, hunt prices, and hunt durations to 
choose from. 
Suggestions include: 
• Allocate species' quotas to hunting bags to offer a few, quality, hunts with a 
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Whilst packaging the species' quotas into hunts, differentiate strictly between 
trophy hunts (male trophy animals of all species) and non-trophy hunts (female 
and non-trophy bearing male animals) to increase variety and choice. 
Whilst packaging the species' quotas into hunts, differentiate strictly between 
big game hunts and plains game hunts. Shorten hunt durations for plains game 
hunts, to again increase variety and choice. 
Take account of sport hunter's hunting requirements (consumer orientation) and 
experience. Allocate necessary species as bait animals for cat hunts. Liaise with 
professional and amateur hunter associations. 
4.7.1.9. Calculate the cost of administering a lottery system to achieve equality of hunt 
allocation, and estimate the number of applicants. Set a nominal fee for each 
application to cover administrative and postage costs. The purpose of the 
application fee should be to cover costs, not to maximize revenue and earn a profit 
from the lottery system. (Market-priced auction systems maximize revenue more 
efficiently. See Chapter 5.) 
4.7.1.10. Address defaulting and lack of commitment by hunting applicants as a priority, 
because it is costly for all parties concerned. Ideally defaulting could be prevented 
by somehow allocating hunts only to those hunters who are serious about hunting 
and who will go and hunt. Thus ways to discriminate (differentiate) between 
individual applicants must be found that are acceptable. Criteria include: price 
(willingness to pay), time and effort (willingness to queue), financial commitment 
(application and upfront payment). For fix-priced lottery systems, suggestions to 
increase the hunt's value for hunters include: 
• First, allow applicants to personally choose and rank their most preferred hunts 
(eg. using a preference list). Preferences should then be considered using one 
of two available hunt preference allocation procedures (see conclusion 
4.5.2.14); 
• Second, require applicants to advance payment for the price of their first hunt 
preference when they apply, in order to qualify for the draw; 
• Third, the DNPWLM should, in turn, commit itself to refund all unsuccessful 
applicants in full within a short, specified time period, once the lottery draw 
results are made public. Undrawn applicants and the DNPWLM are then 
financially no worse off after, than they were before, the lottery. 
4.7.1.11. Increase the value of hunts for hunters (the opportunity cost of not going hunting). 
Applicants who apply and are allocated a hunt by the lottery system should stand 
to loose more by defaulting, than by going hunting; citizen hunter's commitment 
to go hunting is increased. To increase hunt value and quality of hunting requires 
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4.7.1.12. Consider implementing a raise in total hunt price (recommendation 4.7.1.11) using 
the following measures: 
• Charging higher trophy prices per species in the hunting bag (consumptive 
resource); 
• Charging every hunter and visitor a price per. person per day for entry and 
access to the protected area (non-consumptive resources); 
4.7.1.13. Consider implementing a quality improvement of the hunting experience for some, 








Upgrading facilities and services for hunting camps; 
Instituting a marksmanship test for all citizen hunters (see 
recommendation 4.7.2.9); 
Providing maps of the hunting areas; 
Enforcing more walking and stalking by hunters to limit driving during hunting 
trips; 
Limiting the practice of baiting for lion hunts . 
Documenting and communicating these improvements to all potential applicants 
(marketing function). 
4.7.1.14. Recognize that most recommendations to improve efficiency (and equality that 
follow) are designed to increase quality and price of the hunting trip: Most 
measures require a larger DNPWLM budget and more human resources to 
be allocated to the management of Charara/Makuti study area. A budget 
increase is considered by the author to be highly unlikely under current financial 
and institutional arrangements that apply to the DNPWLM, given Zimbabwe's 
current economic climate (see research assumptions in section 1.5, page 8). 
4.7.2. Recommendations for equitable hunt allocation by lottery 
As defined in this dissertation, the term equality includes all distributive notions of resource 
allocation amongst people, including: "equal opportunity", "equal access", "fair, or equitable 
lottery systems", or "a fair chance to win". For the DNPWLM to be "seen to be fair" during 
hunt allocation as a government agency serving the Zimbabwean public, licensing systems 
should be defined, allocation principles and rules operationalized and quantified, and 
documented. All this information on the licensing system should be made freely available to 
the public, especially the interested and affected citizen hunters. Administrators and decision-
makers should be open and accountable - that is answerable - to the public. 
Decision-makers may be guided by the objective criteria of probability and costs of 
administering the lottery system, but deciding on equality remains a subjective politi.cal choice 
taken by those with decision-making power in the DNPWLM and the Zimbabwe Government 
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Recognizing that the concept and implementation of equality is subjective, the following 
recommendations are based on the author's value system. They are proposed for debate and 
consideration by decision-makers in the DNPWLM, the agency responsible for defining 
equality and turning this concept from theory into practice, a vexatious task as aptly noted 
by Rae, et al., (1981): 1-7. 
4.7.2.1. To apply notions of "fairness", "equity", "equality" or "equal opportunity and 
access" to resource distribution using lottery systems, and recognizing the 
subjective and multi-faceted nature of these distributive notions (see Rae, et al., 









State the purpose of using such a concept, rather than using the hunter's 
willingness to pay; 
Define the concept of equality clearly. What is to be equal? (eg. Any Hunt, 
Next Hunt Preference, or First Hunt Preference). Which type of sport hunting 
should it apply to? (eg. to big game, plains game, trophy or non-trophy 
(venison) hunts?); For whom is it to be made equal? (For all applicants, that 
is licence holders, or for all hunters entering a hunting area, that is hunters and 
co-hunters); Where in Zimbabwe is it to be made equal? (eg. confined to state 
land and protected areas only: in one single big game hunting area, in more 
than one big game hunting area, or in all Zimbabwe's big game hunting areas 
within the system of protected areas). Rae, et al., (1981) show that many 
aspects, and consequently many definitions, of equalities are possible. 
Consider and specify why sport hunting for Zimbabwe citizens should 
necessarily take place on state land within Zimbabwe's protected area system, 
but not on other state land categories ( eg. state land in communal areas not 
managed by appropriate authorities, state land in protected forest areas, and 
state-owned commercial farm land). 
Specify the rule(s) that are to be applied; 
Specify whom the rule(s) are to include and whom they are to exclude; 
Implement the concept so that all persons have the same rules; 
Ensure that the rule(s) cannot be avoided by some persons to achieve a 
different benefit distribution for themselves to that originally intended by the 
objective; 
Consider the opportunity costs of using lotteries based on a concept of equality 
as compared to prices and market incentives for resource allocation. (see 
comparative study in Chapter 5.) 
4.7.2.2. Ranked lists of applicant's hunt preferences can be considered using one of two 
procedures documented in this dissertation: 
• An unequal, manual, unsophisticated and financially and administratively cheap 
procedure used by the ZHA lottery system for Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas 
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• An equal, fully computerized and centralized, sophisticated, and financially and 
administratively costly procedure used by the Wyoming lottery system (see 
review, section 3.3.1). 
Both procedures have benefits and costs. Both distribute hunts differently amongst 
applicants; different distribution patterns are defined as different equalities in this 
dissertation. 
4.7.2.3. Regarding the relative benefits of the hunt allocation equalities achieved by the 
procedures in recommendation 4. 7 .2.2: The Wyoming procedure allocates hunts 
amongst applicants who rank these hunts highest on their preference lists. The 
procedure increases these winner's commitment to go hunting. The ZHA 
procedure, by contrast, allocates hunts randomly amongst all applicants irrespective 
of their ranking of these hunts in the preference list. The procedure reduces these 
winner's commitment to go hunting.1 
4.7.2.4. Regarding the administrative costs of implementing both procedures in 
recommendation 4.7.2.2: The Wyoming procedure is complex and costly to 
administer. For efficient administration, the procedure relies on computerization of 
the licensing system, which is hardly warranted for the approximately 200 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters who applied to hunt in Charara/Makuti in 1991. This 
procedure must be centralized. It requires skilled staff, a computer programme and 
computer facilities. The Wyoming procedure is unsuited to being conducted in 
public for applicants, it is Jess open and its results are Jess accountable for 
administrators. The ZHA procedure is Jess complex and costly to administer. The 
procedure can be administered manually. It requires Jess skilled staff, but no 
computer. The ZHA procedure is suited for public entertainment, it is more open, 
and its results are more accountable for administrators. 
4.7.2.5. The decision of which hunt preference allocation procedure (in recommendation 
4. 7 .2.2) to choose depends on a number of issues: 
• Clarifying, debating and defining the policy and principles to be adopted for 
resource allocation by the DNPWLM for wildlife and protected areas in 
Zimbabwe (see recommendation 4.7.2.1); 
• 
• 
Clarifying, debating and defining the policy on citizen hunting for Zimbabwe's 
protected areas as well as for other land categories; 
Adopting a precise definition for equality of hunt allocation by the DNPWLM 
for citizen hunting in Zimbabwe's protected areas (see recommendation 
4.7.2.1). The allocation criterion for a licensing system may be the hunter's 
willingness to pay, or an equal probability of winning a specific hunt, but not 
a mixture of both (as exhibited by the DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti in 1991); 
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Defining the DNPWLM financial and human resources (budget) available to 
implement a policy citizen hunting in the Charara/Makuti (and Zimbabwe's 
protected area system); 
Clarifying the macroeconomic opportunity costs of principally using a lottery 
system, rather than alternative systems, to allocate scarce resources for hunting 
in Charara/Makuti study area (eg. the forgone revenue). (These macroeconomic 
opportunity costs are the topic of Chapter 5 following.) 
4.7.2.6. If decision-makers decide that equality of hunt allocation should be applied to 
Charara/Makuti, and that a lottery system with one application (ticket) per 
applicant should be used, under present rules some Zimbabwe citizens would still 
be able to hunt in Charara/Makuti who had not entered the lottery. The author 
recommends that in principle all hunters, rather than all applicants, should have 
equal probabilities of winning and accessing hunts in the Charara/Makuti study 
area. 





Applications for each hunt preference must identify all members of the hunting 
party; 
Each applicant in the party should be identified uniquely using the Zimbabwe 
national identification number. (Name, initials, and address alone are not 
unique, as this research using the DNPWLM ticket register has shown.) 
Rigorous control procedures must ensure: first, that no applicant can apply 
twice for the same hunt and preference1; second, that no applicant can apply 
twice for different hunts using the same hunt preference. 
Applicants should be informed of this rule, should it be implemented . 
The author, however, considers that the administrative, technical, personnel, and 
financial costs of achieving this type of equality would be very high (see 
recommendation 4.7.2.4). 
4.7.2.8. Lottery results should be communicated to applicants as in the Wyoming lottery 
system (see Chapter 3) to make lotteries more transparent for the public and all 
applicants. This information is vital for applicants and resource managers to make 
rational informed choices. The author recommends that all applicants - both 
winners and losers - of any lottery be documented with application data, and with 
statistics of the lottery draw results of the previous year. Such information could 
be included in the refund of the hunt price to unsuccessful applicants (see 
recommendation 4.7.1.10). 
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4.7.2.9. In not one of Zimbabwe's big game hunting areas are, at present, sport hunters 
(citizen hunters or safari hunters) tested for marksmanship. The author recommends 
that all sport hunters should undertake a marksmanship test every time they hunt 
immediately prior to entering the hunting area in order to qualify for their hunt. 
Hunters who fail the test, in the author ' s opinion, should forfeit their hunt and the 
full hunt price and not be allowed to hunt in protected areas. Applicants should be 
informed of this rule, and test qualifications should be drawn up and made public, 
should the recommendation be implemented. A marksmanship test in Zimbabwe 
would serve a number of purposes, that combined, promote efficient and equitable 
hunt allocation and use of the nation's arguably scarcest and most valuable wildlife 
resources in public areas: 





Improve shooting quality according to specified standards of marksmanship for 
all hunters; 
Minimize traumatizing and wounding of wild animals that may endanger 
human life ( eg. park visitors, neighbouring communities, park employees, 
hunters); 
Minimize costs for DNPWLM staff and hunters who must track, follow-up and 
report wounded animals to DNPWLM control offices; 
Prevent waste of valuable wildlife resources from the resource manager's point 
of view, and animal suffering from the species' point of view. 
4.7.2.10. To implement recommendation 4.7.2.9, the DNPWLM should design a marksman-
ship test that complies with accepted international standards and is locally 
applicable (see standards set for NPB lottery system in Chapter 3, footnote 1, 
page 106). The test should take place at the DNPWLM Marongora control office 
(for Makuti hunting area), or at the existing rifle range near Kariba aerodrome (for 
Charara hunting area) (see map of study area, Appendix 20, page A113); 
alternatively, the DNPWLM could authorize accredited rifle ranges or rifle 
associations with the necessary facilities. 
4.7.2.11. The macroeconomic opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system should be 
considered by decision-makers before any of the above recommendations m 
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4.8. Progression of the study 
All recommendations to improve efficiency and equality of hunt allocation for a lottery 
system impose financial costs on the DNPWLM who administers the lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti hunting areas. Whether these costs are justified at this microeconomic level 
of assessment to allocate valuable resources in Charara/Makuti is a question of policy and the 
political decision-making process, since the benefits of lottery systems are not priced or 
known. 
The more important question for policy and decision-makers in the DNPWLM, however, is 
how large, and how significant, the opportunity costs of forgoing revenue by pricing valuable 
resources at fixed, rather than at market, prices are at a macroeconomic level of assessment. 
The choice for decision-makers is thus: What allocation system can supply the greatest real 
conservation benefits to present and future generations from protected areas such as 
Charara/Makuti? Are efficient and equitable lottery systems the answer? Chapter 5 following 
now considers some opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system, by comparing it to 
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CHAPTERS 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ZIMBABWE'S LICENSING 
SYSTEMS: A MACROECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 
OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter established that at a microeconomic level, the DNPWLM lottery system 
allocated hunts inefficiently and inequitably. Causes were sought, and suggestions to improve 
the lottery allocation system were made. By limiting revenue, however, all lottery systems 
in addition incur other macroeconomic costs, especially if compared with revenue maximizing 
allocation systems based on market principles - such as the auction system. The purpose of 
this chapter is first, to see how well Zimbabwean licensing systems generate revenue and 
recreational opportunities and second, to establish the type and amounts of benefits foregone1 
by the DNPWLM lottery system in relation to other allocation systems. 
In this chapter, the five Zimbabwean licensing systems (see Table 5.1), reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 3, are compared. 
Table 5.1 Licensing system alternatives compared for Zimbabwe: 1991 
The systems refer to hunting resources in seven hunting areas, are administered by the 
government Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management (DNPWLM), the 
1 Known as "opportunity costs" in economics, or benefits that could have been earned by allocating resources 
differently. Here, care must be taken to distinguish between benefits that are foregone, and the actual costs of 
producing and distributing these benefits, which taken together would result in net-benefits or net-costs. The actual 
costs of producing (protecting. managing and researching) wildlife for sport hunting in Zimbabwe's protected areas 
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private Zimbabwe Hunters' Association (ZHA) through its local branches, and by a 
commercial safari operator. The alternatives supply sport hunting to citizens and to foreigners, 
and cover the whole range of sport hunting types defined for Zimbabwe in Chapter 1 (see 




Citizen hunting, offered by alternatives A to F; 
Citizen/safari hunting, offered by alternatives G and H; 
Safari hunting, offered by alternative I. 
Two pricing methods are used by alternatives A to I to value and allocate hunting. Lottery 
systems on the one hand value each hunt's animal quota at fixed prices set by government 
(alternatives A and B), or at fixed prices set by the ZHA (alternatives C, D, and E). The price 
values each hunt's consumptive resources (whilst non-consumptive resources remain 
unpriced). Lottery systems are thus referred to as fix-priced systems. Tender, auction, and 
commercial marketing systems on the other value each hunt at market prices determined by 
the hunters themselves according to their willingness to pay. Accordingly, these systems are 
referred to as market-priced systems. The market prices value the total hunt experience 
expected by the hunter (eg. alternatives F, G). In Zimbabwe, only commercial marketing 
systems (alternative I) price access time to hunting areas explicitly as a non-consumptive 
resource. As expected, hunting revenues differ greatly between market- and fix-priced 
systems. 
To allow revenues based on different resources (quantity and quality of species' quotas, 
access time) to be compared for different hunting areas and alternatives two economic 
indicators are used: A wildlife index measures wildlife quotas as the consumptive hunting 
resource, and hunter-days measures hunting time available to hunters as the non-consumptive 
hunting resource, for each alternative and hunting area respectively. Revenue measures the 
hunting benefits produced by alternative systems. 
In addition to direct hunting benefits, two Zimbabwean licensing systems (alternatives C and 
E) provides significant numbers of people with important non-hunting benefits. Three distinct 
user-groups benefit indirectly from hunting and access to Zimbabwe's protected areas: 
• Hunters: from hunting benefits and indirectly from the accompanying non-hunters; 
• 
• 
Non-hunting visitors who accompany a hunting party: indirectly from the hunting, 
and directly from non-hunting use of the area; 
School children and teachers: indirectly from the hunting revenue used to finance 
access and environmental education programmes. 
The benefits of conservation education for school groups in two hunting areas are a direct 
result of the ZHA's ability and commitment to invest hunting revenue in these activities. In 
this way, the alternatives C and E administered by the ZHA are a good example illustrating 
how important the institutional arrangements are for enabling revenue from profitable 
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conservation benefits (infrastructure and environmental education) for potentially unprofitable 
but socially beneficial activities (educational programmes) for other users (visitors, teachers, 
and school children). 
The benefits these various user-groups gain from using the sport hunting areas are 
qualitatively (eg. conservation education and hunting) and quantitatively different. The 
benefits are also based on different resources: Revenues, quotas, and access times. A "social" 
indicator was developed to allow these benefits to be compared between the various 
alternatives for different resource bases: Recreation-days per dollar measures the "visitor 
intensity" of the hunting revenue. Recreation-days is the time spent in the hunting area by 
each user-category (hunters, visitors who accompany hunters, school children and teachers). 
Hunting areas are seen here as multi-purpose resource areas, in accordance with their 
definition as Safari Areas (see section 2.4.2, page 46). 
Two objectives of resource allocation for each alternative and hunting area are proposed for 
the comparison: 
• Maximize total revenue earned from the hunting resources; 
• Maximize conservation benefits (hunting and non-hunting) for people from direct, 
personal, access to protected areas (hunting areas). 
Two preliminary remarks on the objectives are necessary. To maximize the total (gross) 
revenue from selling the hunting resources to hunters, the question of whom this hunting 
revenue accrues to is important for the analysis. There are additional direct benefits from 
hunting than those measured by revenue indicators due to foreign exchange earned from 
foreign safari hunters but not from Zimbabwe citizen hunters. There are also indirect benefits 
that are not measured by revenue indicators due to economic multiplier effects of foreign 
exchange revenue. The conservation and development implications of earning revenue under 
different institutional arrangements are the topic of the second objective, assessed in 
section 5.3 and interpreted in section 5.4 as the institutional dimensions of resource allocation. 
The indirect social benefits from hunting measured by the social indicator differ both in the 
type of benefit, and the persons that benefit. The indicator assesses (quantifies) people's 
benefits, but does not attempt to evaluate (price) the enjoyment experienced by different user 
groups (ie. foreign hunters, citizen hunters, visitors, school classes) for different activities (ie. 
hunting, recreation, educational value). The two associated problems of placing a monetary 
value on different individuals and different benefits, and then aggregating these individual 
values into a social value are avoided here (see Arrow, 1983; Rae, et al., 1981; Sinden and 
Worrell, 1979). Benefits are deemed to be valued personally by users who are willing to pay 
for them. Users thus benefit if they have access (priced access for hunters, and unpriced 
access for visitors and ·school groups). Recreational benefits thus depend on how hunting 
revenue is spent or distributed by institutional arrangements to benefit people directly. If, for 
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the form of employment, non-hunting visitors or educational benefits, no additional persons 
have access or benefits from this hunting revenue. The economic indicators of hunting 
revenue earned may be better for this example than for other systems, but the social indicator 
of recreation-days (the number of people who spend time in the hunting area) may well be 
lower for this example than for systems where hunting revenue can be invested to develop 
further access to conservation benefits, thereby giving more people than just hunters access 
to protected areas ( eg. through educational programmes). 
Both economic indicators assessing the first resource allocation objective of licensing systems 
are concerned with efficiency, that is with producing benefits from limited resources by 
allocating sport hunting. 
The social indicator assessing the second objective is concerned with equality, that is with 
investing and distributing revenue (from the first objective) to achieve visitor access and 
educational benefits. This objective is emphasized for Zimbabweans by the DNPWLM in 
wildlife, tourism and sport hunting policy guidelines1. Equality in this sense indicates how 
"user intensive" the hunting revenue was, and shows how many persons benefitted directly 
from every Zimbabwe dollar of hunting revenue earned by each alternative and hunting area. 
The comparative assessment in this chapter takes a macroeconomic viewpoint of resource 
allocation. It looks at benefits and benefit differences from the perspective of Zimbabwe's 
economy. (Chapter 4 took a microeconomic viewpoint.) The comparative assessment shows 
that there are significant differences between market-priced and fix-priced systems of 
allocating sport hunting resources. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 applies the two efficiency criteria, with 
revenue per wildlife index in section 5.2.1, and revenue per hunter-day in section 5.2.2. In 
these sections, revenue from foreign hunters in foreign currencies is valued in Zimbabwe 
dollars at official (fixed) exchange rates, but it noted that in so doing the Z$-value of hunting 
revenue is undervalued. In section 5.3 the equality criterion is applied to data to assess the 
institutional and social dimensions of resource allocation. The results are then interpreted 
graphically to highlight the trade-offs that exist (section 5.4) and to reveal the issues that 
decision-makers need to consider and address when choosing a particular allocation system. 
In section 5.5, an estimation of the market value of foreign currency to the Zimbabwe 
economy is made using information available since the recent liberalization of the foreign 
exchange system in Zimbabwe. The nature and extent of the value of foreign exchange is 
examined in the light of Zimbabwe's economic development priorities. In the final section 
1 For example, see: Zimbabwe Government (1992) [Policy for Wildlife 1.1.19921, sections 2.1.6; 2.3; 4.3; 4.4.1; 
4.4.4; 4.4.8. Zimbabwe Government (1990b) (draft Policy for Wild Life 22.9.1989), sections 8 vi); 11. Parks and 
Wild Life Act (1975) (Act 14 of 1975), section 26 (1) and (2) on the purpose of Safari Areas. Child and Heath 
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to this chapter, a summary of initial conclusions and recommendations based on insights from 
this chapter's comparative assessment alone is given. Key policy areas that require attention 
by decision-makers in the DNPWLM and government are highlighted. 
Each section is structured with: 
• Introduction to the analysis; 
• Data and methods; 
• Results; 
• Discussion of results; 
• Initial conclusions. 
Throughout this chapter, extensive reference is made to data included in appendices for 
readers to corroborate data and calculations, whilst minimizing detail in the text. 
5.1.1. Assumptions of the analysis 
The comparison of alternatives is based on certain assumptions that are built into the tables 
used to present the results in this chapter (Table 5.3, Table 5.4 and Table 5.6). The 
assumptions made are: 
5.1.1.1. That hunters (foreign and local), visitors, and school children all benefit equally 
as persons, because physical access quantifies benefits. Each day spent by one 
person from any user-group is not worth more, or less, than the same day spent by 
a different type of user. In particular, foreign hunters and Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
have equal weighting.1 
5.1.1.2. That revenue earned in foreign exchange currencies, when valued using the current 
controlled exchange rates valid at the time of research, grossly under-valued the 
importance of foreign exchange to Zimbabwe's economy. The distortion is 
quantified for the DNPWLM lottery system in section 5.5, page 213, with a 
market-valued foreign exchange rate. 
5.1.1.3. Every hunt had the full number of hunters possible in the hunting party. For 
example, it was assumed that all hunts offered by the ZHA had the maximum of 
four hunters (1 hunter and 3 co-hunters). Further research is needed to establish the 
actual numbers of hunters in each hunting party. 
5.1.1.4. Any visitor accompanying a hunting party spends on average only half the hunting 
period in each hunting area. Available data (Zimbabwe Government, 1988a; 
Zimbabwe Government, 1989a; Zimbabwe Government, 1990a) do not distinguish 
the average period spent per visitor; this figure was assumed by the author based 
on personal observation during a field trip, where visitors arrived and left during 
the course of the hunting period. Further research and validation of this assumption 
is needed. 
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5.1.2. Limitations of the analysis 
The analysis and results are limited, because the assessment does not attempt to place values 
on all the benefits from resource allocation, nor to determine the relative importance of 
benefits to different resource users (eg. hunting, visitor, and educational benefits). The total 
value of benefits is largely unknown for all systems where users (hunters, visitors, pupils) are 
charged non-market prices (eg. citizen hunters) or no price at all (eg. co-hunters, visitors, or 
pupils).1 Benefits to citizen hunters are assumed by the author to be greater than the fixed 
prices paid at present, in other words, it is assumed that Zimbabwe citizen hunters would be 
prepared to pay more than the present fixed price to go hunting. Just as fixed prices cannot 
reflect the value of benefits to consumers accurately, fixed prices do not reflect the actual 
costs of producing these benefits either. The benefit-cost equation at present does not have 
to be balanced for each activity (hunting, visitor access, education), for each hunting area, or 
for the conservation agency over the entire protected area system. The DNPWLM budget is 
a subsidy for all these activities. The subsidy is the extra cost of producing sustainable quotas 
and protected areas to enable sport hunting in the first place, but which the hunt price charged 
to sport hunters at present excludes. 
The assessment also does not consider the costs of supplying benefits in the comparative 
assessment. These costs would have to include not only the administrative costs of supplying 
citizen hunting, citizen/safari hunting or safari hunting, but should also include the full current 
costs of protecting, researching, administering, managing and developing the hunting areas 
as their rightful proportion of the DNPWLM budget for each protected area. Such a view is 
based on economic theory and current conservation practice in southern Africa (see McNeely, 
1988; Leibold, 1991; Magome, 1993). At the outset of this dissertation the author assumed 
that for conservation to be sustainable activity for present and future generations, protected 
areas must be managed according to ecological principles of sustainability and according to 
financial principles of sustainability (see study assumptions, section 1.5, page 8). This 
assumption means that an unbalanced budget effectively constitutes a subsidy to the 
DNPWLM for maintaining protected areas. The subsidy is an economic cost that Zimbabwe's 
population at large pays for those who use the resource. The assumption is justified by current 
moves in Africa and other parts of the world that where possible, conservation should pay 
its way. Government resources are limited particularly in the context of developing countries 
in Africa where demands made on them are already high and will increase in the foreseeable 
1 Environmental Impact Assessment procedures use a wide variety of methods in an attempt to assess (measure 
and quantify) costs and benefits of actions or policies. Decision-makers use this information to evaluate the 
significance of costs and benefits, that is they place values on them and attempt to determine a net value. The net 
value may be positive, in which case the action of policy is beneficial, or negative, in which case it is harmful if 
executed. This approach is based on expert decision-makers deciding with best-known methods and information on 
behalf of other persons. Economic theory is based on an opposing world-view, namely that which accords individual 
persons sovereignty in making economic decisions for themselves. Economic theory does not assume that all 
information is available, nor that this information is free - as the world-view of informed decision-making underlying 
the impact assessment procedures do. Until the full price based on full costs of maintaining protected areas and 
supplying their benefits is charged to those that use them, a socially representative value of the benefits and costs, 
and the assessment of their net positive of negative value, is not possible. The comparative method should be treated 
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future due to the sustained, exponential, population growth rates. (Over half Zimbabwe's 
population of 10.4 million persons in 1992 was under the age of 20. The annual population 
growth rate is 3.1 percent.) 
Thus, the main limitation is that this chapter assesses partially quantified benefits, and does 
not subtract any costs of providing benefits. Gross benefits, rather than net benefits, are 
quantified. 
The costs of providing all benefits are largely unquantified to date, and are borne by various 
people and organisations in different ways. At present, costs (mostly) accrue to the 
DNPWLM, but some are also borne by safari operators as lessees of hunting areas, by the 
ZHA and members of this association who provide educational and other services in their 
own time free of charge. Due to severe under-funding of the DNPWLM and increasing 
demands made on the existing budget to protect endangered species ( eg. black rhinoceros and 
elephant) in the Zambezi valley hunting areas (including the Charara/Makuti study area) from 
poaching activity at the present time, society is arguably also bearing the unknown cost of 
insufficient management and control. Under-funding has also caused other unquantified costs 
for the agency: the Joss of qualified staff, the lack of quality personalized tourist services, 
insufficient maintenance and development of infrastructure. 
5.2. Economic costs of resource allocation 
This section compares how efficiently licensing systems can generate hunting revenue, taking 
two hunting resources as the basis for efficiency calculation. It demonstrates the dichotomy 
between market-priced systems based on economic incentives and market principles ( eg. 
auctions) and fix-priced systems based on political/administrative principles and probability 
(eg. lotteries) for resource allocation. 
Revenue efficiency is first defined as the gross hunting revenue each system generates based 
on the quota of wildlife species (section 5.2.1). The wildlife index was used to overcome the 
problem of invalidly comparing hunting revenues obtained from different sport hunting quotas 
(due to different numbers and species of wildlife) in the various hunting areas amongst each 
other. 
Revenue efficiency is secondly defined as the gross hunting revenue each system generates 
based on the total number of hunter-days supplied during the entire hunting season in each 
hunting area (section 5.2.2). The criterion represents the gross revenue earned for each day 
a hunter is allocated in the hunting resource area. The measure may be compared to the daily 
rate a tour operator charges clients (eg. for a canoeing trip), or to the fee the DNPWLM 
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5.2.1. Efficiency criterion: Gross revenue earned per wildlife index 
The concept of measuring the efficiency of hunting revenue using a wildlife index is taken 
from Child, B., (1988). Its purpose is to standardize mixed hunting bags of trophy and non-
trophy species. Berry (1986) used an ecologically adjusted index to equate different types of 
wildlife production systems to compare the efficiency of trophy hunting, non-trophy (venison) 
hunting and meat production. 
5.2.1.1. Definition 
Revenue efficiency is defined as the total gross hunting revenue (in 1991 Z$) earned per 
hunting area and licensing system, divided by the index value of the available wildlife quota. 
5.2.1.2. Understanding the wildlife index 
For rational decisions to be made by resource managers and hunters on wildlife for hunting, 
resource managers need a basis on which to assess effici.ency, whilst hunters need detailed 
information on each hunt ' s characteristics to evaluate which combination is more valuable 
to them based on their personal preferences. 
African wildlife in Zimbabwe has traditionally been hunted as a hunting bag of mixed species 
for a set number of hunting days. Species of wildlife include big game trophy animals that 
act as draw cards for hunters, as well as other species of plains game to complement the 
hunting bag. If efficiency of earning revenue is to be measured in terms of the total number 
of animals on quota as a factor limiting revenue in each hunting area, then total revenue per 
animal is neither comparable for hunting bags with different species, numbers, and sexes of 
animals, between different hunting areas, nor is it consequently comparable between different 
licensing systems. 
Resource managers using the Wyoming single licence draw system in America do not 
encounter this problem of comparison, because this system allocates hunts using one licence 
for each animal and species.1 Consequently, the total deer hunting revenue, for example, can 
be divided meaningfully by the total number of deer hunter-days, to obtain the average 
revenue per deer hunter per hunter-day (Crowe, 1987: 37-44). 
The practical problem of comparison for resource managers of African wildlife can be 
illustrated using an analogy of two vendors selling fruit at a market. The first vendor elects 
to sell each species of fruit separately (Wyoming system) and sets a price per kilogramme 
for her apples, pears and oranges, for example. The second vendor decides to sell only 
baskets of mixed species of fruit (African system), and sets a price for her mixed fruit baskets 
which all contain different numbers of apples, pears, and oranges. The first vendor has no 
problem setting her prices for each species of fruit efficiently. She can compare her fruit 
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prices per kilogramme directly with those of other vendors selling the same type of fruit. By 
buying each fruit separately, this vendor's customers can likewise compare her prices per 
kilogramme with those of other vendors. The second vendor who sells fruit baskets, however, 
does have a problem setting her prices efficiently for the fruit baskets if she does not know 
the price per kilogramme for each type of fruit in her _ baskets ( or the cost of each per 
kilogramme), or what each individual fruit basket is worth to her customers. Without this 
information, the second vendor and her discerning customers have no comparable basis with 
which to assess the prices of the mixed fruit baskets. 
The difficulty the second vendor has in the above analogy applies to resource managers (the 
vendors) analyzing sport hunting in the context of African wildlife resources. Data and the 
index method that are used to _resolve the problem, and equate different quotas for each 
licensing system, are now described. 
5.2.1.3. Data and methods 
All citizen hunters require a hunting licence to hunt in Zimbabwe's protected areas.1 The 
licence records the hunting bag (number, species and sex of the animals) and the price paid 
by the hunter in Zimbabwe dollars. The licences were obtained from the licensing offices of 
the DNPWLM in Harare, Marongora and Kariba, and from ZHA branches in Harare and 
Mhangura. The data for 1991 was entered and analyzed using a spreadsheet programme, with 
different systems being differentiated. 
Hunting revenue was calculated as the quota for each hunting area valued at fixed or market 
prices, depending on the allocation system. Revenue from foreign hunters in foreign exchange 
currencies (alternatives G, Hand I) is valued at official fixed exchange rates valid at the time 
of research (31.5.1991). These are taken from data published by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe (1991). Hunting revenues for each licensing system and hunting area are in 
Appendices 7.1, page A49 to Appendix 7.7.4, page A75. The revenue for the DNPWLM 
lottery system (alternatives A and B) includes ticket revenue (all priced tickets purchased by 
applicants to participate in the lottery) and the value of the quota at fixed prices, detailed 
separately in Appendix 14, page A104. Total ticket revenue (Z$43'060) was apportioned 
according to the ratio of hunts in these hunting areas, that is 40:60, respectively. 
An index value of the wildlife on quota was calculated to allow hunting bags of mixed trophy 
and non-trophy species to be compared. The 1991 trophy prices for foreign hunters set by 
the government schedule (see Appendix 8, page A 77)2 were used as an indicator of each 
animal's relative value in the quota. Each species in the quota was then valued, and the index 
totalled for wildlife species grouped in five trophy categories: Big game, big plains game, 
1 Parks and Wild Life Act, section 29 (a) (ii), and section 30 (a) (i). 
2 The reader is alerted to the fact that the trophy fee schedule distinguishes between prices for sport hunts sold to 
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small plains game, big other game and other game. The index is from that described by 
Martin (Zimbabwe Government [1991]). Individual species included in each category 
accompany the government trophy price schedule (see Appendix 14, page A104). 
Table 5.2 shows the total indices calculated for each hunting area, differentiated according 
to five animal categories to indicate how each hunting area's quota composition differs. 
Table 5.2 Indices of wildlife for quotas for licensing system alternatives: 1991 
Source: Index values for each licensing system according to hunting area in Appendix 9.1 (page A79) to 
Appendix 9.7.2 (page AlOl). For species included for each index category, see Appendix 14, page A104. 
With this method, the index value of a trophy bull elephant is 7' 500, a trophy buffalo 1 '000, 
and that of a guinea fowl 5, for example. Thus a fictive hunting bag containing a trophy 
elephant (7'500), a trophy buffalo (1 '000) and ten guinea fowl (50) has a total wildlife index 
value of 8'550. 
To obtain the ratio of revenue efficiency per wildlife index, total gross hunting revenue was 
divided by the total wildlife index value on quota, for each hunting area and allocation 
system. For example, assuming that our fictive hunt sold for Z$17'100, then the gross revenue 
per wildlife index calculated according to the criterion is: Z$17'100 divided by 8'550, or 2.0. 
If this hunt were sold for less, say Z$12'000, the index of revenue efficiency would be 1.4, 
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5.2.1.4. Results 
A comparison of the revenue efficiency of alternative licensing systems, derived by using the 
above method, is given in Table 5.3, page 184. Pertinent results are highlighted in bold in the 
last line of the table. Gross revenue per wildlife index differs between lottery systems, auction 
systems, and safari operator marketing systems, by several orders of magnitude. 





All lottery systems (alternatives A, B, C, D, and E) that allocate big game to 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters have a revenue efficiency of about 1.0 per wildlife 
index, which is far lower than the corresponding revenue efficiency of auction 
and commercial marketing systems. 
The efficiency of auction systems (alternatives G and H) that allocate big game 
to citizen and safari hunters is about five times, and that of the commercial 
marketing system (alternative I) is about seven times, that of lottery systems. 
(This result is based on fixed exchange rate values for foreign exchange 
currencies, not their market exchange rate values.) 
The DNPWLM lottery system (alternatives A and B) allocates hunting 
resources in the Charara/Makuti study area to citizen hunters less efficiently 
than does the ZHA lottery systems ( alternatives C and E). It is important to 
note, however, that a total of Z$43'060, or almost one fifth of all hunting 
revenue earned by the DNPWLM lottery system, stems from ticket revenue and 
is due to the system's inequitable hunt allocation procedure (see section 4.3, 
page 141). The procedure allowed applicants to maximize their probability of 
winning an option to hunt by purchasing unlimited numbers of priced tickets, 
and thereby maximized ticket revenue1 for the DNPWLM. 
The auction system (alternatives G and H) appears to be more efficient than the 
tender system (alternative F). However care must be taken with this 
interpretation. As the wildlife indices in Table 5.2 indicate, the tender system 
only sold bags of plains game consisting solely of impala which are less valued 
by sport hunters, whilst the remaining systems sold mixed bags with large 
proportions (60% or greater) of big game species (ie. hunts with trophy 
elephant, buffalo, lion and leopard) and other rarer antelope species (ie. sable, 
waterbuck, nyala). These are the species most valued by sport hunters. 
1 Readers should note that although total ticket revenue may be maximized, the DNPWLM lottery system does not 
maximize total revenue because fixed prices were paid for all animals. An auction system would maximize total 
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The DNPWLM tender system (alternative F) achieved a market pnce for 
impala that is about three times that set by the government foreign hunters for 
impala in the 1991 schedule (see Appendix 8, page A 77). 
The safari operator marketing system (alternative I), with a revenue efficiency 
of about 7.0 appears to be more efficient than the DNPWLM auction system 
(alternatives G and H) at allocating big game hunts of a similar quota 
composition (see Table 5.2) with revenue efficiencies of about 5.0. Care should 
be taken with this result because it refers to gross revenue, not net revenue 
(gross revenue minus costs of supplying the hunting services) for the 
DNPWLM and the safari operator, due to this chapter's macroeconomic 
perspective. Secondly, gross revenue for the auction system is based on what 
the DNPWLM as the landholding agency earned from selling the resources, but 
excludes gross revenue earned by Zimbabwe safari operators and agents who 
bought auction hunts for resale to foreign hunters. Thirdly, the results are based 
on fixed exchange rate values for foreign currencies, not on their market 
exchange rate values. (A market value for foreign exchange is estimated later 
in this chapter, see section 5.5, page 213.) 
The safari operator marketing system appears to earn more for Zimbabwe by 
commercially marketing the Charara/Makuti sport hunting quota than any other 
allocation system. Reasons for this result (eg. the safari operator adds value to 
the quota with personal services), as well as implications of foreign exchange 
earnings and their economic multiplier effects for Zimbabwe are discussed in 
section 5.5, page 213. 
5.2.1.5. Discussion of results 
• Competition, valuation and pricing of hunt characteristics 
Market-priced allocation systems based on competition and willingness to pay maximum 
prices for hunting undoubtedly achieve the highest revenue efficiency per wildlife index over 
fix-priced lottery allocation systems which currently allocate citizen hunting in Zimbabwe. 
The results presented in Table 5.3 are in no way unexpected, however, since high returns 
from safari hunting as a land-use are well known and documented (Child, B., 1988; 
Bigalke, 1986; Cumming, 1988; Anderson, n.d.). Safari operators not only attempt to achieve 
the highest selling price for a hunt. Being commercially oriented, they also minimize and 
cover their costs to maximize the net-value of their safari hunting business. Also, the purpose 
of auctions is to achieve the highest prices possible for the seller. Conversely, the purpose of 
lottery systems is to give persons equal access based on their unwillingness to pay market 
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Fix-priced lottery systems and market-priced tender, auction and safari marketing systems also 
value different hunting resources. Zimbabwe's lottery systems value only the consumptive 
hunting resource. Fixed trophy prices value each species in the hunting bag (the consumptive 
resource). Access time (the non-consumptive resource) and other characteristics associated 
with individual hunts remain unpriced by Zimbabwe's lottery allocation systems (alternatives 
A, B, C, D, and E). Tender and auction systems allow hunters to value and determine the 
market price of all resources associated with the hunt. In competition with other hunters, the 
hunt price and value is the maximum that the last hunter is willing to pay. Hunts are priced 
at their margin. Safari operators value the hunt differently to auctions. Although a safari 
operator's hunt prices are also competitive market prices, they are not the highest possible 
from all international clients. A safari operator's hunt price is lower than the marginal hunt 
price, being limited by his reputation, the cost structure of his commercial safari hunting 
business, any local and international competition from safari hunters, and by the services he 
offers the foreign hunter in addition to the actual hunting bag ( eg. professional hunting or 
taxidermy and shipment services). 
• Influence of quota composition on results 
Does quota composition (type of species and their relative proportions in the hunting area) 
affect the prices achieved and the results? From Table 5.2, the quota compositions for all 
licensing systems ( except for the DNPWLM tender system in alternative F) appear to be 
similar. Nevertheless, although the safari operator marketing system (alternative I) has a 
smaller total wildlife index than those calculated for the DNPWLM auction systems, the 
DNPWLM lottery system, and the ZHA lottery system (alternatives C and E), the safari 
operator still achieves the highest gross revenue. 
The following factors can increase a safari operator's revenue: 




The additional services offered to foreign hunters which "add value" to the wildlife 
quota, such a professional hunting services, transport; 
Charging foreign hunters for each day's hunting sold as part of the package - and 
not just for the trophy species the hunter shoots (kills or wounds). 
The slightly higher proportion of big game to plains game species for the safari 
operator marketing system (80%) compared to other alternatives ( 60-80%) suggest 
that the quota composition, that is the relationship between numbers and types of 
big game and plains game species, is decisive for the value achieved. 
• Influence of market participants on competition and results 
Foreign hunters and Zimbabwe safari operators acting as agents for foreign hunters who pay 
for hunting at the DNPWLM auction in foreign currency, but bid in Zimbabwe dollars, have 
greater purchasing power than Zimbabwe citizen hunters. Their participation at the auction 
helps to drive up prices at the auction. The DNPWLM auction is not competitive, however, 










Chapter 5: Comparative study and macroeconomic assessment 187 
two hunts for foreign hunters; bureaucratic regulations for auction participants to register with 
the DNPWLM as bidders are considerable, and costly to administer (ABC Auctions, 1991). 
Such regulations limit competition and prevent safari operators and the auction system from 
earning maximum gross revenue per index unit of wildlife they could sell, if they could sell 
more than two hunts to foreign hunters. 
With the participation of foreign hunters (or their Zimbabwean agents) at the DNPWLM 
auction, this system generated between 70 and 80% of total revenue in foreign exchange 
currencies (see Appendix 7.7.2, page A69), whereas the allocation of similar quotas 
exclusively to Zimbabwe citizen hunters earns no foreign exchange currency for the 
Zimbabwe economy. The safari operator marketing system earns all revenue in foreign 
exchange, but the hunting area is only leased to a single operator which limits competition 
and the number of operators who have access to big game in the safari hunting industry. Big 
game is a limiting resource for safari operators to earn maximum revenue and to become 
commercially viable. 
Foreign exchange revenue is of vital importance to the Zimbabwean economy for two 
reasons: Due to its scarcity value for productive sectors of the economy; and due to its 
multiplier effects for economic activity, job creation, and its consequent stimulus to earn 
more foreign exchange by increasing exported goods nd services. Foreign exchange earnings 
are a national development priority of the Zimbabwe Government (Zimbabwe Government, 
1991b; Zimbabwe Government, 1990c) in terms restructuring the economy, reducing the 
country's foreign debt, and promoting financially sustainable development (without aid 
grants). (The scarcity value and multiplier effects of foreign exchange compared to Zimbabwe 
dollar revenue are quantified in section 5.5, page 213; at this point, their importance is merely 
noted.) 
• Relevance of financial institutional arrangements on results 
From a macroeconomic perspective, the question of which system is most beneficial for the 
DNPWLM as the landholder, or for the state as the (present) receiver of revenue, is 
considered to be a question of second order, which cannot be discussed with data presented 
in Table 5.3, page 184 alone. The costs of protecting and managing the wildlife in protected 
areas would have to be known, and management services rendered by the ZHA, the safari 
operators and the DNPWLM would have to be priced. These tasks were beyond scope of this 
report. The institutional effects on resource allocation and secondary conservation and 
development benefits are discussed in section 5.4, page 208. 
• Effect on results of an equal hunt probability for the DNPWLM lottery system 
If the recommendations to equalize the probability of winning a hunt by all applicants for the 
DNPWLM lottery system (section 4.7.1, page 163) were adopted, what would be the effect 
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By limiting each applicant and hunting party to one ticket, the DNPWLM lottery system 
would earn a ticket revenue of 2$4'0001 instead of 2$43'060. Total gross revenue from 
hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area would be reduced by about 2$40'000. Less gross 
hunting revenue means that the revenue efficiency calculated for this system would be 
reduced from about 1.0 to 0.70 per wildlife index. Therefore, with an equalized hunt 
allocation, the DNPWLM lottery system would be the least efficient of all alternatives 
shown in Table 5.3, page 184. An equal DNPWLM lottery allocation system's revenue 
efficiency per wildlife index for the equal DNPWLM lottery system (about 0.7) would be ten 
times lower than that (about 7.0) for a safari operator marketing system. The difference 
represents a significant and relevant economic opportunity cost for decision-makers in the 
DNPWLM to consider, before a new lottery system aiming to be "fair", or give citizen 
hunters "equal access to hunting", is adopted for the Charara/Makuti study area. 
• Flexibility of auction system for market participants and the DNPWLM 
For safari operators in Zimbabwe big game trophy quotas are the scarcest resource that limit 
revenue (Child, B., 1988). This scarcity increases competition amongst safari operators for 
access to hunting areas with big game quotas. Such areas are allocated by the DNPWLM as 
exclusive hunting concession to single operators. This allocation method reduces the number 
of market participants and therefore market forces in the safari hunting industry. This fact was 
not pointed out by a major consultancy report2 submitted to the DNPWLM, but it is critical 
to achieve a market-orientated resource allocation, because it relates to market structure, 
flexibility and competitiveness. Safari operators through the association representing the 
industry has indicated that more big game resources are required, and the DNPWLM is under 
pressure to renew lease agreements more often and to allocate hunting concession areas using 
criteria other than the highest price in order to allow new participants to enter the .market (see 
Price Waterhouse, 1992b: Volume 4: 52-57). Such pressure is understandable, but counter to 
market principles and earning maximum benefits from scarce resources based on price and 
competition. By applying the DNPWLM auction system to the Nyakasanga and Sapi hunting 
areas, more participants are able to access big game resources under market conditions than 
would occur if the same areas were allocated as exclusive hunting concessions to a single ( or 
a number of) safari operators. The above mentioned report, does not recognize this essential 
difference in market structure and the advantage of the auction system per se over allocating 
hunting areas and big game resources as single concession areas. 
Contrary to this author's view, the Price Waterhouse report suggests that the DNPWLM 
auction system should be discontinued for Nyakasanga and Sapi hunting areas, and one 
hunting area should be allocated as an exclusive hunting concession area, and the other to 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters. How the resource allocation should be achieved is not stated. 
1 With approximately 200 applicants in 1991 , at 2$20 per ticket. 
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It should also be noted that the DNPWLM does not, at present, allocate all the hunting 
resources associated with exclusive safari hunting concession areas in accordance with 
competitive market principles. Although participants tender competitively for concession areas 
with known hunting quotas for lease periods of up to five years (the non-consumptive hunting 
resource), the consumptive big game hunting quota is sold at government controlled fixed 
trophy prices per species to safari operators. Safari operators only pay the trophy price for 
the shot quota (animals killed or wounded); unshot animals on quota are not paid for, and 
represent an economic opportunity cost, providing the quota could have been marketed at all. 
Unshot quotas also represent an ecological opportunity cost if these numbers are allowed to 
increase, since with time such populations will have to be reduced by culling or live capture 
or by natural causes. 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters have also indicated that big game hunts are extremely limited, as 
reported by Price Waterhouse: Volume 4 (1992b): 49-50 and Grobbelaar (personal 
communication). The ZHA would be interested in additional state land reserved exclusively 
for allocation to citizens. At present, such a choice appears to be an either-or-decision, and 
at present is taken administratively at a policy-level by the DNPWLM: An entire hunting area 
is allocated either to a safari operator as an exclusive hunting concession for foreign clients, 
or as an exclusive hunting area to Zimbabwe citizen hunters. 
The DNPWLM auction system is the only alternative that allows the market forces and 
market prices to determine what proportion of hunting resources are "allocated" to foreign 
hunters and citizen hunters respectively. In 1991, 70-80% of total hunting revenue earned by 
the DNPWLM auction systems from Nyakasanga/Sapi hunting resources was earned from 
foreign hunters in foreign exchange, while the remaining 20-30% was earned from Zimbabwe 
citizen hunters in Zimbabwe dollars. If Zimbabwe citizen hunters do not purchase a hunt 
"because the foreigner outbid me", then in economic terms, there is an opportunity cost 
associated with enforcing an allocation other than the one the auction produces by market 
forces. These opportunity costs consist of forgone foreign exchange revenue and economic 
multiplier effects (see the results of the market-valued foreign exchange rate in section 5.5, 
page 213). 
An advantage of the auction system over the exclusive lease option, is that if one safari 
operator is given an exclusive hunting and access rights to a particular area, there are fewer 
market participants and competition is not enhanced. 
• Influence of fixed exchange rates on value of hunting revenue 
As pointed out in this chapter's assumptions, the exchange rates used in Table 5.3 are 
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• Safari operator revenue is not a maximum 
The estimated amount of 2$865'000 as gross safari operator revenue does not include 
additional revenue that could achieve by the safari operator, if he sold the remaining animals 
on quota for the Charara/Makuti hunting areas, nor does it include additional revenue 
obtainable from combining the predominantly big game buffalo quota in Charara/Makuti with 
additional plains game on private or other land in Zimbabwe which increases the quota's 
market value. Such opportunities do exist for increasing the safari operator revenue which is 
based on a packaging only the Charara/Makuti quota into a number quality big game trophy 
hunts (see Appendix 16, page A109). 
5.2.1.6. Initial conclusions 






In terms of gross revenue relative to an index value of the wildlife quota, the 
efficiency of lotteries, auctions and commercial marketing allocation systems 
can be summarized as follows: 
Licensing System Relative 
Lotteries • 1.0 
Auctions • 5.0 
Commercial Marketing • 7.0 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters are heavily subsidized in relation to market prices, 
by a factor of between 5 and 7, with foreign exchange revenue valued at fixed 
exchange rates. 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters are probably subsidized by a factor of greater than 7 
if foreign currency revenue is valued at market exchange rates. (Foreign 
exchange is valued at market rates in section 5.5, page 213.) 
In relation to the present allocation system, the subsidy of citizen hunters in 
Charara/Makuti would be exacerbated if the DNPWLM adopted a lottery 
system aimed at equalizing hunt allocation in accordance with the 
recommendations made in Chapter 4 (1 ticket per person). Revenue would 
decrease by at about 2$40'000, per year. Zimbabwe citizen hunters would then 
be subsidized by a factor of 10, in relation to market prices, with foreign 
exchange valued at fixed exchange rates. 
The present policy of allocating Charara/Makuti 's sport hunting resources to 
citizen hunters represents an initial amount of about Z$865'000 in foreign 
exchange (valued at fixed exchange rates) that is lost. Additional losses include 











Chapter 5: Comparati,,e study and macroeconomic assessmenJ, 191 
services such as air fares, hotels, taxidermy and shipping services, and 
unquantified losses of economic activity from multiplier effects for Zimbabwe, 
such as jobs, income and sales tax revenue to the Zimbabwe Government. 
The DNPWLM tender system supplies citizen hunters with plains game hunting 
that is three times ($175) the government controlled price set for impala (Z$50-
75) for foreign hunters. 
Based on these conclusions alone, the policy question to be addressed by decision-makers in 
the DNPWLM and Zimbabwe Government can be formulated economically: Are the benefits 
of allocating big game hunting in Charara/Makuti exclusively to citizen hunters worth, at the 
very minimum, Z$865'000 in foregone foreign exchange revenue? 
5.2.2. Efficiency criterion: Gross revenue earned per hunter-day 
The purpose of this section is to assess the revenue efficiency of each alternative in terms 
of the resource of the time available to hunters in the hunting area. Sport hunting is seen as 
only one of many ways of using the wilderness qualities of Zimbabwe's protected areas 
during any year. If access time (standardized using hunter-days) rather than the trophy quota 
(standardized using the wildlife index in the previous section) is used as a basis for 
comparison, how efficient are the alternative systems at allocating hunting? Does the gross 
revenue earned from every hunter for every day he has access and hunting rights to the 
hunting area match the gross revenue that a safari operator could earn per person per day (the 
daily rate charged per tourist) for non-hunting tourist activities in otherwise similar natural 
resource areas? 
5.2.2.1. Definition 
Efficiency per hunter-day is defined as the total gross hunting revenue (in 1991 Z$) earned 
per hunting area and licensing system, divided by the number of hunter-days available to 
hunters. 
Hunter-days standardize different numbers of hunts per hunting area and wildlife quota, each 
with varying numbers of hunters per hunt (2 or 4 hunters), varying hunt durations (ranging 
from 6-12 days for citizen hunting, and 10-14 days for citizen/safari hunting, and extending 
to 21 days for safari hunting). Child, B., (1988) uses the concept of efficiency per hunter-day 
in his analysis of Zimbabwe's safari hunting industry. A similar concept is used by resource 
managers to plan the Wyoming lottery system (Crowe, 1987). 
If, for example, the gross revenue efficiency of an allocation system should be calculated as 
Z$100 per hunter-day, what does this figure mean? This figure would be the daily rate paid 
by the hunter for the privileges of accessing and hunting - the total value charged by resource 
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consumptive value of the hunt) and the recreational benefits (the non-consumptive value of 
the hunt). 
5.2.2.2. Understanding the criterion 
Hunting revenue is related to access time as the second important scarce resource that is part 
of every hunt, although the resource has not been treated by decision-makers as an economic 
(ie. scarce) on for Zimbabwe's licensing systems to date. Access time is not explicitly priced 
for sport hunting in Zimbabwe (except by safari operators), so that access to protected areas 
has tended to be under-valued, and thus under-priced. This situation has been known for some 
time, and is documented for the aspect of tourism by Child and Heath (1990) in their article 
"Underselling National Parks in Zimbabwe". Price Waterhouse, (1992b): Volume 2: 5, cite 
a cost comparison of entry fees to Zimbabwe's protected areas with those of other African 
countries, confirming that in Zimbabwe access is the cheapest.1 Why is access time in 
protected areas a scarce resource, and why should access time be priced explicitly for sport 
hunting? 
"A hunt" thus gives hunters the right to actually use two resources at once: 
• First, the right to access the hunting area for a specific period of time (the non-
consumptive resource); 
• Second, the right to hunt a defined hunting bag of animals (the consumptive 
resource). 
The hunter's right to use both these resources also benefits the members of his hunting party. 
With the DNPWLM allowing up to thirty persons in the hunting camp at any point in time 
(Zvinongoza, personal communication), significant numbers of non-hunters do actually 
accompany hunters on their hunting trip for a holiday (see non-hunting members of the ZHA, 
Table 3.7, page 80). Part of the recreational value (for the hunter) of a hunting trip is due to 
the fact that family and friends can share in, and benefit from, the access time a hunter 
purchases as part of his hunt. 
Readers should note, that the issue is not whether hunters actually pay a price for access time, 
or whether hunters personally explicitly value the time period they purchase as part of their 
hunt, or indeed whether hunters perceive the hunt price to be for the time period, the trophy, 
or the venison. Revenue per hunter per day concerns the opportunity cost of using the 
hunting season and the hunting area for sport hunting, rather than for any other 
activity. 
The scarcity and economic value of total access time spent hunters on hunting trips can be 
understood in a number of ways. With the hunting season divided into a number of hunts 
with fixed hunting periods, the DNPWLM allocates 2 days between each hunt, termed slack 
I In Z$ for four adults per car, entry c~ts are: Botswana 104; Tanzania 90; Kenya 34; South Africa 24; Malawi 7; 
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time. For any given hunting season and given species' quotas, this allotment of the hunting 
season means that: 
• With longer hunt durations per hunt, fewer hunts and consequently fewer hunters 
• 
can access the hunting area per season; 
With shorter hunt durations per hunt, more hunts can be supplied to more hunters 
per season, but proportionately more time is spent unproductively between the 
hunts (total slack time); 
• With shorter hunt durations per hunt, more hunting parties and more hunters will 
enter the hunting area at any one time, increasing hunting pressure and the 
possibility of shooting accidents; the maximal hunter density (eg. hunters per km2), 
and consequently maximal number of hunter-days per hunting area and hunting 






With more, shorter, hunts in any hunting area and season, the tum-around rate 
(number of hunting parties per hunting camp during the season) is higher, which 
increases the DNPWLM personnel required to accompany each hunting party in 
the hunting area. Due to severe DNPWLM budget constraints, available personnel 
on the ground in hunting areas (trackers or game scouts) are a key limitation for 
providing hunting opportunities in a hunting area .. 
During the time DNPWLM personnel accompany and control sport hunters, these 
trackers and game scouts are not available for other duties during the 
hunting period, particularly for anti-poaching patrols to protect endangered 
species (eg. black rhinoceros and elephant) in protected areas. Financial and 
human resources for protection are stretched to the limit, and thus compete directly 
with DNPWLM personnel made available to accompany hunting parties for citizen 
or safari hunting. 1 
The alternative to using a hunting area for sport hunting activities during the 
hunting season (climatically, the most attractive time to visit the Zambezi valley), 
is to use it for recreational activities. In this case a safari operator and the 
DNPWLM would limit the use to a carrying capacity of X persons per day in any 
area. The opportunity cost of using the hunting season then the difference in 
economic value between revenue from non-hunting and hunting options in that 
area. 
Finally, gross revenue per hunter-day can also be seen from the hunter's 
perspective as his cost of purchasing the hunt for the hunting benefit, per day. This 
cost represents each hunter's daily budget for the hunt ( excluding the cost of 
transport, food, and ammunition). 
1 During the field trip to the Charara/Makuti study area in August 1991. DNPWLM Wardens (park managers) for 
these areas at Kariba and Marongora emphasized that at that time. they could not offer additional hunts or guided 
hiking trails in these areas because protection of endangered species had priority (Gapara and Zvinongoza, personal 
communications). The threat to endangered species in the entire Zambezi Valley protected areas has increased, 
reducing the population of black rhinoceroses to critically low levels in Zimbabwe, down from 2'000 previously 
estimated animals to 400 known animals (Figures given by M. Kock at a conference attended by the author (Kock, 
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5.2.2.3. Data and methods 
Data and methods used to calculate the total hunting revenue for each Zimbabwe licensing 
system alternative are identical to those used for the revenue efficiency per wildlife index (see 
5.2.1.3, page 181). 
This analysis assumes that the full complement of hunters and co-hunters allowed per hunting 
party actually went hunting for each licensing system. 
The number of hunter-days for each alternative is calculated according to the formula: 
Hunter-days = 
No. Hunts per 
hunting area 
x No. Hunters 
per hunt 
x 
No. Hunting days 
permitted per hunt 
Applying the formula to calculate the hunter-days in the ZHA lottery system for Tuli hunting 
area (alternative C), for example, the formula produces: 
1 '144 Hunter-days = 26 x 4 x 11 
For alternatives with more than one hunt duration, (eg. alternatives G and H had 10-day and 
14-day hunts), hunter-days were calculated separately for each period, and then totalled. 
Details of hunter-days calculated for each licensing system alternative are included in 
Appendix 10, page A103. 
5.2.2.4. Results 
A comparison of the revenue efficiency of alternative licensing systems, derived by using the 
above method, are in Table 5.4, page 196. Pertinent results are highlighted in bold in the last 
line of the table. Gross revenue per hunter-day differs by several orders of magnitude between 
lottery systems, auction systems, and safari operator marketing systems. The comparison in 
Table 5.4 shows that: 
5.2.2.4.1. 
5.2.2.4.2. 
All lottery systems (alternatives A, B, C, D, and E) have a revenue efficiency 
of about Z$150 per hunter-day, which is far lower than the corresponding 
revenue efficiency of the auction and marketing systems. 
Of the systems allocating citizen hunting, the ZHA lottery systems for Tuli and 
Rifa hunting areas (alternatives C and E) are the most efficient, due to the 
extra levy members are charged per trophy species (20-70% in 1991) on top 
of the government controlled price per species for local hunters. No levy was 
charged for trophy elephant in 1991 by the ZHA lottery system for Doma 
(alternative D), due to poor trophy quality, which explains why the result is 
lower in alternative D than for alternatives C and E (on levy, see review of 
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The DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa impala hunts appears to be the 
least efficient system at allocating the resource of access time. Citizen hunters 
who purchased a DNPWLM Dandawa impala hunt had the cheapest access to 
a protected area and to a prime campsite located on the Zambezi river, paying 
an average value of Z$74 per person per day. As mentioned previously 
(conclusion 5.2.1.4.4), care must be taken with this result because all other 
licensing systems allocated at least 70% big game, whereas the DNPWLM 
tender system for Dandawa impala hunts comprised only plains game, a species 
less valued by trophy hunters. 
The efficiency of auction systems (alternatives G and H) is about Z$1 '000 per 
hunter-day, or more than six times that of other systems. That of commercial 
marketing systems (alternative I) is about Z$1 '900 per hunter-day, or more than 
12 times that of lottery systems. The result is based on fixed exchange rates for 
foreign exchange currencies, not their higher market exchange rates. 
The safari operator marketing system (Alternative I) earned almost twice as 
much revenue per hunter-day as the auction system (alternatives G and H). It 
allocates access time and space twice as efficiently as auction systems. 
The safari operator marketing system ppears to earn more for Zimbabwe in 
gross revenue and foreign exchange by marketing the sport hunting quota in 
Charara/Makuti commercially than any other allocation system. Reasons for 
this result ( eg. the safari operator adds value to the quota with personal 
services), as well as further foreign exchange and economic multiplier effects 
of this system are discussed later in the chapter in section 5.5, page 213. 
The DNPWLM lottery system (alternatives A and B) allocates hunting 
resources in the Charara/Makuti study area less efficiently than the ZHA lottery 
system (alternatives C and E). It is important to note, however, that a total of 
Z$43'060, or almost one fifth of all hunting revenue earned by the DNPWLM 
lottery system, stems from ticket revenue and is a due to the system's 
inequitable hunt allocation procedure (see section 4.3, page 141). The unequal 
DNPWLM lottery hunt allocation procedure allows applicants to maximize 
their probability of winning an option to hunt by purchasing unlimited numbers 
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5.2.2.5. Discussion of results1 
Results show that market-priced allocation systems achieve revenue efficiencies per hunter-
day that are several orders of magnitude larger than those achieved by fix-priced lottery 
allocation systems with which the DNPWLM and the ZHA allocate big game citizen hunting 
in Zimbabwe. A number of questions will be discussed that influence these results. 
• Influence of quota composition and quota packaging into hunts 
In using the criterion of revenue per hunter-day, the analysis assumes that there is a direct 
relationship between the price hunter's are prepared to pay and the length of the hunt, ie. 
between hunting revenue and the total number of hunter-days offered by a certain quota. 
It may be argued, that sport hunting revenue is not limited by the number of hunter-days 
supplied by any licensing system, but rather by the wildlife species' quota available in any 
hunting area. The question arises, whether hunting revenue could increased by offering more 
hunter-days? To offer more hunter-days, given species' quotas and hunting season in a 
particular hunting area would have to be allocated to hunts in the following ways: 
a) By lengthening the hunt duration per hunt, but keeping hunts and hunters per hunt 
constant; 
b) By packaging the species' quotas into more hunts, but keeping the hunt duration and 
hunters per hunt constant; 
c) By increasing the number of hunters per hunt (hunting party), keeping hunts and hunt 
durations per hunt constant. 
Safari operators package and price their hunts by starting with the longest hunt durations, and 
charging hunters the highest daily rate for this type of hunts. An example serves to illustrate 
that with different packaging of the same species quota, retaining the same number of hunter-
days, revenue can be increased using the safari operator method: Assume a quota of 10 
buffalo is packaged first to offer Jong hunts (say ten 10-day single buffalo hunts) to a number 
of hunters (say X hunters). Then package the same buffalo, but offering short hunts (say ten 
5-day single buffalo hunts) to more hunters (say 2x hunters). It follows, that 200 hunter-days 
are generated by the first packaging method (10 x 10 x 2 = 200 hunter-days), and the second 
packaging method generates the same number (10 x 5 x 4 = 200 hunter-days). However, long 
hunts each fetch higher prices per hunter-day. Therefore, with longer hunts the safari operator 
earns more revenue selling longer hunts than by selling shorter hunts, for the same number 
of hunter-days; this increases his revenue efficiency per hunter-day. 
• Does access time influence hunter's trophy quality and hunting revenue? 
Applied to a foreign safari hunting client of a commercial safari operator, it may be argued 
that the foreign hunter's aim is not to have a longer hunt, but to have enough time to secure 
a quality trophy. A relevant question that cannot be answered in this dissertation concerns 
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the definition of "trophy quality": Is the trophy quality that safari hunting clients pursue 
defined as the species of animal secured (eg. buffalo rather than kudu species), or as the 
quality of the actual trophy (eg. an outstanding set of 24-inch rather than an average set of 
16-inch buffalo horns)? 
If hunt durations were increased, would hunters pay more for a hunt? Conversely, if hunt 
durations were decreased, would hunters necessarily pay less for a hunt if they still obtained 
a quality trophy? In other words, what is the optimal time that should be allocated to each 
hunt? This question is answered next. 
• Do hunters value time? 
Do hunters actually want longer hunt durations to hunt? This question can be answered in the 
affirmative, for several reasons: The longer the hunting period, the more time hunters have 
to stalk and search for a quality trophy animal, rather than shooting the first low or average 
quality trophy animal they encounter. With more time, hunters can afford to be more selective 
in their hunting behaviour. This result has ecological implications for resource managers who 
plan trophy quotas. Obviously, a positive correlation of greater search time and trophy quality 
depends on the type of hunter, his personal motives, preferences and hunting ethics. 
Secondly, time spent stalking is also a valuable hunting experience for the hunter, since a 
hunt's value to the hunter should be viewed holistically, and not based solely on the motive 
to kill an animal. Loomis (1992) presents empirical data showing that sport hunters do value 
time, and value it in addition to the actual hunting bag. He reports that few authors have 
taken this fact into account when attempting to model and quantify demand for hunting. 
Thirdly, time spent by hunters in the hunting area is valuable purely for the access and 
opportunity to enjoy the hunting area in the company of other members in the hunting party. 
Therefore, one can reasonably expect a hunter to value the amount of time each hunter can 
spend in the hunting area. Similarly, resource managers should price access time (the hunting 
season) as a scarce resource. 
• How would an equal DNPWLM lottery system affect the results? 
By limiting total gross revenue earned from the species quota using an equal hunt allocation 
by lottery, Z$40'000 would be foregone in ticket revenue for the Charara/Makuti study area. 
Less hunting revenue means that the revenue efficiency of this system would be reduced from 
about Z$140 to Z$100 per hunter-day for the study area.1 Therefore, if hunt allocation was 
equalized, the DNPWLM lottery system would be the least efficient at earning revenue 
per unit access time of all licensing system alternatives in Table 5.4, page 196. Revenue 
1 Calculated for alternatives A and B in Table 5.4, page 196, as follows: Total hunt values (56'482 + 72'085), 
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efficiency per hunter-day for the DNPWLM lottery system (Z$100) would then be 19 times 
lower than that for a safari operator marketing system (Z$1 '900). (The same tendency was 
noted for the previous efficiency measure.) 
• Can fewer hunter-days generate more hunting revenue? 
Compare the safari operator system of packaging hunts and pricing hunting resources with 
the DNPWLM lottery system for the quota in Charara/Makuti. The safari operator marketing 
system generates more hunting revenue from fewer hunter-days in total, compared to the 
DNPWLM lottery system. This conclusion suggests that hunts could be packaged differently, 
using less of the hunting season, yet making more revenue. How is this possible? 
The following example illustrates how adding time to a hunt would raise gross revenue 
earned by the safari operator. If a trophy buffalo could be sold either as part of a 15-day 
hunting package at US$800 per day or as part of a shorter 5-day or 10-day hunting package 
at US$500 per day, the safari operator can earn more revenue using the first option; The 
importance of packaging an area's species quotas to make the most of the wildlife resource 
(efficiency) is evident. 
• What if the foreign hunter doesn't use all of the hunter-days? 
Hunting revenue for the safari operator is not reduced if safari hunting clients secure their 
trophies in less than the full hunt duration of, say, 21-hunting days, because the safari hunter 
still pays the daily rate for the full 21-days. 
For Zimbabwe, even though foreign hunting clients do not always make full use of the 
hunting period (eg. 21-days for an African big game safari hunt), and often secure their 
trophies within a shorter time period (Child, B., personal communication), foreign hunters still 
pay the safari operator the agreed daily rate for the full time period. Thus, time is priced and 
valuable. 
If safari operators and foreign hunters do not make use of the full 21-days actual access time 
because they frequently secure prime trophy species in a shorter time period (Child, B., 
personal communication), and this implies that shorter 10-day or 14-day hunts may be 
perfectly adequate for safari operators to market a full 21-day big game hunt. The fact that 
safari operators and agents for foreign hunters have participated successfully in the DNPWLM 
auctions of Nyakasanga and Sapi hunting areas since 1986 tends to support this conclusion. 
It is credible, because the onus is on the safari operator to ensure that his foreign hunting 
client secures a quality trophy. 
The auction system thus makes it possible for many safari operators to secure prime big game 
trophy hunting and access time and increase the value of the hunting package when it is sold 
to a foreign client. By auctioning hunts in a hunting area to many safari operators, the auction 










200 Chapter 5: Comparatfre study and macroeconomic assessmenl 
,..,:,:,;,:.-n:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:,:,:,;,:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:d:·:d:·:·:·;.:,:,:,:·:·:+:;..:d.':·:,:-;.:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:,;,;,;.;,;,.;.-n;.<,;,;,:,;.;,;,:.;,;.;.;,:,:,;,:,:-:,:-:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,;,;;.:.;.;,;,;.;,:,:,:,;.:,:,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:•:•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:•:-:,:,:,:,:,;,:,:,:,;.;.:,;.;.;.:..-,:,:..;:,:,:,:,:·.-:·:·:·:·:,:.;,;.:,;,;,;..-,.;,:,:,:,:,:,:,;.:,:,:,:·;.;,••u"-:'"'H';.:,•,w,•.•.;,..,w,•,w,:·.· 
industry and being market conform, over leasing the area on an exclusive basis to only one 
safari operator. Competition in the safari hunting industry and efficiency is thus promoted. 
• How does revenue per hunter-day compare with daily-rates from recreational 
land-use? 
If land-use in Zimbabwe's protected areas was determined rationally according to economic 
criteria (as it is on all other land categories in Zimbabwe), then based on the concept of 
opportunity cost, the gross revenue amount earned per hunter-day from sport hunting should 
exceed the amount that could be earned from non-consumptive uses such as tourism per 
visitor-day. If not, then the absolute difference in revenue from citizen hunting and 
recreational activities represents an economic opportunity cost to Zimbabwe of using the 
hunting season and hunting area for sport hunting. 
Gross revenue per hunter-day from citizen hunting in Charara/Makuti may be compared with 
the following figures quoted by other authors for recreational revenue per visitor per day. 
(The data is indicative, and not comprehensive.) 
The following figures are based on information supplied by a long-standing Zimbabwe safari 
operator (Thompson, personal communication). Average market prices for wilderness trails 
charged by Zimbabwe safari operators in 1992 were: 
Table 5.5 Comparative values for recreational access 
R$hd2cfoI2s6.per· .perJgJ Berday1ijtJ~o¢HIAit1¢~ctYi~1tors. < •·•.> :Jt! ii~661gd6 
···· i,~i·~~···~,···#r~~·~m•·•·¢itiz~n •·H LJijj(~~···J~~~;t;·~~··•;i••i·~·ije~~··········· .·... . ..
bittiJrl~dntlhg .. ai1oc~t~ b.9•••8t-1~~µM ldft~fy~y~i~fu . ·. 
Source: Thompson, personal communications, 11.11.1991. 
As mentioned above, several authors confirm that the rates charged by the DNPWLM for 
tourist entry to protected areas are the lowest in southern Africa (Child and Heath, 1990). 
Price Waterhouse, 1992b: Volume 2: 5 quote comparative data supporting this fact. In 
conclusion for Charara/Makuti hunting areas, the economic opportunity cost appears to be 
large, amounting to at least twice the revenue that could be earned per person if 100 non-
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The revenue efficiency per hunter-day for a hunting area could also be increased by reducing 
physical area available for hunting by zoning certain areas for non-hunting activities. Total 
revenue from multiple land-use activities would then be correspondingly higher. 
• Auction prices allow hunters to value and price qualitative differences 
The difference in revenue per hunter-day between alternatives could also be attributed to 
qualitative differences between hunts offered in different hunting areas. Qualitative differences 
in hunts due to the varying species quota compositions do not account for revenue efficiency 
differences, as previously shown for efficiency with the wildlife index (see section 5.2.1). 
Therefore, qualitative differences may well stem from another source, namely the additional 
services offered to hunters with the hunt under various allocation systems. The safari operator 
marketing system (alternative I), in particular, offers foreign hunters personalized services that 
add value to the hunt and wildlife resource. These services include professional hunting 
services, luxury accommodation and transport for foreign hunting clients. 
Only competitive market-priced allocation systems (alternatives G, H, and I) allow qualitative 
differences between hunts to be explicitly, and personally, valued and priced by hunters. Each 
hunter's willingness to pay defines the hunt value. Fix-priced allocation systems cannot value 
or price qualitative differences. Indeed fix-priced lottery systems in Zimbabwe (alternatives 
A, B, C, D, E) only price the consumptive resource, that is the animals in the hunting bag, 
using the government controlled trophy fee per species. As a result, access time and other 
hunt characteristics ( eg. location) remain unpriced, and the hunt and hunting resources are 
thus under-valued. Fixed prices are set by administrators, not by hunters. Hunters could 
personally determine the value of the hunting resources and benefits they enjoy more 
accurately. In addition, fix-pric d lottery systems themselves reduces the value of a hunt by 
reducing the certainty w th which each applicant can obtain the hunting benefits 
(probability of being drawn in the lottery). Those lucky winners drawn in a lottery benefit, 
because they pay much less in the end for the hunt than they would pay, if the price was kept 
flexible. 1 
1 In economic theory, the difference between the actual price someone pays for something and a higher price they 
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The present DNPWLM lottery system in the Charara/Makuti allocates the 
hunting resource of access time for hunters in the least efficient manner of all 
the available alternatives. Revenue efficiency per hunter-day for the alternatives 
can be summarized as follows: 
Licensing System Absolute Relative 
DNPWLM Lottery - Z$140 1.0 
ZHA Lottery - Z$160 1.1 
Auctions - Z$1'000 7.1 
Commercial Marketing • Z$1'900 13.5 
Daily rates that safari operators could earn from recreational uses of 
Charara/Makuti exceed the present revenue earned from citizen hunting of 
Z$140 per hunter-day between 2 and 4 times (US$200 = Z$600 per person per 
day). 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters are heavily subsidized in terms of gross revenue 
earned for every hunter and day supplied by the DNPWLM in Charara/Makuti 
study area. 
Access time to hunting areas (hunter-days) is explicitly priced only by the 
safari operator marketing system (alternative I). It is priced as part of the entire 
hunt when allocated by the tender (alternative F) and auction systems 
(alternatives G and H). All lottery systems allocating citizen hunting in 
Zimbabwe price only the consumptive hunting resource (hunting bag); the non-
consumptive hunting resource (access time in hunter-days) is thus not 
explicitly valued, and the hunt is under-valued and under-priced by fix-
priced lottery systems, although time is an important and valuable part of 
the hunt for all hunters. (Compare the Ciskei first-come-first-served system, 
section 3.3.3, page 107, where hunters pay separately for a hunt's species quota 
and access time.) 
The DNPWLM tender system provides citizen hunters with the cheapest access 
to protected areas, of all hunt allocation systems. In one instance, citizen 
hunters were paid an average of Z$74 per person per day for non-hunting 
access and a campsite with Zambezi river frontage in a protected area 
(Nyakasanga section). 
Safari operators who purchase a big game hunt at the auction can successfully 
use shorter hunting periods to improve revenue efficiency by selling a full 21-
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5.2.2.6.7. Zoning the Charara/Makuti area for multiple land-use could increase the 
revenue efficiency of the allocation system for sport hunting and allow non-
consumptive tourist activities to take place concurrently with sport hunting 
activities. Such integrated land-use management can be found in the 
Pilanesberg National Park, Boputhatswana (see Brett, 1989; Boonzaaier, et al., 
(1983); Pilanesberg National Park (n.d.)). The Mkuzi Game Reserve, South 
Africa also closely integrates hunting and non-hunting uses of the parks 
resources (see review, Chapter 3, section 3.3.2, page 104). 
5.2.2.6.8. A competitive auction system: allows more safari operators to have access to 
big game hunting resources; enables more sport hunters to personally 
participate in correctly valuing the available hunting resources; achieves 
maximum revenue for the DNPWLM as the resource management agency. 
5.2.2.6.9. Auctions are more efficient than lotteries at resource allocation; they conform 
to market principles. 
5.3. Social costs of resource allocation 
The criterion of equality in this chapter is defined in terms of the number of people that 
benefit from access to the wildlife resource area due to the hunting activities. People benefit 
from hunting, non-hunting, and educational activities. 
5.3.1. Equality criterion: Recreation-days accessed per gross revenue-$ 
The equality indicator is measured as recreation-days divided by the gross hunting revenue 
in Z$. 
5.3.2. Understanding the criterion 
The three significant groups of people that benefit from the hunting activities in Zimbabwe's 
protected areas are: 
• Hunters (hunters and co-hunters in the hunting party), included as hunter-days; 
• 
• 
Non-hunting visitors who accompany hunters in the hunting party (family and 
friends), included as visitor-days; 
School children and teachers who take part in environmental education programmes 
in two areas, included as pupil-days. 
The sum of hunter-days, visitor-days and pupil-days is termed recreation-days, and measures 
the benefits people have who use any protected area during a year. Access for non-
consumptive purposes (at the moment) relies on the revenue generated from the consumptive 
sport hunting activities in the wildlife resource area being invested m real, tangible 
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For example, how would the equality measure be affected if gross hunting revenue increased 
(eg. by replacing the lottery for an auction system), but the hunter recreation-days remained 
the same for that hunting area? By increasing revenue in the criterion's denominator, the 
equality ratio would be decreased, unless some of the hunting revenue was invested to enable 
a greater number of people (non-hunters) to access the hunting area. The criterion is limited 
in its interpretation, because the costs of producing the additional benefits are not taken into 
account. Ideally, the ratio of recreation-days per gross revenue dollar earned in a hunting area 
should rather be the ratio of recreation-days per unit profit (net-benefit). The criterion is also 
limited because it does not measure indirect benefits of such multiplier effects as indirect 
spending, job creation, tax income for government, for people who do not enjoy the protected 
area benefits directly through personal access. 
5.3.3. Data and methods 
For data and methods on hunter-days, see section 5.2.2, page 191, on the efficiency of 
revenue per hunter-day . For details on the calculation of hunter-days, see Appendix 10, 
page A103. 
The total number of visitor-days is similarly calculated according to the formula: 
Visitor-days = 





No. Hunting days 
x permitted per x 50% 
hunt 
Visitor-days are calculated assuming that on average, visitors stayed only half as long as 
hunters in the hunting area (see assumption 5.1.1.4, page 177). Applying the formula to 
calculate hunter-days in the ZHA lottery system for Tuli hunting area (alternative C), for 
example, produces: 
1 '716 Visitor-days = 104 x 3.0 x 11 x 50% 
Details on the calculation of visitor-days and visitor/hunter ratios for each licensing system 
alternative are included in Appendices 11 and 12, on pages A103 and A104, respectively. 
The total number of pupil-days for Doma and Rifa hunting areas (alternatives D and E) was 
calculated according to the formula: 
Pupil-days = 
No. Educational Camps 
per year 
x No. pupils 
per camp 
x 
and substituting values for Rifa education camp, the formula produces: 
1 '620 Pupil-days = 9 x 30 x 
No. educational days 
per pupil 
6 
The first education facility is located in Rifa hunting area and financed by revenue from 
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Area, but is financed by revenue from hunting in the Doma hunting area. These pupil-days 
are thus attributed to the Doma hunting area, and not to the Charara hunting area. Details of 
pupil-days calculated for Doma and Rifa education facilities are included in Appendix 13, 
page A104. 
Data and methods of calculating hunting revenue for all alternatives are identical to those 
used for revenue efficiency (see section 5.2.1.3, page 181). 
5.3.4. Results 
The visitor-intensity of hunting revenue for each alternative, calculated with this method, is 
summarized in Table 5.6, page 206. The ratio of recreation-days per Z$ revenue was 
multiplied by a factor of 1 '000 for all alternatives, and rounded to the nearest whole 
number.1 
The comparison in Table 5.6 shows that: 
5.3.4.1. Of the citizen hunting licensing systems, the ZHA lottery systems in Doma and 
Rifa (alternatives C and E) benefit the most people directly as a result of 
educational programmes for school pupils and teachers funded by hunting revenue. 
5.3.4.2. Most people benefitted from the ZHA lottery system for Doma and Rifa hunting 
areas where revenue was limited by fixed prices, not from the auction systems 
(alternatives G and H) or marketing systems (alternative I) where revenue was far 
greater due to market prices. This surprising result is due to the revenue invested 
by the ZHA in educational programmes. 
5.3.4.3. The ZHA lottery system for Doma and Rifa (alternatives C and E) is about 4 times 
more equitable than the DNPWLM lottery system (alternatives A and B), about 20 
times more equitable than the DNPWLM auction system (alternatives G and H), 
and about 40 times more equitable than the safari operator marketing system 
(alternative I). 
5.3.4.4. The equality of the DNPWLM tender system m Dandawa (alternative F) is 
comparable to the ZHA lottery system in Rifa, ie. a large number of people benefit 
relative to the revenue earned. 
5.3.4.5. The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti (alternatives A and B) is the 
least equitable of all citizen hunting allocation systems. On average, 
Charara/Makuti supplies only half as many recreation-days for every dollar revenue 
earned from citizen hunters; no additional persons benefit directly from the hunting 
revenue. 
1 This does not alter the comparative use of the measurement, when alternatives are compared. The multiplication 
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5.3.5. Discussion of results 
Equality of recreation-days was the indicator used here to compare licensing systems with 
different types of benefits (hunting, recreational and educational) and pricing systems (fix-
priced and market-priced) for hunting resources. Despite hunters paying higher prices for 
hunts in Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas (alternatives C, D and E) than for hunts in the 
Charara/Makuti hunting areas (alternatives A and B), the ZHA lottery system does benefit 
more people directly than the DNPWLM lottery system in the study area. 
Although the DNPWLM auction system (alternatives G and H) earns ten times the revenue 
in absolute terms, and more revenue in relative terms (per wildlife index and per hunter-day) 
than the ZHA lottery system, none of the revenue benefits conservation. Similarly, the 
safari operator marketing system for the Charara/Makuti hunting area (alterative I) earns most 
revenue, but is the least equitable of all licensing system alternatives. How is this possible? 
Clearly, revenue efficiency does not necessarily mean that direct benefits for people from 
protected areas are being maximized or indeed promoted. The number of hunts, hunters per 
hunt, and the hunt duration per hunt that together determine the total number of hunter-days 
supplied in each hunting area are all limited primarily by the consumptive wildlife quota 
(hunting bag). 
Yet the number of non-consumptive visitor- or pupil-days which can be supplied in a wildlife 
resource area is not limited by the sport hunting quota or by the natural resource base, but 
primarily by financial, technical, and human resource constraints that are required to develop 
facilities, services and opportunities for visitors. These inputs add economic tiers of value to 
natural resources, whose consumption is otherwise limited by natural limits of sustainable use 
(see Child, B., 1988 on the concept of economic tiers of value for wildlife). The non-
consumptive visitor use of protected areas is ecologically sustainable, but requires financial 
sustainability for it to be supplied at all, and for its continued management, research, and 
protection. 
5.3.6. Initial conclusions 
Care needs to be taken in drawing conclusions based on this indicator, as it refers only to the 
direct benefits a visitor gains from entering the hunting area and the hunting revenue, and 
ignores indirect economic benefits from this revenue. In the comparison of the auction/safari 
operator systems versus the lottery systems this means that the economic multiplier effects 
and balance of payments impact of foreign exchange are disregarded. The indicator also gives 
the impression that the unpriced educational benefits (which are measured in physical access 
days by persons) are more valuable than foreign exchange and indirect economic benefits, 
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5.4. Economic and social costs interpreted: 
Revealing the institutional dimension of resource allocation 
5.4.1. Introducing the idea of a trade-off 
Economic benefits from the allocation hunting resources were quantified in this chapter as 
gross revenue earned from hunters. Social benefits were quantified as the number of people 
that had direct access to the protected areas due to the revenue earned by the hunting 
allocation systems. Because sport hunting's social benefits remain largely unpriced by 
allocation systems, the indicators represent the author's interpretation of efficiency and 
equality concepts from a macroeconomic perspective. 
The trade-off between efficiency and equality as theoretical concepts is often referred to as 
the efficiency-equality trade-off in the literature (see "The Big Trade-Off", Okun, 1975). 
Usually, it is implied that greater economic efficiency (getting more benefits out of scarce 
resources) can only be achieved at the expense of a more inequitable distribution of benefits 
(fewer people benefit from the same resources). 
Based on data presented for sport hunting, is this trade-off necessarily a win-lose situation 
for conservation and protected areas in Zimbabwe? And why do the fix-priced lottery systems 
administered by the ZHA benefit more people for every Z$ of hunting revenue than the 
market-priced systems administered by the DNPWLM? These questions are addressed in the 
following sections. 
5.4.2. Interpreting revenue efficiency and benefit equality as a trade-off 
The efficiency and equality measures calculated in this chapter are depicted in Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2, on page 209. The measures are interpreted as a trade-off, based on economic 
theory of choice (see Lindsay, 1984: Chapters 3, 4 and 18). the choice is between two 
objectives of resource allocation: 
• Maximizing revenue from sport hunting resources in protected areas; 
• Maximizing direct access for people to protected areas. 
In Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 it is interesting to note that for both measures of efficiency, 
those alternatives whose revenue earning capacity is limited because they rely on fix-priced 
lottery systems for hunting revenue (alternatives C, D and E and alternative F) in fact produce 
conservation benefits for more people who directly enter these hunting areas. As indicated 
in the previous section and detailed in the review of licensing systems (Chapter 3), this is due 
to development of educational facilities undertaken by the ZHA, and to the promotion of 
hunting camps amongst ZHA membership. Hunting revenue is invested back into 
infrastructure, the maintenance of certain roads and facilities in the hunting area on behalf of 
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1991 
Comparing alternatives: Trading efficiency (hunter-days) against recreational opportunities: 
Key to the alternative allocation systems: 
A = DNPWLM lottery system for Chararc1 
B = DNPWLM lottery system for Makuti 
c = ZHA lottery system for Tuli 
D = ZHA lottery system for Doma 
E = ZHA lottery system for Rifa 
F = DNPWLM tender system for Dandawa 
G = DNPWLM auction system for Nyakasanga 
H = DNPWLM auction system for Sapi 
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(Of the total revenue calculated for each ZHA lottery system, the ZHA only receives part of 
this revenue (approximately half), since it pays the DNPWLM for the quota. The ZHA also 
invests additional revenue that is not accounted for in the analysis from membership fees and 
fund-raising programmes back into these hunting areas in the form of facilities and 
environmental education programmes.) 
The results of the trade-off are as follows: 
5.4.2.1. The DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti earns the least revenue from 
hunting resources and benefits the least numbers of people. By contrast, the safari 
operator marketing system for Charara/Makuti could earn the most revenue. 
5.4.2.2. Because present institutional arrangements limit the DNPWLM in its capacity to 
invest and develop hunting and recreational access, benefits from all DNPWLM 
administered allocations systems are lower than those administered by the ZHA. 
5.4.2.3. There is scope to significantly increase conservation and development benefits 
from revenue-efficient licensing systems (alternatives G, H, and I) by developing 
more recreational opportunities. (In Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2 indicated by a move 
to the right of the alternative's present position.) 
5.4.2.4. Significantly increased revenue-efficiency of non-market licensing systems 
(alternatives A to E), and their conservation and development benefits can be 
achieved, by adopting a market-based auction system to sell hunting resources. 
(Indicated by a move upwards from their present positions in Figure 5.1 and 
Figure 5.2.) 
5.4.3. Discussion: Trade-offs for resource allocation? 
The obvious question is, why the market-priced allocation systems (Alternatives G, H and I) 
which generate the largest amounts of revenue are do not seem to promote non-consumptive 
resource use to a far greater degree than the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association is able to from 
a more limited hunting revenue? Two explanations are suggested. 
In the case of Charara/Makuti - and for Zimbabwe's entire protected area system - the 
significant factor causing Jack of conservation benefits is the government institutional 
arrangements that inhibit the DNPWLM from being responsible for the agency budget. 
As a government agency, the Department of National Parks and Wild Life Management 
presently lacks institutional and financial autonomy and authority for retaining any 
revenue · earned within protected areas. As an historically established principle of 
government, all revenue generated by any government department has to be returned to 
central treasury in the Zimbabwe Government. This principle has meant that there is no link 
between the budget allocations to the DNPWLM and the revenue earned by the agency from 
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revenue and expenditure, or to invest hunting revenue in the resource base and develop 
conservation benefits, due to the institutional restrictions. 
Because the ZHA is a financially independent, non-government organisation, and is thus able 
to make decisions based on revenue from the association's membership and citizen hunting 
activities in Tuli, Dama and Rifa hunting areas. The ZHA invested a proportion of hunting 
revenue back into the development of conservation benefits in these protected areas. Hunting 
campsites were maintained and improved to make them more attractive for members, facilities 
and programmes were developed to conduct environmental education for school children and 
class teachers, transport was provided for schools to access and benefit from these facilities 
situated in remote areas. 
The number of persons who benefit from consumptive hunting activities are limited by the 
wildlife resource, and development of facilities to a lesser degree. The number of persons 
who can potentially benefit from non-hunting activities are limited by financial, human, and 
technical resources rather than by natural resource limits (Child, B., 1988). 
Thus, although in terms of general economic theory greater revenue to the state benefits 
"everybody" in Zimbabwe, no direct conservation benefits can be accounted for this 
considerable revenue. The lack of direct accountability for revenue is an institutional 
limitation of present governmental policy that reduces the benefits produced by 
conservation and development in Zimbabwe's protected areas. Efficiency is reduced, as 
is equality, in the sense that the number of people who benefit directly (and indirectly) 
from conservation and protected areas is severely restricted. 
This factor is probably the single most important limitation for the DNPWLM and conclusion 
of this dissertation. The agency cannot link revenue and expenditures from its own efforts to 
the protected areas (the atural resource base). The DNPWLM, despite being the agency 
responsible for the conservation, management, administration, research and development of 
Zimbabwe's protected areas (Parks and Wild Life Estate), is severely restricted in its capacity 
to achieve these responsibilities for the extensive land area's under the agency's 
custodianship, due to lack of financial resources. 
In summary therefore, there does not appear to be an inherent practical trade-off between the 
efficient production and distributing hunting resources and their equitable distribution as 
benefits based on Zimbabwe's wildlife and protected areas. Instead, it is the financial 
institutional arrangements between central government and the DNPWLM that make it 
impossible for the DNPWLM to realize the revenue, to develop the benefits from protected 
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By siphoning-off all revenue from protected areas to central treasury in government, the 
DNPWLM, Zimbabwe citizen hunters and non-hunters, the Zimbabwe economy and the 
Zimbabwe Government itself are forgoing benefits. Citizen hunting by present generations 
is thus an activity which is highly subsidized by government budget allocations to the 
DNPWLM for the Charara/Makuti study area. Such activities do not appear to be financially 
or ecologically sustainable for future generations, unless the natural resource base in hunting 
areas can be protected, researched, managed, used, and developed without adding to the 
nation's long-term external debt, to the Zimbabwe Government's internal budget deficit, or 
to the long-term internal debt. 1 
Non-consumptive activities could be developed to substantially increase access, quality and 
quantity of conservation benefits from protected areas, but only if revenue is returned to the 
DNPWLM and protected areas from which they were earned in the first place. Then revenue 
can be directed towards the protection, research, management and development of 
conservation benefits in protected areas by the DNPWLM, the agency entrusted with the 
custodianship of Zimbabwe's bio-diversity and protected area system. Wise use of resources 
- natural, human and financial - requires not only legal responsibility, but the financial means 
and institutional authority to realize this custodianship. 
For the DNPWLM to efficiently protect, research, manage and develop protected areas and 
their associated benefits for present generations, and for the agency to secure these very 
benefits for future generations in Zimbabwe, it must apply to the principles of ecological, and 
financial, sustainability to its management of conservation and development in protected 
areas. 
5.4.4. Initial conclusions from interpretation 
5.4.4.1. There is no inherent conflict between increasing revenue, and increasing 
conservation benefits from hunting resources and protected areas for Zimbabweans, 
in particular within the Charara/Makuti study area. 
5.4.4.2. By using market-priced systems to allocate hunting, the DNPWLM could generate 
more revenue for Charara/Makuti than at present, and thereby increase access 
opportunities, the quality of visitor services, and could undertake ecological 
management and research, thereby ensuring that the Charara/Makuti study area is 
used sustainably by present generations, and managed responsibly for future 
generations. 
5.4.4.3. At present, institutional arrangements are the major factor severely limiting the 
conservation benefits whose development the DNPWLM can facilitate or itself 
provide for the public in the Charara/Makuti study area. Irrespective of which 
1 Deficits are annual shortfalls between actual revenue and expenditure. Debts are the cumulative result of such 
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allocation system is chosen by the DNPWLM to allocate hunting in the 
Charara/Makuti study area, under current financial arrangements the revenue does 
not accrue to the DNPWLM as the landholder for protected areas for conservation 
purposes, but subsidizes general government activities. This conclusion can be 
generalized to apply to Zimbabwe's entire protected area system. 
5.4.4.4. In the short-term, the ZHA and safari operator allocation systems present a 
mechanism that would allow these financially independent organisations to invest 
and return some revenue to protected areas - inspite of the limitation cited in point 
5.4.4.2. Contractual obligations could increase these benefits for conservation and 
development of protected areas. 
5.4.4.5. Zoning the Charara/Makuti study area, and making use of hills and other natural 
features, would allow the area's inherent wilderness qualities to be used 
simultaneously for both sport hunting and for non-hunting activities. Multiple-use 
would increasing benefits from revenue, conservation, and economic development 
of the region. The recreational opportunities for people would be increased beyond 
the present ~inimal benefit level. 
5.5. Foreign exchange costs: A market value for Zimbabwe 
5.5.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to put an economic market value on foreign exchange that is 
forgone to Zimbabwe. By selling hunting resources hunting areas exclusive to Zimbabwe 
citizen hunters - rather than to foreign safari hunters or on the open market - foreign 
exchange revenue is foregone entirely. Recent developments brought about by the 
liberalization of the foreign exchange market in Zimbabwe allow the market value of foreign 
currency to be calculated more easily than has previously been possible. The significance of 
foreign exchange to Zimbabwe's economy, and the contribution of sport hunting, is now 
briefly discussed. 
If the DNPWLM allocates hunting resources exclusively to Zimbabwe citizen hunters, 
revenue earned is in the Zimbabwe dollar currency. If these same resources could instead be 
sold to foreign hunters ( either directly at an auction, or indirectly through a safari operator), 
revenue earned is in foreign exchange currencies, which are then converted to Zimbabwe 
dollars by the banking system at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe. Until 1991, foreign 
exchange was managed by the Reserve Bank in a tightly controlled system, and although it 
was acknowledged that the exchange rates set by the Reserve Bank did not reflect the true 
value of the foreign currencies to Zimbabwe, there was no easy method of judging their 
market exchange rates compared to the Zimbabwe dollar. This has now changed with the 
Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) that is being instituted by the 
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Up to this point in Chapter 5, all foreign currency revenue has been calculated at official 
fixed exchange rates, which undervalued any revenue earned from foreign hunters. 
Consequently, the absolute and relative revenue efficiencies for the auction system 
(alternatives G and H) and the safari operator marketing allocation system (alternative I) have 
been understated. This section attempts to place a correct market value on foreign exchange 
in Zimbabwe for the 1991 research period. 
5.5.2. A scenario: Marketing hunting by competitive auction1 
As a point of departure, a scenario is assumed where packaged hunting resources are 
allocated at an auction at which any person can bid, and where trading of hunts (and the 
rights to hunt) bought by participants is legal. Thus Zimbabwean safari operators, 
Zimbabwean agents acting on behalf foreign hunters, foreign safari operators, foreign hunters, 
plains game farmers, Zimbabwean "dealers" and Zimbabwean citizen hunters all compete in 
this hunting market. Prices achieved at this fictive competitive auction would be genuine 
market prices, with the auctioneer selected by the DNPWLM according to the lowest 
commission requested by him on final auction prices. For simplicity, assume also that the 
DNPWLM sells a hunt to three different participants in this competitive hunting market at 
exactly the same price, say Z$100. 
The participants in this auction market are: 
Scenario A) A Zimbabwe citizen hunter; 
Scenario B) A Zimbabwe agent, who purchases the hunt for a foreign hunter; 
Scenario C) A safari operator, who markets the hunt to a foreign client with professional 
hunting services. 
The difference in value of these three scenarios in terms of foreign exchange revenue and 
other benefits are sketched below, after outlining how the foreign exchange market in 
Zimbabwe currently operates. 
5.5.3. Zimbabwe's foreign exchange market 
With the advent of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe in 
1991, three innovations have been introduced to successively liberalize the allocation of 
foreign exchange. 
• Export Retention Scheme: 
The Export Retention Scheme (ERS) was introduced in July 1991. It allows exporters to 
retain a percentage of their foreign currency revenue to import foreign goods directly 
(previously all foreign exchange was returned to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe). This 
percentage is known as the export retention rate. The rate has been gradually increased from 
15% in June 1991, and currently stands at 35% (until December 1993) (see Reserve Bank of 
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Zimbabwe, 1992; Standard Chartered, 1993). Exports of tourist services and goods such as 
safari hunting qualify for this scheme, which means that safari operators (exporters) can retain 
the "market value" of their foreign exchange revenue up to the limit of the export retention 
rate on their gross export revenue. The export retention rate is to be increased still further and 
will in time allow exporters to retain 100% of their foreign currency revenue, should they 
choose to do so, once the market is completely liberalized; this is expected by 1995. 
• Export Revolving Fund: 
The Export Revolving Fund (ERF) developed out of the surplus foreign exchange revenue 
that some exporters had earned under the ERS, but wanted to sell for cash in Zimbabwe 
dollars, rather than importing goods. To allocate this surplus foreign exchange, banking 
institutions set up a market to match sellers and buyers of such funds according to the price 
each is willing to pay. Consequently a foreign exchange market has now been created that 
is accessible to any person in Zimbabwe, and the market price paid for foreign exchange -
known as the export retention premium - reflects supply and demand for foreign exchange 
at any point in time. A Zimbabwean purchasing export retention funds to import goods will 
thus pay: The Zimbabwe dollar value of the import licence at the current fixed exchange rate 
plus the export retention premium of the day. 
This premium, being market determined, has varied considerably since the scheme was 
introduced, decreasing from 65%-70% initially in June 1992, to 45% by October 1992, and 
further to 25% in December 1992. The export retention premium was about 24% in February 
1993 (Mpofu, personal communication; Standard Chartered Bank, n.d.). 
For a safari operator exporting goods and services such as safari hunting or tourism, this 
means that the exporter can now earn the full "market value" of the foreign exchange revenue 
in Zimbabwe dollars that qualifies for export retention (see above). The premium now 
measures the difference between the fixed foreign exchange rate and the market-valued 
exchange rate for foreign currencies, as judged by market participants at the time. Therefore 
Zimbabweans now do have access to foreign currency at a price that reflects its market 
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For example: Assuming that the 1991 fixed exchange rates were distorted from the market 
exchange rates by the same amount as the export retention premium in June 1992 (when the 
ERS was first introduced), a gross revenue of one US$ earned by a safari operator by selling 
a hunt to a foreign client was worth the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent of: 
Estimated 





Market Value of Foreign 
Rate Premium Exchange Revenue to 
Zimbabwe 
and substituting values: 
1 US$ x 3.07 x 1.65 = 2$5.06 
The market exchange rate of Z$5.06 per unit US$ is approximately equivalent to the 1992 
fixed exchange rate of Z$5.07 per unit US$ (Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe), 18.2.1992), after 
the Zimbabwe dollar underwent a major devaluation in 1991 (Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, 1991). 
• Export Incentive Scheme: 
The Export Incentive Scheme (EIS) was introduced by the Zimbabwe Government to increase 
exports by the Zimbabwe economy. Exporters are paid a 9% bonus in Zimbabwe dollars on 
the gross value of their exports. Safari operators who export animal products and tourist 
services qualify for this bonus. 
Care must be taken in the interpretation of the bonus in macroeconomic terms. For exporters, 
the bonus represents a direct subsidy paid by the Zimbabwe Government as an incentive to 
increase exports and improve the long term balance of payments deficit. The export incentive 
bonus is to be phased out once exports have increased, then forcing exporters to become more 
cost effective and compete at international world market prices. The temporary subsidy thus 
has to be financed by the Zimbabwe Government with other revenues until such time as it 
is phased out. 
Taking a macroeconomic and Jong-term view, the 9% export incentive bonus is a short term 
subsidy of exporters, and does not represent an opportunity cost to Zimbabwe's economy 
since it only -temporarily increases an exporter's gross revenue.1 For this reason, the export 
incentive bonus was not included in the estimate of opportunity costs for foregone foreign 
exchange revenue to Zimbabwe's economy, as calculated below. 
1 For the period during which exporters are subsidized by 9%, a loss in economic activity (eg. Gross National 
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5.5.4. Estimating foreign exchange opportunity costs of citizen hunting 
Using the method of opportunity costs, the foreign exchange costs of the three auction 
scenarios that allocate hunting resources to different participants are now sketched. Where 
possible, these costs are quantified. It is realistic to assume for each scenario that any big 
game in Zimbabwe could be sold to other participants at the auction price, ie. that a strong 
demand by foreign hunters and safari operators does exist (Child, B., 1988). 
• Scenario A: A Zimbabwe citizen buys a hunt auctioned for Z$100: 
No foreign exchange is earned since the hunt is not exported. The allocation to a Zimbabwe 
citizen hunter does not qualify under the export retention scheme, and no value is added to 
this hunt, so the value of this hunt is 2$100 to the macro-economy. 
• Scenario B: A Zimbabwe agent buys a foreign hunter a hunt auctioned for 
Z$100: 
The hunt is exported to a foreign safari hunter, and foreign exchange is earned. The 
Zimbabwean agent will include certain hunting services at cost, adding value to the hunt's 
auction cost-price, and will charge a commission for his professional services, all to be paid 
for by the foreign hunter in foreign exchange. The professional service and commission 
values are thus also exported in addition to the auction price of the trophy hunt. These 
exported values qualify under the export retention scheme. If the agent's cost and commission 
are assumed to be 20% of the auction price, then the gross export revenue of the hunt to the 
Zimbabwe economy is: 2$120 which is sold to the foreign hunter in foreign exchange (say 
for US$120)1. This hunt then earns U$120 times the fixed exchange rate of 2$3.07 plus the 
premium of the entire foreign exchange to the Zimbabwe economy of 1.65, in total about 
2$600. 
This value excludes economic multiplier effects2, since the foreign hunter also pays for 
airfares, vehicle hire, hotel bills and taxidermy services, all in foreign exchange. These 
economic effects are a multiple of those spent by in scenario A) by a Zimbabwe citizen 
hunter. 
• Scenario C: A Safari Operator buys a hunt for a foreign client auctioned 
for Z$100: 
The hunt is then marketed by the safari operator to a foreign safari hunting client with 
additional professional hunting services as part of a larger hunting package (eg. with plains 
game on private land). The safari operator thus exports the full Zimbabwe dollar auction 
value including additional services at cost, plus a mark-up (profit margin) on all items. The 
1 This mark-up represents current practice in Zimbabwe. Safari operators purchase big game species in Z$ from 
the DNPWLM and sell these for similar amounts in US$; the hotel industry has a similar two-tier pricing system 
(Financial Gazette (Zimbabwe), 3.9.1992). 
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foreign hunter pays for the entire hunting package in foreign exchange. This revenue qualifies 
for the export retention scheme. If the value of the cost and mark-up by the safari operator 
on the auction price is assumed to be 100%, 1 then the gross export revenue of the hunt for 
the Zimbabwe economy is: Z$200 which is sold in foreign exchange (say for US$200)2. This 
hunt then earns US$200 times the fixed exchange rate of Z$3.07 per unit US$ plus the 
premium of the entire foreign exchange to the Zimbabwe economy of 1.65, in total about 
Z$1'000. 
This value again excludes economic multiplier effects, since the foreign client also pays for 
airfares, hotel bills and taxidermy services, all in foreign exchange. These economic effects 
also include job-creation, wages and salaries spent, tax revenue to central Government from 
economic activity (sales tax) and profit (income tax). These effects are not quantified here, 
but are real and significant costs to the macro-economy and the Zimbabwe Government. 
5.5.5. Conclusions of methodology 
The 1991 opportunity cost of foreign exchange revenue to the Zimbabwe economy can be 
estimated using the June 1992 export retention premium of 65%. This premium approximates 
the difference between the fixed exchange rate and the market value of foreign exchange 
valid for 1991 during the research period. 
If hunting resources were allocated to all interested part1c1pants using an auction and a 
liberalized market (allowing safari operators and foreign agents to bid, allowing trading or 
"dealing" by market participants), then: 
5.5.5.1. Citizen hunters benefit the economy at least ten times less than safari hunters. 
5.5 .5.2. Citizen hunters benefit the economy at least six times less than agents acting for 
safari hunters. 
5.5.5.3. Citizen hunting forgoes significant additional economic activity as direct spending 
in foreign currency (multiplier effects) that is not easily quantified, but estimated 
to be the greatest when compared with the option of a safari operator marketing 
an auction hunt as part of a larger packaged hunt. 
5.5.5.4. The above opportunity costs of citizen hunting do not take account of other 
macroeconomic effects that are forgone, such as: job creation, wages and salaries, 
tax revenue to the Government from sales (sales tax) and profit (income tax). 
1 It could be argued that the Zimbabwean agent might pay a higher price than the safari operator. The argument 
goes, that the agent has an assured client and does not purchase the hunt at his own risk on account, whereas the 
safari operator first has to purchase the hunt, then find and market it to a foreign client at his own risk and on his 
own account (High, personal communication). It is also true, that safari operators have foreign c:;lients as regular 
customers who make their hunting requirements known some time in advance. negating a difference in risk, and price 
paid, between an agent and a safari operator. 
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These effects have not been quantified here, but are real significant economic costs 
to the economy and the Zimbabwe Government. 
5.5.5.5. To be objective, it must be acknowledged that the gross revenue earned by the 
DNPWLM from the auction system does not include additional value added by 
safari hunters and foreign hunters or their agents who bought these hunts. This 
revenue can be significant (assumed to be 20-100% of the auction price), and 
auction systems may well, therefore, be more efficient at maximizing total revenue 
from the hunting resource. 
5.5.5.6. The DNPWLM, as the landholder or wildlife resource authority for protected 
areas, earns the same maximal amount of Z$100 by auctioning the hunting 
resources from each scenario, irrespective of who buys the hunting resource. 
5.5.6. Zimbabwe's foreign exchange opportunity costs from 
citizen hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area 
By applying the market determined premium on foreign exchange earnings to the gross 
revenue earned by the safari operator marketing system alternative for Charara/Makuti in 
Table 5.3, page 184, the opportunity costs of citizen hunting to Zimbabwe are calculated in 
Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 Direct economic costs of foreign exchange foregone for Zimbabwe's economy by the 
DNPWLM lottery system in Charara/Makuti: 1991 
$iiii1iii:&()fM#ri<etirlg BfRHw~~Mi~ffi!:!9f ::~jfjri,lj:fi~~Ingi) 
•• QNBIL.Mdicensing .sy$tem t9r·cif1z~d tMn\mg [:\/ }\.! :··· ... 
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Section 5.5.4 showed that the direct economic costs or offering citizen hunting using the 
DNPWLM lottery system in Charara/Makuti of about Z$1.3 million do not include the value 
of foregone multiplier effects to other sectors of the economy (such as jobs, air fares, hotel 
bills, income tax and sales tax revenues). These secondary economic effects are considered 
by the author to be significantly greater for the safari operator marketing option than for the 
citizen hunting option, because the former use hunting resources productively and add 
economic value to the hunt, whereas the latter use hunting resources for consumption and add 
little economic value to the resource itself. 
If hunt allocation were equalized (with 1 ticket per applicant) for the present DNPWLM 
lottery system, Z$40'000 ticket revenue included in Table 5.7 would in addition be foregone, 
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5.6. Conclusions: Opportunity costs of licensing systems 
The chapter set out to clarify the nature and extent of opportunity costs (forgone benefits) of 
different licensing systems in Zimbabwe. 
• Benefits from sport hunting resources and Zimbabwe's protected areas 
The investigations in this chapter showed that allocation systems for hunting can generate the 
following benefit categories: 
• Hunting benefits for sport hunters. They include consumptive (hunting bag) and 
non-consumptive benefits (access to time and protected area space) (see sections 





Recreational (non-hunting) benefits for non-hunters in a variety of forms (see 
section 5.3) ; 
Revenue benefits in the Zimbabwe dollar currency; 
Revenue benefits in foreign exchange currencies (section 5.5); 
Other conservation benefits if revenue is invested back into protected areas to 
develop access, infrastructure, services and human resources that are linked to the 
resource base (section 5.4). 
Table 5.8 shows a summary of the estimated relative opportunity costs of Zimbabwe's 
licensing systems: 
Table 5.8 Summary of estimated relative opportunity costs of Zimbabwe's licensing systems 
Conclusions from each section are: 
• 
• 
The Charara/Makuti study area incurs a high economic cost by foregoing direct 
revenue from sport hunting of its big game resources on quota (section 5.2.1); 
The Charara/Makuti hunting area incurs a high economic opportunity costs by 
forgoing revenue from the resource of hunter-days, that is ti"me available to visitors 
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• Charara/Makuti has high social opportunity costs of direct access that are foregone 
for people (section 5.3); 
• The DNPWLM lottery system in the Charara/Makuti study area and other 
DNPWLM-administered allocation systems have serious institutional limitations 
to achieving efficient and equitable resource allocation. Sustainable development 
and conservation in Zimbabwe is thereby inhibited, and even perverted\ due to 
lack of economic incentives (section 5.4); 
• Both the economic and the social opportunity costs for the Charara/Makuti are 
even greater than anticipated from loss of direct foreign exchange if foreign 
exchange is valued at market prices set by scarcity. If indirect losses from 
multiplier effects are considered, the opportunity costs of present resource 
allocations are greater still (section 5.5); 
• Significant subsidization of Citizen hunters in Charara/Makuti by Zimbabwe 
Government 
Citizen hunting of big game in protected areas is a highly subsidized activity. Concentrating 
on the Charara/Makuti study area, and hunting resources allocated by the present DNPWLM 
lottery system, this allocation system causes Zimbabwe to forego the equivalent of Z$1.3 
million in foreign exchange revenue, in absolute terms. In relative terms, it is the cheapest 
big game hunting available in Zimbabwe (in terms of the consumptive resource and hunting 
bag) and the cheapest access to big game hunting and protected areas in Zimbabwe (in terms 
of the non-consumptive resource of access time in hunter-days). 
• Significant macroeconomic opportunity cost of institutional arrangements for the 
DNPWLM 
The economic and social opportunity costs of the present allocation system in Charara/Makuti 
(fix-priced lottery system) and present institutional arrangements (returning all revenue to 
central treasury in government) are excessive under the policy of using this area exclusively 
for citizen hunting. A mere 63 additional Zimbabwe citizens benefitted from the system who 
did not already have access to big game hunting in protected areas as members of the ZHA; 
a maximum of 200 Zimbabwe citizens could have benefitted from hunting, had the allocation 
been entirely successful; Zimbabweans who can afford to undertake a big game hunting trip 
have to be amongst the most wealthy of Zimbabwe's total population of 10.4 million citizens. 
The policy of citizen hunting incurs Z$1.3 million direct costs of foregone foreign exchange 
revenue. Additional indirect costs are incurred that remain unquantified, consisting of forgone 
economic activity from foreign exchange and its multiplier effects, loss of government 
revenue as sales tax and income tax, and foregone access and conservation benefits. 
1 With no direct economic benefits from the Charara/Makuti study area flowing to local communities at a local 
or regional level in the form of wildlife products, jobs, economic activity, local support for bio-diversity and 
conservation objectives in protected areas can be expected' to be low, and the urge to poach wildlife increased. The 
Pilanesberg National Park has put conservation benefits for people first and won-over the support of the communities 
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• Opportunity costs of the DNPWLM lottery system for Charara/Makuti study 
area 
The macroeconomic opportunity costs of the 1991 lottery system used by the DNPWLM to 
allocate citizen hunting for Charara/Makuti are significant. Opportunity costs, measured as 
direct losses in revenue, amount to Z$1.3 million. This entire amount is foregone as foreign 
exchange - recognized as a priority resource for Zimbabwe's economy under the present 
socio-economic development programme by the Zimbabwe Government (ESAP) and the 
business community. Additional foreign exchange is directly foregone by other sectors in the 
economy for hotel expenses, airline tickets, taxidermy services. Due to the high value of 
foreign exchange, other indirect opportunity costs from forgoing foreign exchange are also 




economic activity as multiplier effects from safari operators earning foreign 
exchange; 
job creation; 
Government revenue from turnover (sales tax) and profit (income tax) as part of 
the value added by the safari operator to hunting resources. 
• Performance of allocation systems 
Altering the fix-priced DNPWLM lottery system to a market-priced system (an auction or 
safari operator marketing system) would not benefit the DNPWLM or conservation and 
development in Charara/Makuti. To achieve real benefits from revenue, the institutional 
arrangement that prevents the DNPWLM from earning revenue from activities must be 
altered. 
Market-priced auction systems have the ability: 
• to generate the greatest revenue for the DNPWLM, allowing the DNPWLM to 
potentially self-finance maximum conservation benefits; 
• 
• 
to promote competition and efficient resource allocation amongst all persons who 
want to access big game in protected areas; 
to stimulate the supply of and conservation of wildlife and land in other areas of 
Zimbabwe using market mechanisms and economic incentives. 
• Auction systems are a fair, competitive, and efficient method resource allocation 
for all sport hunters and participants in Zimbabwe's safari hunting industry 
Using an auction system, the market price of hunting would ensure that the proportion of 
sport hunting resources (hunting quotas and access to space in hunting areas) would be 
allocated flexibly, competitively, and conform with market valuations and principles. Auctions 
minimize opportunity costs. It was shown that even if hunting is allocated at the highest 
auction price to Zimbabwe citizen hunters in competition with other market participants, there 
are substantial opportunity costs to Zimbabwe's economy due to ,the foreign exchange revenue 
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system, rather than an exclusive lease of a hunting area to a safari operator, the number of 
participants in the safari hunting industry is increased, along with competition and efficiency. 
• Influence of equality recommendations for lottery systems made in Chapter 4 
By adopting recommendations made in Chapter 4 to equalize hunt allocation in the 
Charara/Makuti study area (eg. based on the Wyoming lottery system), not only would such 
a lottery system be costly to administer, but hunting revenue would be reduced by an 
additional Z$40'000 compared to the 1991 DNPWLM lottery allocation system. An equal 
lottery system would cause macroeconomic opportunity costs of resource allocation in 
Charara/Makuti to be even more significant than those calculated for 1991 in this chapter. 
• Policy conflicts between Government and DNPWLM 
The conflict between the objectives of maximizing foreign exchange revenue and providing 
Zimbabweans with preferential (exclusive) access in terms of current DNPWLM policy 
statements is due to the choice being formulated as a political goal disregarding economic 
costs, instead of being presented as an economic choice. 
For the DNPWLM and policy-makers in the Zimbabwe Government, the pertinent question 
is not: Whether big game hunting resources in Zimbabwe's protected areas should be 
allocated to foreign hunters for foreign exchange revenue or to citizen hunters for Zimbabwe 
dollar revenue. 
Rather, decision-makers should ask: At what economic cost to the DNPWLM, to 
government, to taxpayers, to current users and to future generations big game hunting 
in Zimbabwe's protected areas should be supplied to Zimbabwe citizens? Or, what price 
are Zimbabwe citizen hunters and society (all non-hunting Zimbabweans) prepared to pay to 
supply big game hunting as an economic luxury to a privileged few? 
• No inherent trade-off exists between promoting efficiency and equality for the 
Charara/Makuti study area 
There is not necessarily a trade-off between maximizing foreign exchange and providing 
Zimbabweans with quantitatively and qualitatively increased benefits and access to protected 
areas. If the economic cake is large, then benefits and access are greater and are shared by 
more people than just foreign and Zimbabwean big game sport hunters. By limiting revenue 
outright with fixed prices for species, and preventing conservation benefits in and access to 
protected areas from being developed, the slicing of a diminished economic cake becomes 
politically and economically more difficult, because demand by all people for resource 
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CHAPTER 6 
INTEGRATED RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR 
THE C UTI STUDY AREA 
By comparing the existing DNPWLM lottery allocation in Charara/Makuti with alternative 
systems in the previous chapter, it quickly became apparent that this licensing system is 
inferior to all other alternatives. The present lottery system is inferior: 
• in terms of generating revenue and recreational opportunities from the resources 
available in the study area; 
• because the lottery system causes Zimbabwe to forego significant conservation and 
development benefits, mainly because economic incentives are not harnessed. 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is to summarize and conclude the investigation for the case study 
area and the DNPWLM lottery system by integrating major findings from all previous 
chapters of this dissertation. Zimbabwe's development priorities (Chapter 2) are integrated 
with the microeconomic results of the lottery system assessment (Chapter 4) and the system's 
macroeconomic assessment in Chapter 5. 
Drawing on data presented in all the preceding chapters, this chapter filters the maJor 
conclusions indicated by this investigation concerning the allocation of hunting resources in 
Charara/Makuti study area. Such a filtering process is essentially an attempt by the author to 
integrate and evaluate possible options for policy and practice in the study area. The process 
is subjective, based on the author's values and the data presented. A strategy with actions is 
recommended for decision-makers in the DNPWLM to take these conclusions forward. These 
recommendations necessarily affect policy issues and conservation practice in Zimbabwe's 
protected areas. 
In its simplest form, the key question requiring a decision may be formulated as follows: 
· ... · Are:: Zimli1Jb.W~ 'citi!e.ns':.(wtm~i{·to. :pa~':·: tti:. . e.x~i ·) tii ·:~s.iij'·'::mtUt6n/:.~~i .... :~e.ar::1i{:=< 
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In Chapter 3 hunting resources and technical details of the DNPWLM lottery system for the 
Charara/Makuti study area were reviewed. 
In Chapter 4 the microeconomic performance of this lottery system in 1991 regarding the 
efficient and equitable allocation of hunts amongst citizen hunters was critically assessed as 
a case study. At the microeconomic level, the assessment showed that the DNPWLM lottery 
system allocated hunts in the Charara/Makuti very inefficiently and very inequitably in terms 
of the specified criteria. Recommendations that were made to achieve a more efficient and 
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complex administrative and specialized technical and human resources. The costs for such 
resources to the DNPWLM are considered by the author to exceed the agency's capacity at 
present. The costs to supply citizen hunting would stand in no relation to the few Zimbabwe 
citizens that could, under the most favourable administrative circumstances, benefit from 
citizen hunting in Zimbabwe. It was also apparent that for a lottery system to be "fair" to all 
applicants, there should only be one lottery system allocating big game resources in the whole 
of Zimbabwe. 
Chapter 5 assessed the macroeconomic opportunity costs of the lottery system with respect 
to foregone revenue, the value of foregone foreign exchange and foregone access and other 
foregone conservation and development benefits in a comparative study. At the 
macroeconomic level, the assessment 5 showed that opportunity costs of lottery systems are 
significant, and directly impact the size of conservation and development benefits supplied 
by hunting resources in Zimbabwe's protected areas. 
6.1. Summary of hunting resources: 
Supply and demand in the study area 
6.1.1. The Charara/Makuti study area is part of Zimbabwe's system of protected areas under 
the authority of the DNPWLM. The area is used as a sport hunting area exclusively 
for Zimbabwe citizens. The area supports a sport hunting quota with a high proportion 
of big game and plains game distributed over a large area (1 '452km2) at low densities 
in the mid-Zambezi valley . Trophy and non-trophy buffalo (big game species) form 
the major part of the quota; 
6.1.2. The hunting season in Zimbabwe is between May and October annually, in the dry 
season, which is most agreeable to all visitors (hunters and non-hunters) of the 
Zambezi valley for climatic reasons. 
6.1.3. The hunting resources (sport hunting quota and hunting season) were allocated to 100 
hunts of fairly low hunt quality. Most hunts (but not all) had either a trophy or a non-
trophy buffalo allocated to the hunting bag; all the hunts had a uniform 6-day hunt 
duration and took place between specified hunting dates between May and October; 
6.1.4. Zimbabwe citizen hunters who demand these hunts are amongst the most wealthy 
persons in Zimbabwe. Of Zimbabwe's total population of 10.4 million people, 
between 1 '000 and 10'000 people, that is between l001h and l '0001h of a percent of 
the population, potentially qualify for big game citizen hunting in protected areas 
according to gross income estimates. 
6.1.5. In 1991, an estimated 196 Zimbabwe citizen hunters applied for an option to hunt in 
the DNPWLM lottery draw for the Charara/Makuti study area. Of these, an estimated 
133 applicants (or 52%) were members of the Zimbabwe Hunters' Association 
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in Zimbabwe (the Tuli, Doma or Rifa hunting areas) as members of that association. 
In 1991, the DNPWLM lottery system effectively catered for a mere 63 Zimbabwe 
citizens who did not already have big game hunting opportunities elsewhere, and who 
voluntarily chose not to have access to these other opportunities by not becoming 
members of the ZHA. 
6.2. Summary of case study: Allocating hunts in the study area 
Major results of the case study assessment in Chapter 4 were: 
6.2.1. Of all the 100 hunts planned for the Charara/Makuti study area in 1991, only 55 hunts 
were allocated successfully to Zimbabwe citizen hunters by the DNPWLM lottery 
system. A further 12 hunts were re-allocated by the DNPWLM using a first-come-
first-served system. 
6.2.2. The remaining 33 hunts and their potential benefits (revenue, hunting and recreational 
experiences) were wasted, and did not benefit additional Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
by the end of the 1991 hunting season. 
6.2.3. The dual allocation of hunts in the Charara/Makuti using two different licensing 
systems (a lottery system and a first-come-first-served system) was administratively 
inefficient for the DNPWLM, and costly in terms of time, money and effort spent by 
applicants. 
6.2.4. Contrary to the objective of using a l ttery system (as interpreted by the author in the 
absence of DNPWLM policy and conflicting statements made by administrators and 
practices observed by the author and documented in this dissertation), the DNPWLM 
lottery system gave applicants very unequal probabilities of winning a hunt. 
6.2.5. Applicants who bought over 23 tickets each, paying more than 2$460 for this option, 
had an overwhelming probability (p > 90%) of winning a hunt, whereas applicants 
who bought only one ticket each, paying only 2$20 for this option, had a remote 
probability of winning a hunt (p = 10%). 
6.2.6. The probability of winning a hunt was thus determined by each applicant's 
willingness to pay for a maximum number of tickets. The current DNPWLM lottery 
system for the Charara/Makuti favours wealthy Zimbabwe citizen hunters. 
6.2.7. The current lottery system for the Charara/Makuti study area also benefits the state 
(the central treasury of the Zimbabwe Government) by an additional 2$40'000 earned 
as ticket revenue from hunting applicants. This revenue was only possible because the 
DNPWLM lottery system was designed as an unequal, rather than an equal, lottery 
system. 
6.2.8. It was concluded that the design, administration and allocation of hunts using an 
equal lottery system for the Charara/Makuti study area is possible (using the 
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Zimbabweans to win a hunt of their preference is only possible if one central lottery 
system were to be adopted to allocate big game hunts in the whole of Zimbabwe 
(including those of the ZHA lottery systems in the Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas), and 
if application rules required that all hunters in the hunting party were to be specified 
on application. A centralized lottery system with these rules and suitable control 
procedures would ensure firstly, that no applicant could apply twice and secondly, 
that no hunter could hunt without having applied and drawn a hunt, thus effectively 
equalizing draw success for all citizen hunters who apply. (Present lottery systems do 
not ensure either condition.) 
6.2.9. None of the lottery systems used at present in Zimbabwe to allocate citizen hunting 
achieves the type of "fairness" (defined as equality in this dissertation) one could 
expect of a lottery system. Neither the DNPWLM lottery system or the individual 
ZHA lottery systems for the Tuli/Doma/Rifa hunting areas gives all hunters an equal 
probability of winning a hunt of their choice (eg. their First Hunt Preference). 
6.2.10. Equality, defined as an equal probability for each hunter to win a hunt of his 
preference) is a complex and costly objective to achieve, whose opportunity costs can 
only be assessed in comparison with other non-lottery systems of resource allocation. 
6.3. Summary of comparative study: Allocating hunting resources 
The economic, social and foreign exchange opportunity costs of the present DNPWLM lottery 
system were assessed in Chapter 5 at the macroeconomic level for the study area. Main 
results were: 
6.3.1. The DNPWLM lottery used the lowest fixed prices per species available in Zimbabwe 
to sell big game hunting resources in the Charara/Makuti study area to citizen hunters. 
6.3.2. Due to the fix-priced lottery system and the low prices, the DNPWLM lottery system 
generated the least absolute revenue from hunting resources of all Zimbabwe licensing 
system alternatives for allocating resources, both in terms of the species' quota and 
in terms of the access time supplied to citizen hunters. 
6.3.3 . The efficiency of revenue earning for the DNPWLM lottery system for the 
Charara/Makuti study area would be even lower than at present if an equal lottery 
system (according to Chapter 4's recommendations) to enforce an equal probability 
of being allocated a hunt of one's choice (ie. with one ticket per person). 
6.3.4. All hunting revenue earned by the DNPWLM lottery system from resource allocation 
in the Charara/Makuti study area - because it is a protected area managed by a 
government agency - is returned to the state (the central treasury of the Zimbabwe 
Government), not to the DNPWLM as the agency that incurs costs and is responsible 
for the resource area's management. The re~enue from the Charara/Makµti study area 
is thus not returned to the resource area from where this revenue originated to cover 
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6.3.5. The ability of the DNPWLM to invest revenue and develop access and conservation 
benefits in the Charara/Makuti area is severely curtailed by the conservation agency's 
lack of financial resources brought about by present institutional arrangements that 
prevent the agency from assuming full budgetary and financial responsibility. 
6.3.6. Under present institutional arrangements, the DNPWLM has no incentive or ability 
to increase the quality, quantity, or variety of conservation benefits and services 
presently being offered in the Charara/Makuti study area. This conclusion applies to 
all protected areas within Zimbabwe's Parks and Wild Life Estate - the land category 
for which the DNPWLM is the nation's legal custodian. The custodianship includes 
responsibilities for wildlife, bio-diversity and protected areas in the whole of 
Zimbabwe. 
6.4. Major conclusions for resource allocation in the study area 
Taken over the entire investigation, conclusions were that: 
6.4.1. Citizen hunting is an economic want, and therefore a luxury for Zimbabwe citizens 
since sport hunting as a recreation falls into the category of luxury goods, rather than 
that of basic human needs such as food, housing and education, for example. (Citizen 
hunting, being a type of sport hunting, was differentiated from subsistence hunting.) 
6.4.2. Citizen hunting is an expensive sport, especially when the hunting bag involves big 
and dangerous game species, of which buffalo is the most numerous on quota in the 
Charara/Makuti study area. At present, to afford a hunting trip in Charara/Makuti, 
Zimbabwe citizens must be amongst the country's richest citizens, in terms of both 
income and wealth, in order to participate in hunting for sport. Active and potential 
citizen hunters are estimated not to exceed 1 '500 persons in Zimbabwe's total 
population of over 10.4 million persons (1992 census). 
6.4.3. Given this perspective above, there is no economic or social reason for the Zimbabwe 
Government or the DNPWLM to subsidize citizen hunts, and every reason for the 
state to treat it as a luxury for which the wealthy should pay market prices. Support 
comes from economic theory of public goods, Maslow's hierarchy of needs, 
environmental economics that prices natural resources at market prices or higher to 
include unpriced ecosystem services (known as social costs). 
6.4.4. If the additional administrative costs to the DNPWLM (in terms of hours worked, 
money spent by the hunting administrators) due to the inefficient and inequitable hunt 
allocation using a lottery system are recognized, then the DNPWLM lottery system 
is judged by the author to be the most inefficient licensing system available. The 
lottery system ~oes not maximize present benefits or enhance future benefits from the 
Charara/Makuti study area for all persons concerned. It is inefficient for Zimbabwe's 
social and economic development, for the DNPWLM as the administering agency, 
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subsidized sport hunting for Zimbabwe citizens is judged by the author to be 
unjustified in the context of Zimbabwe's present development status. 
6.4.5. The comparative analysis raises the question of priorities for allocating hunting 
resources in protected areas. It also documents the significant loss of revenue as 
Zimbabwe dollars and more particularly as foreign exchange due to the present policy 
and lottery system adopted by the DNPWLM. Foreign exchange is considered a 
national priority under the present economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) 
instituted by the Zimbabwe Government and the World Bank. 
6.4.6. The comparative analysis revealed that even if the DNPWLM were to adopt a market-
priced auction system to allocate sport hunting in the Charara/Makuti study area as 
a non-exclusive hunting area for Zimbabwe and foreign hunters alike according to 
their willingness to pay market prices, the present institutional arrangements for the 
DNPWLM are inimical for that agency to promote sound conservation and wise 
resource utilization practices. This conclusion specifically for the study area can be 
generalized to apply to all protected areas in Zimbabwe that are the responsibility of 
the DNPWLM. Revenue from protected areas must be linked to costs, by returning 
hunting (and other) revenue earned from each protected area back that same area for 
the protection, management, research and development of its natural resource base 
(and human resource capacity). Such a change in the financial and budgetary 
responsibilities of the DNPWLM would enhance present efficiency, equality, and 
promote financial and ecological sustainability of conservation and development in 
protected areas into the future. Benefits for present generations of Zimbabweans could 
be increased, whilst at the same time making sure that these same benefits are 
available for generations into the future on the same, sustainable management basis. 
(At present, the management of Zimbabwe's protected areas is not sustainable with 
both an internal government debt and external foreign debt having accumulated, 
which future generations must pay for.) 
6.4.7. The author argues here for a change in thinking amongst the DNPWLM and the 
Zimbabwe Government as the nation's designated resource custodians, and amongst 
Zimbabwe citizen hunters as resource users of the Charara/Makuti study area. 
Hitherto the DNPWLM have supplied park visitors with, and citizen hunters have 
been privileged to benefit from, exclusive access to Zimbabwe's protected areas at 
low prices. Citizen hunting of big game, it is concluded, is an activity that is highly 
subsidized by the Zimbabwe Government and is therefore not sustainable in the 
longer term in financial terms. Citizen hunting at present does not contribute towards 
maintaining goals such as bio-diversity and ecosystem integrity or the long-term 
sustainable utilization of natural resources in Zimbabwe's context of wildlife 
legislation. 
6.4.8. The question Zimbabwe's wildlife resource custodians and users must address 
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a protected area, but how these conservation and development benefits are to be 
achieved in a financially sustainable manner, within the ecological limits posed 
by nature. Land is increasingly becoming scarce in Zimbabwe and on the African 
continent as a whole, due to the burgeoning population pressures. Unless conservation 
can not only pay its way, but in addition give larger numbers of citizens actual 
tangible benefits to cater for their basic needs and future wants, Zimbabwe's protected 
areas, their diverse wildlife populations and the natural ecosystems on which they 
depend will not be recognized for what they are - very valuable and naturally 
renewable resources with many benefits for mankind. 
6.4.9. Microeconomic efficiency: Should decision-makers decide that sport hunting for 
Zimbabwe citizens ( citizen hunting) should be allocated using a lottery system and 
fixed prices, then care needs to be taken with the design of the lottery system, and 
with the preference allocation procedure using preference lists to achieve equality of 
hunt allocation with lottery systems. It must be emphasized, however, that such a 
policy is contrary to the recommendation made by the author of this dissertation. An 
equitable (or "fair") lottery system does not increase the net hunting benefits for 
citizen hunters, but decreases them overall, due to additional costs of administering 
the lottery; total benefits from the resource allocation by lottery for all Zimbabweans 
are not increased, but would remain untapped or wasted. Lottery systems, in 
principle, can only distribute existing resources and their associated benefits 
somehow amongst people; lottery systems are unable to produce additional 
resources or benefits, nor can they enhance the quality of available benefits for 
people. 
6.4.10. Macroeconomic efficiency: When debating whether to adopt market prices determined 
by competition and economic incentives for conservation (eg. a competitive auction 
system for sport hunting) or fixed prices determined by resource administrators and 
perverse economic incentives for conservation, decision-makers in the DNPWLM and 
the Zimbabwe Government should consider the economic and social opportunity costs 
of their options. Resource allocation decisions using market forces and prices are 
definitely more efficient and flexible than bureaucratically determined allocations, 
especially if a long-term perspective for present and future generations is adopted. 
6.4.11. An important point for policy and decision-makers to consider when deciding on the 
manner in which the DNPWLM is to be made more market-oriented by altering the 
agency's institutional limitations concerns whether the conservation agency should be 
a profit-making, or a non-profit-making organisation. An example of the latter is the 
NPB in South Africa which is partially independent and self-financing to some 
degree, receiving subsidies for the remainder of its budget. An essential difference 
between these two approaches in maximizing benefits should be noted. 
6.4.12. A profit-making enterprise has nothing ,to do with being socially irresponsible towards 
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ensure that benefits exceed the costs of supplying these benefits in the long term. A 
long-term perspective of running a park or a business by socially responsible directors 
can aim for survival and continuity of the park or the enterprise, respectively. 
6.4.13. The difference comes in the ability of the profit-making enterprise to maximize 
benefits by generating a surplus value as profit (revenue over costs) that can be used 
for socially responsible programmes. The non-profit-making enterprise limits benefits, 
since no net-value as profit is produced and this surplus is thus foregone outright 
through the goal of being a non-profit organisation. Such organisations (eg. the Natal 
Parks Board (NPB) which manages conservation in the Natal province of South 
Africa) are unable to use a net-surplus (profits) to increase socially responsible 
programmes and benefits. The importance of this difference was clearly highlighted 
in a recent Environmental Impact Assessment report (CSIR Environmental Services, 
1993) that compared mining and tourist development options by a profit-making and 
a non-profit-making enterprise, respectively. 
• 
• 
Mining development was to be managed by Richard's Bay Minerals as a private 
profit-making enterprise and profits were to cover rehabilitation costs and fund 
substantial commitments to social development programmes to benefit 
communities locally and regionally. 
Conservation development, on the other hand, was to be managed by the Natal 
Parks Board as a semi-independent government agency that is non-profit-making. 
Due to this limitation, the environmental impact assessment identified the NPB as 
being unable to generate any surplus value (profit) from its eco-tourism proposals in 
order to re-invest this money back into social development programmes and benefits 
that would go beyond the conservation development proposals themselves (see CSIR 
Environmental Services, 1993: xx; 140-142; and 153-154). 
6.5. Present constraints to maximize the study area's 
conservation benefits 
6.5.1. Financial and institutional constraints 
Most recommendations that call for the development of existing or new facilities, human 
resources or services by the DNPWLM in the Charara/Makuti study area require this agency 
to have additional financial resources to implement them. Clearly, in the present severely 
restricted annual budget allocated to the DNPWLM by central Government, whose real value 
is decreasing as inflation rises, and in the climate of reducing government costs, personnel, 
and deficits, added financial resources are not available and cannot be realistically expected 
as subsidies. The resources could become available to the DNPWLM through self-funding 
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By subsidizing activities based on some of Zimbabwe's economically most valuable hunting 
resources (wildlife and resource areas) the DNPWLM also creates perverse economic 
incentives for other wildlife based activities. 
These perverse price incentives curtail supply-side responses that would increase the supply 
of other hunting and tourist opportunities on land outside the Parks and Wild Life Estate. One 
such market that would benefit is the supply of plains game trophy and non-trophy hunting 
on private land to Zimbabwe citizens. Another market that would benefit is the supply of 
quality big game trophy hunting on communal land to Zimbabwe citizens (eg. the 
CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe). 
6.5.2. Lack of a formal, integrated planning document for the 
Charara Safari Area and region 
The current activity of Citizen Hunting (and possibly limited Safari Hunting) practised in part 
of Charara/Makuti study area does not appear to be the most rational land-use for this area 
that would maximize conservation and development benefits for the region. 
Decision-makers must determine the priority of earning foreign exchange revenue versus 
Zimbabwe dollar revenue as a resource of crucial importance to Zimbabwe's economy. 
Establishing this policy priority is of critical importance to all further decision-making and 
evaluation of options. 
6.5.3. ·Lack of baseline information for ecological monitoring and planning 
The evaluation of land-use options for Charara/Makuti demands a detailed resource inventory 
to be undertaken, and was outside the scope of this study. The importance of undertaking 
such a study in terms of comprehensive planning for the land bounding the eastern section 
of Lake Kariba cannot be emphasized enough, and needs urgent consideration. Planning 
processes should consult widely with all parties on the ground, and incorporate existing 
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6.6. The policy options available to the DNPWLM for 
land-use in the study area 
Option A: Continue present (1991) policy: Exclusive subsidized citizen hunting in the 
entire Charara/Makuti study area, allocated using an inefficient and 
inequitable lottery system. 
The Charara/Makuti area is used as an exclusive hunting area for Zimbabwe citizens to hunt 
big game and limited plains game at subsidized prices. Trophy hunts, non-trophy venison 
hunts and mixed trophy and non-trophy hunts will continue to be allocated wastefully and 
inequitably to wealthy citizens. Conservation and development benefits will not be maximized 
from the resources in the area. Long term sustainability is questionable, for example 
maintenance of endangered black rhinoceros populations in this area that was previously 
renowned for the species. 
Clarify specific citizen hunting objectives. If the criteria of efficiency a d equality as defined 
in this report are appropriate, consider implementing the recommendations made in this report 
for improving the efficiency and equality of hunt allocation. 
Option B: Discontinue present policy: Instead, introduce exclusive subsidized citizen 
hunting in the entire Charara/Makuti study area, allocated using a more 
efficient and equitable lottery system. 
The Charara/Makuti area remains an exclusive hunting area for Zimbabwe citizens. Hunts are 
allocated using either the Wyoming or ZHA lottery system to achieve a greater or lesser 
degree of equality amongst all persons for winning a hunt in these areas. The costs of 
administering such a system are judged to be high, and greater than for the administration of 
the present lottery system. The value of foregone benefits ( opportunity costs) to Zimbabwe's 
economy, the Zimbabwe Government, the DNPWLM, and non-hunting visitors remains high. 
Option C: Discontinue present policy: Instead, introduce non-exclusive competitively 
allocated sport hunting resources in the entire Charara/Makuti study area, 
allocated using an efficient, competitive auction system. Retain present 
financial institutional arrangements between DNPWLM and government. 
Auction the sport hunting quota as basic hunts and individual species to earn the maximum 
price of the day. The Charara/Makuti area would become a non-exclusive hunting area 
accessible to any person who can pay market prices. Market prices for hunting are decided 
by the individual bidders' willingness to pay, and the available supply of hunting 
opportunities. Market forces also determine the proportion of hunting resources that are 
finally allocated between various market participants (eg. citizen hunters versus foreign 
hunters), and thus the proportion of revenue earned as Zimbabwe dollars and as foreign 
exchange. The revenue and net value from the auctioned sport hunting resources 
(consumptive and non-consumptive) are maximized for the landowner, in this case the 
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exchange earned from the resources for the country is maximized, and subsidies of any type 
of sport hunting in the Charara/Makuti can be eliminated. All participants have the assurance 
that they can buy the available hunting resources at the lowest market price of the day. 
Opportunities for safari operators to access to Zimbabwe's most valuable big game species 
for trophy hunting (especially of a prime species such as buffalo) are increased using a well 
known, efficient, and accountable auction procedure. With more participants in the safari 
hunting industry, competition is enhanced. 1 (Access to big game resources, particularly for 
emergent safari operators, is probably the single biggest limitation to growth in Zimbabwe's 
safari hunting industry at present. See Price Waterhouse, 1992b: Volume 4.) 
Under option C, despite these innovations, all hunting revenue earned at the auction would 
continue to be returned to central treasury and not be available to the DNPWLM for 
conservation and development of the natural, human, or physical resource base. 
Option D: Discontinue present policy: Introduce exclusive sport hunting in the 
Charara/Makuti study area, and allocate the entire area to one singte 
safari operator using a competitive auction. Retain present financial 
institutional arrangements between DNPWLM and government. 
The Charara/Makuti area would become an exclusive hunting area accessible only to foreign 
hunters who can pay market prices in foreign exchange. Zimbabwe citizen hunters are 
excluded. The revenue from the auctioned sport hunting resources (quota and access rights) 
is maximized for the Zimbabwe Government, but no revenue is returned to the conservation 
agency or the resource area for development. 
In contrast to Option C (above) and Option E following, opportunities for other safari 
operators to have access to big game species for trophy hunting are reduced. There are fewer 
participants and less competition in the safari hunting industry. In general, the lease period 
of safari hunting concessions made available by the DNPWLM is for 5-years, so that this 
system is less flexible for the agency and cannot take account of differences in market 
valuation or inflation during that period - costs borne by the DNPWLM up till now as 
reduced nominal and real revenues, respectively. Opportunity costs for conservation remain 
high. 
1 Competition is recognized as a necessary and positive factor in any industry and economy. There are benefits for 
new participants. consumers, and producers in the longer term to have a mechanism that ensures the lowest prices 
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Option E: Discontinue present policy: Instead promote quality sport hunting and 
various non-hunting activities based on market prices and integrated land-
use in the entire Charara/Makuti study area. Alter the present financial 
institutional arrangements between DNPWLM and government. 
Auction all sport hunting using a competitive market to anyone willing to pay market prices. 
Participants should include citizen hunters, foreign safari hunters, safari operators and dealers. 
Hunting licences should be made legally transferable. It is anticipated that more Zimbabwe 
citizens will join the local Zimbabwe Hunter's Association (ZHA) as a result of citizen 
hunting being priced at market prices, resulting in lower probabilities of winning a hunt for 
all members of the association. To counter balance this effect, and to reduce the opportunity 
costs of the ZHA lottery system, the association should be allowed to sell hunting to earn 
foreign exchange. This revenue can either be used for conservation education, or to increase 
the hunting opportunities already offered by the association. 
With this option the DNPWLM would have all the revenue from auctio ing the sport hunting 
resources available for conservation and development of the Charara/Makuti study area. The 
Charara/Makuti study area should be developed within an holistic policy framework to 
integrate multiple land-uses in the area. Consumptive and non-consumptive land-uses should 
be combined for the greater Charara/Makuti region. The Kuburi Wilderness Area, the 
communal land areas currently developing community based wildlife programmes, the 
recreational park of Lake Kariba, and the nearby urbanized areas of Kariba, Makuti, Vuti 
towns should be included. Development in the region should be harmonized, using economic 
and market incentives to promote wildlife conservation and tourist-based development. 
Development potential includes: increasing hunting opportunities for Zimbabweans in the 
Parks and Wild Life Estate; providing all hunters and accompanying non-hunters with quality 
serviced hunting campsites; promoting guided non-consumptive recreational activities such 
as hiking trails, horse trails, and others. Revenue from sport hunting needs to be . returned 
to the resource area to be used productively for the development and distribution of benefits. 
A mandatory shooting test should be instituted for all sport hunters (Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
and foreign safari hunters) to improve shooting quality, reduce wounding of animals, and 
reduce follow-ups that are costly in terms of time, money and effort for DNPWLM staff and 
hunters alike. 
6.7. The case for auctioning the study area's sport hunting resources 
Only if clear, quantifiable objectives are set by the DNPWLM policy, and detailed park plans 
are drawn up for each protected area, each form of land-use, and thus for the licensing system 
and hunt allocation in the Charara/Makuti study area, can economic principles of efficiency 
and political principles of equality be rationally applied to resource allocation. With neither 
a coherent policy, nor specific plans, definitive recommendations for any one lottery system 
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systems, however, the magnitude of the differences is so great that the author felt it would 
be irresponsible to omit the recommended obvious course of action. 
A guiding tenet for decision-makers, however, should be that all resources involved in 
the production and distribution of hunting are scarce, and limited. Scarce resources for 
the DNPWLM include: 
• the protected area's natural resource base of wildlife and associated eco-systems; 
• human resources to accompany each hunting party (agency staff); 
• human resource expertise for administration, research, and management of the 
resource base; and most important of all financial, resources. 
It follows, therefore, that resources should be allocated so as to maximize present and future 
benefits for people, whilst minimizing present and future costs to society . In environmental 
terms, policies and actions should be efficient, equitable, and above all sustainable in 
ecological and financial terms (see Leibold, 1991). 
Equality, however this goal is defined, has costs of some kind or other which are borne by 
various groups of people. In Chapter 4 the dissertation revealed and quantified some of the 
implicit microeconomic costs incurred by the DNPWLM and by Zimbabwe citizen hunters 
during the 1991 hunt allocation process. Chapter 5 considered and partially quantified other 
macroeconomic costs of using the fix-priced DNPWLM lottery system rather than market-
priced systems to value and allocate hunting resources in the Charara/Makuti study area. It 
is recommended that Option Ebe considered by the DNPWLM as having the least direct and 
indirect costs overall for Zimbabwe, and the potential to achieve the greatest conservation and 
development benefits from the natural resource base. 
In revealing these costs of lottery systems, a snapshot view of the data was taken as though 
there was a lottery with a specific number of applicants in any year. By taking a more 
realistic dynamic view, it can be seen that over time with rising incomes, a larger population, 
and changing recreational tastes, sport hunting could easily become more popular, with the 
consequence that the number of applicants in any lottery would increase from year to year. 
This trend has been noticeable with the hunting membership of the Zimbabwe Hunters' 
Association, for years where data is available (see Chapter 3, Table 3.7, page 80). With rising 
membership and applicants and an unchanged number of hunts to be allocated by a lottery 
system, the hidden costs of lottery systems for all applicants are a lower probability for 
any citizen hunter to win any hunt at all. In this situation, the costs of lottery systems are 
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The main advantages of using a competitive auction in Option E to allocate scarce resources 
for sport hunting are as follows: 
• With auctions, the processes of valuation, allocation, and distribution all adjust 
dynamically over time, whereas for lotteries they are static. 
For example, if the number of applicants for a particular hunt increases (the hunt becomes 
more popular, the species become less numerous, or hunter's incomes rise), then in a market-
priced system higher hunt prices result and applicants who bid unsuccessfully at the auction 
would instead demand other hunts elsewhere in Zimbabwe (eg. on communal land and 
private land with wildlife enterprises). The price of these hunt alternatives would also rise and 
signal potential suppliers to increase the supply of these hunt alternatives. The net result of 
the market-priced system: More hunters can go to hunt, some at higher prices, and some at 
lower prices. 
Contrary to this flexible interplay between price, demand and supply, an increase in demand 
for one type of hunt with a fix-priced lottery system would cause all applicants, not only 
the final draw winner, to collectively have a lower probability of winning this specific hunt. 
None of the remaining hunt 's prices would rise in the lottery system due to the increased 
demand. The net result of the lottery system: The same number of persons go and hunt at 
fixed prices and everyone has Jess chance of winning a hunt at all. There is no economic 
incentive for suppliers of hunting alternatives in other areas of Zimbabwe (eg. on communal 
land and on private land) to increase the quantity of hunts supplied if a lottery system is used 
to allocate resources. Lottery systems are static, and merely distribute the available hunts 
according to some pre-defined pattern and definition of equality. Revenue earned from lottery 
systems is fixed. All participants (not just the winners of the lottery) incur an unpaid 
additional "price", or cost, from randomizing citizen hunting benefits of winning a valuable 
hunt at fixed prices for all applicants, namely a reduced chance of winning and actually going 
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• Prices are incentives and information signals for people demanding and supplying 
a scarce resource; as such, prices are one of a competitive market's main 
properties and advantages 1• 
With monetary prices and valuations, costs and benefits of allocation decisions are at least 
made explicit for all persons concerned. Monetary units have the advantage of being 
comparable between persons as their willingness to pay for resources and benefits. Resource 
allocation decisions based on non-monetary allocation mechanisms, such as the draw 
probability in a lottery or the time wasted in a queue, are economic decisions. However, 
despite the disappointment of not winning a hunt or of not being allocated one's most 
preferred hunt being real costs for individual citizen hunters, these costs are not explicit, and 
are rarely quantified by those affected, because they remain unpriced. 
Efficiency of hunt allocation as defined in Chapter 4 is not, therefore, based on the costs of 
producing these hunting benefits for all Zimbabwe citizens. One such implicit cost is that 
other Zimbabwean producers of wildlife and wildlife products (eg. sport hunting) are not 
given economic incentives to produce more hunts for Zimbabwe citizens even if a lottery 
system that uses subsidized prices for big game allocates all hunts efficiently to 
applications is used. Consequently, lottery systems that allocate citizen hunting affect the 
efforts of the CAMPFIRE programme, whose main rational is to place the highest economic 
value on natural resources that previously had low, or zero economic value for communities 
concerned. 
Ideally, efficiency should consider the financial sustainability (profitability) of supplying and 
distributing resources, in addition to the well known criterion of ecological sustainability. 
Resource management of protected areas in Zimbabwe should incorporate the goals of 
ecological and financial sustainability for present and future generations of 
Zimbabweans. 
1 The Austrian School of economics emphasizes market mechanisms as incentives and as constant sources of 
information for resource allocation decisions by all participants. See O'Driscoll and Rizzo (1985): 105-106, and 











240 Chapter 6: J11tegmted resource a/location for the stwly area 
"''':,• '•,;,:,:,:·!•!-!•:•:·!· ,•,·,•,•,•,,•,•,•,•,•,,,•,•,·.•,,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,·,•,•,•, :-:•:-:,;,;.;,;,;.;,;,:,;,:,;-;,; ,•,•,•.•,•,•,•,•,•,•.•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•.•,•,,,•,•,••,•,•,•,•,•,•,••,•,•,•,•• ,.,••,••,•, •,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•,•?,',',',',',',','•'','''''•'•'·"•' •'·"h'•'•'•' •'•',',U',','•' •'•'•''•' 
6.8. Summary of actions for decision-makers in the study area 




Alter institutional arrangements to make DNPWLM financially independent and 
responsible for all revenue and costs from the Charara/Makuti study area. 
Decide on resource allocation principles for wildlife conservation and resource 
allocation in protected areas versus similar activities on all other (non-protected) 
land areas in Zimbabwe. 
Determine the priority bio-diversity conservation goals and strategies to manage 
the Charara/Makuti study area as an integral part of the ecological processes (eg. 
elephant migration routes) within it, and those on all surrounding land categories. 
Plan in close consultation with all local communities. 




Institute a competitive auction system to allocate sport hunting resources in the 
Charara/Makuti study area to all participants, on the basis that they are willing to 
pay market prices in Zimbabwe dollars (Option E). Market participants should 
include Zimbabwean and foreign safari operators, Zimbabwean agents for foreign 
hunters, foreign hunters in person, and Zimbabwe citizen hunters. 
The hunting licence, which incorporates the right to enter the hunting area, to hunt 
a specific quota within a specific time period between set calendar dates, and to 
camp at a demarcated site, should be made legally transferable. 
Consult with Tsetse Control in the Department of Veterinary Services, the 
Zimbabwe National Army, Campfire representatives and the Kariba town planning 
authorities to coordinate an integrated plan and approach to development for the 
region surrounding the eastern shoreline of Lake Kariba. 





Draw up a resource inventory and zonation plan . 
Develop a park plan for the Charara/Makuti study area integrating it into 
neighbouring areas and land-use developments. 
Develop park plan in a consultative process. Institute a business plan, complete 
development and baseline documents. 
Finalize institutional decision-making for financial and budget independence of the 
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Appendix 1 Common and scientific names of species 
Common Name 
Baboon .. .. .. ........ ... ... . 
Bat-eared Fox ........ ... .... . 
Blesbok . .. ...... ..... .... . . 
Buffalo .................... . 
Bushbuck .................. . 
Bushpig . .. ..... . .......... . 
Civet, african . ....... .... .. . . 
Crocodile .................. . 
Duiker, common ......... ... . . 
Eland . . ............. . ..... . 
Elephant .... . ........ .... .. . 
Fallow deer .. . ....... . ...... . 
Francolin ... .... .... ....... . 
Genet, small-spotted ..... ... ... . 
Giraffe ..... .. ............. . 
Grysbok, Sharpe' s ...... .. .... . 
Guinea Fowl, crowned and crested .. 
Hippopotamus ...... .. . . ..... . 
Hyaena, spotted . ... ...... .. .. . 
Impala ... . ....... . ........ . 
Jackal, side-striped and black-backed 
Klipspringer . ....... .. ...... . 
Kudu . ................... . . 
Leopard .. .... .. ........... . 
Lion ......... .. ......... .. . 
Nyala .................... . . 
Pigeon/Dove .... .. .......... . 
Porcupine . ..... ... ...... ... . 
Red hartebeest .......... . .. . . . 
Reedbuck ....... . ..... .. .. . . 
Reedbuck, mountain .... ....... . 
Sable .. . ..... .... ... .. .... . 
Serval .. ................. .. . 
Springbok .................. . 
Steenbok ............ . ..... . . 
Tsessebe . .......... .... ... . . 
Warthog .................. . . 
Waterbuck . . ... ... .. ....... . 
Wild cat, african ... . .. . ...... . 
Wildebeest, black ... ... ....... . 
Wildebeest, blue 




























Columba sp , Streptopelia sp ., Turtur sp. 
Hystrix africaeaustralis 
A/ce/aphus buse/aphus 
R edunca arundinum 
R edunca fulvorufula 
Hippotragus niger 
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Appendix 2 
Appendix 2.1 
CHARARA SAFARI AREA: 
Quota allocation to hunts for Zimbabwe hunting areas: 1991 
Quota allocation: Charara Safari Area 
AU.OCATION OF HUNTING QUOTAS 1991 
Citizen Hunting Area (includes MsiaJfi Totals) 
YEAR: 1991 
DATEfrom: 1.5 1.5 9.5 9.5 17.5 17.5 25.5 25.5 2.6 2.6 10.6 10.6 18.6 18.6 
DATE to: 7.5 7.5 15.5 15.5 23.5 23.5 31 .5 31 .5 8.6 8.6 16.6 16.6 ?A.6 24.6 
DRAW NO. 4 5 9 10 14 15 19 20 24 25 29 30 34 35 
HUNT NO. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 CB C9 c10 C11 C12 C13 C14 
SPEC ES 





W"" ""' 1 1 1 1 .... -~·~-~tMl l 1 1 1 1 1 l 





~~- ll 1 ~, .. ,., 






W~t ·--,-Ml 2 2 2 2 2 ~ 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 










Bal-eartld ~ ..... 
... ,,..,,WW.. 
~~ l l 1 l l 1 l 
Crocodile 




DATA SOURCE DNPWLM Licensing Offi::e, Haran,. 
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CHARARA SAFARI AREA: 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 4.7 4.~I 127 127 20.~I 20.~I 28.~I 28.~I 5~1 
5.8 13.8 13.8 21 .8 21 .8 29.8 29.8 
DATE to: 10.7 10.7 18.7 18.7 '26.7 '26.7 3.8 3.8 11.8 11 .8 19.8 19.8 V .8 27.8 4.9 4.9 
DRAW NO. 44 45 49 50 54 55 59 60 64 65 69 70 74 75 79 80 
HUNT NO. C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C:l4 C25 ca, C27 Gal C29 C3) C31 C32 
SPEC ES 





Wa - 1 1 1 1 
C.r, 
Kor ~rMI 1 1 l l l 1 1 
~·" trl 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 
Buffalo IN II 













lrmala!,'I) 2 2 2 " 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ,< 2 2 2 1-••'Fl 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1- cull) 








l-laxxin l I I I 1 I 1 1 
Crocodile 
Gui.-Fowt 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 
iFr""""'"' :, :, :, :, :, :, 4 :, 4 :, 4 :, :, 5 :, 4 
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a-wv\RA SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
::rn~&.,'o/.fJ.l '"" :•:•:•:•::;:;::~ ... :t:=:•:•:•:•:•: DATE from: 6.9 6.9 14.9 14.9 229 229 ~J.~I 30.9 MAKVTl ,taP..t®V 
DATE to: 12.9 129 20.9 20.9 28.9 28.9 6.10 6.10 }:},'i#.11::{{ 
DRAW NO. 84 85 89 90 94 95 99 100 •· . . . AUT1-0Rl2ED ' -"im~-
HUNT NO. C33 C34 C36 C36 c:r, C38 C38 C40 ifal&'8: QUOTA :(='~-'(= SPECES ALLOCATED :,AU.OCA'lm: 
Elephant (M) 3 :,}:/::::::::,:::::\::::ii:: 
EleDllantfR :::::::::::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::: 0 
E """"'ll'lfl 0 ::::::::::::::::::::::·:·:·:····· 
I £JIOfB. 0 :=::;:::;:;::::::·:·:····-·-··· 
ll" 
;:;:;:::;:;:;:::--···-·.·· 1 -:-:-·-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: : 
WA• ""' ::::::::::::::::: 18 
11.>r ::::::t·····-·.·.·.·.··· 0 
t<UI IO(M) Z! 
t>U!!illO (t-) 2' 
Buffalo IN 0 :::::::;:;:;:;::::::-:-:,: 
Nv- :::::::::::::::::: :::=::::::::::. 0 
Bustbud( (M) 1 1 1 1 •.••.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•, ll" 
'"""" Ml 15 
Kudu Fl :;:;::-:-:-:-:-:- 0 :;·:-.. :.:.:::::::::::::::.:.: .. 
ciana [M) -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:;::::;:::;::;:;:::·. 0 
~A~ l~I ll" 
LJu11<er ::::::::::;:::=:::::;:;:::::::::::: 
A~ 0 
Wa!...tiuck CMl s 
Wat~""<IH 0 
'""°"' {Ml ~ 
Sable (F) :;:;:;:;::::::::;:::::::::::::::::· 0 
W~I :::::::;:;:;:::::::::::::::::::::: 0 ::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::0:: ,.........,.. 0 ::::::::::::::;:;:;:::::::; 
·=- !Ml 2 2 2 1 1 ll" .... ::::::::::::=:.:.: .. 
Jn-nalA IFl 2 2 2 0 
1~ culn 0 
Klnvvi naer 9 
a ···=·::::::::::::::::: 
lr.lSDOI< 1 1 1 1 4l: :,::,:::::::::,:::,:,:::::,:,:~ .. 
Lion tMl 3 ::::::::::::::::=:-
inn (Fl 0 :;:;:::;:;:;:: :;:::::::::;:;:;: : 
Leocaro :::::::::::::::::::;:::-:-:-·-·.· · s .-:-:-:-:-:-::::::::::::::::: 
IYVIOCal 0 ::;:;:;:;:::::::::::::::::::: : 
S«val 0 :;:;:;: ::;:;:;:;:;:;:::::;:;::: 
IGoww a ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
;:;:;:;:;:::::::::::::;:;:-:-:-·,· 2 ::::::::::;:;:;:-:-:-·-·.··· 
_,., ;:;:;:;::::::::::::::::=:::::::=::: 1i :::::: ::::::::::::;:::;:::::::: 
Jad<al :-:-:-:-:;:-:;:::::::::· 0 .·:-:-::;:;:;:::::::;:;:: 
Bat-eared ~ox 0 :::::::: 
t'OltlllrW ~ :::::=:::::: 
1 1 1 1 :,:::::::::::::::::::::::::::,, 
Crooodile 0 :;:;:;:::::::::::::::: 
Gu.--~owl s 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 217 :::,:=:::::::':::':::::,:C:ll' .t : 
'""' ~ ~ a a 3 3 3 3 3 :;:;:::;:;:;:;:::::;:;:;:;:::~ ... : ?17 ::=:::::::::::::::::::::::::q: 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 :::::::::::::·~-
,.,.,.,,,.ouse ,::,:,:=:,:,:;:::;ii:11 0 
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Appendix 2.2 Quota allocation: Makuti section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUl'GNE SAFARI AFEA ALLOCA T10N OF QUOTA TO HUNTS 
MAKUTI SECTION Citizen Hunting Area 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 
1~ 1 1~ 1 1~ 1 9~ 1 
9.5 9.5 11
~ 1 11.~1 17~1 
25.5 25.5 25.5 2.6 
2.~1 2.~1 10.6 
10.6 10.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 
DATE to: 7.5 7.5 7.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 31 .5 31 .5 31 .5 8.6 8.6 8.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 24.6 24.6 24.6 
DRAW NO. 1 2 3 6 7 8 11 12 13 16 17 18 21 22 23 36 27 28 31 32 33 




E,epnam CF Hl 
/ otva 
n=~ 
Wan ""' 1 1 1 1 ur~ 
" 'ma !Ml 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 1 
"t.ma,o (F) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 
Buffalo [ N 

























C>iEOOfl 1 1 1 1 1 --,- --,- --,- 1 l 
Crooodile 
Gui.-F<>M 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
l~lilllOOll1 3 3 4 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 -3 ·3 3 3 3 3 :, :, 




DATA SOURCE ONPWL/,1 Licensing Office, Harare. 
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HURUN3WE SAFARI AREA 
MAKUTI SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
DATI:from: I 26 ~1 26 ~1 26·~1 4~1 4.7 4.7 12~112~ 1 12~1 20.~1 20~I 20.~1 28.7 28.7 28.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 DATI:to: 27 2.7 27 10.7 10.7 10.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 11.8 11 .8 11.8 19.8 19.8 19.8 
DRAW NO. ~ 37 38 41 42 43 46 47 48 51 52 53 56 57 58 61 62 63 86 f;l 68 
HUNT NO. M M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 M36 M37 M38 M39 M40 M41 M42 
SPECES 





w·~ - 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ural e 
.. ,m, (Ml l 1 1 1 1 I I l 1 1 
Hun, I<> (Fl 1 1 1 l l 1 l 1 1 
Buffalo IN II -·~ 
























~ 1 1 1 
Jadoo! 
I Bat-eareo H>X 
~~ ~ 1 
"'°""' l I 1 1 l l l l l l l 
Crocodile 
Guinea Fowl 3 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 
IFrancx>1n ;s 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 0 0 4 0 0 4 5 5 5 4 
'IDll"ll:.-Vl..JOV9 7 I II II II II II II II II ,, II II II II 8 8 8 8 
"""""rouse 
Dud< 











Appendix 2.2 All 
:-:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:,:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
HUAUOOWE SAFARI AFEA 
MAKUTl SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 21 .8 21 .8 21.8 29.8 29.8, 29~1 6~1 6.~I 6.~, 14~1 14.~I 14~1 ~~1 ~~, ~~, '.l)~I '.ll.9,1 '.ll.9 ?::n ,,,, 
DATE to: 27.8 27.8 27.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 129 12 9 129 20.9 20.9 20.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 6.10 6.10 6.10 
DRAW NO. 71 72 73 76 77 78 81 82 83 86 f57 88 91 92 93 96 97 98 \ ,, ~ tA t HUNT NO. M4.1 M44 M45 M46 M47 M48 M49 MSO M51 M52 M53 M54 MSS M56 M57 MSB M59 M60 
SPEC ES iAUOCA'lm: 
Elephant (Ml ,:;,;:;:;:;:;:;:;::)):t 
E-•- IF\ 
EleCllanl n- Ul 
ILJIDl'a 
.·:·::::::::::::::::::: 
"""'°" 1 w~ 
l.>Hffe :::::::::::;:;:;::: 
"'-- (Ml 
.,,ma,o(F) 1 1 1 1 ;,;:;:;:;,;:;,;:;:;, 
Buffalo IN I I ,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;c,,,m:, 
-~,u, 




UUIIOOI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 :;:::::: ,,,;,;:;:;:;:;:;:;,;:~ .. ' 
R-*x.ck ;.;.:,: ·=·=·=·=·:·:·:·:·:·.·'.·:·· 
Watelbuck CM\ 
vvatelbuck (F) :;:;:;:;.;:;:;.;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:; 
~- IMI 1 1 1 :;:;:;:;:;:;::::;::;::;:;:: 
Sable (F) ;:;:;:;:; •,·:=:-:·:·:·:-:-:-:·:· 
w~ ..... """' ·~ - :Ml :::::::;::::::::::::::::::::::::;: 
I"""' "' 'Fl 
1"""'~ culn 
11.I~·~ 
Gryobok 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 T T l 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .::::::::: ;:::;:;:;:;:-:-:-··· 







... orcum\8 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Crocodile 
Gui,-Fowt 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1~r~ 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 3 3 '"3" 3 3 3 3 3 :< ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:;:;:;: ... 

























Appendix 2.3 Al3 
:·:·:-:,:,:-:-:,:,:-:·:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-: ....... ·.-..... ·.·-····:::::::::::-:-::-:-:-:-:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:-:-:-:-···· ... ···•.•.•,·,•· .. ·.•.•,•.·.·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:·:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-·-·.•,•.•,·,.·.·-·.·.·.·.·.·.·-·.·········-·.·.·-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-:·.·········-·················-···-·-·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-: 
Appendix 2.3 Quota allocation: Tuli Safari Area 
ruu SAFARI AREA: ALLOCATION OF QUOTA TO HUNTS 
Matabeit,land Hunter's Association 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 27.4 27.4 11 .5 11 .5 25.5 25.5 
8~ 1 
8.6 226 226 6.7 6.7 20.7 20.7 3.8 38 1 17.8 1 17.8 
DATE to: 7.5 7.5 21 .5 21 .5 4.6 4.6 18.6 18.6 2.7 27 16.7 16.7 30.7 30.7 13.8 13.8 27.8 27.8 
HUNT NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
N s N s N s N s N s N s N s N s N s 
SPECES 
Elephant (Ml 1 1 
EIBOMnt fFl 
Eleohant IF tll 
ILB[)(a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bust,p,g 






Bushbuck (M) 1 1 1 
IKudu :Ml 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kudu Fl 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Eland Ml 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IEcland If-) 1 1 1 1 1 1 






Widebeest 1 1 1 1 1 1 
lsessebe 
11rmrua (Ml 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 
lrmrua !Fl 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 20 26 
1~"' (culll 
Klnsor1na8' 








HVaAna 1 1 1 
Jackal 1 1 1 1 
Bat-eared ~ox 
l"orct.plne 
,n- •• 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 " " Crocodile 
Guinea Fowl 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
1~ranco1n 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 
I r-,georvuove 1U :, 1U :, 1U :, lU :, lU :, 1U :, lU :, lU :, lU :, 
Sanda rouse 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 
Duck 
NOTES Lion (M) and Lion (F) were not allocated, by choice. 
Oates are the actual huntng days. Hunter can ent8'/leave the catT1J 1 day belor&'after the dale given above. 
Full relund of $7500 will be given on unshot Elephant (M). 
8 Bus"""' are available on r,,auest at $75 each. 










Al4 Appendix 2.3 
:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-....... ·-·-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-·-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•. :-:-:-:.;-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.;-;-;,;,;-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.;-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:,:,:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:,:,;,;,;-:,:.;,:, 














t, UJTaJO (Ml 




















20 26 20 26 20 26 20 :::::: : 
20 26 20 26 20 26 20 ;;,dl: 
Kln<..CYinoer ;:;:=:::::::::::::::;"1_: 
SteenDOK :::::::::::::;:::;:::::::::::::::ti' ; 
;::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::;:;:::!"! : 
Lion IM\ :,:::::::::0: 






I Hyaena ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::::::=:-;,ii : 
Jad<al ::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;::::;:;:;:;I:: 
IBa!...ared Fox :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;::::;:;::::::E): 
t-'Qfr.tJnrte 
t,a,oon 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::, : 
Crocodile 
Guinea F c,wj 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::1 
l f-rancoln 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 ::::::=::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;::'ll 
IJHl IVI Jn\/8 lU 0 lU 0 lU 0 lU 0 :::::::::::::::::;:;:;::::::::~; 













Appendix 2.4 AJS 
:·:·:·:·:-:-:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-: -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·.·.·.·.·. :-:-:.;-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
Appendix 2.4 












' tluttalo (!-) 
Buffalo INTI 
jNyala 






























Quota allocation: Doma Safari Area 
1991 
Al.LOCATION OF QUOTA TO HUNTS 











1 2 3 4 5 
2 2 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
1 
1 1 1 
1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 2 2 2 2 
10 10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 10 
20 20 "" "" "" 
15~1 31~ 1 14~1 
29.8 
26.7 10.8 25.8 9.9 
6 7 8 9 
1 1 1 1 





1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 " " 
10 10 10 10 
10 10 10 10 
"" "" "" "" 
LHA offers additional anmals on application @ DNPWLM prices + 20%. 
Dates are the actual hunting days. Hunter can enter or leave the carrp 
1 day befonwafter the date given above. Full refund ol $7500 will be 
Ol\len on unshot Ei..nru.nt !Ml. 
ZHA aloca!ion sheet. Mhanoura 
















































Appendix 2.5 Al7 
;,;.;,:,:-:,:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·=·=·=·:·:-:,:,:-:-·.·-···-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·-·······-.... ·.·.·.·.······::::::: :::-:,:,::-:-:-:·-·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.·.·,•,·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.····-· ..... ·.·.·················· · ·.· ··.·················.·······.·.·.········.····· .·,,·:·.·:-:-:-: •. -'.·'.·'.·'.·'.·'.•'.•'.·'.·'.·'.···'. .. :•'.•'.•'.•'.·'.·'.·'.·'.·:.•·•·•·:-:-:-:-:-:-;.:,;.:,; ................. . . :-:-....... :-•• ;.;;.,.;.: 
Appendix 2.5 Quota allocation: Rifa section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUN3WE SAFARI AREA ALLOCATION OF QUOTA TO HUNTS 
RIFA SECTION Mashonaland Hunter's Association 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 







DATE to: 7.5 7.5 7.5 21 21 21 4.6 4.6 4.6 18. 18. 18. 27 27 27 16. 16. 16. 30. 30. 30.7 13.8 138 13.8 27 8 27.8 
HUNT NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B 
SPECES 
Elephant CMl 1 1 1 1 1 
E"""'~n1 !Fl 
E,epnam (F ti) 
Zeb<a 1 1 
,-S 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
CUSJ""" 
WarthOO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Gwalfe 
MUflaJO (Ml 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
cuna,o (~) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Buffalo CNTJ 
Nvala 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
"uou(M) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kudu (Fl 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 










1n-pa,a (Ml 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 




l>rVSOOK 1 1 1 1 1 
L,on (M) 1 1 1 1 
Lion (Fl 1 1 1 1 








carxion 2 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 " " b Crocodile 
Guinea Fowl 4 4 4 4 ·4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Francoon 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
e 4 4 4 J J J J J :J :J J :J J J :J :J J J J J J J J :J J J 
S•"""rouse 
Duck 
NOTES Dates are the actual hunling days. Hunler can enterllea11e the carrp 1 day befo,a'after the date given above. 
One"""" with eleohant (Ml is raffled to merrbers each AGM. 










Al8 Appendix 2.5 
:·:·:·:·=·=·=·=·:·:·:·:·=·:·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·=·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:· :·:·:·:·:·:-: :-:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:,:,:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:- .·············.···.-.-.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.···-·.··.-.·.·.·.··,·.·.·.··.·.···.·.·.··.·.·.·-·-·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-: ...... :-:.-.·:-:,:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:,:,:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:.;,:,;,;,:,:-:-:,:,:.:. 
HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
RIFA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: I 17.8 31 .E 31 .8 31 .B 14.1 14.1 14.9 28.1 28.~ 28.1 121 121 12. DATE to: 27.8 10.1 10.9 10.9 245 24.1 24.9 8. H 8.1C 8.H 22.1 221 221 
HUNT NO. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 :'. .. ' : .. :. : .. :.· : ·. 
c A B c A B c A B c A B c }:::::®ofk:} 
SPEC ES 'AU..'OOATIID. 
Elephant (Ml ::::::::::::~ 
Ele""•"' l i=l ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::,::::::0 
Eleonant IF tll :,,::;:;::,:;:;0. 
=a 




~,ma,o fMl 2 2 2 :,:::::::::::::::::::::::::;:) .. : : 
t>unaio (F) 1 1 :;:':::':::\:! ... :: 
Buffalo INTI :::,::::,:,:':,:,::::::::::::::::::a: 
Nvala ,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,:::n_, 
tiu~ •""IMl 1 1 :::::::::,:,:,:;:;:;:,:;:;:;}fll : 
"uou (M) l I ,,::::n~, 
Kudu IF\ ::::::,:,:,:,:,:,:::::::::::::::1t: 
Eland IM\ ::::::::;::1:: 





,,,,,o., (M) :::,'~: 
Sable (Fl ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;::::::o· 
Wildebeest :,::::::::::::a 
Tsessebe /:\:0. 
m~ rMl 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 .:.:.:::.;·:·:·:· ;:::;:;::·~ : 
1.,..,.,a IR 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 10 10 10 ::::::::::::::::::. :;:;::::~ ·: 
l"""•a lcull\ :;:;,;:;::::,::::::::::a 




Lion CF) :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;::;:::;:<!;: 
Leooarn :,:::::::::::::::::::::::,1:, 








2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 ,:::,:~1:: 
Crooodile :::::::::::::::::::::::::::,:::,:::0: 
Guinea Fowl 3 3 3 2 2 ·2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 :,::::::::::::::,:::,:;:;:;:;i • 
1cranco1n 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 :::::::::::::::;:;::::,, 
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•.·.·.·.·.•.·,·.•.·.·,·.·,·,·.·.·.·.·.·.·.-.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·,•,·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·,·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.•.·.;,:,:····-:.·,•.•.·.·.•.·.·.···• •,•·••••.••··,·.·.·,.·,·.· ·.·.•.•.·.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.•.·.··•···::::::::::::::'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.•'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.""""'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'. •••••••••••• • ·.•.·.v.•uu ••••• o'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'. '.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'.'. '.'.'.'. '. '.'.:::;;;;;:: :A: :;;;; 
Appendix 2.7 Auction allocation result: Zambezi valley hunts 
Appendix 2.7.1 Allocation result: Nyakasanga section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUr-GWE SAFARI AFEA Al.LOCATKlN OF QUOTA TO HUNTS AS RESULT OF AUCTON 
NYAKASANGA SECTION Zambezi Valley ALJCtion Hunts 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 01 .05 18.05 04.06 21 .06 08.07 25.07 11.08 28.08 14.09 01 .05 18.05 04.06 21.06 08.07 25.07 11 .08 28.08 14.09 
DATE to: 14.05 31 .05 17.06 04.07 21 .07 07.08 24.08 10.09 27.09 14.05 31 .05 17.06 04.07 21 .07 07.08 24.08 10.09 27.09 
BLNER: Foreiarvlocal F F F F F F F F L F F F F F L F L L 
HUNl NO. Nl N2 N3 N4 NS N6 N7 N8 N9 N10 N11 r, 12 r,13 r,14 N15 N1 6 N17 N18 




I Eleonant CF tn 
· - a 
H,ppopolam.JS 
Bushoia 
Warttvv. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
IG<atfe 
jtlUhaio (M) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 
Buffalo IF\ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Buffalo INTI 
I Nva°" 
I tlusnouc:K (Ml 
Kudu M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kudu " 
l tclan<l l~I) 
·~~~1c 








lrroaJa lMl 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
'"""""' 'Fl 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ln-na"'lculll 
IKlpsp11nqer 
I Steentxll< 











Baboon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Crocodile 
Gu1nea~OW1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
rancolri 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Pneon/Dove 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
s~rYV'lrouse 
Duck 
l~ ·,il::r,-:J~~~=::;::: :;::::::;:::::::;:;:::::::;:::::::::;:::::;:::::;::::::::::;;:::;::::::::;::::::::·:·:····· ··· ·········.··.·.·.·.··.·.·.· .. ·.•.•.•.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ·-:- ····,·.··· 
Eleohant IMl 1 1 1 1 
EIAnhant rFl 
Zebra 1 1 1 




Bushbuck (Ml 1 1 
,~mu(MJ l 
Waterbuck IMl 1 1 1 1 1 
lrmaia Ml 
["""""' 'Fl 1 
IL,on CM: 1 1 l l 
L"""""" 1 1 1 1 1 
NOTES The Hunt allocation is D(&<letemiined· the Sinale Tr"""ies allocation shown is the result al the auction. 










A22 Appendix 2.7.1 
•:•.·.·.···.·:•.•.•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:··:·.· · • ... ·· ....... ... .. ........ · ............. -.:·.·:·:·:· ·:·:·:-;-;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,;,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:· .. · ... · ................................................ · .. ·.·······••• ············u ............... :.-. ........... ,•.u .......... . · ............. . •, ... ;.; .... . 
HURUr-.GWE SAFARI AREA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 01 .05 14.05 27.05 09.06 22.06 05.07 18.07 31 .07 13.08 26.08 08.09 21 .09 01 .05 14.05 27.05 09.06 22.06 05.07 
DATE to: 10.05 23.05 05.06 18.06 01 .07 14.07 27.07 09.08 22.08 04.09 17.09 30.09 10.05 23.05 05.06 18.06 01 .07 14.07 
BUYER: Foreiorvlocal F L L F F F F F F F F F F F F l L F 
HUNI NU. N19 N20 N21 N22 N23 N24 N25 N26 N27 """' N29 N"'-1 N31 N32 N33 N34 N35 N36 










c1urraio (M) l l l l l l l 
Buffalo !Fl 1 1 1 














lrroa,a IM\ 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 















Baboon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Crooodile 
Gu1nea eow, 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
r-rdlKA.7111 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 











,sl.lSf10UCI( (M) 1 
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13.08 26.08 08.09 
22.08 04.09 17.09 
F F F 
N39 N40 N41 
F E E 
1 1 1 
6 6 6 
7 7 7 
4 4 4 
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Appendix 2.7.2 Allocation result: Sapi Safari Area 
SAP! SAFARI AREA ALLOCATION OF QUOTA TO HUNTS AS RESULT OF AUCTON 
Zambezi Valley Auction Hunts 
YEAR: 1991 
DATE from: 01 .05 18.05 04.0E 21 .06 08.07 25.07 11 .0E 28.0I 14.Cl!, 01.Cl!: 18.Cl!: 04.0E 21 .0E 08.0, 25.0, 11 .0I 28.08 14.09 01 .05 14.05 27.05 
DATE to: 14.05 31 .05 17.0E 04.07 21.07 07."" 24!• 10.nc 27.r< 14."' 31 .fl' 17."" 04.0' 21 .0 07."' 24."' 1009 27.09 1005 23.05 05.06 
BUYER: Foreiorvlocal F F F F F F F L L F L F L L F F L F L L L 
HUNT NO. S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 SB S9 S10 S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 S18 :;19 :;20 :;21 










1t>unaio (M) 1 1 1 1 1 1 















lrroaJa fMl 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 















B.txion 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Crocodile 
l !Jll lnear-OWI 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
11-rancon 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 














t~ •a Mt 
IIT'4)ala :Fl 
tUon ( '-1 1 1 1 
L~" 1 
NOTES The Hunt allocation is n,e-<Jeterrnined· the Sinnle Tr--'-ies allocation shown is the result of the auction. 
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I t!usoouck (Ml 






09.06 2206 05.07 18.07 31 .07 
18.06 01 .07 14.07 27.07 09.(lF 
F L F F F 
522 S23 S24 S25 S26 
















7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
l 
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Appendix 3 Interviewed hunters 
Chasura, L, Tatos Brothers, 77 Moffat Street, Harare, Zimbabwe (9.9.1991) 
Mujuru, TSR, Commander, Zimbabwe Republic Army, KG6 Barracks, Harare, Zimbabwe (10.9.1991). 
Sifeku, T, Harare Municipal Police, Gaul Avenue 5, Harare, Zimbabwe (12.9.1991). 
Tavengwa, J, CID Firearms, Morris Depot, Harare, Zimbabwe (9.9.1991). 
Appendix 4 Interview questions for hunters and non-hunters 
1. Do you go and hunt wild animals? 
2. Where do you hunt (communal/private/state land, other)? 
3. Which animals would you prefer to hunt, in order of preference? 
4. Would you prefer to choose the category of game yourself? 
5. Would you like to choose when you would like to hunt? 
6. How long would you like to hunt for? 
7. What would you be prepared to pay for each animal? 
8. Do you have any friends or relatives that you know would also like to hunt? 
9. Are you a member of a hunter's association? 
9.1. If yes: What benefits do you have? 
9.2. If no: Why not? 
10. Give your main reasons for going to hunt, in order of importance. 
10.1. For the game meat (and other products)? 
10.2. For the enjoyment of the sport of hunting, including the tracking and shooting of game, 
the bush life, and a holiday? 
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Appendix 5 Computer simulation of DNPWLM lottery system for 
Charara/Makuti area 
Appendix 5.1 Programme coding for simulating DNPWLM lottery system 
The programme code below was written in Fortran 77 by statistical consultant L. McNiell. 
Her help is gratefully acknowledged. The programme simulates the lottery draw used by 
the DNPWLM for allocating hunts to huntmg applicants in the Charara/Makuti study area 
during 1990 and 1991. The draw was simulated- on a VAX computer, and due to the 
complex rules that govern the draw procedure, the programme used 10 hours of 
processing time. With suitable modification, processing time could be reduced. The 
simulation was based on actual data (see Appendix 5.2.1) from the applications in 1991, 
sourced at the DNPWLM licensing office in Harare, and additional data from hunting 
licences located at DNPWLM hunting offices in Marongora and Kariba. The random 
umber generator used was Algorithm AS 183 (Wichmann and Hill , 1982). 
C To simulate runs of lottery for DNPWLM 
c 
C np=no. of entrants, max 500 
C nt=total no. of tickets purchased, max 3000 
C nh=no. of hunts to be drawn 
C ns= no. of simulations 
C ix,iy,iz are seeds for the random number generator 
C ft ik(np)= number of first ticket for each entrant, assuming that 
C tickets are numbered sequentially, ie. if the first buyer buys 
C five tickets, he gets numbers one to five. In practice, it will 
C be simpler to allocate numbers in either increasing or decreasing 
C number of tickets eg. start with all the one-ticket buyers, then 
C the two-ticket buyers etc. 
C wicd() = wins in current draw, for each entrant 
C nw() = no of wins for each entrant 
C new() = no of elephant wins 
C nhun = number of hunt currently being drawn 




This program is very inefficient in that numbers already drawn may be re-drawn. It would run a lot 
faster if all tickets belonging to a winner were removed from the draw using a programming device 
similar to subroutine SHUNT in program HUNTER, but note that a slightly more complex device is 




INTEGER np,nt,nh,ns,ftik(500),wicd(500),nw(500), new(500), 
& ic(3000) 
COM MON/RAND/ix, iy, iz 
OPEN (unit=12,file= 'dnpwlm.par') 
open(unit=11 ,file='dnpwlm.out ') 
C Read input data 
read(12,*) ns,ix,iy, iz,np,nt,nh 
read(12,*) (ftik(i) ,i=1 ,np) 




C Initialise number of wins for each entrant 
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C Main loop 
do 1000 ins=1,ns 
C initialise wins in current draw, and no of wins 




C start draw of next ticket, unless all hunts allocated 
12 nhun=nhun+ 1 
if(nhun.gt.nh) go to 1000 
15 ir=int( (random(O)*nt)+ 1) 
ic(ir)=ic(ir)+ 1 
C find who owns this ticket 
do 20 ip= 1,np+ 1 
if(ir.ge.ftik(ip)) go to 20 
iwin=ip-1 
go to 22 
20 continue 
C ticket holder iwin is the winner 
C if he has won already, draw another ticket, else update 
22 if(wicd(iwin).eq.1) then 




C check for elephants! 
if(nhun.eq.8 .or. nhun.eq.11 .or. nhun.eq.14 .or. nhun.eq.17 
& .or. nhun.eq.20) new(iwin)=new(iwin)+ 1 
go to 12 
end if 
1000 continue 
C ns simulations completed; print results 
write(11, 1100) iix,iiy,iiz,np,nt,nh,ns, 
& (ftik(i),ftik(i+ 1 )-ftik(i),new(i),nw(i),i=1,np) 
stop 
1100 format(' rng seeds ', 3i6,/ 
& ' no entrants ',i6,/ 
& ' no tickets ',i6,/ 
& ' no hunts ',i6,/ 
& • no simulations',i10,/ 
& ' first ticket no tickets no elephants no wins ',/ 
& 500(4i12/) ) 
end 
function random(I) 
C Algorithm AS 183 
common/rand/ix,iy,iz 
ix = 171 • mod(ix, 177) -2 • (ix I 177) 
iy = 172 • mod(iy,176) -35 • (iy I 176) 
iz = 170 • mod(iz,178) -63 • (iz I 178) 
if (ix.lt.O) ix=ix+30269 
if (iy.lt.0) iy=iy+30307 
if (iz.lt.O) iz=iz+30323 
random=amod(float(ix)/30269.0 + float(iy)/30307.0 + 
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Appendix 5.2 Results of simulating DNPWLM lottery system: With actual number 
of applications in 1991, after 1 '000'000 draws, and 100 hunts 
Appendix 5.2.1 Probability of an applicant winning Any Hunt 
RESULTS Cir SIMULA T10N DNP'M.M LOTTERY SYSTEM IN CHARARM.1AKUTI 
WINS ard PROBABILITY (p) 
1,- 1 'CXXJ'COJ SIMU\.A TED DRAWS 
Progranrne Variables 
mg seeds 3, 33, 99 
no entrants 196 
no ti::kets 2.008 
no hunts 100 
no sim.Jla:tions 1,000,CXXl 
Based on Da!a from Year: 1991 
A""'ication Qala Results 
~ First No. No. I p No. Tockel No. Td<ets ANY HUNTS to Mi 
Won ANY HUNT 
18 18 1 98,076 0.0981 
21 21 1 98,249 0.0982 
3 3 1 98,:nl 0.0983 
27 27 1 98,354 0.0984 
28 28 1 98,361 0.0984 
20 20 1 98,463 0.0985 
6 6 1 98,500 0.0985 
9 9 1 98,53:J 0.0985 
1 1 1 98,562 0.0986 
23 23 1 98,588 0.0986 
14 14 1 98,602 0.0986 
12 12 1 98,613 0.0986 
10 10 1 98,620 0.0986 
19 19 1 98,661 0.0987 
5 5 1 98,674 0.0987 
26 26 1 98,787 0.0988 
7 7 1 98,801 0.0988 
13 13 1 98,810 0.0988 
2 2 1 98,852 0.0089 
15 15 1 98,873 0.0089 
25 25 1 98,904 0.0989 
16 16 1 98,911 0.0089 
11 11 1 98,934 0.0989 
29 29 1 99,013 0.0990 
24 24 1 99,102 0.0991 
8 8 1 99,140 0.0991 
22 22 1 99,158 0.0992 
4 4 1 99,234 0.0992 
17 17 1 99,262 0.0993 
44 58 2 187,262 0.1873 
35 40 2 187,527 0.1875 
32 34 2 187,544 0.1875 
42 54 2 187,557 0.1876 
34 38 2 187,714 o.10n 
38 46 2 187,767 0.1878 
33 36 2 . 187,811 0.1878 
40 50 2 187,814 0.1878 
41 52 2 187,927 0.1879 
39 48 2 187,975 0.1880 
31 32 2 188,008 0.1880 
3) 3) 2 188,217 0.1882 
36 42 2 188,276 0.1883 
43 56 2 188,392 0.1884 
37 44 2 188,495 0.1885 
45 60 2 188,862 0.1889 
48 68 3 267,645 0.2676 
46 62 3 268,245 0.2682 
47 65 3 268,322 0.2683 
49 71 3 268,393 0.2684 
50 74 3 268,537 0.2685 
51 n 4 340,947 0.3409 
53 86 5 405,198 0.4052 
88 261 5 405,221 0.4052 
58 111 5 405,539 0.4055 
61 126 5 405,615 0.4056 
95 296 5 405,628 0.4056 
85 246 5 405,740 0.4057 
57 106 5 405,m 0.4058 
55 96 5 405,784 0.4058 
93 286 5 405,866 0.4059 
91 276 5 405,937 0.4059 
99 316 5 405,940 0.4059 
94 291 5 405,970 0.4060 
98 311 5 405,978 0.4060 
82 231 5 405,988 0.4060 
74 191 5 405,990 0.4060 
83 236 5 406,000 0.4060 
97 306 5 406,001 0.4060 
69 166 5 406,003 0.4060 
86 251 5 406,056 0.4061 
n 206 5 406,066 0.4061 
64 141 5 406,066 0.4061 
52 81 5 406,072 0.4061 
76 201 5 406,079 0.4061 
71 176 5 406,147 0.4061 
70 171 5 406,205 0.4062 
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RESULTS OF SIMUI.A TKlN ONPWLM LOTTERY SYSTEM IN CHARARAIMAKVTI 
WINS and PROBABILITY (p) 
1.- 1'COO'CXXJ SIMULATED DRAWS 
Progranme Variable& 
mgs-is 3, 33, 99 
no entrants 196 
notickols 2,008 
no hunts 100 
no sirnJlalions 1,000,CXXJ 
Based on Data from Yeat: 1991 
Annlication Data Results 
"R)locanl ~,rst NO. 
NO. I p No. Ticl<M No. Td<.ols ANY HUNTS to win 
Won ANY HUNT 
75 196 5 406,235 0.4062 
81 226 5 406,Zlll 0.4062 
89 266 5 406,270 0.4063 
84 241 5 406,278 0.4063 
92 281 5 406,315 0.4063 
56 101 5 406,369 0.4064 
90 271 5 406,424 0.4064 
66 151 5 406,464 0.4065 
80 221 5 406,476 0.4065 
63 136 5 406,547 0.4065 
68 161 5 406,552 0.4066 
78 211 5 406,556 0.4066 
65 146 5 406,584 0.4066 
59 116 5 406,641 0.4066 
54 91 5 406,650 0.4067 
79 216 5 406,727 0.4067 
62 131 5 406,n1 0.4068 
72 181 5 406,846 0.4068 
73 186 5 406,846 0.4068 
60 121 5 406,898 0.4069 
67 156 5 407,389 0.4074 
96 301 5 407,455 0.4075 
101 '127 6 465,291 0.4653 
100 '121 6 465,606 0.4656 
102 333 7 517,934 0.5179 
103 340 7 518,375 0.5184 
106 363 8 565,586 0.5656 
104 347 8 566,480 0.5665 
105 355 8 566,686 0.5667 
132 621 10 647,252 0.6473 
107 371 10 647,469 0.6475 
109 391 10 647,524 0.6475 
113 431 10 647,568 0.6476 
123 531 10 647,622 0.6476 
136 661 10 647,666 o.64n 
128 581 10 647,673 o.64n 
134 641 10 647,697 o.64n 
117 471 10 647,717 o.64n 
131 611 10 647,726 o.64n 
119 491 10 647,781 0,6478 
135 651 10 647,795 0.6478 
125 551 10 647,841 0.6478 
139 691 10 647,885 0.6479 
115 451 10 647,933 0.6479 
122 521 10 647,949 0.6479 
112 421 10 647,966 0.6480 
108 381 10 648,026 0.6480 
140 701 10 648,029 0.6480 
114 441 10 648,072 0.6481 
124 541 10 648,093 0.6481 
118 481 10 648, 108 0.6481 
126 561 10 648,157 0.6482 
116 461 10 648,214 0.6482 
110 401 10 648,237 0.6482 
120 501 10 648,255 0.6483 
133 631 10 648,312 0.6483 
129 591 10 648,335 0.6483 
130 601 10 648,374 0.6484 
138 681 10 648,417 0.6484 
111 411 10 648,4n 0.6485 
·121 511 10 648,594 0.6486 
127 571 10 648,625 0.6486 
137 671 10 648,679 0.6487 
148 795 12 713,317 0.7133 
147 783 12 713,886 0.7139 
146 n1 12 714,070 0.7141 
141 711 12 714,094 0.7141 
145 759 12 714,109 0.7141 
142 723 12 714,190 0.7142 
144 747 12 714,651 0.7147 
143 735 12 715,416 0.7154 
153 859 13 741 ,805 0.7418 
151 833 13 742,241 0.7422 
149 807 13 742,410 0.7424 
150 820 13 742,866 0.7429 
152 846 13 742,972 0.7430 
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RESULTS OF SIMU\.A TION DNPWLM LOTTERY SYSTEM IN CHARARMAAKUTI 
WINS and PROBABl.lTY (p) 
1.-1 'COO'COO SIMutA TED DRAWS 
Progranme Variables 
mg.-- 3, 33, 99 
noentrans 196 
no ticl<ata 2,008 
no hunts 100 
no sirn.ilations 1,000,000 
Based on Data from Y9"': 1991 
A,v.,lirotion Data Results 
~ Finst No. 
No. I p No. Toc:l<aNo. Td<els AN'(HlJNTS to"'" Won Ar,N 1--l,iNT 
155 885 13 743,048 0.7430 
156 898 14 7f,f,f!l67 0.7679 
158 gzf 15 790,218 0.7902 
157 912 15 790,401 0.7!l04 
163 1,002 15 790,410 0.7!l04 
166 1,rJ:12 15 790,648 0.7'906 
162 987 15 790,704 0.7907 
167 1,062 15 790,830 0.7!0! 
159 942 15 790,846 0.7!0! 
161 972 15 790,876 0.7909 
160 957 15 790,980 0.7910 
164 1,017 15 790,993 0.7910 
166 1,047 15 791,112 0.7911 
168 1,077 19 f!/61 ,628 O.f!/616 
173 1,176 20 874,894 0.8749 
171 1,136 20 875,064 0.8751 
175 1,216 20 875,125 0.8751 
172 1,156 20 875,148 0.8751 
170 1,116 20 875,210 0.8752 
174 1,196 20 875,354 0.8754 
169 1,096 20 875,372 0.8754 
179 1,296 20 875,644 0.8756 
178 1,276 20 875,781 0.8758 
176 1,236 20 875,816 0.8758 
177 1.256 20 875,899 0.8759 
180 1,316 Z3 908,834 0.9088 
182 1,364 25 925,163 0.9252 
181 1,339 25 925,666 0.9257 
183 1,389 25 925,673 0.9257 
184 1,414 26 932,535 0.9325 
185 1,440 26 933,020 0.9330 
187 1,496 30 955,363 0.9554 
1f!l6 1,466 30 955,567 0.9556 
188 1,526 33 967,Z31 0.9672 
189 1,559 41 985,510 0.9855 
190 1,600 49 993,'450 0.9935 
192 1,699 50 993,943 0.9939 
191 1,649 50 993,949 0.9939 
193 1,749 50 994,020 0.9940 
194 1,799 51 994,696 0.9947 
195 1,850 60 W7,732 0.9977 
196 1,910 99 999954 1.0000 
MAXt.1UMW1NS 999,954 1.0000 
MEAN WINS (Equality) 510,204 0.5102 
MNIMUMWINS 98,076 0.0981 
STD 274,955 0.2750 
n 196 196 
Nol•: Applicalion da&a and rt1Bults oorted acoording to the 
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Appendix 5.2.2 Mean probability per applicant ticket class of winning Any Hunt 
RESUI. TS Of' SIMULATION 0-.PW\.M LOTIERY SYSTEM IN CHARARM.1AKUT1 
Mean WINS and Mean PROBABILl1Y (p) per APPLICANTTO<ETCLASS 
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Appendix 5.2.3 Calculations for Lorenz diagram for results: Applicant and proba-
bility proportions for equality and inequality of winning Any Hunt 
Lorenz Diagram Cak:ulali>,. 
Proportion al~"""',.. 
Proportion al Probabiity for Equality, and lnequal~y 
Applicants sorted i, 81C*ldilg Older by no wins (or 
~""-) Awlicant No. 
Alnicants lneciualitv Eoualitv 
Awlicant Proportion Inequality Proportion Corrulaiiw Equaiy Proportion Curru lalive 
No. alNo. ofo ofo ofo al O 
A B c D E F G H 
1 0.0051 0.0981 0.0010 0.0010 0.5102 0.0051 0.0051 
2 0.0102 0.0982 0.0010 0.0020 0.5102 0.0051 0.0102 
3 0.0153 0.0983 0.0010 0 .0029 0.5102 0.0051 0.0153 
4 0.0204 0.0984 0.0010 0.0039 0.5102 0.0051 0.0204 
5 0.0255 0.0984 0.0010 0.0049 0.5102 0.0051 0.0255 
6 0.0306 0.0985 0.0010 0 .0059 0.5102 0.0051 0.0306 
7 0.0357 0.0985 0.0010 0 .0069 0.5102 0.0051 0.0357 
8 0.0408 0.0985 0.0010 0 .0079 0.5102 0.0051 0.0408 
9 0.0459 0.0986 0.0010 O.cnl9 0.5102 0.0051 0.0459 
10 0.0510 0.0986 0.0010 0 .0098 0.5102 0.0051 0.0510 
11 0.0561 0.0986 0.0010 0.0108 0.5102 0.0051 0.0561 
12 0.0612 0.0986 0.0010 0.0118 0.5102 0.0051 0.0612 
13 0.0663 0.0986 0.0010 0.0128 0.5102 0.0051 0.0663 
14 0.0714 0.0987 0.0010 0.0138 0.5102 0.0051 0.0714 
15 0.0765 0.0987 0.0010 0 .0148 0.5102 0.0051 0.0765 
16 0.0816 0.0988 0.0010 0 .0158 0.5102 0.0051 0.0816 
17 0.0867 0.0988 0.0010 0.0167 0.5102 0.0051 0.0867 
18 0.0918 0.0988 0.0010 0 .0177 0.5102 0.0051 0.0918 
19 0.0969 0.0989 0.0010 0 .0187 0.5102 0.0051 0.0969 
20 0.1020 0.0989 0.0010 0.0197 0.5102 0.0051 0.1020 
21 0.1071 0.0989 0.0010 0.0207 0.5102 0.0051 0.1071 
22 0.1122 0.0989 0.0010 0.0217 0.5102 0.0051 0.1122 
23 0.1173 0.0989 0.0010 0.0227 0.5102 0.0051 0.1173 
24 0.1224 0.0990 0.0010 0.0237 0.5102 0.0051 0.1224 
25 0.1276 0.0991 0.0010 0 .0247 0.5102 0.0051 0.1276 
26 0.1327 0.0991 0.0010 0.0257 0.5102 0.0051 0.1327 
27 0.1378 0.0992 0.0010 0.0266 0.5102 0.0051 0.1378 
28 0.1429 0.0992 0.0010 0.0276 0.5102 0.0051 0.1429 
29 0.1480 0.0993 0.0010 0.0286 0.5102 0.0051 0.1480 
30 0.1531 0.1873 0.0019 0.0305 0.5102 0.0051 0.1531 
31 0.1582 0.1875 0.0019 0.0324 0.5102 0.0051 0.1582 
32 0.1633 0.1875 0.0019 0.0343 0.5102 0.0051 0.1633 
33 0.1684 0.1876 0.0019 0.0361 0.5102 0.0051 0.1684 
~ 8:l~ 8:lK~ 8:~l~ 8:&ll 8:W~ 8:lml 8:l~ 
36 0.1837 0.1878 0.0019 0.0418 0.5102 0.0051 0.1837 
37 0.1888 0.1878 0.0019 0.0436 0.5102 0.0051 0.1888 
38 0.1939 0.1879 0.0019 0.0456 0.5102 0.0051 0.1939 
39 0.1990 0.1880 0.0019 0.0474 0.5102 0.0051 0.1990 
40 0.2041 0.1880 0.0019 0.0493 0.5102 0.0051 0.2041 
41 0.2092 0.1882 0.0019 0.0512 0.5102 0.0051 0.2092 
42 0.2143 0.1883 0.0019 0.0530 0.5102 0.0051 0.2143 
43 0.2194 0.1884 0.0019 0.0549 0.5102 0.0051 0.2194 
44 0.2245 0.1885 0.0019 0.0568 0.5102 0.0051 0.2245 
45 0.2296 0.1889 0.0019 0.0587 0.5102 0.0051 0.2296 
46 0.2347 0.2676 0.0027 0.0614 0.5102 0.0051 0.2347 
47 O.Zl98 0.2682 0.0027 0.0641 0.5102 0.0051 O.Zl98 
48 0.2449 0.2683 0.0027 0.0667 0.5102 0.0051 0.2449 
49 0.2500 0.2684 0.0027 0.0694 0.5102 0.0051 0.2500 
50 0.2551 0.2685 0.0027 0 .0721 0.5102 0.0051 0.2551 
51 0.2602 0.3409 0.0034 0.0755 0.5102 0.0051 0.2602 
52 0.2653 0.4052 0.0041 0.0796 0.5102 0.0051 0.2653 
53 0.2704 0.4052 0.0041 0.0636 0.5102 0.0051 0.2704 
54 0.2755 0.4055 0.0041 0.0877 0.5102 0.0051 0.2755 
55 0.2806 0.4056 0.0041 0.0917 0.5102 0.0051 0.2806 
56 0.2857 0.4056 0.0041 0.0958 0.5102 0.0051 0.2857 
57 0.2908 0.4057 0.0041 0.0999 0.5102 0.0051 0.2908 
58 0.2959 0.4058 0.0041 0.1039 0.5102 0.0051 0.2959 
59 0.3010 0.4058 0.0041 0.1080 0.5102 0.0051 0.3010 
60 0.3061 0.4059 0.0041 0.1120 0.5102 0.0051 0.3061 
61 0.3112 0.4059 0.0041 0.1161 0.5102 0.0051 0.3112 
62 0.3163 0.4059 0.0041 0.1201 0.5102 0.0051 0.3163 
63 0.321"4 0.4060 0.0041 0.1242 0.5102 0.0051 0.3214 
64 0.3265 0.4060 0.0041 0.1283 0.5102 0.0051 0.3265 
65 0.3316 0.4060 0.0041 0.1323 0.5102 0.0051 0.3316 
66 0.3367 0.4060 0.0041 0.1364 0.5102 0.0051 0.3367 
67 0.3418 0.4060 0.0041 0.1404 0.5102 0.0051 0.3418 
68 0.3469 0.4060 0.0041 0.1445 0.5102 0.0051 0.3469 
69 0.3520 0.4060 0.0041 0.1486 0.5102 0.0051 0.3520 
70 0.3571 0.4061 0.0041 0.1526 0.5102 0.0051 0.3571 
71 0.3622 0.4061 0.0041 0.1567 0.5102 0.0051 0.3622 
72 0.3673 0.4061 0.0041 0.1607 0.5102 0.0051 0.3673 
73 0.3724 0.4061 0.0041 0.1648 0.5102 0.0051 0.3724 
74 0.3776 0.4061 0.0041 0.1689 0.5102 0.0051 0.3776 
75 0.3827 0.4061 0.0041 0.1729 0.5102 0.0051 0.3827 
76 0.3878 0.4062 0.0041 0.1770 0.5102 0.0051 0.3878 
77 0.3929 0.4062 0.0041 0.1811 0.5102 0.0051 0.3929 
78 0.3980 0.4062 0.0041 0.1851 0.5102 0.0051 0.3980 
79 0.4031 0.4062 0.0041 0.1892 0.5102 0.0051 0.4031 
80 0.4082 0.4063 0.0041 0.1932 0.5102 0.0051 0.4082 
81 0.4133 0.4063 0.0041 0.1973 0.5102 0.0051 0.4133 
82 0.4184 0.4063 0.0041 0.2014 0.5102 0.0051 0.;4184 
83 0.4235 0.4064 0.0041 0.2054 0.5102 0.0051 0.4235 
84 0.4286 0.4064 0.0041 0.2095 0.5102 0.0051 0.4286 
85 0.4337 0.4065 0.0041 0.2136 0.5102 0.0051 0.4337 
86 0.4388 0.4065 0.0041 0.2176 0.5102 0.0051 0.4388 
87 0.4439 0.4065 0.0041 0.2217 0.5102 0.0051 0.4439 
88 0.4490 0.4066 0.0041 0.2258 0.5102 0.0051 0.4490 
89 0.4541 0.4066 0.0041 0.2298 0.5102 0.0051 0.4541 
90 0.4592 0.4066 0.0041 0.2339 0.5102 0.0051 0.4592 
91 0.4643 0.4066 0.0041 0.2380 0.5102 0.0051 0.4643 
92 0.4694 0.4067 0.0041 0.2420 0.5102 0.0051 0.4694 
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Lontnz Diagram Calculali:>ns 
Proportion cl Applianta vensus 
Proportion cl Probabiity for Equality, and lnequaliy 
Applicants sorted in aooending order by no wins (or 
p-val-) Applicant No. 
"""icants 1.-aualitv EQualitv 
Applicant Proportion Inequality Proportion 
,.., 
Equally Proportion Cum,lalive 
No. clNo. ofo ofo ofo cl p 
A B c D E F G H 
94 0.4796 0.4068 0.0041 0.2502 0.5102 0.0051 0.4796 
95 0.4847 0.4068 0.0041 0.2542 0.5102 0.0051 0.4847 
96 0.4898 0.4068 0.0041 0.2583 0.5102 0.0051 0.4898 
97 0.4949 0.4069 0.0041 0.2624 0.5102 0.0051 0.4949 
98 0.5COO 0.4074 0.0041 0.2664 0.5102 0.0051 0.5COO 
99 0.5051 0.4075 0.0041 0 .2705 0.5102 0.0051 0.5051 
100 0.5102 0.4653 0.0047 0.2752 0.5102 0.0051 0.5102 
101 0.5153 0.4656 0.0047 0.2798 0.5102 0.0051 0.5153 
102 0.5204 0.5179 0.0052 0.2850 0.5102 0.0051 0.5204 
103 0.5255 0.5184 0.0052 0.2902 0.5102 0.0051 0.5255 
104 0.5306 0.5656 0.0057 0.2958 0.5102 0.0051 0.5306 
105 0.5357 0.5665 0.0057 0.3015 0.5102 0.0051 0.5357 
106 0.5408 0.5667 0.0057 0.3072 0.5102 0.0051 0.5408 
107 0.5459 0.6473 0.0065 0.3136 0.5102 0.0051 0.5459 
108 0.5510 0.6475 0.0065 0 .321)1 0.5102 0.0051 0.5510 
109 0.5561 0.6475 0.0065 0.3266 0.5102 0.0051 0.5561 
110 0.5612 0.6476 0.0065 0.3331 0.5102 0.0051 0.5612 
111 0.5663 0.6476 0.0065 0.33115 0.5102 0.0051 0.5663 
112 0.5714 o.64n 0.0066 0.34EO 0.5102 0.0051 0.5714 
113 0.5766 o.64n 0.0065 0.3525 0.5102 0.0051 0.5766 
114 0.5816 o.64n 0.0066 0.35QO 0.5102 0.0051 0.5816 
115 0.5867 o.64n 0.0065 0.3654 0.5102 0.0051 0.5867 
116 0.5918 o.64n 0.0065 0.3719 0.5102 0.0051 0.5918 
117 0.5969 0.6478 0.0065 0 .3784 0.5102 0.0051 0.5969 
118 0.6020 0.6478 0.0065 0 .3849 0.5102 0.0051 0.6020 
119 0.6071 0.6478 0.0065 0 .3914 0.5102 0.0051 0.6071 
120 0.6122 0.6479 0.0065 0.3978 0.5102 0.0051 0.6122 
121 0.6173 0.6479 0.0065 0.4043 0.5102 0.0051 0.6173 
122 0.6224 0.6479 0.0065 0.4108 0.5102 0.0051 0.6224 
123 0.6276 0.6480 0.0065 0.4173 0.5102 0.0051 0.6276 
124 0.6327 0.6480 0.0065 0 .4238 0.5102 0.0051 0.6327 
125 0.6378 0.6480 0.0065 0 .4302 0.5102 0.0051 0.6378 
126 0.6429 0.6481 0.0065 0.4367 0.5102 0.0051 0.6429 
127 0.6480 0.6481 0.0065 0 .4432 0.5102 0.0051 0.6480 
128 0.6531 0.6481 0.0065 0.4497 0.5102 0.0051 0.6531 
129 0.6582 0.6482 0.0065 0.4562 0.5102 0.0051 0.6582 
130 0.6633 0.6482 0.0065 0.4626 0.5102 0.0051 0.6633 
131 0.6684 0.6482 0.0065 0.46191 0.5102 0.0051 0.6684 
132 0.6735 0.6483 0.0065 0.4756 0.5102 0.0051 0.6735 
133 0.6786 0.6483 0.0065 0.4821 0.5102 0.0051 0.6786 
134 0.6837 0.6483 0.0065 0.4886 0.5102 0.0051 0.6837 
135 0.6888 0.6484 0.0065 0.4951 0.5102 0.0051 0.6888 
136 0.6939 0.6484 0.0065 0.5015 0.5102 0.0051 0.6939 
137 0.6990 0.6485 0.0065 0.5080 0.5102 0.0051 0.6990 
138 0.7041 0.6486 0.0065 0.5145 0.5102 0.0051 0.7041 
139 0.7092 0.6486 0.0065 0.5210 0.5102 0.0051 0.7092 
140 0.7143 0.6487 0.0065 0.5275 0.5102 0.0051 0.7143 
141 0.7194 0.7133 0.0071 0.5346 0.5102 0.0051 0.7194 
142 0.7245 0.7139 0.0071 0.5418 0.5102 0.0051 0.7245 
143 0.7296 0.7141 0.0071 0.5489 0.5102 0.0051 0.7296 
144 0.7347 0.7141 0.0071 0.5560 0.5102 0.0051 0.7347 
145 0.7398 0.7141 0.0071 0.5632 0.5102 0.0051 0.7398 
146 0.7449 0.7142 0.0071 0.5703 0.5102 0.0051 0.7449 
147 0.7500 0.7147 0.0071 o.5n5 0.5102 0.0051 0.7500 
148 0.7551 0.7154 0.0072 0.5846 0.5102 0.0051 0.7551 
149 0.7602 0.7418 0.0074 0.5920 0.5102 0.0051 0.7602 
150 0.7653 0.7422 0.0074 0.5995 0.5102 0.0051 0.7653 
151 0.n04 0.7424 0.0074 0.6069 0.5102 0.0051 O.n04 
152 o.nss 0.7429 0.0074 0.6143 0.5102 0.0051 o.n55 
153 0.7806 0.7430 0.0074 0.6217 0.5102 0.0051 0.7806 
154 0.7857 0.7430 0.0074 0.6292 0.5102 0.0051 0.7857 
155 0.7906 0.7430 0.0074 0 .6366 0.5102 0.0051 0.7906 
156 0.7959 0.7679 o.oon 0 .6443 0.5102 0.0051 0.7959 
157 0.8010 0.7902 0.0079 0 .6522 0.5102 0.0051 0.8010 
158 0.8061 0.7904 0.0079 0.6601 0.5102 0.0051 0.8061 
159 0.8112 0.7904 0.0079 0.6680 0.5102 0.0051 0.8112 
160 0.8163 0.7906 0.0079 0.6759 0.5102 0.0051 0.8163 
161 0.8214 0.7007 0.0079 0.6838 0.5102 0.0051 0.8214 
162 0.8265 0.7906 0.0079 0.6917 0.5102 0.0051 0.8265 
163 0.8316 0.7908 0.0079 0.6996 0.5102 0.0051 0.8316 
164 0.8367 0.7909 0.0079 0.7075 0.5102 0.0051 0.8367 
165 0.8418 0.7910 0.0079 0.7154 0.5102 0.0051 0.8418 
166 0.8469 0.7910 0.0079 0.7234 0.5102 0.0051 0.8469 
167 0.8520 0.7911 0.0079 0.7313 0.5102 0.0051 0.8520 
168- 0.8571 0.8616 0.0086 0.7399 0.5102 0.0051 0.8571 
169 0.8622 0.8749 0.0087 0.7486 0.5102 0.0051 0.8622 
170 0.8673 0.8751 0.0088 0.7574 0.5102 0.0051 0.8673 
171 0.8724 0.8751 0.0088 0.7661 0.5102 0.0051 0.8724 
172 a.ans 0.8751 0.0088 o.n49 0.5102 0.0051 a.ans 
173 0.8827 0.8752 0.0088 0.7836 0.5102 0.0051 0.8827 
174 0.8878 0.8754 0.0088 0.7924 0.5102 0.0051 0.8878 
175 0.8929 0.8754 0.0088 0.8011 0.5102 0.0051 0.8929 
176 0.8980 0.8756 0.0088 0.8099 0.5102 0.0051 0.8980 
1n 0.9031 0.8758 0.0088 0.8187 0.5102 0.0051 0.9031 
178 0.9082 0.8758 0.0088 0.8274 0.5102 0.0051 0.9082 
179 0.9133 0.8759 0.0088 0.8362 0.5102 0.0051 0.9133 
180 0.9184 O.!Kl88 0.0091 0 .8453 0.5102 0.0051 0.9184 
181 0.9235 0.9252 0.0093 0 .8545 0.5102 0.0051 0.9235 
182 0.9286 0.9257 0.0093 0 .8638 0.5102 0.0051 0.9286 
183 0.9337 0.9257 0.0093 0.8730 0.5102 0.0051 0.9337 
184 0.9388 0.9325 0.0093 0 .8824 0.5102 0.0051 0.9388 
185 0.9439 0.9330 0.0093 0.8917 0.5102 0.0051 0.9439 
186 0.9490 0.9554 0.0096 0.9012 0.5102 0.0051 0.9490 
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Lorenz Diagram Cak:ulalions 
Pn:portion cl Applianls \181SUS 
Proportion cl Probabiity for Equality, and lnequalty 
Applicants sorted in ascending Older bv no wins (or -
p-valu.) Applicant No. 
&-nicants 1~ualitv Eaualitv 
Applicant Proportion Inequality Proportion Cumilaliw Equalfy Pn:portion Currulalive 
No. clNo. of p ofp ofp cl p 
A B c D E F G H 
188 0.9592 0.9672 0.0097 0.9205 0.5102 0.0051 0.9592 
189 0.9643 0.9855 0.0099 0.9303 0.5102 0.0051 0.9643 
190 0.9694 0.9935 0.0099 0.9403 0.5102 0.0051 0.9694 
191 0.9745 0.9939 0.0099 0.9502 0.5102 0.0051 0.9745 
192 0.9796 0.9939 0.0099 0.9601 0.5102 0.0051 0.9796 
193 0.9847 0.9940 0.0099 0.9701 0.5102 0.0051 0.9847 
194 0.9896 0.9947 0.0099 0.9800 0.5102 0.0051 0.9898 
195 0.9949 O!iliJ77 0.0100 0.9900 0.5102 0.0051 0.9949 
196 1.0000 1.0000 0.0100 1.0000 0.5102 0.0051 1.0000 
Notes on Calculation ol Columns: 
B • Colurm Al Sum cl Colurm A (196) 
c- Sinualion reouk (p) 
D· Colurm Cl Sum al Colurm C (1 ,0) x 100 
E1 • 01 
E2- E1 +02 
F- 100' Sum cl column A (196) for al appicants equally. 
G· Colurm F/ Sum cl Colurm F (1 ,0) x 100 
H1 • G1 
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Applendix 6 
Appendix 6.1 
Applicants' hunt preferences for ZHA hunting areas: 1991 
Applicants' hunt preferences: Tuli Safari Area 
APPLICANT'S HUNTING PREFERENCES tor TUU SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIATION 
APPLICAN PREFERENCES (1st ,2nd, .. 26th) 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
1 9 111317192123242526 8 10 14 16 18 20 22 
2 1 3 7 12 14 2 5 6 8 9 10 11 13 4 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
::::;:::;;:::;:::; ':':::',3,: } 't: -:'7: :;:'5 ::Al!!::W:::::/J':······ .............. ···-,aiiei,"";;,;;;;liciint.No::,1ii2':=:::::::::=::::·:·:······. 
4 3 1 4 7 12 15 2 5 16 17 21 22 23 20 19 18 24 25 14 13 11 10 9 8 6 21 
5 3 1 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 8 10 12 14 16 18 5 
6 12 14 10 8 13 7 9 11 13 15 18 17 20 19 6 8 21 22 23 24 25 26 4 3 2 1 
7 4 7 12 15 25 23 21 19 17 13 11 9 6 5 3 2 1 18 20 22 24 16 14 10 8 2 
8 1 3 2 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 4 5 6 
9 1 3 2 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 4 5 6 
10 17 19 18 20 1 2 16 15 4 6 9 11 13 21 5 8 10 14 22 23 25 3 7 12 24 21 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
12 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 8 7 6 5 4 3 
13 4 6 17 19 18 20 7 9 11 13 15 8 10 12 14 16 21 23 25 22 24 26 5 3 2 1 
14 1 3 2 4 7 12 15 5 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
15 14 12 10 8 6 4 13 11 9 7 5 16 18 20 22 15 17 19 21 2 1 3 23 24 25 
16 2 17 18 19 15 16 20 10 11 12 13 
17 6 7 5 4 3 10 9 11 12 14 13 22 21 23 24 25 26 
18 1 3 6 7 9 11 13 15 4 10 12 14 16 2 5 8 
19 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324252 
20 3 1 2 5 4 7 12 15 
21 17 18 19 20 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 7 8 21 22 23 24 
22 17 18 19 20 15 16 9 10 11 12 13 14 7 8 21 22 23 24 
23 3 1 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 8 10 12 14 16 18 5 
24 3 1 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 8 10 12 14 16 18 5 
25 3 1 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 8 10 12 14 16 18 5 
26 5 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 1 2 3 4 2322242521 
27 7 9 11 13 15 8 10 12 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 6 5 
28 1 3 2 6 4 5 17 19 21 23 25 7 8 10 12 14 17 18 20 22 24 9 11 13 15 H 
29 19 21 18 20 22 1 3 17 23 16 24 5 6 8 10 14 12 2 4 7 9 11 13 15 25 21 
30 15 17 19 16 18 20 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 21 22 232425263 
31 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
32 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
33 12 15 7 16 14 17 18 13 20 19 10 11 8 9 4 5 6 3 2 1 
34 9 13 17 19 21 23 25 10 11 20 22 24 
35 2 6 4 3 1 5 15 
36 5 2 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 
37 5 2 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 
38 17 19 21 23 25 
39 1 3 2 5 4 9 11 15 17 23 25 10 12 16 18 
40 7 5 12 8 9 10 12 6 14 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 26 2 3 1 
41 7 5 12 8 9 10 12 6 14 13 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 4 26 2 3 1 
42 2 7 12 15 9 11 13 17 19 21 23 8 10 14 16 18 20 22 24 
43 17 18 19 20 21 16 22 15 23 24 26 14 13 3 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1 
44 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
45 14 16 18 17 10 9 4 1 3 13 20 19 15 22 21 12 11 23 25 24 6 8 7 
46 11 13 12 14 7 9 15 17 19 21 8 10 16 20 
47 1 3 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324 25 2 
48 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 2 
49 2 5 7 12 15 4 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 3 
50 2 5 7 12 15 4 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 1 23 24 3 
51 2 5 1 3 4 7 12 15 18 17 19 20 6 8 10 14 9 11 13 15 22 24 21 23 25 2 
52 2 5 4 7 12 6 8 1 14 3 9 11 13 1 
53 2 5 4 7 12 6 8 10 14 3 9 11 13 1 
54 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 1 3' 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 2 
55 12 11 13 14 3 1 6 7 8 9 10 4 5 2 22 21 24 23 25 16 18 20 15 17 19 2 
56 12 11 13 14 
57 6 8 4 5 7 3 2 1 
58 4 16 15 2 6 7 5 9 10 8 11 12 13 14 23 
59 7 9 11 13 15 8 10 12 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 6 5 
60 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 
61 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 2 5 1 3 4 6 7 19 20 21 222324252 
62 17 20 14 11 8 23 26 24 22 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 25 
63 2 4 5 7 12 15 1 3 6 9 11 13 17 19 8 10 14 16 18 21 23 25202224 21 
64 6 111615141312109 8 7 5 
65 10 12 9 11 
66 17 18 19 20 21 22 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 16 23 24 25 26 
67 1 3 2 4 7 12 15 5 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324252 
68 11 12 13 14 21 22 
69 7 9 11 13 8 10 12 14 15 16 21 23 22 25 
70 21 19 17 15 13 11201816 14 12 9 7 5 3 4 6 8 2 1 22 23 24 25 26 
71 23 24 25 26 
72 20 17 14 11 8 10 
73 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 6 16 16 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 5 4 3 2 1 
74 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 15 16 17 18 19 20 6 5 4 
75 3 1 
76 1 2 17 18 19 20 3 5 4 7 12 15 6 9 11 13 21 23 25 8 10 16 22 24 26 1, 
n 1 2 17 18 19 20 3 5 4 7 12 15 6 9 1113212325 8 10 16 22 24 26 1 
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APPLICANTS HUNTING PREFERENCES fo, TUU SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIM BABWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIATION 
APPLICAN PREFERENCES (1st,2nd, .. 26th) 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
79 17 18 19 20 
80 5 13 17 15 
81 15 16 5 6 13 14 17 18 
82 1 3 5 4 12 15 7 2 6 9 11 13 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 14 16 18 20 22 24 21 
83 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 8 7 6 5 4 
84 3 17 18 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2 1 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
85 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
86 9 13 17 19 21 23 25 10 11 20 22 24 
87 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 
88 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 
89 9 10 11 12 13 14 8 7 6 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 5 4 3 2 1 
90 1 3 2 8 6 9 10 11 13 16 17 14 18 5 19 
91 20 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 26 6 
92 20 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 26 6 
93 1 2 4 6 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 
94 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
95 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
96 9 111719212325 
97 20 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 26 6 
98 1 2 3 4 16 15 17 18 
99 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
100 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324 252 
101 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 21 
102 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 
103 3 1 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 
104 2 4 7 12 15 5 6 
105 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 11 12 13 15 
106 9 5 6 13 7 14 10 8 
107 17 18 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 
108 2 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
109 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
110 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
111 1 3 2 5 7 15 4 12 9 11 13 17 19 21 23 25 6 8 10 14 16 18 20 22 24 21 
112 18 20 17 19 16 15 2 1 
113 2 5 4 12 7 6 3 9 11 13 14 8 10 1 
114 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 10 9 8 7 
115 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 10 9 8 7 
116 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 10 9 8 7 
117 1 3 2 5 12 7 4 6 9 11 13 15 17 8 10 14 16 18 
118 6 8 10 12 
119 1 3 2 5 
120 3 13 7 9 6 111219 2120 23 22244 5 8 10 14 15 17 16 18 
121 4 9 10 11 13 14 16 
122 13 14 17 18 19 20 
123 4 6 7 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 21 
124 4 6 7 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 21 
125 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324 252 
126 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324 25 21 
127 1 3 2 5 4 7 12 15 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324 252 
128 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 21 
129 9 10 11 7 8 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1~ 1 3 2 5 4 6 7 9 11 13 17 19 21 23 25 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
131 4 6 7 5 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 3 20 21 
132 18 20 17 19 22 21 2 1 4 3 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 2423262 
133 1 3 2 5 7 15 4 12 9 11 13 17 19 21 23 25 
134 2 4 7 12 5 15 6 9 11 8 10 14 16 18 20 22 24 13 17 19 21 
135 4 16 15 2 6 7 5 9 10 8 11 12 13 14 23 
136 2 5 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 7 
137 2 5 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 17 
138 17 19 21 23 24 
139 1 3 15 12 13 17 18 16 14 11 2 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
140 9 11 13 17 25 
141 1 2 3 4 6 5 7 8 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 2 
142 19 17 18 20 11 12 11 9 24 23 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 8 7 16 15 22 21 26 2 
143 19 17 18 20 11 12 11 9 24 23 6 5 4 3 2 1 14 13 8 7 16 15 22 21 26 2 
144 9 5 6 13 7 14 
145 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 2223 24 25 26 3 2 1 
146 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 10 19 20 21 222324 25265 9 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 11 
147 8 10 14 18 20 22 9 11 13 17 19 21 
148 18 20 22 12 10 8 6 4 2 16 14 1921 2311 9 7 5 3 1 13 15 17 24 25 2 
149 8 10 14 18 20 22 9 11 13 17 19 21 
150 8 10 14 18 20 22 9 11 13 17 19 21 
151 18 17 20 19 16 15 14 13 12 11 22 21 24 23 26 25 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
152 18 17 20 19 16 15 14 13 12 11 22 21 24 23 26 25 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
153 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 
154 13 14 15 16 5 6 
155 4 7 12 15 2 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 2526 
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APPLICANT'S HUNTING PREFERENCES for TUU SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIA TKlN 
APPLICA/f PREFERENCES (1st,2nd, .. 261h) 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2223242521 
157 25 26 24 23 21 19 17 13 11 9 20 22 18 15 12 16 10 7 6 2 1 3 4 5 8 
158 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
159 1 3 2 4 9 10 13 14 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 11 
160 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
161 1 3 2 5 12 7 4 15 6 16 8 10 14 18 20 9 11 13 17 21 23 24 25 26 
162 1 3 2 5 12 7 4 15 6 16 8 10 14 18 20 9 11 13 17 21 23 24 25 26 
163 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23252 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 242 
164 1 3 2 4 9 10 13 14 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 11 
165 3 4 5 8 1114172023 
166 1 3 5 7 2 4 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2223242521 
167 1 3 5 7 2 4 6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 2223242521 
168 6 8 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 
169 12 15 9 10 11 13 14 16 17 18 19 2021228 7 
170 12 13 14 15 16 17 8 19 20 21 22 232425261 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 
171 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 1 2 3 4 
172 2 4 5 7 12 15 1 3 6 9 11 13 17 19 8 10 14 16 18 21 23 25 20 22 26 
173 1 3 19 20 17 18 2 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 7 8 21 22 
174 7 9 11 5 
175 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 13 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
176 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 13 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1n 19 20 16 7 8 
178 17 19 21 24 23 13 11 9 20 18 14 10 8 16 22 15 7 4 5 6 12 225263 1 
179 11 3 14 9 
180 1 3 2 25 6 4 5 18 19 24 13 11 10 23 24 12 6 8 9 7 14 16 17 20 21 2 
181 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 6 5 4 3 2 1 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 252 
182 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 222324252 
1~ ; :::,:::, Applicant No. 3's first Hunt preference was Hunt No. 6, then th«! Hunt No. 7, 5, 12, and 17 
in order from rrost to least preferred. 
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Appendix 6.2 Applicants' hunt preferences: Doma Safari Area 
APPLICANT'S HUNT PREFERENCES 10< DOMA SAFARI ARE 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABAWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIATON 
APPLICANT PREFERENCES (1st, 2nd, . . 39th) 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 2 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2 6 8 4 9 7 5 10 3 
::::::::::c::::::::::::::::::;::::;3: =:::,a::: ;::g: :::10: ;::;::1=:::::::: ::;::::::::::::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :::::;::: 
4 1 2 4 3 5 10 9 
:, .. " I IU .J I b :, 4 " b :, b 
I 3 :, I 4 b .. 9 lU £ l .. 4 IU I :, I 
9 :, I 4 b .. 9 lU 
IU I :, b IU " 4 3 2 11 .. " lU I b :, 4 .J " I 12 4 .J I 9 lU 
I.J " 10 14 b 4 " :, .J I " IU 1:, .. 9 l 2 I b :, 4 lU .J 
16 7 8 9 10 6 :, 4 3 2 l 
11 lU " .. I b :, 4 .J " I lH 10 9 .. I b :, 4 .J 2 l 
'" b I 8 :, 4 3 9 lU l "' b I .. :, 4 .J " IU I 21 4 6 .. 9 10 
22 5 6 l 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 
ZJ :, b I .. " lU l 2 .J 4 "" :, 6 I 8 9 10 l 2 3 4 c., l 2 .J 4 :, b I .. 9 IU 
2b 3 :, I 4 :, l £ .. " lU 
"' 7 8 9 10 3 2 l 6 4 :, ~ .J :, I 4 b .. " lU l " 29 :, b I .. " lU 3) 6 4 .. :, I 9 lU 3 2 l 
31 3 4 !> 
.J2 .. " IU I b :, 33 3 :, I 4 :, l 2 .. 9 10 
34 7 8 9 10 6 5 4 3 2 1 
,J:, l J :, I " 2 4 b .. l U 36 4 b l 2 :, .J I .. lU 9 
37 6 !> 2 3 4 10 9 8 7 1 
.J!I b :, 
39 8 9 7 
4U I .. lU b :, 4 .J 2 l 
41 I .. 10 b :, 4 .J 2 l 
42 8 9 10 
4.J .J I :, .. 4 b " lU 2 l 44 6 :, 8 10 4 l 2 
45 7 3 8 9 10 4 2 1 
46 3 :, 4 1U 
47 3 4 :, 6 I 8 9 10 
4" 8 5 3 
4,i " .. lU I b :, 4 .J 2 I :,u " .. lU I b :, 4 .J 2 l 51 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 
52 8 7 
53 2 1 :, b I 8 3 4 9 10 
:>4 2 1 4 6 8 3 5 I 9 10 
:,:, I b .. " :, 4 IU J 2 I ob 4 :, b I .. 
I!.~, ;:;:;:;:;:;:,: Apphcant No. 3's first p,efe"""'9 was 
Hunt No. 8, then Nos. 9, 10, and 7 ,n 
order from roost to least 0<eferred. 
Source: Hunting Reco,ds, Lomagundi Hunte,'s 
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Appendix 6.3 Applicants' hunt preferences: Rifa section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
APPLICANTS HUNTING PREFERENCES for RIFA SECTION a HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZJMBABAWE HUN1ER'S ASSOCIATON 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
4 1 363534393837 
4 1 363534393837 
5 363738391 2 3 4 
6 17 20 11 8 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 10 9 7 6 5 23 24 25 2627284 3 2 1 2930 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
7 17 20 11 8 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 10 9 7 6 5 23 24 25 2627284 3 2 1 2930 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
8 17 14 11 8 6 10 15 26 7 12 16 19 9 13 18 23 33 34 35 5 22 25 29 2 21 30 32 27 37 36 31 28 24 4 3 1 38 39 
9 14 17 20 23 26 29 22 25 28 24 27 30 33 24 35 5 12 21 31 32 10 13 1 16 18 19 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 9 36373839 
10 11 14 17 20 7 12 16 19 9 13 18 23 6 10 15 26 3 21 24 27 33 5 29 32 4 22 28 30 31 25 2 34353637381 39 
11 17 8 20 14 11 21 22 26 29 32 30 28 27 25 24 23 31 16 18 19 35 34 33 36 13 12 10 9 7 15 6 5 4 3738393 2 
12 17 8 20 14 11 21 22 26 29 32 30 28 27 25 24 23 31 16 18 19 35 34 33 36 13 12 10 9 7 15 6 5 4 3738393 2 
13 17 8 20 14 11 21 22 26 29 32 30 28 27 25 24 23 31 16 18 19 35 34 33 36 13 12 10 9 7 15 6 5 4 3738393 2 
14 18 19 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 13 4 16 18 20 
15 18 19 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 13 4 16 18 20 
16 20 17 14 11 8 7 13 18 9 10 15 16 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 6 5 4 3 2 1 12 
17 7 9 12 13 15 16 18 19 23 
18 21 33 22 25 34 35 2 30 24 27 31 1 28363 
19 8 17 14 11 20 10 12 7 19 16 6 15 26 9 13 18 23 33 29 21 25 353424222736283738 39 5 4 3 2 1 
20 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 22 23 24 
21 20 17 14 11 8 19 16 12 7 26 15 10 6 9 13 18 21 22 23 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 5 4 3 2 
22 1 2 3 4 21 22 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 5 6 7 9 18 10 16 23 26 
23 20 17 14 11 8 19 21 22 16 18 12 13 15 9 10 26 27 24 23 25 30 32 28 29 31 33 3 4 5 6 7 2 1 34 35 36 37 38 39 
24 21 22 24 31 33 39 
25 20 17 14 19 18 16 13 23 15 26 21 22 24 27 25 28 29 30 
26 17 20 14 16 19 12 11 18 13 15 23 22 21 25 27 33 7 9 10 26 24 8 28 31 30 32 
27 26 21 25 28 30 29 
28 8 11 26 7 10 16 19 7 12 10 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 39 1 4 5 6 
29 8 11 14 17 20 1 2 3 4 5 16 18 19 
30 8 11 14 17 20 1 2 3 4 5 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
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APPLICANTS' HUNTING PREFERENCES tor RIFA SECTION of HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABAWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIATON 
NO. 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
90 5 16 21 18 19 26 29 25 27 28 30 2 3 1 15 6 7 9 10 12 35 34 33 13 23 22 24 4 32 31 36 38 39 37 
91 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 26 2 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
92 14 17 20 8 11 7 12 16 19 6 15 26 10 23 18 13 9 3 21 24 27 30 33 36 22 25 28 29 31 32 34 35 37 5 4 2 1 38 39 
93 17 20 8 11 14 5 21 18 16 19 2 3 1 4 6 23 26 29 25 22 24 27 28 30 12 13 9 10 15 
94 8 11 14 17 20 5 15 6 12 21 25 29 35 2 9 18 24 3 1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 23 26 27 28 30 31 32 33 34 36 37 38 39 
95 8 1 4 7 10 2 6 9 13 15 26 
96 29 30282726252 3 1 35 33 34 32 31 36 37 24 23 22 21 19 18 16 15 13 12 9 10 5 6 4 38 39 
97 24 22 25 27 26 28 29 30 21 15 31 32 33 23 19 20 17 14 11 8 34 35 36 37 38 39 18 16 13 12 10 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 
98 24 22 25 27 26 28 29 30 21 15 31 32 33 23 19 20 17 14 11 8 34 35 36 37 38 39 18 16 13 12 10 9 7 6 5 4 3 2 
99 8 11 12 10 9 7 17 20 14 35 34 32 30 36 29 26 28 27 31 23 24 22 21 18 19 16 15 13 6 3 5 4 3 38 39 25 2 1 
100 26 2923272530282422 5 2 3 1 6 4 38 35 32 39 37 36 34 33 31 17 14 11 8 21 18 15 12 10 1916 15 9 7 
101 2 1 3 6 21 10 18 19 15 13 12 9 16 7 31 32 33 34 35 36 
102 20 1714118 2730292825 26 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 15 13 12 10 9 6 5 4 3 2 
103 20 17 14 11 8 27 30 29 25 26 16 18 28 19 21 22 23 24 31 32 33 35 36 3 38 34 39 15 13 12 10 9 7 6 4 3 2 1 
104 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
105 38 39 37 24 4 21 25 27 29 30 31 32 
106 4 21 24 25 27 29 30 31 32 37 38 39 
107 8 11 14 17 20 7 12 16 19 9 13 18 23 6 10 15 21 25 29 33 
108 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 
109 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 
110 20 17 14 11 8 19 16 12 7 26 15 2 
111 20 17 14 11 8 19 16 12 7 26 15 2 
112 33 34 35 32 29 5 10 22 24 27 31 
113 34 35 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 25 24 22136374321 
114 34 35 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 25 24 22 21 36 37 4 3 2 1 
115 34 35 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 25 24 22 21 36 37 4 3 2 1 
116 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 79456252627 23 
117 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 7 9 4 5 6 252627 2 3 
118 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 794562526271 23 
119 20 17 14 11 8 19 16 12 7 26 15 10 6 9 13 33 34 35 36 37 
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APPLICANTS" HUNTING PREFERENCES for RIFA SECTION al HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABAWE HUNTERS ASSOCIATON 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
179 2 3 1 33 19 12 21 22 23 24 25 27 5 6 4 7 9 10 13 15 16 18 26 28 29 30 31 32 
180 20 17 14 11 8 27 24 22 21 18 15 13 10 39 6 4 31 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 19 23 25 26 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
181 20 17 14 11 8 27 24 22 21 18 15 13 10 39 6 4 31 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 19 23 25 26 28 29 30 33 34 35 36 37 38 
182 20 17 14 11 8 27 24 22 21 18 15 13 10 39 6 4 31 1 2 3 5 7 9 12 16 19 23 25 26 28 29 30 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 
183 19 21 4 3 2 1 22 23 24 27 25 28 30 31 35 37 38 39 
184 10 7 12 16 19 9 13 18 23 6 15 26 21 22 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 5 4 3 2 1 
185 20 17 14 11 8 26 29 33 22 25 28 30 24 27 
186 20 17 14 11 8 26 29 33 22 25 28 30 24 27 
187 20 17 14 11 19 16 12 7 23 18 13 9 3534333637383923 32 31 30 28 27 26 25 24 22 21 15 8 10 5 6 4 2 3 
188 20 17 14 11 19 16 12 7 23 18 13 9 3534333637383923 32 31 30 28 27 26 25 24 22 21 15 8 10 5 6 4 2 3 1 
189 20 17 14 11 8 5 26 25 27 28 30 23 12 15 18 21 13 16 19 22 9 10 7 6 29 32 2 3 4 1 31 33 34 24 36 37 38 39 35 
100 17 20 14 11 8 12 19 16 7 13 18 23 9 10 15 6 26 21 22 24 25 
191 11 14 17 20 12 16 19 33 34 35 9 13 18 23 8 21 25 29 10 15 22 24 26 36 37 2 30 31 32 3839765432 
192 11 14 17 20 12 16 19 33 34 35 9 13 18 23 8 21 25 29 10 15 22 24 26 36 37 27 28 30 31 32 3839765432 
193 11 14 17 20 12 16 19 21 25 29 10 15 26 13 18 22 23 24 28 30 34 35 33 36 37 38 39 
194 17 20 14 11 8 23 32 35 33 5 26 27 24 21 18 12 9 6 15 36 31 25 22 24 16 13 7 10 4 38 34 37 2 3 39 
195 26 29 30 2 3 28 25 27 23 22 24 1 7 12 16 19 
196 8 7 4 20 11 12 16 19 10 15 26 9 13 23 18 5 33 34 35 29 32 2 6 21 25 27 28 22 24 30 31 4 3 36 37 1 38 39 1 
197 7 19 21 2 13 10 22 4 
198 17 20 18 15 23 26 29 21 24 27 30 32 33 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 
199 6 10 15 26 7 12 16 19 9 13 18 23 
200 26 25 27 23 22 24 8 7 9 11 1 12 14 13 15 17 16 18 20 19 21 5 4 6 
201 26 25 27 23 22 24 8 7 9 11 10 12 14 13 15 17 16 18 20 19 21 5 4 6 
202 20 17 14 11 19 8 16 12 7 18 13 9 23 15 10 6 26 21 5 25 27 
203 20 17 14 11 19 8 16 12 7 18 13 9 23 15 10 6 26 21 5 25 27 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
204 14 17 20 8 11 7 12 16 19 6 15 26 10 23 18 13 9 3 21 24 27 353738394 5 2 
205 11 14 17 20 8 33 34 35 12 16 19 
206 8 11 14 17 20 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 222324252627282930 31 32 33 
207 16 12 23 18 13 9 26 15 10 21 22 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 7 19 
208 16 12 23 18 13 9 26 15 10 21 22 24 25 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 7 19 
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APPLICANTS' HUNTING PREFERENCES tor RIFA SECTION of HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
ZIMBABAWE HUNTER'S ASSOCIATON 
I rncrc ~"'"""" (1st, .a>a, ... . ,,,m) 
NO. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
268 17 12 8 7 101514111626 18 13 9 19 20 29 33 
269 4 5 6 7 10 11 13 15 21 22 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 1 2 3 14 15 
270 26 23 6 9 32 5 2 38 12 14 18 20 7 27 29 37 31 22 16 25 1 3 4 10 13 15 19 21 39 24 30 33 17 28 11 8 34 35 36 
271 23 266 29325 2 8 11 17 20 7 27 16 12 18 21 4 14 35 31 25 24 19 22 15 9 10 30 33 34 36 3 3738391 28 13 
272 10 11 13 17 23 7 29 16 39 21 38 22 24 28 37 34 14 9 20 6 33 5 35 1 19 25 18 36 31 10 4 2332158 
273 8 11 14 17 20 32 30 26 22 21 12 13 2 33 35 34 36 37 31 38 39 9 10 15 16 18 19 23 24 25 27 28297654 3 1 
274 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
275 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
276 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 21 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 31> 36 31 38 39 1 2 3 4 5 6 
277 39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
278 25 26272829301 2 3 
279 1 2 6 4 5 6 7 9 10 12 13 15 16 18 19 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
280 20 11 17 8 14 2 3 6 26 5 21 23 24 27 12 32 33 35 36 34 31 1 
281 26 19 6 21 24 27 30 22 25 3 28 15 16 7 2 12 
282 19 18 22 21 20 16 17 
283 26 19 6 21 24 27 30 22 25 3 28 15 16 7 2 12 
284 26 19 6 21 24 27 30 22 25 3 28 15 16 7 2 12 
285 29 28 30 2 1 3262527 8 11 14 17 20 23 22 24 19 16 13 10 12 15 18 21 31 32 33 
286 29 28 30 2 1 3 262527 8 11 14 17 20 23 22 24 19 16 13 10 12 15 18 21 31 32 33 
287 14 17 11 8 10 26 15 12 27 25 30 2928 
288 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 20 19 18 17 14 11 8 
289 11 8 14 17 20 9 12 15 18 21 6 7 10 13 16 19 22 24 23 
290 11 8 14 17 20 9 12 15 18 21 6 7 10 13 16 19 22 24 23 
291 10 18 6 7 8 11 12 14 17 19 20 21 
292 10 18 6 7 8 11 12 14 17 19 20 21 
293 10 18 6 7 8 11 12 14 17 19 20 21 
294 34 35 1 2 3 21 22 24 25 27 28 30 31 36 37 38 39 8 11 14 20 
295 1 2 3 8 11 14 17 20 21 22 24 25 27 28 30 31 34 35 36 37 38 39 
296 12 16 7 6 9 10 15 26 13 18 23 19 5 21 29 32 33 34 35 22 24 2530272836372 4 1 3 31 
297 26 27 25 2 3 1 23 24 22 29 30 28 32 33 31 35 36 34 38 39 37 20 21 19 17 18 16 14 15 13 11 12 10 8 9 7 5 6 4 
298 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ?7 28 29 30 31 5 4 3 2 1 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 
299 8 11 14 17 26 15 16 7 12 10 22 2425279 13 18 23 28 29 30 
300 26272552 1 3 4 6 33 34 352930288 9 7 11 12 10 14 15 13 17 18 16 ?O 31 19 ?3 ?4 ?? 31 36 37 38 39 
!f;~; :,:;::=:::=::: Applicant No. 3 had Hunt No. 33 as first preference, then Hunt Nos. 31 and 35 in order from mos1, to leas1 prelernid. 
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Appendix 7 
Appendix 7.1 
CHARARA SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 





Value of quota allocation for Zimbabwe hunting areas: 1991; valued 
at the public retail price. 
Value of allocation: Charara Safari Area 
VALUATON OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
Citizen Hunting Area (inclvdes Makuti Totals) 
1991 
LOCAL 
1.5 1.5 9.5 9.5 17.5 17.5 25.5 25.5 26 26 10.6 10.6 18.6 18.6 26.6 26.6 4.7 
7.5 7.5 15.5 15.5 23.5 23.5 31 .5 31 .5 8.6 8.6 16.6 16.6 24.6 24.6 2.7 27 10.7 
4 5 9 10 14 15 19 20 24 25 29 30 34 35 39 40 44 
Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16 C17 
SPECES TROPHY1-t:1: 
Elephant (M) 7500 7500 7500 
El.nh..nt IF1 2000 




Wartnoa 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Gi'ane 800 
Buffalo(Ml 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
DUTialO (/- ) -~ ~ - ""' ~ ~ -~· """ Buffalo !Ni l 450 
NVaJa 500 ·- · .. 1::<J 
1'00U (M) ~ 
Kudu !Fl 200 
land IMl 500 500 
tc1ana (F) 4UJ 
UU1k8r .!!) .!!) .!!) <::S .!!) .!!) 
Ree<b.ck 100 
Wa!eibuck IMl 350 





lrr()ala IM I 60 120 120 120 120 ,.,., 120 120 120 1£U 1£U 1.o., 120 120 120 120 120 120 
lrrc,aJa 11=1 40 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 




Lion (Ml 1500 




""""" 25 Civec 50 
Hyaena 50 
Jad<al 25 
tla!-eared I-OX 50 
.. orcupt'le 25 
=•on 1U 1U 1u 1u 1U 1U tu tu 1U 
Crooodile 500 
Guinea Fowl 5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 15 15 15 15 15 25 
,-.. n ~ ~ ~ 9 9 9 9 9 1< 1< 1< 1< ~ ll ll ll ll 1::S .. 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1 1 1 8 
"-rouse 1 
Dud< 0 
TOTAL TROPHY VALUE 856 766 856 691 831 791 831 7749 764 874 1 189 941 681 841 681 916 7748 
N01tc::s 
DATA SOURCE DNPWLM Licensing Office, Harare. 
Penms DNPWLM Petel's Pomt, Karba. 






















ASO Appendix 7.1 
:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-;,;,;,:-:-:,:,:,:-;,·..-··········•··••·· · •••.·.··•,·o · ·······u···•····•···········••··•········•·········•··.·;.;,;.;,:-;,;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;,;····.·.•,·.·.· ············· ·.·.·.•.·.·······.··;,;.;,;,;., .. •.•.• .. · ...... ·.• ..... :•:•.•:·:·:·:·:•:•:·:•:•:•:•:•:•:•:·:·:•:•:•:•: :,.».u . 
CHARARA SAFARI AREA: 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: LOCAL 
DATE from: 127 127 20.7 20.7 28.7 28.7 5.8 5.8 13.8 13.8 21.8 21 .8 29.8 29.8 6.9 6.9 14.9 14.9 
DATE to: 18.7 18.7 26.7 26.7 3.8 3.8 11.8 11 .8 19.8 19.8 27.8 27.8 4.9 4.9 12.9 12.9 20.9 20.9 
DRAW NO. 49 50 54 55 59 60 64 65 69 70 74 75 79 80 84 85 89 90 
HUNT NO. C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 CV C28 C29 C30 C31 C32 C33 C34 C35 C36 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Elephant (Ml 7500 7500 





Warthoa 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Graffe 800 
Buffalo (Ml 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
~uttaJo (r) ~ ~ - - -~, .. ~, """ """ Buffalo !Nil 450 
Nvala 500 
~usr~~IMI 150 1:,u l:,U 1:,U H,o 150 
Kudu Ml '"' Kudu Fl 200 




Wate,buck IM\ 350 
vvat~ir.11,(1-J A 
,,.,o,e (M) !lUJ 
Sable IF\ 400 
Wildebeest 200 
Tsessebe :XlO 
1rroaia (Ml 60 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 1 ..... 120 120 120 120 120 120 ldl l dl o(J 
lnnae. (Fl 40 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 40 
lrroaia (cull) 40 
Klnsnrinae< 100 
,St-,ooo< 20 
i=~ 25 ~ 20 25 
Lion IMl 1500 1500 
Lion (t-J 1CXXl 







Bat-oored Fox 50 
orcup<>e ~ 
Rahnnn 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1U 10 
Crooodile 500 
Guineat-owl 5 25 25 25 25 20 25 20 25 20 25 25 25 25 20 25 15 15 15 
'"""""' 3 15 15 15 15 12 15 12 15 12 15 1~ 1~ 1~ 12 1o 9 9 9 'qeorvuove 1 II II II II II II II II 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 I I I 
Sardarouse 1 
Duck 0 
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CHARARA SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 






229 229 30.9 30.9 All.OCATIC 
28.9 28.9 6.10 6.10 VALUE 







Eiecnant ,~ UJ 
t:11 ..... 
t,t.llTIIIO(M) 





































60 60 60 60 60 
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Appendix 7.2 Value of allocation: Makuti section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA: VALUATON OF ALLOCATED QUOTAS 
MAKUTI SECTION Citizen Hvnting Area 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1YPE: LOCAL 
DATE from: 1.5 1.5 1.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 26 26 26 10.6 10.6 10.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 
DATE to: 7.5 7.5 7.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 31 .5 31 .5 31 .5 8.6 8.6 8.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 24.6 24.6 246 
DRAW NO. 1 2 3 6 7 8 11 12 13 16 17 18 21 22 23 36 27 28 31 32 33 
HUNT NO. M1 M2 M3 M4 MS M6 M7 MB M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 M18 M19 M20 M21 
SPEC E S TAOPHYFtct 
Elephant (M) 7500 
Eie""""' IF\ 200J 
Eleonant (F t1l 1CXX) 
·~ a 450 
·- ........ 
t:iUSllP'Q ,~ 
w~ntv,n 75 75 75 75 75 
Gralfe 800 
Buffalo(MI 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
Huttalo {t-J """ """ """ """ """ """ """ '"'" """ 450 -Buffalo INTI 450 
Nvafa 500 
Hushbuck {MJ 150 
K ,><1u (MJ -~ 
Kudu IF\ 200 
"-land (Ml 500 
·~=1t-1 -II.Ju1k.er 20 20 2~ 2~ 2~ ~ ~ 20 20 20 25 
Reoobuck 1()() 
Wat81buck IM\ 350 
I vvatetbuck (t-J ,,,.,., 
~ ,UH (M) ~ 
Sable IF\ 400 
Widebeest 200 
Tsessebe 300 
, ,m=~ (MJ 60 
l~'-'IF\ 40 
Jnn.,ia (cull) 40 
KJ.......-,noer 100 
Steenoo< 20 
cI=~ ~o 20 
L,on (Ml 1500 






Hyaena ::,0 ::,0 :,() 
Jackal 25 
Bat-eared t-ox 50 
1-'0fCl-l)tnS 20 
n- m lu 10 10 lu lu lu lu lU 1U lU lU 
Crocodile 500 
Gu,neat-owt 5 15 15 20 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
FrantX"Hrt 3 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 9 9 9 ,; 9 ,; ,; ,; 9 9 9 9 9 
e 1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 7 7 7 7 7 
Sanoorouse 1 
Duck 0 
TOTAL TROPHYVALUE 706 51 6 639 516 706 524 631 516 706 516 631 516 631 516 681 516 706 516 631 516 706 
NOTES 
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HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA 
MAKUTl SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE lYPE: LOCAL 
DATE from: 26.6 26.6 26.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 127 127 127 '20.7 '20.7 '20.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 13.8 13.8 13.8 
DATE to: 2.7 2.7 2.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 11 .8 11 .8 11 .8 19.8 19.8 19.8 
DRAW NO. 36 37 38 41 42 43 46 47 48 51 52 53 56 57 58 61 62 63 66 67 68 
HUNT NO. M22 M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 M36 M37 M38 M39 M40 M41 M42 
SPECES TROPHY FEE 





!E- / 0 
WartnoQ 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
1,;rall,, 800 
Buttalo(M) 600 600 600 600 bl bl.< bl.U bl.U bl.U 600 600 
'"""- (t"J """ """ """ -~, - -~ = -~ -~, """ 
Buffalo!NIJ 450 
=ag 500 
Bushbuck (MJ 1:,u 
"""'" I '"-' Kudu '200 
~g~ ll 500 
Eland -.. 
uu11t.er 25 25 25 25 25 "" 25 25 25 25 25 25 "" Redluck 100 
Wa!erbuck !Ml 350 
vvaf:_.-r- LINC (t-J ZUJ 
""""'(MJ ~., 





irTl)&la lculll 40 
100 100 
<:>1--.ocJ< 25 
"""" e., e., e., e., 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 .a, e., e., .a, "" "" e., e., e., "" e., Lion M 1500 
Loon F 100'.l 





,HV-,ia 50 50 50 50 
Jad<al 25 
Bat.....,ed ~ox 50 
""""-"""" 25 25 
~ l U 10 10 10 10 10 l U l U lU lU lU 1u 
Crooodile 500 
3u;,_ ....... 5 15 '20 25 25 25 '20 25 '20 '20 25 25 '20 25 25 '20 25 25 25 '20 
P,IIYnll"I ;j 9 12 15 15 15 12 15 12 12 15 10 12 15 15 12 10 10 10 12 
1 I I ll ll ll ll ll ll ll ll 9 B B 8 8 8 8 8 8 
'"-rouse 1 
Duck 0 
TOTAL TROPHYVALUE 541 700 500 7564 708 573 758 540 683 500 700 548 809 540 683 598 700 598 708 7608 900 
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HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA: 
MAKUTI SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE lYPE: LOCAL 
DATE horn: 21 .8 21 .8 21 .8 29.8 29.8 29.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 30.9 30.9 30.9 
?::j~ w· 
:~~ 
DATE to: 27.8 27.8 27.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 129 129 129 20.9 20.9 20.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 6.10 6.10 6.10 
111 :11•1 DRAW NO. 71 72 73 76 77 78 81 82 83 86 87 88 91 92 93 96 97 98 HUNT NO. M43 M44 M45 M46 M47 M48 M49 M50 M51 M52 M53 M54 M55 M56 M57 M58 M59 MED 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Elephant (M) 7500 7500 
E-·-IICI 2CXX) 
E~n-111 l CXXl ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::·:·· 
/""'& 450 ::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;: ;:;:;:;:;:::: ... ::::::::::::::::::: .;:::::::::: 
t>USIDO r::. "' ~-w~~ 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 Gra!le BOO t>unaio (M) 600 600 600 ~=•-It"! """ 450 """ """ """ BuffalotNII 450 :;::::::::::::::::::· ::::::::::. : 
500 :::::::::· 
1:,0 ;:;:;:;::::::::f· 
~mu ( ~) ~ ~ co.I ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ "'- "'- co.I :::::::::::::::::::::::~'.al' 
Kudu ') 200 :,;.;,:,::::::;:;:;:::·:=:::· 
t:ana M) 500 :;:::::::;:;:;:::::::::::::::;:;: 
- ~~ r-1 4l ::;:;:;:::;:; .;:;:::::::::::::; 
UUtker "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" ;::, ;::, ;::, ;::, ;::, "" :::::::::::::::::::::::;;h.• Redx.d< 100 :::::::::::::::::::::;:;: 
Waterbuck (Ml 350 360 360 360 360 350 :,:,:::,:;:;:;:;:;:::::,i :-..,..... 
: YYalercuc:K {I-) :::::::::::::::::;:::::;::::::::: 
~ tM) BW ...... :::::::::::::::::::::::z« 
Sable IFl 400 ::::::::::;:=::·: .,:;:;:':;:=:::: 
w~ 200 ·:·:::::=::::;:; .::;:;:;:;:::::: : , __ 
XX) :::::::=::::::::::::::;:;:::::;:: ·~ IMJ till ::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::::;:;:· 
t~-rH 40 ::::::: 
1- cuUl 40 ·:::::::::: 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 lw 1w ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: .. ,.,,_..,,. 25 ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::::;:;:: 
ll1)'Sl)Ok "" e., e., e., e., e., e., e., ;::, ;::, e., "" "" "" "" "" ;::, "" ;::, ::::::::::::::::;:::;:;:;1: ... Lion !M 1500 1500 1500 1500 :;:::;:;:;:::::::::;:;:;• ·-
Lion (Fl 1CXXl :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
-"""""' 1 ... 1 .... ..... ::::::;::::::::=::::;:;..:a:1. , .. ~ 25 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Serva! 50 :;:::::::::::::::::;:;::::::::::: 
Gene! 25 .... :···:·.·····. 
.'"'8 50 50 50 ;:::::::::::::;:::;:;:::::n - :,0 ::::::::;:::::::::::::;:;::~ Jackal 25 ;:;:::::::::::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::: 
R.f.-nodi-rnr 50 :::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::::::::::::::. 
r-ort:WJnt ;.!:, "" ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 JU 10 10 10 ;:;:;:;:;:::;:;:::;:;:;:;::::::. 
Crocodile 500 :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;: ,~-~- 5 25 25 20 25 25 20 25 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1:, 1::. 1::. ;:;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:::::;:;'J '.c,1 
nanooor, 3 15 15 12 15 15 12 15 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 :;:::::::::::::::::::::::::~ 
l II II II II .. .. .. 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 I I :::,:;:::;:;:':;:;:;:;:;:;:!!, .. : 
.__. ..... ,oi.e 1 ,:;:::,:::;:;::;,::::::::,:::::,:n; 
Duel< 0 ·,:,:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:O: 
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Appendix 7.3 Value of allocation: Tuli Safari Area 
TULi SAFARI AREA: VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTS 1991 
MatabeitJ/and HuntlJ('s Association 
YEAR: 1991 LEVY in "lo of DNPWLM Trophy Fee 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: LOCAL 170% 
DATE from: 27.41 27.4 1 11~ 1 11 .5 25.5 25.5 8.6 8.6 22.6 22.6 6.7 6.7 20~ 1 20~1 
3.8 3.8 17 8 1 17 8 
DATE to: 7.5 7.5 21 .5 21 .5 4.6 4.6 18.6 18.6 27 27 16.7 16.7 ~ .7 ~ .7 13.8 13.8 27.8 27 8 
HUNT NO. 1 2 3 4 :, ts I 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
N s N s N s N s N s N s N s N s N s 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Eleohant (Ml 7500 7500 7500 
Eleohant CFl 2000 
~~m(t- 111 1700 
·""'a '"" '"" '"" It>::> I t>::> / ts:> "'" '°" Hippopotamus Ubl 
9,..,,.,,0 127.5 
Warth<JQ 127.5 128 128 
u•ane 1:<n1 
t>UTTaJO (M) 1U20 
Buffalo (Fl 765 
Buffalo IN 11 765 
NV~"' ""' 
tlus/1bUCk (M) ~"" ~"" ~"" ~"" 
Kudu (Ml 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Kudu CFl 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Eland (Ml 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 850 
""'"" (t- ) oov ~ oov oov """ 680 """ Du,ker 42.5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Reedbuck 170 
vvatemuC1< (Ml :,,,:, 
vv aterouc1< (t- ) ,.., 
Sable CMl 1360 
Sable (Fl 680 
Widebeest 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
lsesseoe OIV 
l=•'s !Ml 102 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 
lrroaia CFl 68 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 
IITT>aJa !culll 68 
" 'pspr,nqer 170 
Steenbok 42.5 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 
.""5l>Ok 42.5 
L,on CMl 2550 
L,on (~J 1700 
Leooanl 1/UJ l" 1,vv l" 1,vv 1,vv 
Wildcat 42.5 
Serva! 85 
<.;enet 4;., ~ 
vrvet 8:> 
Hvaena 85 85 85 85 
Jackal 42.5 43 43 43 43 
tlat-eared t-ox 85 
!-)orcupne 42b 
Baboon 17 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
Crcrod,le 850 
Guinea Fowt 8.5 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
I Francol,n 5.1 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 2ti 
Poeon/Oove 1.7 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 
Sardqrouse 1.7 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 
Jud< 0 
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ruu SAFARI AREA: 
YEAR: 
TROPHY FEE TYPE 
DATE from: 31 .8 31 .8 14.9 14.9 28.9 28.9 12.10 12.10 lai DATE to: 10.9 10.9 24.9 24.9 8.10 8.10 22.10 22.10 HUNT NO. 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 N s N s N s N s 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE :::=:::=:/ifAlUE}::::' 
Eleohant IMl 75CO :'/':}':/,'jj;:iim' 
Eieohant IH 20'.Xl :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::}(): 
Elepnant (F ti) 1700 
,.,,,a "'" '"" ·= ·= ::;:;:::::::-::::::::::;::';:..~ .. H,ppopotamus '""" 
Bustnia 127.5 
Warthoq 127.5 :;:=:::::::::::::::::=::::::.~ 
uwane 1360 
tlultalo {M) 
Buffalo IFl 765 
Buffalo 1Nn 765 
,NyaJa 
;tsus =c~IMJ """ :::::::::::;:;:;:::::::::::;:;4:~ 
Kudu IMl 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 :,::::,:::::::,:::::,~ :;w,: 
Kudu {Fl 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 ;}}}}:':;:':;~)EiQ 
Eland rMJ 850 850 850 850 850 ::;1".1'Z'll"I 
l~<tM (f-) """ """ """ :;:;:,}}}:;:;:;:;i.~ Duiker 425 : ·::::::::;:::::::::::::::::::-
H-*>uck 170 
vvaterbuck (M) = 
1vvatl'Hnllt"':I( (t-J 340 
SablelMl 1360 
Sable {Fl 680 
Widebeest 340 340 340 340 340 :=:=::::::::::::::::::;:::.,~ 
Jsesseoe blU :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::,:,:;:~ ; 
l~•alMl 102 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 2652 2040 :::::::;:::::::::::=·- ·.~ : 
l""'-"1a (Fl 68 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 1768 1360 ::::::,::::::::::::::38:896: 
1~1;;1(cullJ 68 ::::::::::(): 
I Klpspm1qer JIU ·:::::·:::·::::::::::::::::=:::::::~ : 
Steenbok 42.5 43 43 43 :::;:::::::::::,:::,:;:':':;:l)1ll: 
:.;,v.,bok 42.5 ,:,:,:::::::;:,:,:,:,:::::;:,:::;:;o: 
Lion (M) 2550 :::::,:::,,,,,,:::::::::,,,,::::;,,o., 
!UOn {F) 1, w :::::::::::,:::,:,:::,:;:;:;:;:;:;:!) ; 
!Leopard l ·vv :::::::::::::::::::::::;:~::>{I: 
Widcat 42.5 ,:::,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:,:::,:::,o·: 
Serva! 85 ;:;:;:::;:::,:;:/::::::::::::::0: 
'-""let 42.b :::;:::::::;:::::,:::::::,:::,/,Q: 
CJVet !lb :;:,:;:,:::::::,:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:~; 
Hvaena 85 :;:;:;:;}:\:;:;';:;:;:255: 
Jackal 42.5 ,:,:,:::::::::,:::::::,::::::.110: 
Bat-<>ared Fox 85 :::::::::;:::::::;:::::::;:::::}(): 
t-Jorcupine 4Z.b :,:,:::,:;:,:;:,:;:;:::::::;:::,:::!), 
B.boon 17 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 :::::::::::::::::::;:::::::::R"lll : 
Crocodile 850 ,,,,::::::::::;:::::;::,::::::::rn, 
Guinea Fowl 8.5 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~ : 
f-rancohn 5.1 51 26 51 26 51 26 51 26 ::::=::::::::::::::=::::::::~ : 
PoeonlDove 1.7 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 ::::;:::;:332: 
Sardqrouse 1.7 17 9 17 9 17 9 17 9 :/:;:;:;}}}}:~ : 
Duck 0 ,:::::::::,:::::::,:,:,:,:,:::;::::u: 
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Appendix 7.4 Value of allocation: Doma Safari Area 
OOMA SAFARI AREA VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 1991 
Lomaguna Hunter's Association 
YEAR: 1991 LEVY in (%) of DNPWLM TrC!)l,y Fee 
TROFHY FEE 1Y LOCAL 20% 
DATE from: 1.5 16.5 31 .5 15.6 
:xi~ 1 157 1 :xi~I 1481 2981 
13.9 
DATE to: 125 27.5 11 .6 26.6 11 .7 26.7 10.8 25.8 9.9 24.9 
iHUN 1 NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SPECES TROPHY•+> 
Eleohant IM\ 7500 7500 7500 
Eleehant IFl 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 
~~mf~U\ 1200 
LBDra 540 04U 04U 04U 
Hippopotamus 
B,~nnin 90 180 180 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Warmoa 90 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 180 
urane 
Bultalo (M) '""' '"'1 '"'1 ("'1 /"'1 /"'1 / "'1 '"'-' '"'-' '"'-' Buffalo (Fl 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 540 ::::::::::::::::::::::;:;s .... 
Buffalo INll 540 
INv~I;, bl 
i ~usl1ouc!< (M) ]tj{J lllU lllU lllU l llU lllU 
Kudu IM\ 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 
Kudu (Fl 240 
Eland (Ml 600 600 600 600 600 
.... M (F) 4BO 4BO 4BO 4BO 48{ 
Duik.er :xi :xi 30 :xi 30 30 :xi :xi :xi :xi :xi 
H~k 120 
vvatemucs (Ml 420 
vvat-""". It- \ 74! 




'"""""' (Ml 72 
1....,.1,, IFl 48 
lrroaia (cull) 48 
l'\.1 11: :r-.lxlnQer ' "'-' :;:;:;:;:;:::::;:;:;:;:;:::;::::::.~: 
Steenbok :xi 
:xi :xi 30 :xi 30 :xi 30 :xi 30 :xi :xi 
Lion (Ml 1800 
LIOO (~) 1<:\AJ 
L900am '""" '""" '""" '""" ;:::::::::::::::::::::::~~~ Wildca! :xi :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::'"1': 
Se,vai 60 
'-"""" :xi 
L !Vel bU ·:·::::::::::::::::::::::;:;:;:;::v 
Hvaena 60 
Jad<al :xi 
~at-eared ~ox 60 
1-1orcupine 30 
Baboon 12 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Crocodile 600 
Guinea Fowl 6 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Hanconn 4 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 
PnAOn/1 Jnve 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
->aroarouse 1 
iJud( 0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;U,: 
TOTAL QUOTA VALUE 9 ,864 10824 6554 6,194 6,554 6,194 6,554 5,654 5,354 5054 
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Appendix 7.5 Value of allocation: Rifa section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURU~WE SAFARI AREA VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
RIFA SECTION Mashonaland Hunter's Association 
YEAR: 1991 LEVY in % of ONPWLM T roph Fee 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: LOCAL 170% 
DATE from: 27.4 27.4 27.4 11 5 11 .5 11 5 25.5 25.5 25.5 86 8.6 86 22.6 22.6 22.6 
DATE to· 7.5 7.5 7.5 21 .5 215 21 5 4.6 4.6 46 186 186 186 2 7 2.7 27 
HUNT NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c 
SFECES TROPHY FEE 
Elephant (Ml 12,750 12,750 12,750 12,750 
E~•ntlFl 3400 
E""""ant rF11l 1700 
Zebra 765 765 765 
H.mintarr,us 1,= 1,-">ll 1,""'-.1 1,= 1,.>bl 1,.>bl 1,""'-.1 1,""'1 1.= 1,'1bl 1,360 1 .. ~ 1 .. ~· 
Ousnota l~ll 
Warthoo 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Gwaffe 1360 
Buffalo (Ml 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 
t,UTiaJO (f'l '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" /00 100 / 00 / 00 /00 / 00 / 00 / 00 /00 / 00 '"" Buffalo(NTI 765 
Nvala 850 
8ushbuck (Ml 2t>:> /~~ /~~ 2t>:> 255 
I\UdU {Ml 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 
Kudu IFl 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Eland (Ml 850 850 
r::iana (f- l -lJuoker 43 
Redlt.d< 170 
Wateobuck IMl 595 595 595 
vvateonuc• (f-l ,,.., 
,,.w.,(M) ,.~ 
Sable IF\ 680 
Wildebeest 340 
Tsessebe 510 
lrrpa,a (Ml 102 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1.224 1.224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 
lrrpa,a (F) 68 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 
1rroa1a rr::ulll 68 
Klnc:.rv1noer 170 
Ste.enDOk 43 
l>r)'SUU" "" "" "" "" "" "" L1on(Ml 2.550 2 .550 2550 
Lion (Fl 1700 1,700 1,700 





Hyaena 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Jackal 43 43 
Bat-eared f-ox 85 
Pore""'°" 43 
O.IJOOrl 11 ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, llu ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, llr~ ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, ;;,, llU 
Crocodile 850 
Gu,neaFowt 9 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
t-ranco1n , 1, 1, 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1, 1, 1, 15 1, 1, 
~nJOl/e 2 1 1 I 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Sardarovse 2 
Dud< 0 
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HURUI-.GWE SAFARI AFEA 
RIFA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: LOCAL 
DATE from: 6.7 6.7 6.7 2()7 20.7 20.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 31 .8 31 .8 31 .8 
DATE 10: 16.7 16.7 16.7 :¥J.7 :¥J.7 :¥J.7 13.8 13.8 13.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 10.9 10.9 109 
HUNT NO. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 '.¥] 
A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c 
SPECES TROPHY FEE 
Elephant (M) 12,750 12,750 12 ,750 
Ele- 0 - tFl 3400 
EleOllant IF ti) 1700 
Zebra 765 
HIOPOPOtamus 1,->DU 1,-">U 1.~ 1. ~ 1 .. ~, 1,-">U 1,->DU 1,->DU 
ousnp,g lZH 
WarthoO 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Giraffe 1360 
Buffalo(Ml 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 1.020 1,020 1,020 
l:!unaio (r ) ,= OJ '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" '"" OJ ·= ( b!) ·= Buffalo IN 11 765 
Nvala 850 
tsus rnK:K{MJ ,,,,_, """ z :,:, z:,:, 255 ' "" Kudu (M) 510 510 510 :,10 510 510 
Kudu IFl 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 
Eland IMl 850 
Eland (Fl 680 
UUtker "" Reedbuck 170 
Wa1eroucl< (Ml 595 595 595 595 
. vv aten:x>O\ (I-) 340 
'"'""' (M) 1,""'-' 
Sable fFl 680 
Widebeest 340 
Tsessebe 510 
lrrpala (Ml 102 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 14<4 14'4 1.=~ 1,a 4 14<4 1,a4 1,a 4 14'4 1.~4 1,224 
,.,..,,.,a fFl 68 816 816 816 816 816 816 81 6 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 816 
,~,, tcu\\l 68 
Klnsn,inqer 170 
!:>tee nr--. 43 
Grvsbok 43 
LiontM\ 2550 2.550 2550 
Lion IFl 1,700 1,700 1700 
Leooam 1,tw 1,tw 
""'cal "" Se,va\ 85 
Genet 43 
Civet 85 
Hyaena 85 85 85 85 85 85 
Jad<al 43 
Bat...ared Fox 85 
1,-Jorcupne 43 
K.~ 17 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 102 34 34 34 34 
Crocodile 850 
Guinea Fowl 9 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 17 
t-rancoln 5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1:, 15 1:, 1:, 10 10 10 
Pgeorvuove 2 :, :, :, :, :, :, :, :, :, :, 5 5 " :, :, Sandorouse 2 
Dud< 0 
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HURUf\GWE SAFARI AREA 
RIFA SECTKlN 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE lYPE: LOCAL 
\/r~t <t 
DATE from: 14.9 14.9 14.9 289 28.9 28.9 12.10 12.1~1 12.10 i&it DATE to· 24 9 24.9 24.9 8 10 8.10 8 10 22 10 22.10 22.10 HUNT NO. 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 A B c A B c A B c 
SPECES TROPHY FEE . :/OUOTA)' 
Elephant (Ml 12,750 : ::::/¢3:'750, 
E~·-IFl 3400 ... ,:::,,,,,::>:::::::',,::::,,o 
Eleohant IF dl 1 700 :.:::;.,.,:,.,.;.·· .. ·.·.·.·.·. ,, 
Zebra 765 :,:;:;:;:':':\/:1:;~ 
I M,ppopo,am.JS 1.-~ 1,.~ ::::,::::::;u~: 
I 8usf'IPl!l '"~ :,:::,:':·:':::::::=:::::'::::::::" 
Wartnnn 128 128 128 128 128 :::::::::::::::::::::3:6!18 
Graffe 1 360 :;:}O: 
Buffalo(Ml 1,020 1,020 1,020 2,040 2.040 2,040 1,020 1,020 1,020 1,020 :,::::::::::::;:::::::s1,;1~ 
ounaio (~) ( ~ ( ~ "'" ·= ·= ( ~ ( ~ ( ~ ':':':' . .:!l;!:,N.)' 
Buffalo INTI 765 ·,:,:,:,:::::,,,:,:,,,:,:,:,:::::::o, 
INvala 850 :,:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::,:,:0. 
~•~•""<IMI ,.,,_~ ,,,,,, ,:,:,::;:::::::::;:::::::il;= 
Kudu IM) 510 510 ;:;:E; ,:1i,; 
Kudu !Fl 340 :,:::::::::::::::::::3740 
t:land Ml 850 ::::::::::;,.._ ..... 
tiana [cl """ ;:;:;:;:;:!), 
IUUtKer 43 ::::.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::JI· 
Reectiuck 170 ::\::'::/0 · 
Wa1erbuck IMl 595 595 3.57D 
IWatAf'tlt.j{'!k(t-) 340 ,.,.,.·.,,,,,,:::-,,:::,=:;:;:;:-,,o, 
1;::,ao,e {M) l ,.JOV :::,::::::::::::::::=:::::::;:JJ· 
Sable {Fl 680 :,:::::::::::,:,:·:::·::::::::;:1i: 
Wldebeest 340 :::::::::o: 
Tsessebe 510 :,.::::;::::·,:;:::::::::,:::::::-0: 
l lrTl)3Ja(M) 102 1,224 1,224 1 ,224 1,224 1,224 1,224 1,lL'U 1,J.'U 1,J.'U :-:· :,:;;:;:':;:':;t,"1<04; 
ln-na"' (Fl 68 816 816 816 816 816 816 680 680 680 .,:::::::::,::::::-:·31:,415, 
l=lculO 68 :::,,,.o. 
Kl~tnnAI" 170 ::::::::::::::::::::::::::0: 
ISteenoo< 43 ,,,,,,,,,,,,,,::::::::::,,,::;:·o, 
"" ::::,.,.-:.:;:::::::::::::::· .. ,,.; Lion !Ml 2550 ,;,;.;.;,:,:,::,:-:,10:200-
Lion (Fl 1 700 ,,.:::.,,,.:::,:::::::::s.ooo 
L-•=rr 1,700 ... ·.·.··:::::::::;:::1>;~· 
I VVIIOCal 43 :,::;:;:-:':;:;:lJ 
Se<11al 85 .·.·:·.:··:·.·,:::::::::::::·o-
Genet 43 .·.·.·.··.··.·.·:·::-.::·.a. 
Civet 85 .. .... ·:::.::::::::. o . 
Hyaena 8!> 8!> 85 ,·:-.::: 1., lJLl 
Jackal 43 ·:: ;:., ·>·.·. 43 
Bat-eared Fox 85 :::./ ... :,:·:·:,:::.:-::, .. 0 
1-'0<~one 43 .. 0 
t>aooon 17 34 34 34 34 34 34 17 17 17 :,:.) ,547 
Crocodile 850 .. .·,:;:;:,:.;:::O· 
Gu,neaFowt 9 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 ,', ... :,: ... ,·,.:::-1 .007 
ranco,n 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 ····.·-:::::~ 
1-'qeorvuove 2 !) !) !) !) !:, !:, !:, 5 5 .·.·. .,:·.:,/:\:::.:,:u,i 
Sanda rouse 2 0 
Dud< 0 ::::::::::::,:::::::::::::::::::::0 
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Appendix 7.7 Value of auction: Zambezi valley hunt results: 1991 
Appendix 7.7.1 Auction values: Nyakasanga section (Hurungwe Safari Area) and 
Sapi Safari Area: Hunt values 
ZAMBEZI VALLEY HUNTING CAMPS SOLD BY AUCTION 
DATE. 1991 
HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA: NY AKASAl¥3A SECTION and SAPI SAFARI AREA 
HUNTS: NY AKASAl¥3A AND SAPI 
H-UA It:'> H·LJA It:'> HUN1 1991 (LY(r) - ·- """' 
.,,.... , 
HUNTr,.Q CAMP FROM· TO: DAYS BIDZS NATIONAL FOREIGN LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL 
N1 D Ol ·May 14-May 14 19,000 F 19,000 
N2 D 18-May 31-May 14 19,500 F 19,500 
N3 D 04.Jun 17.Jun 14 16,000 F 16,000 
N4 D 21.Jun 04.Jul 14 19,500 F 19,500 
NS D OS.Jul 21.Jul 14 24,000 F 24,000 
N6 D 25-Jul 07-Aug 14 17,000 F 17,000 
N7 D 11 -Aug 24-Aug 14 19,000 F 19,000 
NS D 28-Aug 10-Sep 14 20,000 F 20,000 
N9 D 14-Sep 27-Sep 14 19,000 L 19,000 
N10 E 01-May 14-May 14 16,000 F 16,000 
N11 E 18-May 31-May 14 18,000 F 18,000 
N12 E 04.Jun 17-Jun 14 14,500 F 14,500 
N13 E 21.Jun 04-Jul 14 19,000 F 19,000 
N14 E OS.Jul 21-Jul 14 24,000 F 24,000 
N15 E 25-Jul 07-Aug 14 18,000 L 18,000 
N16 E 11-Aug 24-Aug 14 21 ,000 F 21 ,000 
N17 E 28-Aug 10-Sep 14 20,000 L 20,000 
N18 E 14-Sep 27-Sep 14 17,000 L 17,000 
N19 CH-N 01-May 10-May 10 12,500 F 12,500 
N20 CH-N 14-May 23-May 10 13,000 L 13,000 
N21 CH-N 27-May 05-Jun 10 10,500 L 10,500 
N22 CH-N 00-Jun ls.Jun 10 10,000 F 10,000 
N23 CH-N 22-Jun 01-Jul 10 10,500 F 10,500 
N24 CH-N 05-Jul 14-Jul 10 12,500 F 12,500 
N25 CH-N 18-Jul 27.Jul 10 12,500 F 12,500 
N26 CH-N 31 -Jul 09-Aug 10 11 ,500 F 11 ,500 
N27 CH-N 13-Acg 22-Aug 10 12,000 F 12,000 
N28 CH-N 26-Acg 04-Sep 10 11 ,500 F 11 ,500 
N29 CH-N OS.Sep 17-Sep 10 11 ,000 F 11 ,000 
N30 CH-N 21-Sep 30-Sep 10 11 ,500 F 11 ,500 
N31 CH-W 01-May 10-May 10 7,500 F 7,500 
N32 CH-W 14-May 23-May 10 7,000 F 7,000 
N33 CH-W 27-May OS.Jun 10 5,000 F 5,000 
N34 CH-W 00-Jun ls.Jun 10 6,500 L 6,500 
N35 CH-W 22-Jun 01-Jul 10 4,500 L 4,500 
N36 CH-W 05-Jul 14-Jul 10 8,500 F 8,500 
N37 CH-W 18-Jul 27-Jul 10 10,000 L 10,000 
N38 CH-W 31 -Jul 09-Aug 10 7,000 F 7,000 
N39 CH-W 13-Aug 22-Aug 10 8,500 F 8,500 
N40 CH-W 26-Aug 04-Sep 10 5,250 F 5,250 
N41 CH-W OS.Sep 17-Sep 10 5,250 F 5,250 
N42 CH-W 21-Sep 30-Sep 10 5,750 F 5,750 
Sl G 01 -May 14-May 14 19,500 F 19,500 
S2 G 18-May 31-May 14 16,000 F 16,000 
S3 G 04.Jun 17-Jun 14 18,000 F 18,000 
$4 G 21-Jun 04-Jul 14 19,000 F 19,000 
SS G OS.Jul 21 -Jul 14 17,000 F 17,000 
S6 G 25-Jul 07-Aug 14 17,500 F 17,500 
S7 G 11 -Aug 24-Aug 14 18,000 F 18,000 
S8 G 28-Aug 10-Sep 14 17,000 L 17,000 
S9 G 14-Sep 27-Sep 14 21 ,000 L 21 ,000 
SlO H 01-May 14-May 14 16.000 F 16,000 
S11 H 18-May 31 -May 14 17,000 L 17,000 
S12 H 04.Jun 17-Jun 14 18,000 F 18,000 
S13 H 21-Jun 04-Jul 14 19,000 L 19,000 
S14 H OS.Jul 21 -Jul 14 20,000 L 20,000 
S15 H 25-Jul 07-Aug 14 20,000 F 20,000 
S16 H 11-Aug 24-Aug 14 23,000 F 23,000 
S17 H 28-Aug 10-Sep 14 20,000 L 20,000 
S18 H 14-Sep 27-Sep 14 21 ,000 F 21 ,000 
S19 CR-S 01-May 10-May 10 12,000 L 12,000 
S20 CR-S 14-May 23-May 10 11,000 L 11 ,000 
$21 CR-S 27-May OS.Jun 10 13,500 L 13,500 
S22 CR-S 00-Jun ls.Jun 10 12,500 F 12,500 
S23 CR-S 22-Jun 01-Jul 10 17,500 L 17,500 
$24 CR-S 05-Jul 14-Jul 10 16,500 F 16,500 
$25 CR-S 18-Jul 27-Jul 10 16,000 F 16,000 
S26 CR-S 31 -Jul 09-Aug 10 17,000 F 17,000 
$27 CR-S 13-Aug 22-Aug 10 18,000 F 18,000 
$28 CR-S 26-Acg 04-Sep 10 19,500 L 19,500 
S29 CR-S OS.Sep 17-Sep 10 19,000 L 19,000 
S30 CR-S 21-Soo 30-Seo 10 19,000 F 19 000 
TOTALS TOTAL 864 1,088,750 441 ,750 118,500 322,000 206,500 
AREAS 560,250 528,500 
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Appendix 7.7.2 Auction values: Nyakasanga section (Hurungwe Safari Area) and 
Sapi Safari Area: Individual trophy animal values 
INDIVIDUAL TROPHY ANIMALS: NY AKASANGA AND SAPI 
1991 (I.JF) NY AKASIW<:. NYAKA= SAPI SAPI 
HUNT LOT SPECES BID ZS NATIONAL FOREIGN LOCAL FOREIGN LOCAL 
N30 1 Elephant (M) 33,500 F 33,500 
NS 2 Elephant (M) 34,000 F 34,000 
N4 3 Elephant (M) 32,000 F 32,000 
N2 4 Elephant (M) 27,000 F 27 ,000 
N37 5 Elephant (M) 26,000 L 26,000 
N10 6 Elephant (M) 25,000 F 25,000 
N25 7 Elephant (M) 27,000 F 27,000 
N19 8 Elephant (M) 28,000 F 28,000 
N31 9 Elephant (M) 29,000 F 29,000 
N20 10 Elephant (M) 30,000 L 30,000 
N12 11 Leopard 4,500 F 4,500 
N18 12 Leopard 3,500 L 3,500 
N13 13 Leopard 3,750 F 3,750 
N9 14 Leopard 3,000 L 3,000 
N40 15 Leopard 2,900 F 2,900 
NS 16 Leopard 3,000 F 3,000 
N38 17 Leopard 3,000 F 3,000 
N34 18 Leopard 2,800 L 2,800 
N36 19 Leopard 2,750 F 2.750 
N29 20 Leopard 2,750 F 2,750 
N7 21 Lioo (M) 14,000 F 14,000 
Nl 22 Lioo (M) 16,500 F 16,500 
N2 23 L>0n(M) 23,000 F 23,000 
N6 24 L>0n(M) 24 ,000 F 24 ,000 
N9 25 Waterbuck (M) 3,500 L 3,500 
N13 26 Waterbuck (M) 2,750 F 2,750 
N34 27 Wate<buck (M) 2,400 L 2,400 
N7 28 Waterbuck (M) 2,700 F 2,700 
N2 29 Wat91buck (M) 3,100 F 3,100 
N15 30 Wat91buck (M) 2,500 L 2,500 
N36 31 Bushbud< 600 F 600 
N24 32 Bushbud< 650 F 650 
N3 33 Bushbud< 750 F 750 
N7 34 Bushbud< 600 F 600 
N38 35 Bushbud< 650 F 650 
N22 36 Kudu (M) 700 F 700 
N12 37 Kudu (M) 600 F 600 
N32 38 Kudu (M) 550 F 550 
N42 39 Kudu (M) 575 F 575 
N24 40 Kudu (M) 775 F 775 
N32 41 Hippopotarros 2,500 F 2,500 
N13 42 Hippopotarros 2,300 F 2,300 
N15 43 Hippopotamus 2,400 L 2,400 
N29 44 Hippopotamus 2,1 00 F 2,100 
N9 45 Hippopotamus 1,900 L 1,900 
N38 46 Buffalo (M) 8,250 F 8,250 
N11 47 Buffalo (M) 7,750 F 7,750 
N28 48 Buffalo (M) 8,250 F 8,250 
N24 49 Warthog 325 F 325 
N3 50 Warthog 275 F 275 
N35 51 Warthog 275 L 275 
N38 52 Warthog 325 F 325 
N40 53 lrrpala (M) 80 F 80 
N35 54 lrrpala (M) 70 L 70 
N1 7 55 lrrpala (M) 50 L 50 
N21 56 lrrpala (F) 40 L 40 
WIORAWN 57 lrrpala (F) 0 
WIORAWN 58 lrrpala (F) 0 
N2 59 Zebra 1,000 F 1,000 
N7 60 Zebra 1,200 F 1,200 
N35 61 Zebra 1,100 L 1,100 
N22 62 Zebra 1,300 F 1,300 
N9 63 Zebra 1,400 L 1,400 
53 64 Elephant (M) 26,000 F 26,000 
57 65 Elephant (M) 26,000 F 26,000 
51 2 66 Elephant (M) 23,000 F 23,000 
5 18 67 Elephant (M) 22,000 F 22,000 
510 68 Lioo (M) 15,000 F 15,000 
524 69 L>0n (M) 9,000 F 9,000 
51 2 70 L>0n (M) 9,500 F 9,500 
515 71 Lioo (M) 10,500 F 10,500 
51 72 Leopard 7,000 F 7,000 
524 73 Leopard 9,000 F 9,000 
510 74 Leopard 9,000 F 9,000 
52 75 Leopard 9,000 F 9,000 
511 76 Nyala 1,500 L 1,500 
513 77 Ny ala 1,700 L 1,700 
523 78 Nyala 1,800 L 1,800 
5 10 79 Nyala 1,500 F 1,500 
51 80 Hippopotam.,s 1,800 F 1,800 
512 81 Hippopotamus 1,600 F 1,600 
516 82 Hippopotarros 1,500 F 1,500 
511 83 Hippopotarros 1,600 L 1,600 
519 84 Warthog 150 L 150 
58 85 Warthog 175 L 175 
51 1 86 Warthog 175 L 175 
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INDIVIDUAL TROPHY ANIMALS: NY AKASANGA AND SAPI 
1991 (UF} NYAKAS"""°' NYAKASA~ SAPI SAPI 
1-lUNT LOT SPECES BIDZS NATIONAL FOREIGN LOCAL C:/"ICC:11"'.Al l l'T41 
S13 88 Wartnog 150 L 150 
S2 89 Warthog 200 F 200 
S21 90 Warthog 150 L 150 
S12 91 Warthog 175 F 175 
S24 92 Warthog 200 F 200 
S23 93 Warthog 200 L 200 
S11 94 Bushbud< 600 L 600 
S13 95 Bushbud< 625 L 625 
S23 96 Bushbud< 625 L 625 
S19 97 Bushbud< 650 L 650 
Sl 98 Zebra 1,500 F 1,500 
S24 99 Zebra 1,650 F 1,650 
S11 100 Zebra 1,500 L 1,500 
S21 101 Zebra 1,800 L 1,800 
SS 102 Waterouck (M) 2.200 F 2.200 
S7 103 Waterouck (M) 2,100 F 2,100 
S11 104 Waterouck (M) 2.200 L 2,200 
S19 105 Waterouck (M) 2.200 L 2.200 
Sl 106 Waterouck (M) 1,800 F 1,800 
TOTALS TOTAL 676,440 386,305 80,935 191 ,400 17,800 
AREAS 467.240 209.200 
ZVA TROPHIES 1991 676,440 
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Appendix 7.7.3 Total Auction values: Nyakasanfta section (Hurungwe Safari Area): 
Hunt and Individual trophy va ues 
HURUtsGWE SAFARI AREA VALUAHJN OF QUOTA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION Zarrbezi Valley Auction Hunts 
YEAR: 1991 
HUNT TYPE: FOREGN 
DATE from: 1.5 18.5 4.6 21.6 
DATE to: 14.5 31 .5 17.6 4.7 
BUYER ,~,.,....,,rvt.ocall: F F F F F F F F L F F F F F L F L L 
ICAMP A A A A A A A A A <..; ti ti ti ti ti B B B 
HUNT NO. Nl N2 N3 N4 NS N6 N7 NB N9 N10 N11 N12 N13 N14 N1 5 N16 N17 N18 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Eleohant IMl 7500 
E~•"1 1F1 2500 
t:leDllanl IF tfl 100J 
utta 600 
I Hippopotamus l:iu.1 
BusllOia 100 
Warttvv. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
IG•alle 100J 
IRutt~1n(M) 1UJJ 1,u 1,u..u 1,UJJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ 1,1.MJ l ,v.AJ 1,v.AJ 1,v..AJ 1,v.AJ 1,11 1,lI 1,lIIJ 1,lI 
Buffalo IFl 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Hutlalo IN ll 500 
NVal.> kw 
IHl~IJlJc:J((M) '"" Kudu IMl 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
Kudu IFl 250 
1-1an<11Ml 900 
t:iand(~l """ 
Duik.er 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Redx.d< 300 
Waterouck IMl 700 
I VVattvr 11r.k. (rJ '""' Sable IMl 1200 
Sable /Fl 600 
Widebeesl 400 
Tsesseoe 600 
1-•'alMl 75 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 450 
lrroaJa IF\ 50 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 
l~•alculll 0 
IKlnsrv,...,_. 200 
•::;t~ / 0 
'""""'k 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
LtonlMI 2500 
Lion IF\ 1500 





H\laena 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Jad<al 25 
I Bat-eared Fox 75 
l t'orcup,ne ~o 
Baicton 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40' 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Crocodile 100J 
~1near-nw1 5 20 20 <.'\) "" 20 "" "" 20 "" "" "" 
<.'\) <.'\) <.'\) 20 20 20 20 
rancoin 3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 '" '" '" 12 12 12 12 Pneon/Oove 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Sardarouse 1 
'""' 0 
siNOtft#:jp@=, ? ·. /? 1::==:~ ~ IillIT ~ -t:18Dnant (Ml I :»,) '·""" E'"""ant IFl 2500 
L"""""' 20CO 200J 200J 2 00J 
Lion (M) 2500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
RuffalolMl 100J 1,00J 
VVa!erDUCK (Ml I I.A.I IV. 
Nvafa 1200 
H 1500 1500 1 500 
vvarmoa 100 
Rushhu,,k (M) "' "· 
,.,,., .,.,..., 
Kudu IMl 400 
1~ .. 1M1 75 75 
11rroaia IF\ 50 50 50 50 50 
L.OOra ouv ouv ouv OU OU.I 
TROPHY VALLIE BAG 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,184 3,084 2,684 2,684 2,684 2,684 2,684 2,684 2,684 2,684 
AUCnON VALUE BAG 1900( 19 50( 1600( 1950<. 24 00( 17""' 19001 20""' 19 001 16. 00 18 00 14 5ll! 1900, 24 00 18 00( 21 ocx. 2000< 17000 
VALUE TROPES 50 9,850 2,500 7,500 8,100 50 3,850 600 5,400 7,500 700 700 3,400 0 2,800 0 75 0 
AUCnON VALUE TROPHIES 1650( 54 10<. 1025 32.00I. 37001 24,llfll 1850 0 9 800 25.00 7.750 5 100 8800 0 4900 0 50 3500 
rot~~V~o.s niZi4 13.@ ·s.~ 111 ]11. {13'~ iJ.~; } j~ :it :1.~ffl Iii }i~ Iii :11-':lt1! ii SM [%~ c:c2,:ffi~i: ~!i.&.U:' : =tt: ::::::: :tot:& ::'!J6;30i Jj,_°M tiii2: :#;iiij ji;i;iii =2i))ii~ :::t.~$1 '.i{M ~ii.too 
OUHt:"-"'I 35,:,u; '"·"""' 11.~~ 01 ,:U "'·"'"' 41 ,uu 3/ ,.AA. ,!IJ,uu "'·"'"' ""·'-' 1~,cu 2/ ,r:,., 24,uu 21 ,l.U. LOCAL 28 RIY 22 900 20050 20500 













,:,:·:·:,:,:,:.;,;,;.;,:-:-:·:·:·:·:-:,:-:-: .;.;.;.;,:,:-:·:-:-:-:-:-:·:-:-:-: .•.•.•.•.••.•.••.··· ·······.····· ········.·.·.·.··· .. ·.· ··.· · ·.·.· ·.·.•.•.·,• ·,·.·.·.· · :,·.;,;,;,:,;,;.;,:,:,:,:,:,;,;.;.:-:·:-:-:-:·:··.;.;,·.·.· ......... ·:·,:-:··:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-: ............. .... . .,: ... ......... .:-:.;. :-: .......... ~ 
HURUN3WE SAFARI AREA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
HUNT lYPE: FOREIGN 
DATE from: 
DATE to: 










u u l) D E E F E t:: I:: 
N20 N21 N22 N23 N24 N27 N28 N29 N30 N31 N32 N33 N34 N35 N36 
TROPHY FEE 
Eleohant IM\ 7500 
2500 
t::lephant (F ti) 1000 
ceora 
I Hippopotamus 1""" 
100 
Wartttoa 100 100 
1uralle 1 III 
IKlfflal<'>(M) l w l ,OCX) l ,LU.J 1,LU.J l ,l.UJ l ,LUJ 1,l.UJ 1,LUJ 1,LU.J 1,u..u 1,LU. 1,u..u 1,LU. 1,l.A.A. 1 ,l.A 1,1.A.AJ 1,1.A.AJ 1,LUJ 1,u..u 
Buffalo IF\ 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
I Buffalo (Nil 500 
Nvala 
lllJStDucK (M) 
Kudu M 400 
Kudu F 250 
Duiker 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Reecb.d<. 300 
Watetbuck IM\ 700 
I vvatert>uck (r) 
Sable IM\ 1200 






r~k 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Lion (Ml 2500 




IHvaena 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Jad<al 25 
Baboon 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Crocodile 1000 
,c,u,near-ow, 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
t-ranu•n J 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 "' ,~ 1~ u 1~ u 1~ 
Pi:ieon/Dove 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
S;1mnrouse 1 
L,on (Ml 





























TROPHYVALUE BAG 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,634 2,134 2,134 2,234 2,134 2,134 2,134 
AUCnONVALUE BAG 12501 13("J()( 1050£ 10("J()( 1050£ 12'"' 12501 11'"' 12001 11'"' 11001 11'"' 7500 7000 5000 6500 4500 8500 
VALUETROPES 7,500 7,500 400 2,100 0 2,600 7,500 0 0 700 3,100 7,500 7,500 2,600 0 !nl 3,075 2,100 
AUCnONVALUE TROPHIES 28,00£ 30,00I. 40 2000 0 1750 2700 0 0 8250 4850 33,;r, 29nn. 3050 0 5200 1445 3350 
l'"Vt1t:IU'< 40,:iu. 12,Wl 10,"'-" 14,;!:>l ""·"'-" 11 ,0Ut 12,v.., 19,I:> 15,<>:> 45,v.., 36,:>A 10,U:>. 5 ,UW 11 ,tl<>U 
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HURUN3WE SAFARI AREA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 












F F F 
t: t: t: 
N40 N41 N42 
ICAMF' 
HUNT NO. 
SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Eieohant !Ml 7500 
Ele<)llant (Fl 2500 
Eiepnant (F tll 1000 
ILet)(a 600 
I H,ppopotam.Js l ~ 
100 
Wart~ 100 100 
1c.ratfe 1000 
ltlultaJo (M) 1 cv., 1 ,cv., 1 ,cv., 1 ........... l ........... 1 ........... 1 ,cv., 
Buffalo 1F1 500 
BuffalotNII 500 
tlushbuck (M) 
Kudu IM 400 
Kudu Ir 250 
lt:JanO (N) 900 
Duiker 
Reedbuck 
Wateibuck (Ml 700 
vvall>IOUC!< (r) 
Sallle IMl 1200 
Sallle !Fl 600 
Widebeest 400 
Tsess""" bl 
lrT-oaJa !Ml 75 450 450 450 450 450 450 
50 350 350 350 350 350 350 











































:;teenoot< to o :,:;:::,,: 
'""""""' 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 3 150 
Lion !Mt 2500 0 12 500 ::;:;:;:;:::;:=:;:::;,,.: 
Lion (Fl 1500 0 
LeooatO U lu,cv., :::':::::':::'::=:::::\"" 
Widcal 50 0 
S8!Val 75 0 
,_,.,, 50 u 
vrvet 75 0 
""'aena 1 CO 1 CO 1 CO 1 CO 1 CO 1 CO 1 CO 4 200 }:=:,::::}::=::,=::4·'" · 
Jad<a) 25 0 ,:;:;:;:,:::=:,:::,:::;:;:;:,:;:,:,(l: 
tla!-eared t-ox 15 u ,:,:;:;:,:;:=:,:,:::::::::,:;::c:::U.: 
OfC\4)M 2o O :::::::::::::::::::;:=:;:':;:;:;:;:!)' 
Ba:xioo 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 680 
Crocodile 1000 0 
Guinea ,-ow, 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 840 ::::,:,:,:::,:,:,:;:;:::;:::,.,,. 
""""""" :J 1, 1, 1, l~ l ~ l, -""' :,:::,:;:;:;:::::':::::::::;:,,.. .: 
P"-'n/Dove 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 504 :=:::::=:,:-
S.amnrouse 1 0 ::::,:::::::=:::::,:;:::::=::::::=:O, 
~ : 
Eie""""' IF\ 2500 
L"""""' 2000 
Lion (Ml 2500 
1t,UT1'!JO (Ml 1u.u 1,u.u 
IVVatHR lJCJ( IM / W 
N\lala 1200 
H..........,,,.amus 1500 1,500 
1vvartnnn 100 100 
I tlushbuck (M) 300 
Kudu (Ml 400 
l~•a!Ml 75 75 
I lrrnaJa (F) 50 
'"'°'a OVJ 
TROPHYVALUEBAG 2,134 2,134 2,234 2,134 2,134 2,134 
AUCT/ONVALUE BAG 1000( 7000 8500 5250 5250 5750 
UVALUE TROPES 7,500 3, 100 0 675 0 100 
AUCTION VALUE TROPHIES 26,00( 12,22! 0 2,980 0 575 
1:Qtiit=rnPP.i:;t'{V&Ue?===:::::=·=·=·=··· ='='963ii :: 5234 ( ~ \tii® \g;~ }?~ 
::._·." ,..,..,·_··•·.· = :··_,.,.\_·. ':·• .. t.·.··;::1:;,,,_==··· ..=.··:.,_=.•.=.=.·=.·=.·=.· .. =·.,.:_:_•.,.:_, •. :.=.:=.".0: ,.,_;.;;;::_ •.•. ~mi •=_='t,k"' . . ,,,."""' . :,,:..,.,,, . ,-:..,,..,, . '°"'""' """'''""'"'""'"""'' , , .,..._ ·'" .,. :=:o;w« :=:v;c.,.,. '::,,;c.,.., :;:;v;.,,;:.,: 
t-UMt:IUl'I 19,""; 8 ,:>,,AJ 8,2'.JU :J,2:,U 6 ,-><:~ 
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Appendix 7.7.4 Total 
values 
Auction values: Sapi Safari Area: Hunt and Individual trophy 
SAPI SAFARI AREA: VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
Zarrbezi Valley Auction Hums 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TY FOREGN 
DATE from: 1.5 18.5 4.6 21.6 
DATE to: t45 31 .5 17.6 4.7 
BUYER (Fnn,;,,rvl.ocan. F F F F F F F L L F L F L L F F L F 
HUNI NO. 51 52 S3 S4 SS S6 57 SB S9 510 511 512 ::;13 ::;14 515 ::;16 ::;17 ::;19 
CAMP G G G G G G G G G H H H H H H H H H 
SPEC ES TROHPYFA' 
EIAnhanl IM\ 7500 
EleChanl f Fl 2500 
tc1eonam (t- ti) 1,CXXJ 
,..,,a 600 
H,ppopotam.,s l ,"-AJ 
B•~•""" 100 
Wat1 nnn 100 100 100 100 
lira e 1,CXXJ 
Hl.lffa uo(M) 1,u. 1,u. 1,u....u 1,u...u 1,u..u 1,u....u 1,u...u 1,u....u 1,u...u 1,u...u 1, LU 1,u...u 1,JJ.J 1, LL 1,LIIJ 1, "' 1,VJJ 1,VJJ 1,VJJ 
Buffalo <Fl 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
"unaJo (NI J 500 
NV""' 1 ,,_ 
t:lushbuek (M) ~ 
Kudu M 400 
Kudu F' 250 
I tiana [~ ""-' 
l tlana It- """ 
Duiker 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Reed>uck 300 
Wa!erbuck (Ml 700 
vvat~ 1Jcic ct-1 




1- 00alMl 75 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 
lrrnaia (F) so 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
lrrna1a (cull) 0 
~·~·~ 
Steenoa< lb 
I <.:irVSOOK 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
Lion <Ml 2,500 






"""'""" 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Jad<al 25 
IBa!-<>ared Fox 75 
l~orcuptne "~ 
Baboon 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
Crooodile 1 (XX) 
I liulnea t-OWI 5 20 2[J 2[J 2[J 2[J 2[J 2[J 2[J 2[J 20 2[J 20 2[J 20 20 20 20 20 
11-'rancoin 3 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 1.e 1.e 1;, '" "' 1;, 1;, pirv.nnn n1e 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
1 :,aroqrouse 1 
i ~ 
0 
i};:;:;:;::,;:;::C:},•,::C:}\} ~ ~7,,.. .. 7 ,':DJ 
"'-"1 (F) E"" 2500 
Zebra 600 600 600 
H~arrus 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
IYVartnOQ 100 100 1LO 100 l u.J 100 100 
HU11dlL1(M) 1,cu. 
Nvala 1200 1 ,.. 1 ,.. 1 ,.. .. 
t:lushbuck (M) 300 300 300 300 
,,..,u (Ml 4l 
YValeroucK (M) / W 700 /W /W /U,J /W 
lrroai.> IM) 75 
l=(Fl so 
,on IMI 2 .~· 2 .~ 2,::iuu 2,:,,.,u 
_eooaro 2,LUJ 2,LUJ 2,LUJ £ ,LU.. 
TROPHY VALUE BAG 2,559 2,559 2,659 2,559 2,559 2,559 2,659 2,559 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 2,659 
AUCTION VALUE BAG 7950( 16()()( 1800( 19()()( 1700( 17.SOI. 18MI 17/Y)/ 2100( 1600/ 17nn, 18tlfl 79nn, 20M 2000( 231)(){ 2000( 21000 
VALUE TROPES 4,800 2,100 7,500 0 700 0 8,200 100 0 5,700 4,400 11 ,w. 1,600 0 2,500 1,500 0 8,600 
AUCTION VALUE TROPHIES 12, 10( 9,200 26,00 0 2200 0 2810 175 0 255lJ 7 575 3427 2475 0 1050 1500 0 22000 
lQTS,JBQl?.-it'f:V.~.\\'/\{ 7;0$ i) ;~ ··~~-};!;~ ;t~ ,til :• Ir~ 1,~ {f ;:)$ tiff :a~ '/ii \ii ;,1,:i 11m1 :1m •im ~mwYAiWE'. :: '?=' rot.At ~1:'60<: '25'.~ jiiiiiii .1iiiaii }tfm i#::m FOREIGN 31 ,bUJ 25,L'U 44,UA 19,UA 19,;,u. 17,SCX 46,lOC 41 ,:,u 52;2.7 30,500 24,500 43,CXXJ 
LOCAL 1717~ 21 ,mr 2457! 2147! 2000: 20 (XX) 
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SAPI SAFARI AREA: 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TY FOREIGN 
'= ,~~ 
Ill DATE from: SAPI SAPI DATE to: BUYER IFo...inrvt_...-.an : L L L F F F F F L L F HUNT NO. S19 S20 ::;21 :,22 """ :,:l,I ""' :,213 '527 """ :,29 ;)JJ Ai.C l '-JO AUCT'-JN CAMP CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R CH-R VALUE VALUE :{;;:: 
SPECES TROHPYFE> HUNT TROPHY 
EMhantlM\ 7500 0 30000 ?\'.};wi:IT ·:·: 
Eteonant IFl 2500 0 0 
11-~ fr UJ 1,000 0 
:::1-·· /OIYa 600 0 2,4W Hippopotarrus l ,"'--'- u 6 , .. 
Busheia 100 0 
Wannog 100 100 100 500 1 000 :,:::::::;::::1--
L>rafle 1,1..U 0 
I ~unaJo (MJ 1,<AAJ l ,<AAJ 
1,~ ,.~ 1.~ 1.~ 1,~ 1,,. 1, .. 1, .. 1, ....... l ,<AAJ l ,<AAJ ;JU ,uv., 0 
Buffalo IFl 500 1000 500 1000 500 1000 500 1000 500 1000 500 1000 500 18000 
Rutr""'(N II 500 0 
NVaJil 1 ~ 0 4 ,-
a="""-"' IMJ 300 a 1~~ 
Kudu IMl 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 2400 0 
Kudu IH 250 0 ,;,;,;.;,;.;,:,:·:·:::·:~1 : 
~= (Ml ,.._.., 0 ::::::::::::::::::=::::::u : 
tiana (~) """ u :::::::::::,:,:;:;:;:;:;~ : 
Duiker 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 2250 ::::::::::::::~...:~. 
Redx.ock 300 0 ::::::::::::::::::::::::;to:.: 
vv at81buck (Ml 700 0 3500 :::::::::::;:::1'."'W:JI• 
vvatllllfhl.ir.k (I-) u ::::::::::::::::::::::::=?: 
Sable !Ml 1200 0 :::::=:=:::n: 
Sable (Fl 600 0 ::::::::::0: 
Wildebeest 400 0 :::::::::::::::::::::::::a.1: 
lsesseoe """ u :;:;:;:;:;:t',: 
l~••IM\ 75 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 15750 0 ;::::;::::;1...:;,1.-.r: 
lrroaia rFl 50 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 9000 0 ;:,:i:':::::!ffJlC 
lrroaia cull\ 0 0 ::::::::::;:::;:;:;:;:;:;"~: 
~,= ··- LU) 0 :,t~,- to u 
L>rVsbok 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 2,,,,., 
Lion IMl 2,500 0 
Lion (Fl 1,500 0 
Leooar<1 .:'., .. u 1:1 ,« ::;::::::~'.t• 
Widca! 50 0 
Serva! 75 0 
50 0 
!Vet 75 a 
-<vaena, 100 !:m 
Jackal 25 0 
Ba!-$ll'ed Fox 75 0 
t-'Orcupr19 .:'.~ u 
Baboon 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1200 ;:;:;:;::;:;:;1 M•·•• 
Crocodile 1000 0 ;.;.;.;.;,;.;.· 
l .... ,near-~ ~ 20 20 20 20 20 & & & & & & ;: I 
rancom ;J 1, 1, 1, l, l, l, 1, 1, l< 1, 1, l< Jc:N :;:::::: 
p....,..,,,~,e 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 360 :::::;:: 
S.::1rnnrovse 1 0 ····.·.······· 
UUO< 0 0 
-:-:-:-:-
1::lephant (Ml 30,t.<O 
E-·-IFl 2500 0 
Zebra 600 600 600 2400 
H" ,_ 1,500 6 ,000 
vvannog 100 100 100 loo 100 l ,UVJ 
"unaio (Ml 1,L< u 
Nvala 1.200 1200 4800 
~ushbuck I Ml 300 300 1 ~ 
"uau(Ml 400 a 
vvateroucs (M) ' UU ;J,°"" 
1~,a Mt 75 a ,~,. ·,, 50 0 
,on(!I 2,ow 2,°"" 10,LUJ 
u,ooar .:'., "·'-' 1:1 , 
TROPHY VALUE BAG 3 ,059 2,959 3,159 2,959 3,059 2,959 3,059 3,059 3,059 2 ,959 3,059 2,959 83,570 
AUCTION VALUE BAG 1200( 11 (Yll 13501 12""' 17501 16""' 1600( 17 ()(){ 18001 19 ""' 19 Mi f9(Yl/ 528 500 
VALUE TROPES 0 0 700 0 1,600 5,200 0 0 0 0 0 100 ""-~ 
AUCTION VALUE TROPHIES 3000 0 1950 0 2625 19R.,;J 0 0 0 0 0 175 209200 
fk~~fl wt! )i~ ···~~ } ;):,~ ~* i (@. ](1$ {;i_;®. !f.,.11 { ~,$. \1*"' \ j~ Iir [JIB. d_-5-. "Ml ffiiili d5i45i )iiiri :ai::ii>i ) iii:~ jii'Mi ti,m :fjm j"g;Mi 
FOREIGN 12,:iv. 36,C>O< 16,00C 17,W 18,W 19,17 513,400 
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Appendix 8 Zimbabwe Government trophy fees for local hunters and foreign 
clients: 1991; and Species Index Code for species on quota 
TROPHY FEES SPECIES INDEX CODE 
1991 
GOVERNMENT Based on l9lative 
TROPHY FEE value al species for 
ZirrbabweS f"'"'""n"""" hunter 
LOCAL FOREIGN INDEX CODE INDEX CODE 
SPEC ES Hunt""' Clients Chil:f B Martin 
Eleohant <Ml 7,fl:IJ 7,fl:IJ 1 1 
E"""'•"'IR 2 00) 2fnJ 1 1 
Eleohant CF tO 1 00) 1 00) 1 1 
H ·~ BOO 1 fnJ 4 1 
Graffe BOO 1 00) 4 1 
Buffalo IMl 600 1 00) 1 1 
Buffalo (Fl 450 fnJ 1 1 
Buffalo INTI 450 fnJ 1 1 
Lion IMl 1 fnJ 2fnJ 1 1 
Lion IFl 1 00) 1 fnJ 1 1 
L""""..d 1 00) 200) 1 1 
Crocodile fnJ 1 00) 4 1 
Zsbra 450 600 2 2 
ltwaJa fnJ 1200 2 2 
Kudutl.Al DJ 400 2 2 
Kudu (Fl 200 250 2 2 
Eland ti.Al 500 900 2 2 
Eland 1F1 400 fnJ 2 2 
Wa!etbuck IM) 350 700 2 2 
Wa!etbuck fF1 200 350 2 2 
Sable <Ml 800 1.200 2 2 
Sable <Fl 400 600 2 2 
Widebeest 200 400 2 2 
Tsessebe DJ 600 2 2 
B,.dvw, 75 100 4 3 
W•""""' 75 100 3 3 
Bushbuck I Ml 150 DJ 2 3 
Red:>uck 100 DJ 2 3 
lrmala<MI 60 75 3 3 
1~1,1R 40 50 3 3 
lrmala (culn 40 0 3 3 
D.,i;.,r 25 75 3 4 
Kl;.,.~;~ 100 200 3 4 
St--.bok 25 75 3 4 ,.. __ ....., 
25 75 3 4 
Widcal 25 50 5 5 
S8<Val 50 75 5 5 
Genet 25 50 5 5 
Civet 50 75 5 5 
l-lvaena 50 100 5 5 
Jad<al 25 25 5 5 
Bal-eared Fox 50 75 5 5 
p~.....,. 25 25 5 5 
Baboon 10 10 5 5 
Guinea FOOM 5 5 5 5 
Francolin 3 3 5 5 
PiQeon,Oo,.,e 1 1 5 5 
Duck 0 0 5 5 
Sandgrouse 1 1 5 5 
Code Key. IX.CODE Child, 8 IX.CODE Martin 
1- Big Game Premum Species 
2- Big Plains Game Large Ungulates 
3. Small Plains Game Medium Ungulates 
4. Big olher Small Ungulates 
5. Other Other (predator., , birds) 
Sources: Trophy Fees: ONPWLM : Loose S~ Schedule al 
Hunting F- for 199().1991 Annex I. 
Indices: Chil:f , B. (1988): p. 331 . 
adapted from: Zirrbabwe Government (1991). 
Wildlie Quotas - corr,runal Lands , 1st Draft 
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Appendix 9 Index value of quota allocation for Zimbabwe hunting areas, valued 
Government trophy fee for foreign hunters: 19911 
Appendix 9.1 Index Value: Charara Safari Area 
CHARARASAFARI AREA INDEX VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
Cdizen Hunting Area (includes Makut, Totals) 
YEAR: 
TROPHY FEE TY 
DATE from. 
SPECIES DATE to 
INDEX DRAW NO. 
CODE HUNT NO. 
Martin SPECES 
1 Elephant (Ml 
1 1 c:ooooam (r) 
1 1c:iepnam (1-11) 
2 Zebfa 
1 Hinnnnntamus 




1 ""'""° (Fl 
1 cuna,o (NI) 
2 Nvala 
3 Bushbuck (Ml 
2 I Kudu (Ml 
2 IIW<>U (r) 
2 Eland IMl 
2 Eland !Fl 
4 uu,ksr 
3 '1"8ClOUCI< 
2 Waiemuck (Ml 
2 Wa1erouck IF) 
2 Sable (Ml 
2 ' """"' (Fl 
2 Widebeest 
2 Tsessebe 
3 l'rrpala (M) 
3 lfTl)al3 (F) 
3 1~ .. , 1cull\ 
4 Kl"""'inoer 
4 Si--.bok 
4 l uf\'SOOK 
1 JUoo(Ml 

































































CODE 1 100l 
COOE2 0 
COOE3 250 
COOE 4 75 
CODE 5 31 











9.5 175 175 1 25.SI 25.SI 
1s.s 23.s 23.5 1 31 51 31 5 1 
10 14 15 19 20 






150 1:,u 150 1:,t 1:,u 
100 100 100 1CX: 100 
10 10 10 
26 2.6 , 
8.6 8.6 
24 25 

































15 15 15 15 15 20 20 20 20 15 15 
9 9 9 9 9 12 12 12 12 9 9 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
18.6 26.6 26 6 4 7 
24.6 2.7 2.7 10.7 
35 39 40 44 




1:,u 1:,u 150 150 


















15 15 15 25 25 25 
9 9 
7 7 
9 15 15 15 










ABO Appendix 9.1 
:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:•:•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·::-:·:·:-;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;.;,;,:,:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:•:•:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:,:,:-:-:-:-:.;,;,;-:··,·,··,·.•,w,•·•,••••••·.······••,· ·,;.·;.;.;.;,;,;,:,:-:,:·:·:·:·:·:·· · •.•,• •h''''''"V"'·' "' ••••:,;,;.;.;,;,; ............. ·.• •• •• :·:·:·:·:·:·:·····.· ·,···· ... ••• ·,;·,.-;.;.;.;J 
CHARARASAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1Y FOREIGN 
DATE from: 127 20.7 20.7 28.7 28.7 5.8 5.8 13.8 13.8 21 .8 21 .8 31.8 31:8 6.9 6.9 14.9 14.9 229 229 
SPECIES DATE to: 18.7 26.7 26.7 3.8 3.8 11 .8 11 .8 19.8 19.8 27.8 27.8 4.9 4.9 129 129 20.9 20.9 28.9 28.9 
INDEX DRAW NO. 50 54 55 59 60 64 65 69 70 74 75 79 80 84 85 89 90 94 95 
CODE HUNT NO. C2J C21 C22 C23 C24 C25 C26 C27 C26 C:151 C3) C31 C32 C33 C34 C36 C36 C:J7 C36 
Martin SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
1 Eloohant IMl 7'!:l:1J 7'!:l:1J 
1 I toooonarn (t-J c.:AAJ 
1 ~-=n{rU) ,~ 
2 Zebra 600 
1 H 1'!:l:1J 
3 ,uu 
3 vvannoa ,uu ,uu ,uu ,uu ,uu l UJ 
1 Graffe 1CXXl 
1 ~•m~JMl 1CXXl 1CXXl 1CXXl 1CXXl 1CXXl 1CXXl 
1 t>una,o (t-) "' ~ 1 a un-{NI) "'-" 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbuck I Ml 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 
2 4W 
2 Kudu 2:,() 
2 Eland l 900 
2 Eland '!nJ 
4 uu,ier 75 
3 ~ 
2 Walelbuck (Ml 700 
2 350 
2 =<>111(M) 1200 
2 ·~lrl OU.I 
2 ~t 400 
2 T.-ebe 600 
3 ,nu..,{M) 75 150 150 1!>0 1!>0 1!>0 l !>O l !>O l!>O 150 IOU IOU IOU IOU IOU IOU 150 75 75 75 
3 l~(t-J :,u lUJ 1UJ 1UJ lUJ lUJ l UJ l UJ ,uu ,uu OVJ OVJ IVJ IVJ OVJ lUJ :,u :,u :,u 
3 1~~,culll 0 
4 Kl......,.;.,._ 200 
4 75 
4 Gr','lbok /5 / 5 75 75 75 
1 LIOn(MJ 
1 Lion lt-l 1'!:l:1J 
1 -""""""' 
5 """'- 50 5 .,...,. /5 
5 Genet 50 
5 <.;Mii 75 
5 lUJ 
5 """""" ~ 5 Bat._ed Fox 75 
5 P---- 25 
5 ~ l U 10 10 10 10 10 10 l U 10 10 lU 
1 vroax,lle ,......., 
5 Gui.-.aFOIM 5 25 25 25 20 25 20 25 20 25 25 25 25 20 25 15 15 15 15 15 
5 Franoolin 3 15 15 15 12 15 12 15 12 15 15 15 15 12 15 9 9 9 9 9 
5 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 
5 .:,an:;,crouse l 
5 Duck 0 















Appendix 9.1 A81 
.·.•.·.·.·.·.·.·:•.·.·=·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,.-,·.·.·.•.•.•.•.•.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·-·.·-·.·.·.-••• ::: :::: :·.·.·.·.· .• • •. •.· •• ·.·.·.·.·.· •. •.·,· ................... .. . · •. ·.•.•.·.· .••••••••• :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:, ...................................... • •.• • .• • ....... ............. ........ . ................. . 
a-tARARA SAFARI AREA 
YEAR: 
TROPHY FEE 1Y 
1991 
FOREIGN 
DA TE from: I 30.9 I 30.9 
SPECIES DATEto: 6.101 6.10 
1991 
CHARARA 
INDEX DRAW NO. 99 100 TOTAL 
CODE HUNT NO. C3l C40 INDEX 



























o ·,=,=,=,=,=,=,=,=, ;:;:::;:;a. 
3000 :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:-:-
u ::::::::::::::=:::::::::::~: 
3 500 :':':':':::::=:=:=,~-··. 
0 .; :;:;:;:;:;:::::::,:,,: 
3 600 .·:-:-:-:-:,:, • ..:-~-
0 ;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;n :• 




























Appendix '1.2 A83 
·.·· .. , .. ······.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·,•.•.·.·.-.·:·.·.·.·/'•'•"""""""'"""',',',"••,•••····.·.·.·.·.·:·:·:-:,:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·.·.·.·.·· · ·.··.·.· ·.•,········••···•·······,.···· ...... , .••...............•.••...•.. ·.·.•:·: ......... ...... :-:-:•.·.v.•,·.·.··.·.·.·.·:•:-:,: ....... u .•u ......•. ·.· .•... ;,:,:-:•:·.·.·.•.•.•.'•"""'U"',","""1.•.•.·.•.•.·:·.-: 
Appendix 9.2 Index value: Makuti section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUl'GWE SAFARI AFEA INDEX VALUE OF AI.LOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
MAKUT1 SECTION Citizen Hunting Area 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: FOREGN 
DATE from: 1.5 1.5 1.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 17.5 17.5 17.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 2 6 2 6 2.6 10.6 10.6 10.6 18.6 
SPECIES DATE to: 7.5 7.5 7.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 23.5 23.5 23.5 31 .5 31.5 31 .5 8.6 8.6 8.6 16.6 16.6 16.6 24.6 
INDEX DRAW NO. 1 2 3 6 7 8 11 12 13 16 17 18 21 22 23 36 27 28 31 
COOE HUNT NO. Mt M2 M3 M4 M5 MS M7 MS M9 M10 M11 M12 M13 M14 M15 M16 M17 MIS M19 
Martn SPEC E S TROPHY r t± 
1 Eloohant IMI 7f:IJJ 
1 '"""""'"' (Fl 25IXJ 
1 """"""" (r OJ 
2 Z.ebra 600 
1 ,.US t f:IJJ 
3 t w 
3 vvannoa '"" '"" '"" '"" l W 
1 Gralfe 100) 
1 H•m-(MI 100) 100) 1 ,u 1 lH 1 L< 1L< 1 L<I 100) 1 00) 1 00) 
1 HlffllllO{f-) !)(JO 
1 n=- 11'1 1) :LU 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbuck !Ml 300 
2 ~·~· ~ 400 
2 "uau C,7oJ 
2 Eland i n 900 
2 Eland ~ fJJJ 
4 JUiler 75 75 75 75 75 ,s 75 75 75 75 
3 ~ , ... :.u 
2 Wale!buck !Ml 700 
2 :(F) 350 
2 -IMI 1200 
2 """"' (F) bll.J 
2 Widebeest 400 
2 (...«)II 600 
3 11Tl)1118.(M) 75 
3 lrfPU,ill ( ~ ) :,u 
3 I.......,. lculn 0 
4 Klnonn~ 200 
4 :,-.-no< 75 
4 75 
1 Jon (MJ """" 
1 Lion (Fl t f:IJJ 
1 .~ 200) 
5 :,u 
5 ......,. ,,, 
5 Genet 50 
5 :;.,.. 75 
5 lW '"" 5 J acKal 25 
5 Ba..ared Fox 75 
5 P=....,. 25 
5 iBaboon 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 l U l U lU 
1 I U'CXXX!tte l uuu 
5 GuinMFowl 5 15 15 20 15 15 20 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
5 Francolr1 3 9 9 12 9 9 12 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
5 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
5 l"""'!IIOU!e l 
5 ~ 0 
1~i~=t:tt'i\:::::t?IO:'l'M',:::::\,t ) )i=:ti:i: ::::stm·: :;:1;:lne "\illll' :ld!i'i ;:;:..,;i; ;:j:i'io,, } tit= :;f:""1 t ttt ,;;t~; :::::41;.: :::t:ffi.i '}ii'lil :1::'i3i: ::::iilif ::=,::t'i'i :;:'.R;'UI: j ~f 
CODE ! =t=t ~ 
CODE2 /=/:)~ 












A84 Appendix 9.2 
.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:,:-.·-·-·.•.•.•.•.·,·.·····-··-·.·-·.·-·.·.·.·.·.··-·.···········.···.············· ···· ·.··.·.··.···.··.·.·······-·.·.·.············ ·.·.·.·.················.·.·.·.·.·:·.•.· .......... :·:·.·.·············· ·· ··········· ...... :, ..... :,.;.: ......... ·.·.• ........... -.. :·.·-·-·.·.·-·-········ ··· ········· .. 
HURUPGWE SAFARI AIEA 
MAKUl1 SECTON 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: FOREGN 
DATE from: 18.6 18.6 26.6 26.6 26.6 4.7 4.7 4.7 127 127 127 20.7 20.7 20.7 28.7 28.7 28.7 5.8 5.8 
SPECIES DATE to: 24.6 24.6 2 7 27 27 10.7 10.7 10.7 18.7 18.7 18.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 11.8 11.8 
INDEX DRAW NO. 32 33 36 37 38 41 42 43 46 47 48 51 52 53 56 57 58 61 62 
CXXJE HUNT NO. M20 M21 M22 M23 M24 M25 M26 M27 M28 M29 M30 M31 M32 M33 M34 M35 M36 M37 M38 
Martn SPECES TROPHY FEE 
1 Elophant IM\ 7500 7 ""' 
1 ~~1r 1 =<A.I 
1 t=...,._,. (t-U} l uuu 
2 :z..bra 600 
1 1500 
3 , .. ~ ,...., 
3 YYannoa ,...., ,...., ,....., ,....., ........ ,...., 
1 Gi:ah 1000 
1 " •m-lMl 1000 1 II 1 .. 1 .. 1 000 1 000 
1 ,SlffllUO (F} OU, OU, OUJ OUJ OUJ OU, OUJ OU, 
1 ~=- [Nil 
2 -ala 1200 
3 B...-.buck CM\ 300 
2 "uau M 4II 
2 
2 Eland 900 
2 Eland 500 
4 n u11er 75 75 75 75 75 75 10 10 15 75 
3 -2 Walelbuck IM\ 700 
2 (Fl 350 
2 """""™\ 1~ 
2 """"'Ir OU, 
2 w~ 400 
2 ,....,. 600 
3 IITT)al& IMl 75 
3 '"- ·~· :,u 
3 I""""" lcutn 0 
4 Kl- 200 
4 ,...,_..,,.. 75 
4 ""'""""' (5 ( 5 (5 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 ( 0 ( 0 75 10 10 10 10 
1 ""'iMl 
1 Lion CF 1500 
1 2000 
5 50 
5 ;:,erv. 75 
5 Genet 50 
5 - 75 
5 .._,. ........ ,....., ,....., 
5 .a, 
5 0a1---i-· 75 
5 P~--- 25 
5 10 10 10 1u lU l U lU 10 10 10 
1 YOCDCne IIJUU 
5 GuinMFowl 5 15 15 15 20 25 25 25 20 25 20 20 25 25 20 25 25 20 
5 Franooln 3 9 9 9 12 15 15 15 12 15 12 12 15 15 12 15 15 12 
5 1 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 8 8 8 8 
5 ;:,aroaf ~ l 
5 Duck 0 
,:;:=:\:}'fOT)f : ::::::::::::;: / B'lil: j::':ri <:sit: J ::'i,-· } Mi ,:!fllii:io j;,iii; 
CODE1 














Appendix 9.2 ASS 
:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:,:,:,:,:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,: :-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,: .. : ·.· :-:- .; • ··:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-;,;.:.;,:,:-·-:-:-·-:-:-·-:···:-:-·-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-z-:,:-:-·.·.•.;.·.·.·.·.·.· ••••• • •••• ; •• •·•·•·•::: ·.·: : • : • ., ·• ...••.•••••..• ·.···• ••.• • •:·.: • • • • • ...... • P · • · · '•\Z uz.u.,:;z .. ,:.-..: 
HURUl'GWE SAFARI AFEA 
MAKUT1 SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1YPE: FOREGN 






I 14.9 22.9 22.9 22.9 
SPECIES DATE to: 11 .8 19.8 19.8 19.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 12.9 12.9 12.9 20.9 20.9 20.9 28.9 28.9 28.9 
INDEX DRAW NO. 63 66 67 68 71 72 73 76 n 78 81 82 83 86 87 88 91 92 93 
CODE HUNT NO. M39 M40 M41 M42 M43 M44 M45 M46 M47 M48 M49 M50 M51 M52 M53 M54 M56 M56 M57 
Marti> SPECES TROPHY FEE 
1 Eleohant !Ml 7500 7 ...-, 7"« 
1 c~IM ,,,,..., 
1 ::--..-.1\(~UJ 1Clll 
2 Zebra 600 
1 1500 
3 Busl'c>oA 1W 1W 
3 """""II ll.lJ ,vu ,vu ll.lJ ,vu ,vu ,vu 
Gi'afle ,coo 
H , .. ain (M) ,coo 1 LU. 1 LU. 1 LU. 1.LU. 
t:!UftalO 11-1 
""'"""' '"' ! :,uu 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbucl< f Ml 300 
2 IKlrlJ M 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4UJ 4l 4LU 4LU 
2 I""'"' 
2 Eland )ll oco 
2 Eland f 500 
4 uu11er 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 7':> 75 75 
3 ~ 
2 Wai...bucktMl 700 700 700 
2 w-.."" 11-l 350 
2 ,._(Ml 1200 1 A 1LU.. 1= 
2 ~ ,1-1 
2 W.w-t 400 
2 T.-ebe 600 
3 •~.!Ml /':) 
3 lnnlllll(Fl 50 
3 1-•• truln 0 
4 Kl;,...,w;,,,_ 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 
4 75 
4 Gr'ISbok 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
1 LIOnlMJ 2 .~· 2 .~ 
1 Lion 11-l 15W 
1 2000 7 " 7 "' 
5 ffllOCill 50 
5 75 
5 Genet 50 
5 75 75 
5 ,...,_,... ll.lJ 1W 
5 J ...... ,!':) 
5 Bal-.d Fox 75 
5 p.,..,,.,.,.. 25 25 25 
5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 1C 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
1 
5 Gu.--Fowl 5 25 25 25 20 25 25 20 25 25 20 25 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
5 Franooli, 3 15 15 15 12 15 15 12 15 15 12 15 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
5 1 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
5 :,anmrouee 1 
5 Dud< 0 
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-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-: ·······.·.·.·.·.:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:.:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-: 
HURUN3WE SAFARI AFEA 
MAKUTI SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1YPE: FOREGN 
DATE from: 
SPECIES DATEto: 
INDEX DRAW NO. 
CODE HUNT NO. 
Martn SPECES TROPHY FEE 
30.9 30.9 30.9 
6.10 6.10 6.10 
96 97 98 
M58 M59 M60 
.·.· .. · .. :.-.-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:- -:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·-:-·-··.·.··:::: 
1 Eleohant (Ml 7500 \:;';'::;zt5Xi, 
1 I tcll!oriant (~) c.»J .,:::::::::':::::::::::::::::!J: 
1 t:"""""1l(~U) :::::::':':':::::':\:,:/:# : 
~,ll!br~~·~!!!!~::=1::::::JJ1~~t::::t::::::J::::t'';':':;'':::;.;:;:+;:;:;::::;:;:;:i;:~!I: 







3 Busl-buck tMl 
2 ~~u M 
2 11.UdU ~) 
2 Eland M 
2 Eland IF 
4 >i11ker 
3 M-,a.a< 
2 Waterbuck IMl 
2 Wai""""" (Fl 
2 """"'(M 














4lD 4LU 4UJ 4UJ ::::::::;:;:;:;:;:;::n:~ · .. 
900 
500 ,;,;,;,;,;,;,m , 
75 75 75 75 :::::::::::::;:::/!1:nl :. 
700 700 700 700 ;:;:;:::;:;:::::;:;:;<1·- ·. 
350 









200 200 :,:::::::::::::::=;::; . ... · 
75 
,~ l b ,~ ,~ :;:;:;:::::;'::::::,:""•: :.: 
e.iu., 2,= ::::;:::;:=:;:;:;:;:,:1,:~ · 
1 Lion (Fl 1500 
1 20CO 2 " 2 :::/::':i\n"'•· 51wrm'""""i:::::::,;:...~~~+-~~.:a::,50;;.+..:a.:::::::i~::::::if--~ .... ,;;;;;;;;;.:;:;:;,:;;r11 
5 """'"' ,~ 
5 Genet 50 
5 ::.,,,, 75 75 
5 ny,mr,a 
5 Jar:>cal 25 
5 Bal--,,d Fox 75 ,:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:,:::::(), 
5 P-..,._ 25 :\::::::-:'::::::::::;:J!iO: 
5 10 10 1u 10 :;:;:;:;:;:;:;:::;:;:::::;.-" 
11...,,;;:::;:oax,~~.~,--~~--1~~"""1,,v..u,.;,;;,+--~;.+-.....;.;:+-.....:;::.+,,~::::~:::::~;:::~:::::~::::~:::;:;;::~ii4 .. : 
5 Gui,- Fowt 5 15 15 15 ;:;:;:;:::;:;:::;:::=:, : 
551~Friancol~~.,~~::=1::::::~3+::J9~:j9tt::::::'.9tJ;;:f::::f;:;:;4:::,4:,:;:f::::4:,~~ 1 7 7 7 ::::::;:::;::::,:.., 5 ·~rOU9e l 
5 D.dt O 
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.·.·.·.·.·:·:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·: · ·:-:-:-:·· :-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-::-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:·:·:·'.·'.·'.·'.·'.·:-:-:-::::··:-:·-·.· .. ·.·.·.·.·.·.·-:-·-·.·.·.·.;.·-·.·.·.;.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·.· ·'.·'.·'.·'.·:-:.:-:-::· · :.-:-:-·-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·.········ 
Appendix 9.3 Index value: Tuli Safari Area 
ruu SAFARI AREA: INDEX VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTS 
Matab81eland HuntKs Associa6on 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE. FOREGN 
DATE from: 27.4 27.4 11.5 11 .5 25.5 25.5 8.6 8.6 22.6 22.6 6.7 6.7 20.7 20.7 3.8 3.8 
SPECIES DATE to: 7.5 7.5 21 .5 21.5 4.6 4.6 18.6 18.6 27 27 16.7 16.7 30.7 30.7 13.8 138 
INDEX HUNT NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
CODE N s N s N s N s N s N s N s N s 
Mar111 SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
1 Elephan1 IM) 7500 7500 7.500 
1 1t:.,onanl (t-) LOI. 
1 I t:1epnant (t- tij HAAJ 
2 Zebra 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 
1 HirYrrnamus 1500 
3 HO~ lUJ 
3 Wartnoo 1UJ IUJ lUJ 
1 Giraffe 1CXXJ 
1 tiuffalo1M1 1CXXJ 
1 t>UTiaJO (t-) "'-"' 
1 , nu"~ {NI) 500 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbuck IMl 300 300 300 300 
2 Kudu (M) 4UJ 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 4UJ 400 
2 "uou (t-) ,,,.. , ~ ,':,U """ """ """ """ """ """ """ """ , ~ ,~ """ a .. , 2 Eland !Ml 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 
2 Eland(Fl 500 500 500 500 500 500 
4 Du1ker 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
3 Heedbuck 300 
2 Waleibuck (M) 700 
2 Walerbuck !Fl 350 
2 Sable(M) 1200 
2 ::,ab1e1e1 600 
2 Widebeest 400 400 400 400 400 400 
2 Tsessebe 600 
3 1rrprua (M) 75 1,:,u. 1,950 1,:>UJ l .~"' 1,:>UJ 1,,r.,u 1.:>UJ 1,950 1,:iu., 1,950 1,500 1.950 1.500 1.950 l ,:,u. 1,950 
3 lrrpaia (e) 50 1,CXXJ 1,300 1 ... 1.300 1,CXXJ 1,. • 1 ... 1, .• 1., . 1, .• 1,CXXJ 1,300 l ,CXXJ 1.300 l ,CXXJ 1.300 
3 1~1arculll 0 
4 Kl~1noer 200 
4 Sieenbok 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 
4 <.,('/SOOK I~ 
1 Uon(M) <OVV 
1 Lion IF\ 1500 
1 L..-.iam 2CXXl 2 CXX) 2 XX) 2CXXJ 2 CXX) 2,CXXJ 
5 VVOClcal 50 
5 !;8!Val I~ 
5 Genet 50 
5 Civet 75 
5 H'(aena 100 100 100 100 
5 JaO<aJ 25 25 ~· 25 25 
5 Bal-eared Fox 75 
5 Port"tinne 25 
5 Baboon 10 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 "'1 20 20 20 20 20 20 
1 l.Aocoolle O<.AAJ 
5 Guinea Fowl 5 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
5 Francol11 3 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 30 15 
5 i-neQn/1 Jn\le l 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 10 5 
5 SandQrouse l 10 5 10 5 10 s 10 5 10 5 10 s 10 5 10 5 
5 Duck 0 
INOE'XVALUE '°TOTAL 1:1-1 ... .,,, , .. i-3J~ 1-,· S,'V" 5305 . 6230 5905 · 6555 · 5205 4555 5.205 <t555 72D5 4 555 5205 6.530 .5205 























































ruu SAFARI AREA. 
YEAR: 1991 












































































































:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:·:·:-:·:·:·:·:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-: .... · ... ,.- :-:-:-:,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-;,:,:-:-:-:,:-:,;,;.;,;.;,:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:-:: :::-::-·-·-····.··.··.·.;-;.; .·.··.·.········.·.·.··· 
::-:::·.:'.:'.:'.:'.:'.:'.:'.:'.\:/_.Q: 
400 400 400 400 4W 400 4W 
900 900 900 900 






400 400 400 400 
1,9!,U 1,:,w 1.~"'-" 1,:,W 
1,300 1,CXXl 1,300 1,CXXl 1,300 1,CXXl 1,300 1.~ 
75 75 75 75 
'.'.·.·'.·'.·'.·'·'.'.·'.'. ·'.·'.'.·'.·'.:'.:Q : 
'-:-3.CXJ 
20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 ·.·.· ":)U. 
·:···:·:·:·:-::-:-:·:·:::::::::::.u : 
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
15 15 30 15 30 15 30 
10 10 10 5 10 
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Appendix 9.4 Index value: Doma Safari Area 
DOMA SAFARI AREA INDEX VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTS 
Lomagundi Hunter's Assoaaoon 
YEAR. 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE. FOREGN 
DATE from. 
SPECIES DATE to. 
INDEX HUNT NO. 
COOE 
Martn SPECES 
1 Eleohant (Ml 
1 t: lepllarn ( r ) 








1 t:luftaio (NI) 
2 Nvafa 
3 Bushbuck !Ml 
2 Kudu M 
2 I\UC1U 
2 Eland Ml 



































2.500 2,500 2,500 2,500 
600 600 
100 100 100 100 
1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 




75 75 75 75 
-=-=-=-=-=-=,=::::,1--aro 
==·=·=·.·===-=-:,:=::,:=::=::o= 
100 100 100 100 : ::::::::::::::=:: '""-" 



























2 Watemuck !Ml 
2 Watemuck (t- ) 









1 200 1 ,,_ 1 200 1 200 1 ;,u 1 200 1 200 1 ,Uj =:=:::=:"::-:/ 9-... 
2 .:,ao,e (r) 
2 Wldebeest 
2 Tsessebe 
3 orrpa,a (M) 
3 1rroa,a (Fl 








LIOO (M) L.AAJ 
1 Lion IF\ 1500 
1 L"""""' 20Xl 
5 vv,ocal 50 
5 Serva! 75 
5 Genet 50 
5 (;11181 75 
5 Hyaena 100 
5 Jaosal ~~ 
5 Bat...ared Fox 75 
5 Pntt,unine 25 
75 75 
2,CXXJ 
75 75 75 15 75 I ~ 
2,CXXJ 2,CXXJ 








15 1::·. --~ 










5 1Q 2U 20 2U 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 :-:::::-:-:,:::·:iC::AXJ 
1 l~v~,,;rocxx,~li~,--~~-ll~~-.,.,.:,~sAJ,;;.+~.:a:::.+-...,:;::+~,:;;::..4-....:;:::+-~~ l--..!.:;~....!~~,.:;:;:+-_,:;::+~.:::..~ ;=::::;::::~:::,:;/ ~:C:C:~:Ui,I 
5 Guinea Fowt 5 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 C:::C::::::,:,:::=:_500 
5 Francofn 3 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 · · · ·=:-:=:::,-•" 
5 Poeorvuove 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 :-:-:-:-:-:-·-/:;:: 200 
5 :,anoorouse 1 ····-·-·- •·=·--: :-:-.:::• o 
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Appendix 9.5 Index value: Rifa section (Hurungwe Safari Area) 
HURUNSWE SAFARI AREA INDEX VALUE OF QUOTA ALLOCATION 
RIFA SECTION Mashonaland Hunter's Associa6on 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TY FOREGN 
DATE from: 27.4 1 27.4 27.4 11.5 11 5 11.5 25.5 25.5 25.5 86 86 8.6 22.6 22.6 22.6 67 
SPECIES DATE to. 7.5 7.5 7.5 21 .5 21.5 21 .5 4.6 4.6 4.6 18.6 18.6 18.6 2.7 2.7 2.7 16 7 
INDEX HUNT NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
COOE A B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A 
Martin SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
1 Elephant (Ml 7,9:XJ 79:XJ 7,9:XJ 7,9:XJ 
1 1 <: l8PMnt ( Fl 2,:iu.J 
1 1<:,epnam (I- ti) l ,v..AJ 
2 lJ!b<a 600 600 600 
1 HrYYYY11amJS 1 9:XJ 19:XJ 19:XJ 19:XJ 19:XJ 19:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 1,9:XJ 
3 1W 
3 vvannoa lW l W IUU IUU IUU IUU IUU IUU lW lW '"" lW lW IW 
Gi-alfe 1 CXXJ 
l:luffalorM1 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1,CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1 CXXJ 1,CXXJ 
t>Ul1aJO (t- ) '"' "lIJ om 
,,.., OU. ctIJ OU. OU. "' "' "' ,u. Ol.IJ 1 mu"= {N I) :,v,J 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbuck rMI DJ DJ DJ DJ DJ 
2 '"""U IMI 4LU OU.I OU.I OU.I OU.I OU.I <JU.I 
2 IMJOU (t- ) ,!:,U ~..., ,.,,.... ,.,,.... ,'::,U 
2 Eland rMt 900 900 
2 Eland fFl f'IX) 
4 Ouik.er 75 
3 HAA<lh<"'k :,,.u 
2 Watetbuck fMl 700 700 700 
2 Watemuck (t-l 350 
2 :sable rMt 1,200 
2 ""'""' (t- ) 600 
2 Widebeest 400 
2 Tsessebe 600 
3 = ~ IMI 10 >H J "1.IJ "1.IJ ,._., ,..., ,..., ,..., ,.... ,.... "' "' "' 3 lrrpaJa (t-) 50 600 600 600 600 """ 600 600 OU) """ 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 3 1~ .. rculll 0 
4 Klnsn.-,na"' 200 
4 !::iteenbok 75 
4 ufYSOOI< I ~ I~ I ~ I~ I ~ I~ 
1 "'°" (M) <, <,~ <,"-'U <,"-'U 
Lion IA 19:XJ 19:XJ 1,9:XJ 
L"""""' 2,CXXJ 2CXXJ 2,CXXJ 2CXXJ 
IVYIIOcal 50 
l !::iervaJ 10 
5 Genel 50 
5 CJVet 75 
5 Hyaena 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5 I J aCkal 25 .!O 
5 BaH,ared Fox 75 
5 P=~e 25 
5 l:laooon 10 20 20 20 20 20 bU ,!\) ,!\) 20 60 20 20 20 20 60 <{.) 
1 vr<X001le l ,v..AJ 
5 Guinea Fowl 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 15 
5 Francoln 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
5 .-,qeorvuove 1 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
5 ~rouse 1 
5 Dud< 0 
'JNbt)(:'i/AttJlt C::' ' ,:.mtA(\:c:;:;c: :3iiil }i !i2il: ?i 12ii /ib:tl { i;:#.] i 't'l'92 .) ,.-.,~ . i:i:,m :::C6'ilri2 / 'z:992 ,,,fr:'V'r; °':':8·252 :c; ji.352 fr002 ::<r·iilz i 7.'14J:' 
CODE1 1,9:XJ 
CODE 2 250 
COOE3 1,600 
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HURUJ\GWE SAFARI AREA 
RIFA SECTION 
YEAR : 1991 
TROPHY FEE TY FOREGN 
DATE from: 6.7 6.7 '20.7 '20.7 '20.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 17.8 17.8 17.8 31 .8 31 .8 318 14.9 149 
SPECIES DATE to: 16.7 16.7 30.7 30.7 30.7 13.8 13.8 13.8 27.8 27.8 27.8 10.9 10.9 10.9 24.9 24 9 
INDEX HUNT NO. 17 18 19 '20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
CODE B c A B c A B c A B c A B c A B 
Martin SPECES TROPHY FEE 
Eleohant IM) 7 500 7500 7,500 
t:oepnanl (I-) ~ .~ 
1 1-IAnnam (f- t0 1 ,l.l...A... 
2 Zeb,a 600 
1 H;....,,,....arrus 1,500 1500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 
3 '"u<nol(l 100 
3 IWartnQQ ·~ 100 100 100 100 100 lW 100 100 100 lW IW IW IW 1W 
Gralfe 1 OC() 
Buffalo (Ml 1 OC() 1 OC() 1 OC() 1 OC() 1,0C() 1 OC() 1 OC() 1,0C() 1 OC() 1 OC() 1,0C() 1,0CO 1 OC() 1,0CO 1,0C() 
,..,,,m.11Q (I'"} om ,XU ,XU ow ,XU ow ::u ow ::u ::u ::u ::u "' "' "' ,uJ "' 1 "unaJO {NI/ """ 
2 Nvala 1 '200 
3 Bushbuck !Ml 300 300 DJ 300 300 300 300 
2 "°"" (M 400 """ """ """ """ """ """ 2 r\UOU (I- ) LOU LOU """ CXJ CXJ ,':,.J 
2 Eland !Ml 900 
2 Eland (F 500 
4 lt iker 75 
3 H.-h.ck 300 
2 Waterouck (Ml 700 700 700 700 
2 Waterbuck H·J 350 




2 Wldebeest 400 
2 Tsessebe 600 
3 1rrµa,a (M) 75 SU. 900 >LU 900 900 SU. 900 ,...., ,.__. 900 900 900 900 ,...., >LU "' 3 1rrpa1a (F) 50 O<.A.J O<.A.J 600 600 """ 600 600 600 600 600 
3 ln-oaia tculll 0 
4 Klnc:tV1noer '200 
4 Steenbok 75 
4 JVSDOK lb 
1 uon(MJ L ,= 2,:>J..J 
1 Lion !Fl 1500 1.500 1500 





Hyaena 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Jal><al 2~ 
5 Bat-eared Fox 75 
5 Porcunne 25 
5 tl;boon 10 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 60 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 '20 
.._..rocx:,aue 1,VJJ 
Guinea Fowl 5 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 10 10 10 
Francoln 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 6 6 6 6 
ll'IQ80IVLJ0\/8 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
1s.::1rw1nrouse 1 
Duck 0 
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HURUN3WE SAFARI AREA 
RIFA SECTION 
YEAR: 






I tcieonant (Fl 



















/ i~f \. 
28.9 28.9 t2. to 12.10 12.10 } fl!F,\?\. 
8 10 8 10 22.10 22 10 22.10 [:!11 35 36 37 38 39 B c A B c 
::::::::::;:;:/:1:·'XYl 
..... \ ;l();!XX); 










































































5 10 10 
3 6 6 
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Appendix 9.7 Index value: Zambezi valley hunts 
Appendix 9.7.1 Index value: Nyakasanga section (Hurungwe Safari Area): 
Hunts and individual trophies 
HURUNGWE SAFARI AREA INDEX VALUE OF AUCTIONED QUOTA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION Zambezi Vall6y Auct,on Hunts 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1Y FOREGN 
DATE from 1 5 18.5 46 216 87 25 7 11 .8 28.8 14.9 1 5 18 5 4.6 21 .6 8.7 25 7 11 8 
DATE to 13.1 XI 1 17.6 4.7 21 7 7.8 24.8 109 279 14.5 31 5 176 47 21 7 7 8 24 8 
SPECIES BUYER: Foreicr\/local F F F F F F F F L F F F F F L F 
INDEX IHUNI NU. Nl N2 N3 N4 N5 N6 N I NH N9 NlU Nll Nl.< N13 N14 N15 N16 
COOE CAMP A A A A A A A A A c B B B B B B 
Martn SPECES TROPHY FEE 
Elephant (Ml 7500 
>-wvun1 (F) 2500 
1 ~J~nt(f-tn 1000 
2 Zebra 600 
1 Hn'YYY'llam.,s 1500 
3 Bus"""' 100 
3 Wartnoa 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1 Giraffe 1000 
1 Buffalo !Ml 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 lOCO 1000 l OCO 
1 Buffalo !Fl 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1 Buffalo Nil 500 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Bushbuck I Ml XO 
2 JKudU (II/ ........ 
2 JKudu If- """' 2 '"'""" (M) 
,..,.,
2 11:: land (f- """ 4 IUUt Ke r to to 1:, 1:, 1:, 1:, 1:, 1:, '" '" '" '" 
,, 
'" lo 75 15 3 ,n-,~~ .LU 
2 '"" 
2 I Wateroucl< (f-l -XA.I 
2 J-(MJ ILU.I 
2 ! Sable (I-) """ 2 ,.,.,~1 400 
2 ' l sesseoe ovu 
3 1n,u.ud(MJ to """' 4:,U 4:,U 4!lU ~"" 4!lU """ 4:,U 4:,U ....... ~"" ~ .... 4:,U 4:,U 4:,U 3 1m [~(t-J :,u "'-' 4U 4U '+VO """ """ """ '" 4UJ """ 3 I orrva,a (CUii) u 
4 I I\IDSOf'IOQ9f' LU.I 
4 1:,t-,oc,( 75 
4 · ~ 1:, '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" I ~ to to 1 JLIOO (M) <:,u) 
1 ( Ll()(l (I-) lO<AJ 
1 c~, LUAJ 
5 ··~~, :,(; 
5 Se,val I : 
5 ! '-"""" SC 
5 (1.-IVet ,, 
5 Hvaena 1u; lW '"" IW lW IW IW '"" IUU IUU IUU 
,.,., 
'"" '"" 100 100 100 5 J ao<aJ 2: 
5 t,at-earec, t-ox I: 
5 ,-orcupne 2t 
5 lU 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 4U 40 40 40 
1 ..... rOCDd1le 1LUJ 
5 Gu1neaeowt 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
5 l t-rdn(.;Ullr'I .J '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" '" 12 12 12 5 wgeon1uove 1 12 1< 1" 12 1" 1" 12 1" 12 12 1< 1" 1.< 12 12 12 
5 1 :,anoorouse 1 
5 u 
SlNGlE'TROP.IES .·.· .. ··.·.· .. ···-:::· .. :::: ... : . .: 
Elephant (Ml 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
r---riant{t--1 
_900affl "'-'-" LUAJ <'.\AA ""' ion (M 2,-,u .<500 
1 1-1 1m~1r1 CMl 1 "' 
2 vvatAfDI..Jek.lMJ I W 
2 l'"Y""' 
1 I H IPPCP()lamJS 1:x.u lO<AJ l :JU. 
3 wart~ 100 
3 flushbuck ( M) .LU 
2 IKudu (Ml 400 
3 •~= tMI 75 
3 lrTDala (f-) !:,() :,u :,u :,u :,u 
2 ·~ a ovu bU) 
F-INLJtX VALUE:: : IOI AL 3234 13,034 5,684 10,684 11 ,284 3234 7,034 3,784 10,584 3,384 3,384 6,084 2,684 2.684 
CODE 1 1,500 11 ,000 4,000 9,000 9,000 1,500 5,000 1,500 9,000 1,500 1,500 4 ,000 1,500 1,500 
CODE2 400 400 400 400 1,000 400 400 1,000 400 700 600 600 0 0 
CODE3 1.000 1,XO 950 950 950 1,000 1,XO 950 850 850 950 1,150 850 850 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
CODES 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
L-INDEX VALUE . tOTAL 8,584 5,484 
CODEl 6,000 4 ,000 
CODE2 1,000 0 
CODE3 1,250 1,150 
CODE4 150 150 
CODES 184 184 
.ll'l!JtX .v AL.-1:J!:: '. ':i:\""""""'-'" IVI :: 3 ,234 c:'-1:!;034: . 5 ,684 10,684: ·''' :1:21!4 ·,,·l,23\l : :7;034 \:3',7!1¢ : :~,~ \ l-0,5811: :;::3,384 : .3:;384 ·s:~ ':-2 ,664 :-. 5,484 2,664:-· 
CODEl 1,500 11 ,000 4 ,000 9,000 9,000 1,500 5,000 1,500 6,000 9,000 1,500 1,500 4,000 1,500 4 ,000 1,500 
CODE2 400 400 400 400 1,000 400 400 1,000 1,000 400 700 600 600 0 0 0 
CODE3 1,000 1,XO 950 950 950 1,000 1,XO 950 1,250 850 850 950 1,150 850 1,150 850 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
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HURUIIGWE SAFARI AREA 
NYAKASANGA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TY FOREGN 
DATE from: 28.8 14.9 1.5 14.5 27.5 9.6 22.6 5.7 18.7 31 .7 13.8 26.8 8.9 21 .9 1.5 14 5 
DATE to: 10.9 279 10.5 23.5 5.6 18.6 1.7 14.7 27.7 9.8 22.8 4.9 17.9 30.9 10.5 235 
SPECIES BLNER : ForeiolVlocal L L F L L F F F F F F F F F F F 
INDEX HUNI NU. N17 N18 N19 Nd.I N21 N22 N<J N24 N25 = N27 N28 N~ N3J N31 """ CODE CAMP B B D D D D D D D D D D D D E E 
Martn SPEC ES TROPHY FEE 
Eleohant IMl 7500 
lepnam (Fl 2500 
1 1-""""'nt (F tll 1000 
2 Zebra 600 
1 HnYYlnfam.Js 1500 
3 BJSl'oia 100 
3 Warthoo 100 
Graffe 1000 
R"ffalo (Ml 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
1 Buffalo IFl 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
1 Buffalo INll 500 
2 Nvala 1200 
3 Busl-buck !Ml 300 
2 IP\UOU !Ml """' 2 11\UOU Ir) LO< 
2 IC: ian<J (M) ,,...., 
2 11=1ana 11-1 :,uJ 
4 1uu1Ker / 0 /0 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 / 0 / 0 
3 IH-il:lucK """ 2 I VVa11:nuUCK ( MJ /\Al 
2 1vva,= CK 11-1 .,,,. 
2 '""°"'(M) 
2 --11-1 600 
2 VV I0""""51 4UU 
2 1sessebe bUU 
3 1 1n u ..t.1a MJ 10 """ 450 450 4bU '>OU 450 4bU 4bU '>OU 450 450 450 450 40U 4:,U 
3 , ,rrvaia J-) :,u 4UJ 4UU JOU """ """ """ """ """ """ JO< "'"' .,..,. ·'"' 3 l lrmala cull) u 
4 11\11~< I ·- ,,. 4 ::iteenoc ,,, 
4 l>fYSO()K ,,, 10 10 ,,, 10 10 ,,, ,,, ,,, 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 / ':, 
1 IOO(M ,':,,A) 
,on (J-) l;:,,,v 
1 CJ,J,J 
5 vv ,aca! :,u 
5 ::ietVal 10 
5 1uenet 50 
5 vlVet ,,, 
5 nvaena lW lW lW lW lW lW lW lW lW lW lW lW '"" lW lW lW lW 5 IJao<ai <0 
5 t:iat"""'eo 1-ox 75 
5 r-OfC\.Vff'\8 <0 
5 "'""°"" lU 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 4U 40 40 1vrocncu e 1CUJ 
uuinear-rJINI ,, dJ dJ dJ 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 LU LU LU 
~rancohn J l< u l< l< l< l< l< l< l< l< l< l< l< l< 1< l< 
I r'IQOONlJOVe 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
;:,anoarouse l 
UUO< 0 
l:lM~{E'TROPIES · ·.· ·.·.·.·.:·:···=·==========::::::-:::::::::::::?:::::::::::::::::::::::::::=::::r:::=:::::::::::::::=::::r:r} :::::::::::::::;:-: ·.· · 
Elephant (M) 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 7500 
t:.ieonant f~l 
ACn:lffl 2!XX 2000 , ,on !Ml ' "' 2500 2500 1 , ,i111.oo (M) 11 , 
2 w atHJI JU( tMJ IW I W 
2 '"""' 1 Ho:xxx tamus , .... 
3 VVartllOQ 100 100 100 100 
3 t; u'O;JY1~k(M) 
2 Kudu (M) 400 400 
3 ln"(XlJa(MI 75 75 
3 rvaoa 11-1 :,u 
2 ceora bU 
F·INDEX VALUE : TOTAL 10,134 4 .734 2,634 5.234 10,134 2,634 2,634 3,334 5,734 10,134 9,634 4 ,734 
CODE1 9,000 3,500 1,500 4 ,000 9 ,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 4 ,000 9 ,000 8,500 3,500 
CODE2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 700 600 0 0 0 
CODE3 800 900 800 900 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 900 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
CODES 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
L-INDEX VALUE : TOTAL 2.759 2.684 10,134 3,034 
CODE1 1,500 1,500 9,000 1,500 
CODE2 0 0 0 400 
CODE3 925 850 800 800 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 
CODES 184 184 184 184 
;:!~VAl.:Ut;: :: :;:)Uf:Y'NU'' ' \ .II .. ·, 2 ,759 2;6134 .;:-10:13,!I: :;: 10;:134.: '; 3,034 : 4;7.;14' ;' 2 ,63;4: / 5~ ' 10;1:34: ;:::2;534 ::::2;634 } 3,334 :::Si:7.34 / 10,.134 ,· ·. 9,634 :: 4,7:l•C 
CODE 1 1.500 1,500 9,000 9,000 1,500 3,500 1,500 4,000 9.000 1,500 1,500 1,500 4 ,000 9,000 8,500 3,500 
CODE2 0 0 0 0 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 700 600 0 0 0 
CODE3 925 850 800 800 800 900 800 900 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 900 
CODE 4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 ,so 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
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HURUtGWE SAFARI A~ 
NYAKASANGA SECTION 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE 1Y FCREGN 
1991 1991 1991 
DATE from: 27.5 9.6 22.6 5.7 18.7 31 .7 13.8 26.8 8.9 21 .9 NYAKASANGA NYAKASANGA NYAKASANGA 
DATE to: 5.6 18.6 1.7 14.7 27.7 9 8 22.8 49 179 3()9 SECT ON SECTION SECTION 
SPECIES BUYER : Foretirllocal F L L F L F F F F F 
INDEX HUNI NU. N-"' N34 """' N.J<> N37 Nj(j OU,, """' N41 N42 INDEX INDEX INDEX 
CODE CAMP F E E E E E F E E E VALUE VALUE VALUE 
Mart,i SPECES TROPHY FEE HUI/TS TROPHIES TOTAL 
Eleohant (Ml 7500 0 75 CXXJ 75 CXXJ 
~~= lt-l 2500 0 0 0 
1 ~~·=lt-tll 1CXXJ 0 0 
2 Zebra 600 0 6 (XX) 6 (XX) 
1 H 1500 0 7 500 7.500 
3 B,ochnin 100 0 0 
3 W•~ 100 100 100 1100 500 1600 
Graffe 1CXXJ 0 0 
BuffaJo(Ml 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 1CXXJ 42 CXXJ 4 (XX) 46000 
1 Buffalo !Fl 500 15 CXXJ 15000 
1 Buffalo INTI 500 0 0 
2 Nvala 1200 0 0 0 
3 Bushbucl< !Ml XO 0 1.800 1800 
2 KUdU M 4W 4,l.U.I 4l 4 ,4LU 
2 Kudu ~"" u u 
2 """"" .N•J u u 2 ""'no 't- :,w u u 
4 ·lJUIKef lb lb lb lb lb lb l b l b lb lb lb 3, •"-' 3,lbO 
3 "''''"'"'~ ~ 0 u 
2 Walertluck (M) I\AI u 1.-· ,.-
2 rvarernucK 1~ J ,jOlJ u u 
2 :Saote(Ml u u 
2 =<ll8(t-) u u 
2 •VVI0"""8SI 400 u u 
2 lsess--- bl 0 u 
3 1rrvaia (M) l b """"' 4:,U q.:,u 4:,U 
...,_, q.:,u ...,_, ...,_, ,~.= ,~.,~, 
3 ' lm:>aJa ,~, bO ,jOlJ ,jOlJ ,jOlJ ,jOlJ l>,~ l:l ,OUJ 
3 ,mI..ldld.(CUIIJ 0 u 0 
4 0 u 
4 :StMnbok lb u u 
4 '"""""" Tb lb 10 10 lb 10 lb 10 10 lb lb 3,0"-.1 J,l bO :uon(M) / OUJ u " ·:,u l(:'. ,::il 
1 L,on (t-) louu u u 
1 "'-UJ u lU ,1.AAJ lU,I.AAJ 
5 VVIOCaI bO u u 
5 Serva! 75 0 0 
5 :,u u u 
5 vlVel l b u u 
5 HVaena IW IW IW ,w IW ,w IW ,w ,w 100 ,w 4,<'.W 4 ,«l 
5 Ja<>\a> ,, u u 
5 8al-..ared I-ox l b u 0 
5 ·=~- ~, 0 0 
5 JU 4U 4U 4U 4U 40 40 40 40 40 40 1,""'-J 1,btll 
vrCXXXJI e 1 , .. u u 
(ju1nea r-OW1 b .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) .!I) ;ti) 
1t-rancotr, 3 12 · 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 !,04 !,04 
P"'lr'ff¥VVI nve 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 504 504 
:,aroorouse l u u 
JUO( 0 0 0 
Sil\lGiEtROPIES 
Eleohant (Ml 7500 7500 75,000 75,CXXJ 
,rc.,anant (I-) ~""" u 0 
A III AW 10,II 10,000 
JOO(Ml 2500 12,500 12,500 
1 H lJll.-1.Kl(MJ 1 w llW ll W 4 ,« 4 , 
2 vvalertluCK !Ml ·w 1,400 1,400 
2 INVa<l 1,cw 0 0 
1 ,n~ ~aroos 1"'-'J 1:>UJ 1:>UJ 1 .~ I 
3 100 100 500 500 
3 ·~· .IMl 300 1,800 1,800 
2 Kudu (M 400 4W 400 
3 ·~- 1,~, l b 75 l b ,.,, 
3 1rrvaia ( I- ) bO <'.W <UJ 
2 Let)(a bLU bUJ 6W 6W bUJ b ,lL< b , 
F-INOEXVALUE: TOTAL 2,234 4,234 5,234 2,234 2,809 2,134 2,234 :,:::c:::::c,::c/Ull:Wl: 
CODE1 1,CXXJ 2,500 3,500 1,000 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ ~?,!;i,.w: 
CODE2 0 600 600 0 600 0 0 
!J: J:::11 CODE3 900 800 800 900 875 800 900 COOE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 CODES 184 184 184 184 184 184 184 
L-INOEX VALUE: TOTAL 3,034 5,209 9,634 ,,,,,. ,, .. ,,,c"e;:ce;:50;5SEk 






11ri CODE2 600 0 0 CODE3 1,100 875 800 COOE4 150 150 150 CODES 184 184 184 
INL'tZ<V.illlUtl :,:, :\·.~ :.l·Vf.: :::?'A<! \ ~;q;l<i' C::{>~ } 4,Zl4 ::-.~,634': ,.5,23,4 ,:cc2·~ , ,e;:;iJ.lOI, / ;!,1,3<\ \ 2.?,14 "'°' ''"''"''' 230, 153, 
COOEl 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ 4,CXXJ 2,500 8,500 3,500 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ 1,CXXJ ,/'/: 166,v-.u. 
CODE2 0 600 0 600 0 600 0 600 0 0 ;;e;c:,:,:,·,,:,::c::n;Sd<{ 
COOE3 900 1,100 875 800 800 800 900 875 800 900 :JS~ 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 6,300 
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Appendix 9.7.2 Index value: Sapi Safari Area: Hunts and individual trophies 
SAPI SAFARI AREA: INDEX VALUE OF ALLOCATED HUNTING QUOTAS 
Zambezi Vall8y Auction Hunts 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: FOREIGN 
DATE from: 1.5 18.5 4.6 21.6 8.7 257 11.8 28.8 14.9 1.5 18.5 4.6 216 8.7 25.7 11 .8 28.8 149 
DATE to: 14.5 31.5 17.6 4.7 21.7 78 24.8 10.9 27.9 14.5 31.5 17.6 4.7 21 .7 78 248 109 279 
SPECIES BUYER tForeoonllocall : F F F F F F F L L F L F L L F F L F 
INDEX HUNT NO. Sl S2 S3 S4 SS S6 S7 S8 S9 SlO S1 1 S12 S13 S14 S15 S16 S17 SIS 
CODE CAMP G G G G G G G G G H H H H H H H H H 
Martin SPECIES TROPHY FEE 
1 Elephant (M) 7500 .1 , lr'" ll!etl:.Jfldlll {~) L:,U , ·~ ·~antlt-111 ... 
2 Leora ~ 
1 ,_. 1"' 
3 l:lusnoo l <AJ 
3 vvartnoo . 100 lUU '"" lUU , u1rane lU. 
1 H 1m,1w CM) ... ... ,~ ,~ 1 ~ .. ~ 1~ .. ~ ·~ ·- ·- ·~ ·~ ·~ ·~ '""" " .... H.UJ , l:lultalo (I-) , .. w .. ~ "' "' ~ "' = :,u "' ~ = ouu ,uu .~ ,uu , I HlmaK · (NI) :,uJ 
2 ·-~~ l,< 
3 l:lus""' :(Ml ... 
2 Kudu (II 4UJ 
2 I\UOU {t- LOU 
2 ~=l (MJ ,.... 
2 H~= II- , 
4 Dulke< /':, /':, {':, {':, 15 {':, {':, 15 { ':, ,s / ':, ,s /':, /':, ,s / ':, 75 75 75 
3 '"-<XU XO 
2 1vvaterbud< (M) '"" 2 !VVa!e<OUO< (I-] ""' 2 1.:>aDl81Ml ·~ 
2 i=(F-J bU 
2 vv 1n---.i 400 
2 lsessebe ~ 
3 ,1.maia(M) 75 'JL'J = 52':J ~5 ~':, 52':J ~':, """ "''° """ ~5 525 """ ~5 525 525 525 525 3 "~"- It-I 'JU ... ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ = = ~ ~ = . .. . 
3 11rrpa,a (culQ u 
4 tKIIN'.nnnner ""' 4 ::;1~- / ':, 
4 "= { ':, l'J {':, /':, {':, ,, / ':, { ':, /':, /':, / ':, /':, 7'J / ':, / ':, '" 75 75 75 1 ,on(~ , ~ 
1 ,on (F- lSI 
1 L""""' 200'.l 
5 Wildcat 50 
5 IServal 75 
5 !Genet 50 
5 ,.,et {':, 
5 Hyaena 1()() 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
5 I Jackal 25 
5 Bat-eared Fox 75 
5 PorCU'llne 25 
5 """""" 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 , ~rocodlle \w, 
5 IGumea t-O\N1 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
5 lt-ranoolm :J 12 12 1~ 1., 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
5 Pioeon1• -- 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
5 Sarw10rovse 1 
5 Duel< o 
s1NGtE::rnoP1ES .,' · ·· 
........ .... ·.·: .. , .. :.,::::· ,:,:,::::, .. ·,:: :' :· .. :·: ... , ··: .·., : '.·'. 
1 Eleonant !Ml 7500 7500 7500 7500 75ro 
1 Eleohan1 1F1 2500 
1 Leora bUJ bUJ bUJ 
1 Hnnrr>ntamus 1500 1500 1500 1500 1500 , Wart~ 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Buffalo !Ml lCXXl 
2 Nvala 1200 1200 1200 1200 
1 l:lushbud< !Ml XO XO XO 300 
3 Kudu (Ml 400 
3 Wateroud< fMl 700 700 700 700 700 700 
2 lrmala(M) 75 
3 1~ .. CFl 50 
3 Lion !Ml 2500 2500 2500 2500 
2 L""""'d 200'.l 200'.l 200'.l 200'.l 
F-INDEXVALUE. TOTAL 7,359 4,659 10 15, 2559 3,259 2,559 1085, 8,35! 1425! 5,159 4,159 11259 
CODE 1 3,60C 1,60C 9,CXXl 1,500 1,SC( 1,SC( 9,CXXl 1,SC( 10,60( 1,500 3,CXXl 9.400 
CODE2 2,CXXl 2,CXXl o o o o o 3.20C o o 0 0 
CODE3 1,525 825 925 825 1,52! 825 1,625 3,32! 3,325 3,325 825 1,525 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
CODES 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 184 184 184 184 184 
L-INDEX VALUE. TOTAL 265, 2.65! 705S 425S 2,659 2,659 
CODE 1 1,60( 1,SC( 4,00C 1,90C 1,500 1,500 
CODE2 o o , .20C , .20C o 0 
CODE3 825 925 1,52! 825 825 825 
COOE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 
CODES 84 84 184 184 184 184 
l~X.VALUI,{ .::,,., .. .GRANO TOTA. 7:36!' :ii Bi. ::10,w; ,:z.s.,i :3:~$!c :2·!',.'14' 'l(l(R"' ::2,65!' ::2'6.'i, '::i!::351' :·7Ji51 ::'i:4;25! ='4,25! 12.659 5)$ (159 ·2:659 .· 11,259: 
CODE 1 3,60( 1,60C 9,CXXl 1,SO: 1,500 1,500 9,CXXl 1,60C 1,SC( ,.so: 4,00: 10,60( 1,90: 1,500 1,500 3,CXXJ 1,500 9,400 
CODE2 2,00C 2,00C o o o o o o o 3,20C 1,20( 0 1,20'. 0 o o o 0 
CODE3 1,525 825 925 825 1,525 825 1,625 825 925 3,32! 1,52! 3,325 825 825 3,325 825 825 1,525 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 
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SAPI SAFARI AREA: 
YEAR: 1991 
TROPHY FEE TYPE: FOREGN 
J><,j ·=· ·= DATE from: 1.5 14.5 27.5 9.6 22.6 5.7 18.7 31 .7 13.8 26.8 8.9 21.9 SAPI SAPI SAPI 
DATE to: 10.5 23.5 5.6 18.6 1.7 14.7 27.7 9.8 22.8 4.9 17.9 30.9 
SPECIES BLNER IF°'eian/1.ocall : L L L F L F F F F L L F 
INDEX HUNT NO. S19 S20 S21 S22 S23 S24 S25 S26 S27 S28 S29 S30 INDEX INDEX INDEX 
CODE CAMP CH-F CH-F CH·f CH-I CH-F CH·I CH-F CH-F CH-F CH-I CH-I CH-I VALUE VALUE VALUE 
Martin SPECIES TROPHY FEE HUNT TROPHY TOTAL 
EiePhant Ml 7500 0 0 
1 - .-:•laflt (~) L:iu.J 0 0 
1 ~·~ ant11-t11 llI U 0 u 
2 ceora 0 u 
1 "'""""""amus l ""-J 0 0 
3 Hus,- lUU 0 u 
3 1vvart110Q 100 100 JUU 
1 tt:i1rane luuu 0 0 
Km>"l (Ml ,, .. , ll ••• 11 111 111 1111 11111 1uuu 1( 111 11111 lUUU 11111 11111 11111 ~ .uuu JU ,LII 
Huttalo (I-) ]{ .. , .., ..,. 11 .. ."III ]{ .. , SIT Tl!, ,~.·· 
1 H1 /f1a1Q IN I) ouu 0 0 
2 1;,{IJ n 0 
3 Hus no .!Ml 0 u 
2 Kudu M MYl 2,•• ~.-
2 11\UdU ~· ;,:,u 0 0 
2 lt:JanC [~ll 0 u 
2 H,oM[I- 500 n 0 
4 Uulker 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 2 ,? Sl 2,250 
3 ... _,.,.,,.., 0 u 
2 vvat- •"'<!Ml /UU 0 0 
2 vvat- •"'<11-1 : 0 ... 1 0 u 
2 """"' (Ml 0 u 2 , -, .. 11-1 hlU n 0 
2 -vv 1~ - .tm 0 0 
2 Tses"""" a u 
3 1n-n,,e, !Ml 75 15,rou 1~. •ou 
3 ·~~rH 50 :,,.u :u 1 c Q 
3 1rrpaia I cum 0 0 0 
4 1<.11osonnoer LUU 0 u 
4 ::;t- * 75 n 0 
4 ,~ 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 ~ 75 '.Y?'il' 2:,,.. 
1 JOn(M 0 u 
1 _IOll(I- 1,.u 0 0 
1 0 
5 Wildcat 50 0 
5 I~ u 
5 Genet 50 0 
5 ""et 75 0 
5 HV_,.. 100 
5 Jackal 25 n 0 
5 Hat-eared Fox 75 0 0 
5 orn-ne 25 0 0 
5 "aoooo 10 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 1 'A 1 A 
1 ~mr.n<i,,e 1= 0 0 
5 Guinea P-no.M 5 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
.,., 
"' 600 hU 
5 ranmhn 3 12 12 12 f2 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 ""' 360 
5 PioeoM"""' 1 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 t2 360 360 
5 ~rvinrouse 1 0 0 
5 0 0 0 
SINGlli t'ROf.'IES:\/:::::•: :;:::;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;:;;\f//:\::::::=:··:·:···· 
Eleohant !Ml 7500 ~ .000 
Eleohant !Fl 2500 0 
Slil "' ? ,.tm H.........,...amus 1500 6000 
1 Wannoo 100 100 100 100 100 1 000 
2 IButtalo tMl 1000 0 
2 Nvala 1200 1200 4800 
1 Hushbucl< IMI 300 300 1200 
3 Kudu tMl 400 0 
3 Watemuck IMI 700 3 500 
2 1~ 1a Ml 75 0 
3 l=»•IFl 50 0 
3 Lion IMI 2500 2500 10000 
2 L""""•d 200) 200) 8000 
F-INDEX VALUE: TOTAL 2""' 8,15l 3,""' 3""' 3/"" 3,05' :CC•:d 07;962' 
CODE 1 1,50C 2,20C 2,00: 1,50: 2,00: 1,6CX ~;~ 
CODE2 400 2,40C 0 400 0 400 )/ Wi!m 
CODE3 825 3.~ 825 925 825 825 ::::: ?'?,~ 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 :}}:;!).® 
CODES 84 84 84 84 84 84 :::::::::::::::2-01:1 
L-INDEX VALUE: TOTAL 3059 295<: 30<.e 4 ~"" 2 ""' 3""' /,\4Z'MQ':c 
CODE 1 2,00: 1,SOC 2,700 2,40C 1,50C 2,00: 
ill CODE2 0 400 0 1,20C 400 0 CODE3 825 825 925 825 825 825 COOE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 CODES 84 84 84 84 84 84 
'1liiOEX:\iiiWE: :cc •' •:/ efiANb:TOTA :ilist •'2'""" ·'traw "''°"" :4;;,;;; ~;';$~ t M< gm \l'""' :,it;;;;;: ••!ij•nr.. ) j;,w :::::::· :::::::i50470: 
CODE 1 2.00: 1,SOC 2,700 1,50C 2.40C 2.2(X; 2,00: 1,50C 2,00: 1,50C 2.00: 1,60C ··~,¢.:)· 
COOE 2 0 400 0 400 1,20C 2,40C 0 400 0 400 0 400 J~® 
CODE 3 825 825 925 825 825 3.~ 825 925 825 825 ,825 825 ~150 
CODE4 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 150 ......... ) !(@ 
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Appendix 10 Calculation of hunter days for licensing system alternatives 
Hunting area No. Hunts No. Hunters Total No. Days per Total Hunter 
per season per Hunt Hunters Hunt days 
planned planned 
Charara 40 2 80 6 480 
Makuti 60 2 120 6 720 
Tuli 26 4 104 11 1'144 
Dom a 10 4 40 12 480 
Rita 39 4 156 11 1'716 
Dandawa 30 2 60 8 480 
Nyakasanga 18 2 36 14 504 
24 2 48 10 480 
Total Nyakasanga 42 84 984 
Sapi 18 2 36 14 504 
12 2 24 10 240 
Total Sapi 30 60 744 
C/M Safari Operator 5 2 10 21 210 
5 2 10 15 150 
10 2 20 5 100 
Total Safari Operator 20 40 460 
Source: DNPWLM licensing office, Harare. 
Appendix 11 Calculation of visitor days for licensing system alternatives 
Hunting Area No. Hunters No. Visitors No. Visitors No. Hunt Total Visitor 
per hunting per Hunter per season days spent Days 
season 
Charara 80 1.0 80 3 240 
Makuti 120 1.0 120 3 360 
Tuli 104 3.0 312 5.5 1'716 
Doma 40 3.0 120 6 720 
Rita 156 3.6 562 5.5 3'089 
Dandawa 60 1.0 60 4 240 
Nyakasanga 36 2.8 100 7 700 
48 2.8 134 5 672 
Total Nyakasanga 84 235 1'372 
Sapi 36 3.0 108 7 756 
24 3.0 72 5 360 
Total Sapi 60 90 1'116 
C/M Safari Operator 10 1.0 10 10.5 105 
10 1.0 10 7.5 75 
20 1.0 20 7.5 50 
Total Safari Operator 40 40 230 
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Appendix 12 Calculation of visitor:hunter ratios for selected licensing systems 
Hunting area No. Visitors per season Average No. Hunters Average 
1988 1989 1990 
visitors per season visitors per 
1988-1990 Hunter 
Makuti 71 46 160 92 100 1.0 
Rita 496 715 489 567 156 3.6 
Nyakasanga 483 484 240 402 144 2.8 
Sapi 195 262 293 250 84 3.0 
Assumptions made for: 
Charara 1.0 
Dom a 3.0 
Tuli 3.0 
Dandawa 1.0 
C/M Safari Operator 1.0 
Source: Zimbabwe Government (1988, 1989a, and 1990a). 
Appendix 13 Calculation of pupil days for Z~A school education facilities 
Education Facility No. Education No. Pupils No. Education Days No. Pupil Education 
(ZHA branch) Camps per year per Camp per Camp Days per year 
Doma hunting area 10 25 6 1'500 (Lomagundi branch) 
Rita hunting area 
9 30 6 1'620 
(Mashonaland branch) 
Source: Rifa: Grobbelaar, Mashonaland licensing office, Harare; Doma: Thomas, Lomagundi licensing office, 
Mhangura. 
Appendix 14 Calculation of hunting revenue for DNPWLM lottery system in 
Charara/Makuti 
I in z$ I Charara I Makuti I Charara/Makuti I 
Revenue from Hunts 56'482 72'085 128'567 
Revenue from Tickets 17'224 25'836 43'060 
Hunting Revenue 73'706 97'921 171 '627 
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Appendix 15.2 Venison hunts: Ciskei Safaris: 1992 
SOlJTH AFRICAN VENISON rd TROPHY HUNTNG 
Allocalion and Vai.Je ol Oucl• 
CISKEI SAFARIS (PlY) LTD 
YEAR: 1992 
Valu.nRands Ex~Aale: lZRand-1 .84132$ 
1 DAY HUNT 
SPECIES TROPHY FEE QUOTA VALUE QUOTA VALUE QUOTA 
No. 
VALUE QUOTA (M VALUE (M) QUOTA (F) VALUE (F) 
No. No. 
BlackWi~t !Fl 475 0 0 
Black Wi~t !Ml 510 0 0 
Blesbuck !Fl 255 0 0 
Ble&buck !Ml 275 0 0 
Falow Deer IF\ 230 0 0 
Falow Deer lMl 275 0 0 
1~1o_lF) 230 0 0 
lrrn:u:oCMl 250 0 0 
Kudu !Fl 610 0 0 
Kudu CMl 950 0 0 
Mountain Re.bJck IF\ 110 0 110 
Mountain Re.bJck !Ml 140 0 0 
Red Hart«- IF) 500 0 0 
Red Hart9beeol {Ml 610 0 0 
c:.v;..,,..;,i.d< !Fl 90 2 180 3 270 
!Ml 125 0 1 125 
SPECIES Noa. I VALUE Rando 180 3 505 











0 1 950 
2 220 2 220 • 
140 140 
0 0 
0 1 610 
3 270 3 270 
125 1 125 





















I V IAl t1lJN I VALUt'.: Jl"I t1Aflnll ~ l':>O l .11 .&.c.:::JL ~ .l'V'II.I 
m.rA1;;;i:urtVAlUEt!\=a.:::::::::,:,:,,,:,:,:,:::::::::::::::::,:,::: ::::::::::::::,::::::::::::::::::::::::t=• ::::::::::::::,:,,,:,:,:::::::::::::::::::::J,~ .:::::::,:,:::::,:,:,:,:::::::::::::::::'='=:S ,::'//:::}:::::::,:,:,:::::/::,::;,;::::1-a :::},/::::,::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::;;~m 
NOTES Al_. ol ~ (f-1.....,.,.. are ol--,., hunting quality. AJ 11*=-ol mole (M) .....,.,.. are ol trophy hunting qumily. 
Al pricm incbw V.A. T. 
A rrexirrum of 4 hunters __..ed - "· ..,.;_ ......_ and hunt. 
DA TA SOURCE Ian Wimol, C.Mi San {Ply) Lid, PO ~ 1424, ~own 5320, "°""' Alrica. 
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Appendix 17 Maps used 
at Scale of 1: l '000'000 
(Land Classification) 
at Scale of 1 :250'000 
(Topographical) 













1st Edition 1979 
SD-35-16 3rd Edition 1983 
SE-35-4 3rd Edition 1983 
1628 B4 2nd Edition 1977 
1628 02 2nd Edition 1978 
1628 04 2nd Edition 1977 
1629 A3 2nd Edition 1977 
1629 A4 2nd Edition 1978 
1629 Cl 2nd Edition 1978 
1629 C2 2nd Edition 1978 
1629 C3 2nd Edition 1978 
Appendix 18 Estimated costs of 10-day hunt in Rifa for Citizen Hunters 
a) Transport: At least ·one 4-wheel drive vehicle and one h avy duty truck. Distance from 
Harare to Rifa is 350km one-way. 
Truck costed at Z$4/km for a 700km return trip = 
4-Wheel drive costed at Z$2/km for a 700km return trip = 
In the hunting area itself, 300km costed at Z$2/km = 





b) Camping Equipment: If basics are hired from a company (Rooney' s), the expected cost 
is Z$500 for the period. In addition, hunters need to borrow mobile water pumps, a deep 
freeze or fridge and lighting equipment. 
c) Food and Drink: An average of 3 hunters plus 6 guests costed at Z$40 per person/day 
for the 10-day period = Z$ 3'600 
Labourers for camp duties are costed at Z$20 per person/day Z$ 800 
Total Food and Drink Cost Z$ 4' 400 
d) Ammunition and Weapons: Hunters will normally own their own weapons which cost 
significantly more to purchase, than hiring them from the ZHA. On average the required 
weapons are worth: Heavy calibre rifle Z$ 8'000; Medium calibre rifle Z$ 6'000; Shotgun 
Z$ 4000. Their ammunition is also expensive: Heavy calibre ammunition Z$30/round; 
Medium calibre ammunition Z$ 10/round and Shotgun ammunition Z$5/round. 
Costs for ammunition and weapon hire are included here as minimum recurrent costs that 
could be expected: 
. Hire of rifle (0.375 calibre) for 10-day period = 
20 round of ammunition 




e) Total (Minimum) Hunting-Trip Costs: Total estimated costs [totals of points a) to d)] 
for a 10-day hunting trip are: Z$ 11 '050 











Appendix 19 Alll 
Appendix 19 Probability and time waited (draw sequence) for winning in a lottery1 
"The higher the ticket holding of a person, the more likely he will, on average, be drawn 
earlier on in the procedure than the person holding fewer tickets." 
The following is true: 
The average amount of time waited for by an individual who has a high probability of being 
selected is very much less than the average amount of time waited for by an individual witfl 
a low probability for success. 
There exists a relationship between the time waited (draw sequence) and the draw 
probability: 
The average amount of draws that a person would wait for (time) if all other persons were 
to get more than one hunt each - representing the longest time the person waits - is described 
by the formula for the mean of a geometric distribution (Underhill, 1987: 219-221): 






the number of draws that a person has to win; 
(l - p), or the remaining probability; 
tbe probability of winning. 
Because, for the DNPWLM lottery system hunters are only allowed to win one hunt each, 
r = 1 for our example, and the general formula becomes: 
Time = .9. 
p 
Therefore, the time waited by each person to win a single hunt decreases in comparison to 
the above general formula. 
Example of a likely event occurring: 
An applicant with 99% (99 tickets) probability of winning a hunt in the Charara/Makuti study 
area has to wait (1 - 0.99)/0.99 amount of time, or 0.01/0.99 which equals 0.01 units (a small 
number divided by a large number), or a very short time indeed. Conclusion: A person with 
a large probability of wmning barely waits at all until he wins a hunt. 
Counter example: 
An applicant ~ith 9% (1 ticket) probability of winning a hunt in the Charara/Makuti study 
area has to wait 
(1 - 0.09)/0.09 amount of time, or 0.91/0.09 which equals 10.1 units (a large number divided 
by a small number), or a very long amount of time indeed. Conclusion: A person with a 
small probability of winning will wait an extremely long time until he wins a hunt. 
Example of an unlikely event occurring: 
Were there to be a person with a small probability (eg. 9%) of winning a hunt being drawn 
at the first draw (a very unlikely event to occur), then the next draw would favour the major 
ticket holder slightly better than all other ticket holders remaining to be drawn. General 
conclusion for relationship between draw sequence and draw probability: All persons 
with large probabilities of winning a hunt will, on average, be drawn earlier than persons who 
have smalfer probabilities of winning. 
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